In the van der Leer case*,
_______________
* Note by the Registrar: The case is
numbered 12/1988/156/210.
The first number is the case's position on
the list of cases referred
to the Court in the relevant year (second
number). The last two
numbers indicate the case's position on
the list of cases referred to
the Court since its creation and on the
list of the corresponding
originating applications to the
Commission.
_______________
The European Court of Human Rights,
sitting, in accordance with
Article 43 (art. 43) of the Convention for
the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms ("the
Convention") and the relevant
provisions of the Rules of Court, as a
Chamber composed of the
following judges:
Mr R. Ryssdal, President,
Mr J. Cremona,
Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr J. De Meyer,
Mr J.A. Carrillo Salcedo,
Mr N. Valticos,
Mr S.K. Martens,
and also of Mr M.-A. Eissen, Registrar,
and Mr H. Petzold, Deputy
Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 27
September 1989 and
22 January 1990,
Delivers the following judgment, which was
adopted on the
last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
1. The case was referred to the Court
by the European Commission
of Human Rights ("the
Commission") on 13 September 1988, within the
three-month period laid down by Article 32
§ 1 and Article 47
(art. 32-1, art. 47) of the Convention.
It originated in an
application (no. 11509/85) against the
Kingdom of the Netherlands
lodged with the Commission under Article
25 (art. 25) by a national
of that State, Mrs Hendrika Wilhelmina van
der Leer, in May 1984.
The Commission's request referred to
Articles 44 and 48 (art. 44,
art. 48) and to the declaration whereby
the Netherlands recognised the
compulsory jurisdiction of the Court
(Article 46) (art. 46). The
object of the request was to obtain a
decision as to whether or not
the facts of the case disclosed a breach
by the respondent State of
its obligations under Article 5 §§ 1, 2
and 4 and Article 6 § 1
(art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-4, art. 6-1).
2. In response to the enquiry made in
accordance with
Rule 33 § 3 (d) of the Rules of Court, the
applicant stated that she
wished to take part in the proceedings and
designated the lawyer who
would represent her (Rule 30).
3. The Chamber to be constituted
included ex officio
Mr S.K. Martens, the elected judge of
Netherlands nationality
(Article 43 of the Convention) (art. 43),
and Mr R. Ryssdal, the
President of the Court (Rule 21 § 3 (b)).
On 29 September 1988, in
the presence of the Registrar, the
President drew by lot the names of
the other five members, namely Mr J.
Cremona, Mr A. Spielmann,
Mr J. De Meyer, Mr J. A. Carrillo Salcedo
and Mr N. Valticos
(Article 43 in fine of the Convention and
Rule 21 § 4) (art. 43).
4. Mr Ryssdal assumed the office of
President of the Chamber
(Rule 21 § 5) and, through the Registrar,
consulted the Agent of the
Netherlands Government ("the
Government"), the Delegate of the
Commission and the applicant's
representative on the need for a
written procedure (Rule 37 § 1). The
proceedings were initially
suspended while negotiations for a
friendly settlement took place
between the Government and the applicant,
but on 30 January 1989 the
Agent of the Government informed the
Registrar of their failure.
Thereafter, in accordance with the orders
and directions of the
President, the registry received the
Government's memorial on
26 April. The applicant's observations,
which concerned only her
claims under Article 50 (art. 50), were
submitted on
20 September 1989. On 6 July the
Secretary to the Commission had
advised the Registrar that the Delegate
would make his submissions at
the hearing.
5. On different dates between 6 July
and 24 October 1989, the
Commission, the Government and the applicant
each produced various
documents which, on the Court's
instructions, the Registrar had
requested. On 24 October 1984 the
Government, in addition, submitted
their observations on the applicant's
claims under Article 50
(art. 50).
6. After consulting, through the
Registrar, those who would be
appearing before the Court, the President
directed on 7 July 1989 that
the oral proceedings should open on 26
September (Rule 38).
7. The hearing took place in public
in the Human Rights Building,
Strasbourg, on the appointed day. The
Court had held a preparatory
meeting immediately beforehand.
