[New search]
[Contents list]
[Printable RTF version]
[Help]
SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF LAJOS NÉMETH v. HUNGARY
(Application
no. 3840/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21
October 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Németh v. Hungary,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise
Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu
Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Dragoljub
Popović,
András
Sajó,
Nona
Tsotsoria,
Işıl
Karakaş,
judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 September 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 3840/05) against the
Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection
of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”)
by a Hungarian national, Mr Lajos
Németh (“the applicant”), on 21 January 2005.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr I. Barbalics, a lawyer practising in
Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the
Government”) were represented by Mr L. Höltzl, Agent,
Ministry of Justice and Law Enforcement.
- On
5 December 2007 the
President of the Second Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1959 and lives in Győr.
- On
3 February 1995 company G. brought an action against the applicant,
requesting the Győr District Court to hold, inter alia,
that the termination of a lease contract was valid.
- On
12 October 1995 the court adopted a partial decision holding that the
termination was valid and requiring the applicant to vacate the real
estate in question. On appeal, on 7 November 1996 the
Győr-Moson-Sopron County Regional Court reversed that partial
decision and dismissed the plaintiff's claim concerning the validity
of the termination.
- In
the resumed first-instance proceedings, on 3 July 1997 the District
Court ordered the applicant to pay 1.1 million Hungarian forints
(HUF) in compensation and rejected his counterclaims. On appeal, on
21 January 1998 the Regional Court upheld the decision about the
payment of
HUF 1.1 million but quashed the remainder of the
first-instance decision.
- In
the resumed first-instance proceedings, the District Court held
several hearings, obtained the opinion of an expert, and rejected the
applicant's counterclaims on 22 May 2001. On appeal, on 28 November
2001 the Regional Court quashed that decision.
- In
the resumed proceedings, the case was transferred to the bench of the
Regional Court competent to deal with it. That court held several
hearings and obtained the opinion of an expert. On 6 April 2004 the
applicant was awarded HUF 2.8 million plus accrued interest. On
appeal, on 6 July 2004 the Budapest Court of Appeal reduced the
award. This decision was served on 29 July 2004.
- The
applicant filed a petition for review, alleging that the final
decision was unfounded and at variance with the relevant substantive
law.
- In
a preliminary examination under section 273 of the Code of Civil
Procedure, on 5 November 2004 the Supreme Court refused to deal with
the merits of the petition. It applied section 270 § 2 of the
Code of Civil Procedure, as in force in the relevant period,
according to which a review of the substantive unlawfulness of final
decisions was only admissible if a review was considered necessary
from the perspective of harmonising or developing the application of
the law.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings was
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
- The
Government contested that argument.
- The
period to be taken into consideration began on 3 February 1995 and
ended at the earliest on 29 July 2004. It thus lasted almost nine and
a half years for three levels of jurisdiction.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
application (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument
capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the
present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject,
the Court finds that the length of the proceedings was excessive and
failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained that the Supreme Court's refusal to deal
with the merits of his petition for review amounted to a breach of
Article 13 of the Convention. Lastly, he submitted that the Hungarian
courts' decisions constituted a violation of his rights under Article
1 of Protocol No. 1.
- As
regards the refusal to grant the applicant leave to appeal, the Court
observes that the Supreme Court took the view that the applicant's
case did not raise a point of law of general public importance, which
was the gateway requirement for leave to be granted. It further
observes that where a supreme court refuses to accept a case on the
basis that the legal grounds for such a case are not made out, very
limited reasoning may satisfy the requirements of Article 6 of the
Convention (see mutatis mutandis Nerva and Others v. the United
Kingdom (dec.), no. 42295/98,
11 July 2000). This
principle extends to the Hungarian Supreme Court's decisions on
applications for leave to appeal (Jaczkó v. Hungary,
no. 40109/03, § 29, 18 July 2006). In the absence of
any appearance of arbitrariness, this complaint is manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 and must be
rejected, pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
- Moreover,
the Court considers that the applicant's complaint under Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 does not disclose any appearance of a violation of his
Convention rights, his case – a dispute between private parties
– having been adjudicated without any sign of arbitrariness. He
cannot be regarded as having been deprived of property by the State.
This complaint is therefore likewise manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35
§ 3 and must be rejected, pursuant
to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 200,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage
and EUR 20,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested these claims.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim.
However, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some
non-pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis, it awards him EUR
4,800 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 2,000 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the domestic courts and EUR 2,000 for those incurred before
the Court, plus EUR 1,000 in respect of clerical and postal expenses.
- The
Government did not express an opinion on the matter.
- According
to the Court's case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and were
reasonable as to quantum. The Court notes that the applicant's costs
claim has not been substantiated by any relevant documents and must
therefore be rejected.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning the excessive
length of the proceedings admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 4,800 (four
thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable,
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into Hungarian
forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 October 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise
Tulkens
Deputy Registrar President
