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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF GASHI v. CROATIA
(Application
no. 32457/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
13
December 2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Gashi v. Croatia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr C.L. Rozakis, President,
Mr L.
Loucaides,
Mrs N. Vajić,
Mr A. Kovler,
Mrs E.
Steiner,
Mr K. Hajiyev,
Mr D. Spielmann, judges,
and
Mr S. Nielsen, Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 22 November 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 32457/05) against the Republic
of Croatia lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Croatian citizen, Mr Shani Gashi (“the
applicant”), on 4 August 2005. However, the applicant died
during the proceedings. His spouse Mrs Katica Gashi expressed the
wish to proceed with the application both on her own behalf and on
behalf of her minor son, Edon Gashi.
- The
applicant was represented by Mrs E. Kapetanović, a lawyer
practising in Zagreb. The Croatian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mrs Š.
StaZnik.
- On
20 February 2007 the Court decided to communicate the complaint
concerning the applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 §
3 of the Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the
application at the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1962 and lived in Pula.
- The
applicant was an employee of a glass factory in Pula. On 20 July 1988
the factory granted the applicant and his family a flat for their use
in Pula, consisting of a kitchen, one room and a communal toilet and
measuring 30.60 square metres.
- On
3 June 1991 Parliament enacted the Protected Tenancies (Sale to
Occupier) Act (Zakon o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko
pravo), which regulated the sale of publicly-owned
flats previously let under protected tenancies, giving the right to
holders of such tenancies of publicly-owned flats to purchase them
from the provider of the flat under favourable conditions.
- Under
that Act the applicant as the buyer and the Pula Municipality as the
seller concluded a contract for the sale of the said flat on 8 May
1996. A copy of the contract was submitted for approval by the State
Attorney's Office. On 28 May 1996 approval was given.
- In
a decision of 21 September 1998 the Pula Municipal Court (Općinski
sud u Puli) recorded the applicant's ownership of the flat in the
court's land register. A copy of this decision was sent for
information to the Istra County State Attorney's Office in Pula
(DrZavno pravobraniteljstvo Istarske Zupanije u Puli).
- On
29 March 2000 the Istra County State Attorney's Office brought a
civil action against the applicant and the Pula Municipality in the
Pula Municipal Court, seeking annulment of the sale contract in
question. They argued that the applicant could not have obtained a
protected tenancy of the flat because the glass factory where he had
worked had had no right to dispose of the said flat and that such a
right had been vested in the Pula Municipality alone. The Municipal
Court accepted these arguments and in its judgment of 22 February
2001 annulled the sale contract. The judgment was upheld by the Pula
County Court (Zupanijski sud u Puli) on 15 December 2003.
The relevant parts of its judgment read as follows:
“The Boris Kidrič Glass Factory's decision of
20 July 1988, granting the first plaintiff Shani Gashi the right to
use a flat in Pula at 19 M. Oreškovićeva Street, ,
consisting of one room, a kitchen and a communal toilet, clearly and
expressly shows that the flat in question as regards its size and
equipment is to be considered an unsuitable flat (neuvjetan stan)
– provisional accommodation (nuZni smještaj).
The question whether the first plaintiff actually
acquired the flat in question as provisional accommodation cannot be
assessed separately in the proceedings at issue; instead we have to
accept the presumption that it was so, which the first plaintiff knew
or should have known, owing to which he could not acquire a protected
tenancy of the flat in question since under section 8 of the Housing
Act (Official Gazette nos. 51/1985 and 42/1986) in force at the time,
a protected tenancy could not be acquired in respect of flats and
premises used as provisional accommodation, as correctly established
by the court of first instance in the impugned judgment.
Since the main condition for sale of a flat under the
Protected Tenancy (Sale to Occupier) Act (Official Gazette nos.
43/1992, 69/1992, 25/1993, 2/1994 and 44/1994) is that the buyer is a
holder of a protected tenancy of the flat which is the subject of the
sale, the first-instance court correctly found that the contract in
question concluded between the first and the second plaintiff on 8
May 1996 was null and void under section 52 of the Obligations Act
because it had had no [legal] basis as the first plaintiff had not
been a holder of a protected tenancy of the flat.
This court likewise accepts further findings of the
first-instance court: that the first plaintiff had not acquired a
protected tenancy of the flat in question, and the glass factory ...
had had no right to dispose of the flat to give it to the first
plaintiff for his use and so that he could acquire a protected
tenancy, which he had therefore not done because, as said above, the
glass factory actually gave the flat to the first plaintiff merely as
provisional accommodation.
...
