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THIRD
SECTION
CASE OF BROKA v. LATVIA
(Application
no. 70926/01)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
28 June
2007
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Broka v. Latvia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Third Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Mr B.M. Zupančič,
President,
Mr C. Bîrsan,
Mr J.-P.
Costa,
Mrs A. Gyulumyan,
Mr David Thór
Björgvinsson,
Mrs I. Ziemele,
Mrs I.
Berro-Lefèvre, judges,
and Mr S. Quesada, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 10 April and 7 June 2007,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the last-mentioned date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 70926/01) against the
Republic of Latvia lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Latvian national, Mrs Marina
Broka (“the applicant”), on 7 May 2001.
- The
Latvian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
their Agent, Mrs Inga Reine.
- On
15 December 2004 the
Court decided to give notice of the application to the Government.
Applying Article 29 § 3 of the Convention, it decided to rule on
the admissibility and merits of the application at the same time.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1937 and lives in Riga, Latvia.
- Before
1940, the applicant's aunt owned a farm in the Jelgava district which
comprised a plot of land, a dwelling house and several farm
buildings. The land was nationalised by the Soviet Union in 1940 and
the buildings were considered as abandoned. In 1956 a third person
bought from the local administration a barn and a wood shelter
belonging to the estate; he subsequently converted the barn into a
dwelling house. Throughout the Soviet period, most of the estate was
kept and operated by a co-operative agricultural society.
- Following
the restoration of Latvia's independence in 1991, the applicant's
mother, relying on the new property reform and denationalisation
laws, sought the return of both the
buildings and the land. In 1993, she got back a residential house,
but not the remaining buildings, since they were already owned by
other persons. Moreover, in 1995 or 1996 a certain J. privatised
another two buildings previously belonging to the estate in
accordance with privatisation agreements concluded between him and
the co-operative society according to the laws then in force.
-
In 1995 the applicant, acting on behalf of her mother, applied to the
Land Commission of the Svēte municipality requesting that the
land be restored within its exact historical boundaries, as they
stood in 1940. This request was refused.
- The
applicant's mother died on 25 February 1997, leaving the applicant as
her sole heir. Later, on 20 May 1998, the Riga City Vidzeme District
Court legally declared the applicant her mother's successor.
9. On
14 March 1997 the applicant brought an action before the Zemgale
Regional Court against five co-defendants: the district council of
Jelgava, the local municipality of Svēte, the land commission of
the latter, the co-operative society and the successor of the present
owner of the barn and the shelter.
- The
first hearing was held by the Zemgale Regional Court on 27 June 1997.
At this hearing, some of the defendants recognised the applicant's
claim, and the applicant herself asked the court to conclude the
examination of her claim as soon as possible. However, the
proceedings were subsequently postponed fifteen times, namely:
(a)
on 27 June 1997, until 12 November 1997 – in order for the
parties to see the estate by themselves and to clarify certain points
in their submissions;
(b)
on 12 November 1997, sine die (in fact until 26 August 1998) –
in order to await an official confirmation of the applicant's
inheritance status by the Riga City Vidzeme District Court;
(c)
on 26 August 1998, sine die (in fact until 30 May 2000) –
when the court, motu proprio, declared J. the sixth
co-defendant in the case since the applicant claimed ownership rights
to the buildings privatised by him; however, the court established
that J. had died and adjourned the proceedings pending his succession
case before another court;
(d)
on 30 May 2000, until 12 June 2000 – in order to invite the
Zemgale Regional Office of the State Land Service to join the
proceedings as one of the co-defendants and to compel J.'s successor
to submit the judgment of 11 April 2000 concerning her
inheritance rights;
(e)
on 12 June 2000, until 24 July 2000 – upon the request of the