There appeared before the Court:
(a) for the Government
Miss D.S. van Heukelom, Assistant
Legal Adviser,
Ministry of Foreign Affairs,
Agent,
Mr J.C. De Wijkerslooth de
Weerdesteijn,
Landsadvokaat, Counsel,
Mrs R.E. van Galen-Herrmann, Ministry
of Justice, Adviser;
(b) for the Commission
Mr H. Danelius,
Delegate;
(c) for the applicant
Mrs G.E.M. Later, advokate en
procureur, Counsel,
Mr W.J.J. Los,
Mr J.
Legemaate, Advisers.
The Court heard addresses by Miss van
Heukelom and Mr De Wijkerslooth
de Weerdesteijn for the Government, by Mr
Danelius for the Commission
and by Mrs Later for the applicant.
AS TO THE FACTS
I. Particular circumstances of the
case
8. Mrs Hendrika Wilhelmina van der
Leer is a Netherlands
national. She currently resides in The
Hague.
9. On 28 September 1983 the
Burgomaster of The Hague ordered
Mrs van der Leer's confinement in a local
psychiatric hospital. She
had already been committed on a number of
previous occasions.
Following a decision of 3 October 1983 by
the President of the
District Court (Arrondissementsrechtbank)
refusing to extend her
confinement, she nevertheless remained in
the hospital on a voluntary
basis.
On 18 November 1983, on her husband's
application, the Cantonal Court
judge (Kantonrechter) of The Hague
authorised Mrs van der Leer's
compulsory confinement in the same
hospital for a period of six
months. The application was supported by
a medical declaration by a
psychiatrist, who had examined her on 16
November 1983. In this
declaration, the psychiatrist answered in
the negative the question
whether it would be devoid of purpose or
medically inadvisable for
Mrs van der Leer to be heard by a judge.
The Cantonal Court judge did not hold any
hearings, with the result
that no record was drawn up. His order
stated that the medical
declaration sufficiently indicated the
necessity of committing the
applicant to a psychiatric hospital. The
pre-printed statement, on
the standard-form order, that a hearing
had been dispensed with
because it would have been devoid of
purpose or medically inadvisable
had been deleted.
Mrs van der Leer was not informed of the
confinement order, nor did
she receive a copy of the written
decision.
10. On 28 November 1983, after she had
been placed in isolation,
she became aware that her confinement was
compulsory and immediately
contacted her lawyer. On 6 December the
lawyer requested the Board of
the hospital to discharge her. The
request was refused by the Board
on 15 December, on the basis of the
unfavourable opinion of the
medical director of the hospital. The
request was then forwarded on
20 December 1983, to the public prosecutor
(Officier van Justitie)
who, on 6 February 1984, referred it to
the District Court of The
Hague.
11. The District Court held hearings
on 5 March, 16 April
and 7 May 1984. On each occasion Mrs van
der Leer was represented by
her counsel. On 26 March 1984 the
District Court stated that it wished
to hear the doctor who was treating the
applicant and ordered that he
appear and that the hospital's medical
reports be produced. This
interlocutory decision was, however, not
complied with, either at the
hearing on 16 April or at that on 7 May
1984. On the latter occasion,
in the absence of evidence that, as a
result of her mental illness,
Mrs van der Leer represented a danger, the
court ordered her
discharge.
12. However, Mrs van der Leer, with
the help of her husband, had
already left the hospital without
authorisation on 31 January 1984.
She had been granted probationary leave by
the hospital as from
7 February, but only learned of this
indirectly during the course of
March.
II. Relevant domestic law and practice
13. The confinement of persons of
unsound mind in the Netherlands
is governed by the Act of 27 April 1884 on
State Supervision of
Mentally Ill Persons, commonly known as
the Mentally Ill Persons Act
(Krankzinnigenwet).
A. Emergency committal procedure
14. If it is a matter of urgency, the
burgomaster is empowered to
order the compulsory admission of a
"mentally ill" person to a
psychiatric hospital. Under section 35
(c) of the Act, he must first
seek the opinion of a psychiatrist, or,
where this proves impossible,
another medical practitioner. Once he has
ordered a committal, he
must inform the public prosecutor and
transmit to him the medical
declaration on which he has relied. The
public prosecutor has then to
communicate it, not later than the
following day, to the President of
the District Court, requesting, where
appropriate, the continuation of
the confinement. The President must give
his decision within three
days. If he refuses to order the
continuation of the confinement, it
must cease forthwith.