The evidence submitted does not show that the first
plaintiff acquired a protected tenancy of the flat in question or
that the flat was part of the glass factory's housing assets, or that
the Pula Municipality or the City of Pula recognised the first
plaintiff's protected tenancy of the flat ... and therefore the sale
contract in question ... is in fact null and void because it has no
[legal] basis – that is to say because the first plaintiff was
not a holder of a protected tenancy of that flat...”
- The
applicant then lodged a constitutional complaint, arguing that a
number of his constitutional rights, including his right to property,
had been infringed because the lower courts' judgments had deprived
him of his ownership of the flat in question. On 3 February 2005 the
Constitutional Court dismissed the complaint.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
relevant provisions of the Housing Act (Zakon o stambenim
odnosima, Official Gazette nos. 51/1985, 42/1986, 22/1992 and
70/1993) read as follows:
Section 8
“A protected tenancy cannot be acquired on:
1. Flats designated for temporary or provisional
accommodation...”
- The Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier) Act (Zakon
o prodaji stanova na kojima postoji stanarsko pravo, Official
Gazette no. 27/1991 with further amendments - “the Act”)
regulates the conditions of sale of flats let under protected
tenancies.
Section
1 of the Act gave the right to the holders of protected tenancies of
publicly-owned flats to purchase such flats under favourable
conditions, provided that each holder bought only one flat.
Section
21 obliged a seller to submit the sale contract for approval by the
competent State Attorney's Office within eight days.
- The
relevant part of the Obligations Act (Zakon o obveznim odnosima,
Official Gazette, nos. 53/91, 73/91, 3/94, 7/96 and 112/99), as then
in force, read:
III [LEGAL] BASIS
Permissible [legal] basis
Section 51
“(1) Each contractual obligation shall have a
permissible [legal] basis [causa].
(2)The basis is not permissible if it contravenes the
Constitution, peremptory norms or morals.
...”
Null and void contract on the ground of its [legal]
basis
Section 52
“Where there is no [legal] basis or where it is
not permissible, the contract is null and void.”
Unlimited right to plead nullity
Section 110
“The right to plead nullity shall be
inextinguishable.”
- The
relevant parts of the State Attorney's Office Act (Zakon o
drZavnom odvjetništvu, Official Gazette no. 75/1995) read:
Section 24
“...
... the competent State Attorney's Office shall ... seek
the annulment of a contract ... which contravenes peremptory norms.”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1 TO THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that he had been deprived of his property in
violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention. Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
- The
Government contested these submissions.
A. Admissibility
1. Compatibility ratione
temporis
- The
Government requested the Court to declare the application
inadmissible as being incompatible ratione temporis with the
provisions of the Convention. They argued in this connection that the
proceedings before the national courts had concerned exclusively the
facts related to a period prior to the date on which the Convention
had come into force in respect of the respondent State.
- The
applicant disagreed with the Government's objection.
- The
Court notes that on 5 November 1997 when the Convention entered into
force in respect of the respondent State, the applicant was the owner
of the flat in question. His ownership was finally terminated by
virtue of the Zagreb County Court judgment of 15 December 2003,
upholding the Pula Municipal Court's judgment of 22 February 2001
which had annulled the contract of sale transferring the ownership to
the applicant. The applicant's title having been nullified by virtue
of judicial decisions delivered after 5 November 1997, the date of
the Convention's entry into force in respect of Croatia, the Court
finds that it is competent ratione temporis to examine the
application. Therefore, the Government's objection as to the Court's
competence ratione temporis must be rejected.
2. Applicability of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
- The
Government argued further that Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 was not
applicable in the present case because the applicant had never had a
protected tenancy of the flat in question. The fact that the
applicant's ownership had been recorded in the land register was of
no relevance since such an entry had only a declaratory effect.
- The
applicant disagreed with these arguments.
- According
to the Convention organs' case-law, “possessions” within
the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention may be
either “existing possessions” or valuable assets,
including claims, under certain conditions. By contrast, the hope of
recognition of a former property right which has not been susceptible
of effective exercise for a long period of time is not to be
considered a "possession" (see Weidlich and Others
v. Germany, nos. 18890/91, 19048/91, 19049/91, 19342/92 and
19549/92, Commission decision of 4 March 1996, Decisions and Reports
85, p. 5, and the case-law referred to there on p. 18). According to
the jurisprudence of the Croatian courts, it appears that the
applicant's title to his flat was considered void ab initio
which had the effect that he was considered never to have owned it.