State Land Service in order for them to prepare all necessary
documents;
(f)
on 24 July 2000, until 21 August 2000 – after the court had, at
the applicant's request, declared J.'s widow – now legally
confirmed in her inheritance rights – a defendant and ordered
her to join the case;
(g)
on 21 August 2000, until 18 October 2000 – upon the request of
both parties, in order to submit further evidence;
(h)
on 18 October 2000, until 8 November 2000 – upon the
applicant's request (she in fact asked for a postponement sine die
because, according to her, she could not quickly obtain evidence from
some state authorities);
(i)
on 8 November 2000, until 7 December 2000 – upon the request of
the applicant's counsel (who explained that she was unable to
attend);
(j)
on 6 December 2000, until 26 February 2001 – upon the request
of one of the defendants, in order to rectify the boundary of the
estate and possibly to seek a friendly settlement;
(k)
on 26 February 2001, until 19 April 2001 – because of a
repeated absence of the representative of the State Land Service at
the hearing (by a letter of 27 February, the court issued a formal
warning to this authority and requested it to attend the following
hearing);
(l)
on 19 April 2001, until 19 July 2001 – one of the defendants
being absent for medical reasons (she had previously submitted a
medical certificate granting her sick leave from 9 to 17 April 2001);
(m)
on 19 July 2001, until 6 August 2001 – upon the request of the
State Land Service since it could not provide a proper representation
before the court, and because of the absence of counsel of one of the
defendants (despite the applicant's objections);
(n)
on 6 August 2001, until 26 September 2001 – since the
defendants had not received the amendments to the applicant's claim;
(o)
on 26 September 2001 until 29 October 2001 – upon the
applicant's and J.'s common request, since the State Land Service was
absent from the hearing and the applicant deemed it necessary to see
the respective land plans owned by this Office (it appears from the
case file that this defendant had nevertheless requested the court to
hear the case in its absence).
- On
three occasions, on 1 June 2000, 1 December 2000 and 10 October
2001, the applicant extended and modified her claim. In April 2000
and in March 2001, she unsuccessfully tried to accelerate the
examination of her case by complaining, respectively, to the
president of the Zemgale Regional Court and to the Prosecutor's
General Office about the unreasonable length of the proceedings.
- On
29 October 2001 the Zemgale Regional Court held a hearing and finally
gave a judgment, granting the applicant's claim in part. In its
judgment, the court ordered the defendants to restore to the
applicant a part of the plot of land and six farm buildings, and
declared null and void the privatisation agreements concluded between
J. and the co-operative society. The remainder of the claim was
refused according to the Law on Land Privatisation in Rural Regions
and the Law on the Return of Real Estate to the Legitimate Owners.
- The
applicant appealed. On 21 February 2002 the Civil Chamber of the
Supreme Court, after having held a hearing, dismissed the applicant's
appeal. The applicant then filed an appeal on points of law. On 22
April 2002 the Senate (Cassation Division) of the Supreme Court,
sitting in camera, declared the appeal inadmissible for lack
of arguable points of law.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The period to be taken into consideration
- The
Government first observed that the Convention came into force with
regard to Latvia on 27 June 1997; according to them, the period
covered by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention started to
run on this date. They also reiterated that, from 12 November 1997 to
30 May 2000, the proceedings were adjourned in order to await the
official confirmation of the inheritance status first of the
applicant herself, and then of one of the defendants, by two other
courts where both inheritance cases were pending. The Government
noted in particular that, according to Article 216 of the Civil
Procedure Code then in force, such suspension was not optional but
compulsory. Consequently, they argued that this lapse of time has to
be deducted from the overall length of proceedings scrutinised by the
Court, and that the period to be examined under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention lasted only two years and three months.
- The
applicant disagreed with these arguments.