B. Issue of an order authorising provisional
confinement
15. Section 12 of the Act enables,
amongst others, the spouse of a
mentally ill person to apply in writing to
the local cantonal court
judge for an authorisation to have that
person placed temporarily in a
mental hospital in the interests of public
safety or of the person
concerned.
Section 16 of the Act requires that such
an application be accompanied
by a reasoned medical declaration by a
qualified doctor who has
specialised in mental and nervous
disorders. This declaration must be
to the effect that the patient is mentally
ill and that treatment in a
mental hospital is necessary or
desirable. The statement should also
indicate in so far as possible whether or
not, in view of the
patient's condition, it would be devoid of
purpose or medically
inadvisable for the judge to hear the
patient.
16. The judge will issue the requested
order authorising
provisional detention if the medical
declaration, either on its own or
in conjunction with the facts related or
the documents submitted,
adequately establishes that treatment in a
psychiatric hospital is
"necessary or desirable"
(section 17 § 1 of the Act). The Supreme
Court (Hoge Raad) of the Netherlands has
interpreted this expression
as meaning that the patient must represent
a danger to himself, to
others or to the general public order, to
such an extent that it is
necessary or desirable that he be treated
in a psychiatric clinic
(judgment of 4 November 1983, Nederlandse
Jurisprudentie (NJ) 1984,
no. 162).
The judge is obliged to hear the person
whose confinement is sought
unless he concludes from the medical
declaration that this would be
devoid of purpose or medically inadvisable
(section 17 § 3). The
Supreme Court has held that a decision not
to hear the patient must be
supported by reasons (judgment of 27
November 1981, NJ 1983, no. 56).
The judge must, "so far as
possible", seek information from, amongst
others, the person who made the
application for confinement and the
spouse of the patient (section 17 § 4).
By virtue of article 72 of Regulation I
(Reglement I) made in
pursuance of the Judiciary (Organisation)
Act (wet op de rechterlijke
organisatie), a registrar must be present
at "the hearings and
examinations" conducted by the judge
("terechtzittingen en verhoren").
The confinement order may not be appealed
against and is not notified
to the person concerned (section 17 §§ 1
and 8); its renewal must be
sought within six months of the day on
which it was made (section 22).
C. Discharge of the patient
17. By virtue of section 29 of the
Act, the patient may petition
the Board of the hospital for his release
at any time. The Board must
immediately consult the medical director
of the institution. If the
doctor's opinion is unfavourable, the
Board has to transmit the
request, together with the opinion, to the
public prosecutor who, in
general, will forward the request to the
District Court for decision.
18. As regards the procedure, section
29 refers to section 23,
according to which the District Court is
empowered, but not bound, to
hear the patient. In a judgment of 2
December 1983 (NJ 1984,
no. 164), however, the Supreme Court held
that, in the light of
Article 5 (art. 5) of the Convention,
these provisions should be
interpreted as conferring on the patient
detained the right to be
heard and to adduce any evidence which
might help to secure his
release. This entailed not only the right
to be assisted by a lawyer,
but also the right to demand the presence
of an expert to counter the
arguments of the hospital board.
PROCEEDINGS BEFORE THE COMMISSION
19. In her application (no. 11509/85)
lodged with the Commission
on 18 May 1984, Mrs van der Leer alleged
that her compulsory
confinement in a psychiatric hospital had
been neither ordered "in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law" nor "lawful" within the
meaning of Article 5 § 1 (art. 5-1) of the
Convention. She further
complained that paragraphs 2 and 4 of
Article 5 (art. 5-2, art. 5-4)
had been violated since she had not been
informed of the order of
18 November 1983 or given the possibility
of having the lawfulness of
her deprivation of liberty reviewed
"speedily" by a court. Finally,
she claimed that, in breach of Article 6 §
1 (art. 6-1), she had been
denied a fair hearing in the determination
of her civil rights and
obligations.
20. The Commission declared the
application admissible on
16 July 1986.
In its report adopted on 14 July 1988
(Article 31) (art. 31),
the Commission expressed the unanimous
opinion that there had been a
violation of Article 5 §§ 1, 2 and 4 (art.