The Court considers that the applicant had a “possession”
within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention
even if his title was null and void ab initio. The Court notes
that for about four years he possessed the flat in question and was
considered its owner for all legal purposes. Moreover, it would be
unreasonable to accept that a State may enact legislation which
allows nullification ab initio of contracts or other titles to
property and thus escape responsibility for an interference with
property rights under the Convention (see Panikian v. Bulgaria,
no. 29583/96, Commission decision of 10 July 1997). It follows
that the Government's objection as to the applicability of Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention must likewise be rejected.
3. Conclusion
- The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
The parties' submissions
1. The Government
- The
Government contended that there had been no interference with the
applicant's property rights because the applicant had never been the
owner of the flat in question. Even if the Court found that there had
been an interference, it had complied with the conditions of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention since the States enjoyed a wide
margin of appreciation in this respect. The nullification of the
contract of sale had had a basis in domestic law. The entitlement of
the State Attorney's Office to seek such a nullification was clear
since its role was to protect the State's interests and ensure that
the laws in effect were complied with.
- As
regards the proportionality of the measure applied, the Government
contended that the following factors should have been taken into
consideration. The flat in question had been given to the applicant
as provisional accommodation and the applicant could not have
obtained a protected tenancy of it and consequently could not have
purchased the flat. The applicant should have known that he was not
entitled to purchase the flat. There had obviously existed a public
interest that such a contract be nullified.
2. The applicant
- The
applicant argued that the decision of the glass factory which gave
him the flat had not mentioned that it had been provisional
accommodation. Furthermore, he had paid rent on the flat and had been
entitled to use the flat as a tenant. His ownership of the flat had
been acquired bona fide and annulled in contravention of the
principles established under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention.
The Court's assessment
1. Was there an interference?
- The
Court notes that in 1996 the applicant bought the flat in question
and thus clearly became its owner, which fact was also recorded in
the land register. The Court notes further that the applicant was
deprived of his property as a consequence of the findings of the Pula
Municipal Court and the Pula County Court in their respective
judgments of 22 February 2001 and 15 December 2003. By virtue of
these judgments the applicant's property title to the flat in
question was nullified.
- The
Court finds, therefore, that there was a deprivation of property
within the meaning of the second sentence of Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention. Such deprivation of property must be lawful,
in the public interest and must strike a fair balance between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements
of the protection of the individual's fundamental rights.
2. Whether the interference was provided for by law
- The
applicant's property title was declared null and void by the national
courts under Croatian civil law on contracts and the law regulating
the functions of the State Attorney's Office. The Court, noting that
its power to review compliance with domestic law is limited (see,
among other authorities, Allan Jacobsson v. Sweden (no. 1),
judgment of 25 October 1989, Series A no. 163, p. 17, § 57), is
thus satisfied that the nullification of the applicant's property
title was in accordance with domestic law.
3. Legitimate Aim and Proportionality
- The
Court reiterates that, because of their direct knowledge of their
society and its needs, the national authorities are in principle
better placed than the international judge to appreciate what is “in
the public interest”. Under the system of protection
established by the Convention, it is thus for the national
authorities to make the initial assessment as to the existence of a
matter of public concern warranting measures of deprivation of
property. Here, as in other fields to which the safeguards of the
Convention extend, the national authorities accordingly enjoy a
certain margin of appreciation (see, among many authorities,
Edwards v. Malta, no. 17647/04, § 64,
24 October 2006).
- The
Court must also examine whether an interference with the peaceful
enjoyment of possessions strikes the requisite fair balance between
the demands of the general interest of the public and the
requirements of the protection of the individual's fundamental
rights, or whether it imposes a disproportionate and excessive burden
on the applicant (see, among many other authorities, Jahn and
Others v. Germany [GC], nos. 46720/99, 72203/01 and
72552/01, § 93, ECHR 2005-VI). Despite the margin of
appreciation given to the State the Court must nevertheless, in the
exercise of its power of review, determine whether the requisite
balance was maintained in a manner consonant with the applicant's
right to property (see Rosinski v Poland, no. 17373/02, § 78,
17 July 2007). The concern to achieve this balance is reflected in
the structure of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention as a
whole, including therefore the second sentence, which is to be read
in the light of the general principle enunciated in the first
sentence. In particular, there must be a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
realised by any measure depriving a person of his possessions (see
Pressos Compania Naviera S.A. and Others v. Belgium, judgment
of 20 November 1995, Series A no. 332, p. 23, § 38, and The
Former King of Greece and Others v. Greece, [GC], no.