- The
Court recognises that the period to be taken into consideration began
only on 27 June 1997, when the Convention came into force with regard
to Latvia. However, in assessing the reasonableness of the time that
elapsed after that date, account must be taken of the state of
proceedings at the time. As to the adjournment of proceedings pending
the outcome of other cases, the Court reiterates that the “reasonable
time” requirement within the meaning of Article 6 § 1
must be assessed according to the Court's own case law and not
according to the internal law of the respondent State (see, mutatis
mutandis, Wiesinger v. Austria, judgment of 30 October
1991, Series A no. 213, p. 22, § 60, and G. v. Italy,
judgment of 27 February 1992, Series A no. 228 F,
p. 68, § 17). The Court therefore sees no reason to
exclude the lapse of time between 12 November 1997 and 30 May
2000 from the overall length of proceedings covered by Article 6 § 1
of the Convention.
- In
civil proceedings, the “reasonable time” begins at the
moment the action was instituted before the tribunal (see, for
example, Erkner and Hofauer v. Austria, judgment of
23 April 1987, Series A no. 117, § 64).
In the present case, this happened on 14 March 1997, when the
applicant brought the action before the Zemgale Regional Court. On 29
October 2001, this court gave its judgment in the case. On 22 April
2002, the applicant's appeal on points of law was dismissed by the
Senate of the Supreme Court. The impugned proceedings thus lasted
slightly over five years for three levels of
jurisdiction; this period corresponds to four
years and almost ten months after the Convention came
into force with regard to the respondent State.
Four years and seven months out of this overall period correspond to
proceedings before the court of first instance.
2. The reasonableness of the length of proceedings
- According
to the Court's case law, the reasonableness of the length of
proceedings must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the
case and with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of
the case, the conduct of the applicant and of the relevant
authorities and what was at stake for the applicant in the dispute
(see Sürmeli v. Germany [GC], no. 75529/01,
§ 128, 8 June 2006; Scordino v. Italy (no. 1)
[GC], no. 36813/97, § 177, ECHR 2006 ...; and
Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43,
ECHR 2000-VII). Only delays attributable to the State may justify a
finding of failure to comply with the “reasonable time”
requirement (see, for example, Humen v. Poland [GC], no.
26614/95, § 66, 15 October 1999). In this respect, Article
6 § 1 of the Convention imposes on the Contracting
States the duty to organise their legal systems in such a way that
their courts can meet each of the requirements of that provision,
including the obligation to hear cases within a reasonable time (see
the aforementioned judgments in the cases of Sürmeli,
§ 129, and Scordino, §§ 183
and 224). The State remains responsible for the efficiency of its
system and the manner in which it provides for mechanisms to comply
with the reasonable time requirement – whether by automatic
time-limits and directions or some other method – is for it to
decide. If a State allows proceedings to continue beyond the
“reasonable time” prescribed by Article 6 of the
Convention without doing anything to advance them, it will be
responsible for the resultant delay (see Blake v. the United
Kingdom, no. 68890/01, § 45, 26 September 2006).
- The
Government considered that the present case was complex both as to
its subject-matter (restitution of property rights to former owners
illegally expropriated by the Soviet authorities) and as to the
number of persons involved as co-defendants. As concerns the conduct
of the Latvian authorities, the Government emphasised that they have
always acted with due diligence; whenever the proceedings were
suspended, it was either directly prescribed by law or requested by
at least one of the parties. In other terms, there was no period of
inactivity that would be attributable to the court. On the other
hand, most of the adjournments were due to the applicant's own
conduct. From 12 November 1997 to 26 August 1998, the court had to
await the outcome of her inheritance case. On all other occasions the
postponement was either requested by the applicant herself or agreed
to by her.
- The
applicant disagreed with the Government. In her view, her right to a
“hearing within a reasonable time” has been infringed.
- The
Court leaves to one side the question of the substantial complexity
of the subject-matter of the case. It is enough for it to note that
the overall number of defendants was seven, and that this fact made
the litigation sufficiently complex.