5-1, art. 5-2, art. 5-4),
but no violation of Article 6 § 1 (art.
6-1). The full text of its
opinion and of the separate opinion
accompanying it is reproduced as
an annex to this judgment.*
_______________
* Note by the Registrar. For practical
reasons this annex will appear
only with the printed version of the
judgment (volume 170 of Series A of
the Publications of the Court), but a copy
of the Commission's report is
obtainable from the registry.
_______________
AS TO THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 1
(art. 5-1)
21. The applicant claimed to be the
victim of a violation of
Article 5 § 1 (art. 5-1), which, in so far
as is relevant to the
present case, provides as follows:
"Everyone has the right to liberty
and security of person. No-one
shall be deprived of his liberty save in
the following cases and in
accordance with a procedure prescribed by
law:
...
(e) the lawful detention ... of persons
of unsound mind ...;
..."
She alleged that the order authorising her
confinement in a
psychiatric hospital had not been issued
in accordance with a
procedure prescribed by law, which had
rendered her detention
unlawful.
In the first place and above all, the
Cantonal Court judge had not
heard Mrs van der Leer prior to making the
order, although under
section 17 (3) of the Mentally Ill Persons
Act he was bound to do so,
since the psychiatrist had not raised any
objection to such a hearing
(see paragraph 9 above).
In addition, she submitted that the order
in question had not complied
with the conditions to which, according to
the Netherlands Supreme
Court and the European Court of Human
Rights, the validity of such a
measure was subject. It did not appear
that the judge had established
that the person concerned was a danger to
herself, to others or to the
general public order. The applicant
questioned whether the
psychiatrist's attestation amounted to an
expert report which was
sufficiently objective to support the
conclusion that she was of
unsound mind within the meaning of Article
5 § 1 (e) (art. 5-1-e)
of the Convention.
She considered further that the Cantonal
Court judge ought also to
have heard her husband (section 17 § 4 of
the Mentally Ill Persons
Act), or at least, should have stated why
he had not done so.
Finally she alleged failure to comply with
Article 72 of Regulation I
made in pursuance of the Judiciary
(Organisation) Act, which requires
the presence of a registrar at the
hearings and examinations conducted
by the judge (see paragraph 16 above).
22. In the Court's view, the main
issue to be determined in the
present case is whether the disputed
detention was "lawful", including
whether it complied with "a procedure
prescribed by law". The
Convention here refers back essentially to
national law and lays down
the obligation to conform to the
substantive and procedural rules
thereof, but it requires in addition that
any deprivation of liberty
should be consistent with the purpose of
Article 5 (art. 5), namely
to protect individuals from arbitrariness
(see, in particular, the
Winterwerp judgment of 24 October 1979,
Series A no. 33, pp. 17-18 and
19-20, §§ 39 and 45; the Bozano judgment
of 18 December 1986,
Series A no. 111, p. 23, § 54; and the
Bouamar judgment
of 29 February 1988, Series A no. 129, p.
20, § 47).
23. Notwithstanding the requirements
of the Mentally Ill Persons
Act, the Cantonal Court judge failed to
hear Mrs van der Leer before
authorising her confinement, although the
legal conditions under which
such a hearing might be dispensed with
were not satisfied. At the
very least he should have stated, in his
decision, the reasons which
led him to depart from the psychiatrist's
opinion in this respect.
The Government accepted this.
There has therefore been a violation of
Article 5 § 1 (art. 5-1)
in this regard.
24. Having found a failure to comply
with an essential procedural
requirement on this ground, the Court does
not consider it necessary
to examine the other complaints put
forward by the applicant under
Article 5 § 1 (art. 5-1).
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 2
(art. 5-2)
25. The applicant complained of a
violation of Article 5 § 2
(art. 5-2) which provides as follows:
"Everyone who is arrested shall be
informed promptly, in a language
which he understands, of the reasons for
his arrest and of any charge
against him."
In her submission, this provision entitled
her to be informed
immediately of the order authorising her
confinement. In fact she
found out about it only by accident, when
she was placed in isolation.