25701/94, § 89). Thus the balance to be maintained between the
demands of the general interest of the community and the requirements
of fundamental rights is upset if the person concerned has had to
bear a “disproportionate burden” (see, among many other
authorities, The Holy Monasteries v. Greece, judgment of 9
December 1994, Series A no. 301-A, pp. 34-35, §§ 70-71).
- The
Court notes at the outset that the national courts' findings which
led to the applicant's property title being declared null and void
were concentrated on two main grounds. First, the flat in question
had been provisional accommodation only and under the relevant
legislation the applicant could not have acquired a protected tenancy
of such accommodation. Second, the glass factory had had no right to
dispose of the flat to grant the applicant a specially protected
tenancy, since that right had been vested in the Pula Municipality.
In this regard the Court emphasises that its task in the present case
is not to call into question the right of a State to enact laws aimed
at securing the rule of law by providing for nullification of defect
contracts contravening peremptory norms, but, in accordance with its
supervisory powers to review under the Convention the manner in which
these laws were applied in the applicant's case and whether the
decisions taken by the relevant domestic authorities complied with
the principles enshrined in Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention.
- The
Court recalls that it has already dealt with the question of
annulment of contracts of sale under which applicants bought flats
they occupied (see Panikian v. Bulgaria, cited above; Pincová
and Pinc v. the Czech Republic, no. 36548/97,
ECHR 2002-VIII; Bečvář and Bečvářová
v. the Czech Republic, no. 58358/00, 14 December 2004;
Netolický and Netolická v. the Czech Republic
(dec.), no. 55727/00, 25 May 2004; Mohylová
v. the Czech Republic (dec.), no. 75115/01, 6
September 2005, and Velikovi and Others v. Bulgaria,
nos. 43278/98, 45437/99, 48014/99, 48380/99, 51362/99, 53367/99,
60036/00, 73465/01 and 194/02, 15 March 2007). In those cases,
however, the Court and the Commission were called upon to assess
particular situations, all of which concerned legislation adopted
with the aim of making good injustices dating back decades and
inherited from communist rule in the respective States.
- Quite
differently from the situations where old injustices had to be
addressed in newly adopted legislation, the present case does not
concern an applicant who bought a nationalised flat under favourable
conditions during the communist regime owing to his privileged
position. On the contrary, the applicant in the present case was
rather an ordinary citizen, enjoying no special privileges, who
bought a flat consisting of a kitchen, one room and a communal
toilet. The purchase was based on the laws applicable to all holders
of protected tenancies of publicly-owned flats, and not at all
reserved for some sprivileged category of citizens.
- Bearing
in mind these specific features of the present case, the Court, in
making its assessment as to whether the Croatian authorities pursued
a legitimate aim in the public interest and whether they struck a
fair balance between the general interest of the community and the
applicant's right to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions, gives
decisive importance to the following factors.
- First
and foremost, the flat in question was ab initio social
property. While in the above-mentioned cases concerning Bulgaria and
the Czech Republic two conflicting private interests, namely those of
the initial owners whose property had been nationalised during the
communist regimes and the new owners who bought the nationalised
flats, had to be taken into consideration, in the Court's assessment
under Article 1 of Protocol No.1 to the Convention, in the present
case no such sensitive balance is at stake.
- The
flat at issue was given to the applicant for his use by the glass
factory where he had worked, which was a common practice in the
former Yugoslav socialist regime. The Court notes that the flat is a
rather modest one, comprising merely a single room, a kitchen and a
communal toilet, and was intended to meet the essential housing needs
of the applicant and his family, namely a wife and two children. The
national courts' finding that a protected tenancy could not have
applied to the flat in question since it was merely provisional
accommodation has to be seen against the fact that the applicant's
family has lived there since 1988 and that it has thus become their
normal dwelling, not significantly differing from any other small
flat. Therefore, it cannot be said that the applicant took advantage
of a privileged position or that he even held any such position
during the socialist regime, or that he otherwise acted unlawfully in
order to acquire certain rights to the flat in question.
- The
Court notes that the contract of sale was annulled, inter alia,
on the ground that the glass factory which had allowed the applicant
to use the flat had not been entitled to dispose of the flat, but
that such a right had been vested in the Pula Municipality. In this
respect the Court, without questioning these findings of the national
courts, notes that the Pula Municipality sold the flat in question to
the applicant. Assuming that the Pula Municipality had actually been
the relevant authority to dispose of the flat in the first place, the
Court considers that by selling the flat in question to the
applicant, it recognised the applicant's rights in respect of the
flat. Therefore, the argument that the applicant obtained certain
rights regarding the flat from the glass factory instead of from the
Pula Municipality cannot be accepted, even if an initial right was
given to the applicant by the factory.