- Concerning
the conduct of the parties, the Court notes that the longest period
of inactivity took place from 12 November 1997 until 30 May 2000
(paragraph 10 (b) and (c) above), while the Zemgale Regional Court
waited for the confirmation of the applicant's own inheritance status
and the inheritance status of one of the defendants. This lapse of
time lasted two and a half years. Even if it seems in itself rather
long, the Court reiterates that a legal provision providing for the
dependence of one set of civil proceedings on another, when they
concern the same or related facts, is not per se contrary the
requirements of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention (see
Kiurkchian v. Bulgaria, no. 44626/98, § 68,
24 March 2005). When assessing the relevance and reasonableness
of the adjournment of a case pending the outcome of another case, it
must be taken into account what is at stake for the persons involved
(see Tibbling v. Sweden, no. 59129/00, § 32,
11 October 2005). In the present case, the Court accepts
that the postponement of the proceedings between 12 November
1997 and 30 May 2000 served to ensure legal certainty and to
protect the rights of other people, such as potential heirs and
creditors. In any case, it is not the Court's task to determine
whether there existed a sufficient link between the two sets of
proceedings and whether the proceedings at issue were thus properly
stayed, because, as a general rule, it is for the domestic courts to
establish the facts and to interpret and apply national law. The
Court will not interfere with their rulings, unless the applicants
succeed in demonstrating that they acted arbitrarily; however, this
is manifestly not the case as concerns the impugned litigation. The
Court thus admits that this long adjournment was an objectively
necessary measure which cannot be imputed to the Government as an
element weighing in favour of finding a violation of Article 6 § 1.
- In
the instant case, the Court notes that, on three occasions in 2001,
the hearing was adjourned because of the unexplained absence of one
of the defendants, namely the Zemgale Regional Office of the State
Land Service (paragraph 10 (k), (m) and (o) above). The total
duration of these three periods of inactivity amounted to three and a
half months. Similarly, the hearing was adjourned for three months
between 19 April and 19 July 2001, one of the defendants being absent
for medical reasons. Leaving to one side the question whether these
delays could really be imputable to the conduct of the Zemgale
Regional Court, they do not appear to be disproportionate against the
background of the overall length of proceedings before that court.
Finally, the Court acknowledges that the proceedings before the
appeal and cassation courts were of exemplary speed, lasting only
about six months for these two levels of jurisdiction taken together.
- In
sum, having examined all the material submitted to it, and having
regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that in
the instant case the overall length of the proceedings was compatible
with the “reasonable time” requirement. There has
accordingly been no breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER COMPLAINTS
- The
applicant raises complaints under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, taken
alone and in conjunction with Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention.
She alleges that she was unable to recover all the real estate she
claimed, that she had no effective domestic remedy to restore her
property rights, and that she is discriminated against in the
enjoyment of her property rights. She also alleges, under Article 3
of the Convention, that she was subjected to degrading treatment in
view of the manner in which her numerous applications concerning the
return of the property at issue were dealt with by the Latvian
authorities.
- Inasmuch
as the applicant invokes Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, the Court
points out that her claims to the disputed parts of the estate were
rejected according to the Law on Land Privatisation in Rural Regions
and to the Law on the Return of Real Estate to the Legitimate Owners
(paragraph 12 above). Both laws are covered by the reservation made
by the Latvian government in their instrument of ratification, and
this reservation has been declared valid by the Court (see Kozlova
and Smirnova v. Latvia (dec.), no. 57381/00, ECHR 2001 XI).
The reservation in question therefore applies in the instant case,
and this complaint is incompatible ratione materiae with the
provisions of the Convention within the meaning of its Article 35 §
3.
- As
to Articles 13 and 14 of the Convention, the Court recalls that they
have no independent existence, since they have effect solely in
relation to the rights and freedoms safeguarded by the other
substantive provisions of the Convention and its Protocols. Since the
applicant's complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is
incompatible ratione materiae with the provisions of the
Convention, these two complaints must suffer the same fate.
- Finally,
as far as Article 3 of the Convention is concerned, the case file
does not disclose any appearance of a violation of this provision as
it is construed by the Court's case law.
- It
follows that these complaints must be declared inadmissible in
accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 June 2007, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Santiago Quesada Boštjan M. Zupančič
Registrar President