26. The Government conceded that Mrs
van der Leer should have been
informed promptly, but they contended that
this resulted from
paragraph 4 (art. 5-4). They argued that
paragraph 2 (art. 5-2), on
the other hand, did not apply to the case
in question because the
words "arrest" and
"charge" showed that it was only relevant to cases
arising under the criminal law. The
presence of the conjunction "and"
confirmed this.
27. The Court is not unmindful of the
criminal-law connotation of
the words used in Article 5 § 2 (art.
5-2). However, it agrees with the
Commission that they should be interpreted
"autonomously", in
particular in accordance with the aim and
purpose of Article 5
(art. 5), which are to protect everyone
from arbitrary deprivations of
liberty. Thus the "arrest"
referred to in paragraph 2 of Article 5
(art. 5-2) extends beyond the realm of
criminal-law measures.
Similarly, in using the words "any
charge" ("toute accusation") in
this provision, the intention of the
drafters was not to lay down a
condition for its applicability, but to
indicate an eventuality of
which it takes account.
28. The close link between paragraphs
2 and 4 of Article 5
(art. 5-2, art. 5-4) supports this
interpretation. Any person who
is entitled to take proceedings to have
the lawfulness of his
detention decided speedily cannot make
effective use of that right
unless he is promptly and adequately
informed of the reasons why he
has been deprived of his liberty (see,
mutatis mutandis, the X v. the
United Kingdom judgment of 5 November
1981, Series A no. 46, p. 28,
§ 66).
Paragraph 4 (art. 5-4) does not make any
distinction as between
persons deprived of their liberty on the
basis of whether they have
been arrested or detained. There are
therefore no grounds for
excluding the latter from the scope of
paragraph 2 (art. 5-2).
29. Having found that Article 5 § 2
(art. 5-2) is applicable, the
Court must determine whether it has been
complied with in this case.
30. The applicant was in hospital to
receive treatment as a
"voluntary" patient. It was not
until 28 November 1983 that she
learned, when she was placed in isolation,
that she was no longer free
to leave when she wished because of an
order made ten days previously
(see paragraphs 9 and 10 above). The
Government did not contest this.
31. It therefore appears that neither
the manner in which she was
informed of the measures depriving her of
her liberty, nor the time it
took to communicate this information to
her, corresponded to the
requirements of Article 5 § 2 (art. 5-2).
In fact it was all the more
important to bring the measures in
question to her attention since she
was already in a psychiatric hospital
prior to the Cantonal Court
judge's decision, which did not change her
situation in factual terms.
Accordingly, there has been a violation of
Article 5 § 2 (art. 5-2).
III. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4
(art. 5-4)
32. The applicant complained of a
double violation of
Article 5 § 4 (art. 5-4) which provides as
follows:
"Everyone who is deprived of his
liberty by arrest or detention shall
be entitled to take proceedings by which
the lawfulness of his
detention shall be decided speedily by a
court and his release ordered
if the detention is not lawful."
She claimed in the first place to be the
victim of an infringement of
her right to be informed promptly and
adequately of the facts and the
grounds on which her detention was based
in order to be able to
institute the proceedings referred to in
this provision. Secondly,
she argued that, inasmuch as the District
Court did not deliver its
decision on the lawfulness of the
contested order until five months
after the proceedings had been instituted,
it had not decided the
question "speedily".
33. The Court would observe at the
outset that the review of
lawfulness required under Article 5 § 4
(art. 5-4) was not in this instance
incorporated in the decision depriving the
applicant of her liberty
because, before authorising the detention,
the judge had failed to
comply with one of the fundamental
procedural guarantees applying in
the field of deprivation of liberty failed
to comply (see
paragraph 23 above and the De Wilde, Ooms
and Versyp judgment
of 18 June 1971, Series A no. 12, pp.
40-41, § 76). The applicant
therefore had to be given the possibility
of instituting proceedings.
34. The Court has already determined,
in the context of
Article 5 § 2 (art. 5-2), the question of
the information which should
have been communicated to Mrs van der
Leer. It does not consider it
necessary to re-examine it in the light of
Article 5 § 4 (art. 5-4).