- The
Court places special emphasis on the fact that the purchase of the
flat in question was under the State Attorney Office's control, since
pursuant to section 21 of the Protected Tenancies (Sale to Occupier)
Act all contracts of sale in respect of flats previously let under
protected tenancies had to be submitted to that authority for prior
approval. It is undisputed in the present case that the contract of
sale in question, concluded between the Pula Municipality as a seller
and the applicant as a buyer, was submitted for approval to the Istra
State Attorney's Office (see paragraph 7 above). Thus, the relevant
authorities had an opportunity to verify the contract in question and
to prevent its taking effect if they found any ground justifying such
a measure. However, the Istra County State Attorney's Office gave its
consent on 28 May 1996 without making any objections.
- The
Court considers that the mistakes or errors of the State authorities
should serve to the benefit of the persons affected, especially where
no other conflicting private interest is at stake. In other words,
the risk of any mistake made by the State authority must be borne by
the State and the errors must not be remedied at the expense of the
individual concerned (see, mutatis mutandis, Radchikov v.
Russia, no. 65582/01, § 50, 24 May 2007). What is more, the
nullification of the applicant's property title in the proceedings
instigated by the Istra County State Attorney's Office, once that
same office had consented to the sale contract giving that title to
the applicant, contravenes the principle of legal certainty. The
manner in which the litigation ended does not appear to have been
consistent with the State's obligation to deal with the applicant's
situation in as coherent a manner as possible (see, mutatis
mutandis, Beyeler v. Italy [GC], no. 33202/96,
§ 120, ECHR 2000-I).
- Lastly,
the Court reiterates that it has held that a person deprived of his
or her property must in principle obtain compensation “reasonably
related to its value”, even though “legitimate objectives
of 'public interest' may call for reimbursement of less than the full
market value”. It follows that the balance mentioned above is
generally achieved where the compensation paid to the person whose
property has been taken is reasonably related to its “market”
value, as determined at the time of the expropriation (see Pincová
and Pinc cited above, § 53).
- As
to the present case, the Court observes that the Government did not
put forward any arguments concerning possible compensation for the
applicant. In this connection, the Court notes also that certain
social issues cannot be ignored, as the present application, since
the applicant's death, now concerns vulnerable individuals, namely a
widow with two children, one of whom is still a minor child of
fourteen years.
- As
to the question of whether the national courts pursued a legitimate
aim, the Court notes that the respondent Government did not advance
any arguments in this connection. In the view of the Court's
considerations above, the Court finds it difficult to discern a
possible legitimate aim on the part of the national authorities in
annulling the sale contract at issue. In any event, and leaving that
question aside, the Court considers that the interference with the
applicant's property rights in the particular circumstances of the
present case failed to strike a fair balance between the public
interest and the applicant's rights protected under Article 1 of
Protocol No.1 to the Convention.
There
has therefore been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the
Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
about fairness of the proceedings and under Article 8 of the
Convention claiming that his right to respect for his home had been
violated. He further complained under Article 14 of the Convention
claiming that he had been discriminated against because of his
Albanian origin and poor economic situation.
- In
the light of all the material in its possession, and in so far as the
matters complained of were within its competence, the Court considers
that this part of the application does not disclose any appearance of
a violation of any of the above Articles of the Convention. It
follows that these complaints are inadmissible under Article 35 §
3 as manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected pursuant to
Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant's widow and son claimed 32,634.77 euros (EUR) in respect of
pecuniary damage and EUR 35,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
They further claimed 12,653 Croatian kunas in respect of costs and
expenses.
- The
Government deemed the sums requested excessive and unrelated to the
violations claimed.
- In
the circumstances of the case the Court considers that the question
of the application of Article 41 is not ready for decision. It is
therefore necessary to reserve the matter, due regard being had to
the possibility of an agreement between the respondent State and the
applicant (Rule 75 §§ 1 and 4 of the Rules of Court).
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Holds that the applicant's widow (Mrs Katica
Gashi) and his son (Mr Edon Gashi) have standing to continue the
present proceedings in his stead;
- Declares the complaint concerning the
applicant's right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions admissible
and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
- Holds that the question of the application of
Article 41 of the Convention is not ready for decision;
accordingly,
(a)
reserves the said question in whole;
(b)
invites the Government and the applicant to submit, within the
forthcoming three months, their written observations on the matter
and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement that they
may reach;
(c)
reserves the further procedure and delegates to the
President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 13 December 2007,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