35. On the issue of the compliance, in
this case, with the
requirement of "speediness", it
observes that there are certain
divergences between the views of the
participants in the proceedings
as regards the method of determining the
period to be taken into
consideration. In guaranteeing to persons
arrested or detained a
right to institute proceedings, Article 5
§ 4 (art. 5-4) also
proclaims their right, following the
institution of such proceedings,
to a speedy judicial decision terminating
their deprivation of liberty
if it proves unlawful.
Neither the fact that the applicant
absconded nor even the fact that
she was granted probationary leave could
render such a decision
unnecessary. After she had left the
hospital without authorisation,
Mrs van der Leer could at any moment have
been taken back there
against her will. The leave made no
difference from her point of view.
As it was not possible to bring the hospital's
decision to her notice,
she must have remained in fear of being
compelled to return to the
establishment. Accordingly, the relevant
period runs from when the
application for release was lodged - which
step must be regarded, in
this instance, as equivalent to
instituting proceedings against the
confinement order - to the date of the
judgment ordering her release,
in other words from 6 December 1983 to 7
May 1984.
36. Consequently, the proceedings
lasted five months. In the
specific circumstances of the case, the
Court considers this lapse of
time excessive. As Mrs van der Leer
stressed in her application for
release, the judge had not heard her
before authorising her detention.
Moreover, the institution of proceedings
may have been significantly
retarded by the failure to comply with the
obligation to inform the
person concerned of the measure taken
against her. There were
therefore compelling reasons for avoiding
any dilatoriness. On the
Government's own admission, the public
prosecutor, to whom the matter
was referred on 20 December 1983, did not
transmit the file to the
District Court of The Hague until 6
February 1984 (see paragraph 10
above). In the absence of any grounds
justifying this delay, the
Court finds that there has been a violation
of Article 5 § 4
(art. 5-4).
IV. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1
(art. 6-1)
37. Before the Commission the
applicant also relied on
Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1), but at the
hearing on 26 September 1989 she
withdrew this complaint. The Court does
not consider it necessary to
examine this question of its own motion.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 50 (art.
50)
38. Under Article 50 (art. 50) of the
Convention,
"If the Court finds that a decision
or a measure taken by a legal
authority or any other authority of a High
Contracting Party is
completely or partially in conflict with
the obligations arising from
the ... Convention, and if the internal
law of the said Party allows
only partial reparation to be made for the
consequences of this
decision or measure, the decision of the
Court shall, if necessary,
afford just satisfaction to the injured
party."
39. Mrs van der Leer claimed in the
first place 10,000 Dutch
guilders in respect of pecuniary and
non-pecuniary damage. In
addition to the harm caused by her
unlawful detention, she maintained
that she had suffered not only from the
fear of being returned to the
hospital after she had absconded, but also
as a result of the court
proceedings and the memory of the
distressing circumstances of her
confinement.
40. She also sought the payment of
30,997.55 guilders in respect
of the expenses and fees of the lawyer who
represented her before the
Commission and the Court.
The Government noted that she had received
legal aid. In their view,
she had not shown that she had had to pay
her lawyer additional fees
whose reimbursement she was entitled to
request.
41. With a view to securing a friendly
settlement, the Government
had proposed to the applicant an overall
sum of 15,000 guilders
covering any damage suffered as well as
the costs incurred through her
being represented by a lawyer before the
Strasbourg organs. This
offer was repeated at the hearing.
42. In the Court's view, the applicant
must have suffered some
non-pecuniary damage. The fact that she
was not heard by the Cantonal
Court judge could have led to a feeling of
frustration, to which was
added the fear of being sent back to the
hospital during the delay
resulting from the failure to take the
relevant decision "speedily".
Making an equitable assessment in
accordance with Article 50 (art. 50),
the Court awards the applicant, in respect
of all the heads of claim,
the overall amount of 15,000 guilders.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Holds that there has been a
violation of paragraphs 1, 2 and 4
of Article 5 (art. 5-1, art. 5-2, art.
5-4);
2. Holds that it is not necessary to
consider in addition the
case under Article 6 § 1 (art. 6-1);
3. Holds that the Netherlands is to
pay to the applicant
15,000 (fifteen thousand) Dutch guilders;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English and in French, and
delivered at a public hearing in
the Human Rights Building, Strasbourg, on
21 February 1990.
Signed: Rolv RYSSDAL
President
Signed: Marc-André EISSEN
Registrar
