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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF IVANOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 11697/05)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
24
April 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Ivanova v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Dean Spielmann,
Sverre Erik
Jebens,
Giorgio Malinverni,
George Nicolaou,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 27 March 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 11697/05) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Natalya Pavlovna Ivanova
(“the applicant”), on 21 February 2005.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mrs V. Milinchuk, Representative of the Russian Federation at the
European Court of Human Rights.
- The
applicant complained, in particular, about the quashing of a judgment
in her favour on supervisory review.
- On
15 March 2007 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
- The
applicant was born in 1934 and lives in Lensk in the Sakha (Yakutiya)
Republic of the Russian Federation.
- In
2003 the applicant brought an action against the Government, seeking
to recover the monetary value of a State promissory note for
purchasing of a Russian-made car.
- On
4 March 2003 the Lenskiy District Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya)
Republic found for the applicant and awarded her 138,967 Russian
roubles (RUB) in compensation and RUB 2,802.32 in reimbursement of
the court fee, payable by the Ministry of Finance.
- On
21 April 2003 the Supreme Court of the Sakha (Yakutiya) Republic
(hereinafter – “the Supreme Court”) dismissed the
appeal by the Ministry of Finance and upheld the judgment. The
Supreme Court rejected the Ministry's argument that the
first-instance court had unlawfully refused to apply the Commodity
Bonds Act governing redemption of promissory notes for purchasing of
cars.
- On
15 May 2003 the Ministry of Finance lodged an application for
supervisory review before the Presidium of the Supreme Court. It
claimed that the courts had unlawfully refused to apply the
provisions of the Commodity Bonds Act and the 2001 State Programme
for Redemption of Promissory Notes. It is unclear whether any
procedural decision was taken on that application.
- On
28 June 2004 the Ministry of Finance introduced a new application for
supervisory review, invoking the same arguments. According to the
Government, the proceedings on the applicant's claim had been
previously “suspended” on 23 October 2003 because the
Supreme Court had sent a reference for a preliminary ruling to the
Constitutional Court. The Constitutional Court had been requested to
decide on compatibility of the Commodity Bonds Act with the
Constitution.
- On
7 October 2004 the Presidium of the Supreme Court granted the
Ministry's application for supervisory review, quashed the judgment
of 4 March 2003, as upheld on 21 April 2003, and dismissed the
applicant's claim in full. In so deciding, the Presidium noted that
the courts had failed to take into account the provisions of the 2001
State Programme for Redemption of Promissory Notes which had extended
the period of redemption until 31 December 2004. In the Presidium's
assessment, that failure amounted to a substantial violation of the
material law warranting re-consideration of the case.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE CONVENTION AND
ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 about the quashing of the judgment in her favour on
supervisory review and the issuing of a new decision by which her
claims had been dismissed in full. She also invoked in this
connection Articles 13 and 17 of the Convention. The Court considers
that this complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 6 of
the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which provide in the
relevant parts as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time... by [a]... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law...”
A. Admissibility
- The Court notes that the application is not manifestly
ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other
grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions by the parties
- The
Government submitted that the judgment in the applicant's favour had
been issued in breach of Russian law. The Ministry of Finance had
consistently lodged appeals against it, seeking to overturn the
judgment which could lead to formation of “negative case-law”
on similar claims and “unjustified expenditure from the federal
budget”. There had been no violation of the applicant's rights
because the application for supervisory review had been preceded by
an ordinary appeal and because the supervisory review judgment had
been issued within one year and seven months. The judgment in the
applicant's favour had been quashed with a view to correcting a
judicial mistake, that is incorrect application of substantive law.
- The
applicant disagreed. She pointed out that the Ministry had lodged its
application outside the statutory time-limit, more than one year
after the appeal judgment had been issued. Furthermore, even though
the Presidium had quashed the judgment on the ground that the payment
would be made until 31 December 2004, no payment had been made to the
present day.
2. Alleged violation of Article 6 of the Convention
- The
Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 secures to everyone the
right to have any claim relating to his civil rights and obligations
brought before a court or tribunal. In this way it embodies the
“right to a court”, of which the right of access, that is
the right to institute proceedings before courts in civil matters,
constitutes one aspect. However, that right would be illusory if a
Contracting State's domestic legal system allowed a final and binding
judicial decision to be quashed by a higher court on an application
made by a State official whose power to lodge such an application is
not subject to any time-limit, with the result that the judgments
were liable to challenge indefinitely (see Ryabykh v. Russia,
no. 52854/99, §§ 54-56, ECHR 2003 IX).
- In
the present case the judgment of 4 March 2003, as upheld on appeal on
21 April 2003, was set aside by way of supervisory review on the
ground that the courts had erred in application of the substantive
law. The Court has to assess whether the power to conduct a
supervisory review was exercised by the authorities so as to strike,
to the maximum extent possible, a fair balance between the interests
of the individual and the need to ensure the proper administration of
justice (see, mutatis mutandis, Nikitin v. Russia,
no. 50178/99, §§ 57 and 59, ECHR 2004 ...).
- The
Court takes note, firstly, of an exceptionally long period of time –
more than seventeen months – that lapsed from the date the
judgment in the applicant's favour had become legally binding to the
date the supervisory-review proceedings were conducted. It observes
that the Code of Civil Procedure (“CCP”) set a time-limit
of one year for lodging an application for supervisory review, the
starting point being the date on which the judicial decision became
legally binding (Article 376 § 2 of the CCP). In the present
case it is not clear what happened to the first application for
supervisory review which had been lodged by the Ministry of Finance
within the statutory time-limit (see paragraph 9 above). A second
application for supervisory review was lodged on 28 June 2004, that
is more than two months after the expiry of the one-year time-limit
(see paragraph 10 above). No copy of any judicial decision extending
the time-limit was made available to the Court. The Government
claimed that the proceedings on the applicant's claim had been
previously suspended pending the Constitutional Court's decision.
This claim does not appear convincing to the Court. Firstly, by the
time the Supreme Court decided to adjourn proceedings on similar
claims in October 2003, the proceedings on the applicant's claim had
already ended with the final appeal judgment of 21 April 2003.
It is not clear how the decision on adjournment of pending
proceedings could have effect on the proceedings that had already
been finished more than five months previously. Secondly, the Court
observes that in October 2003 the statutory time-limit for lodging an
application for supervisory review against the appeal judgment of 21
April 2003 had not yet expired. The Government did not point to any
exceptional circumstances which could have prevented the Ministry of
Finance from filing the supervisory-review application between
October 2003 and April 2004, that is within the statutory time-limit.
The Court finds that by accepting a belated application for
supervisory review without valid grounds the domestic courts breached
the principle of legal certainty.
- In
addition to the laxity of the time-limits which the Court has noted
above, it reiterates its constant approach that in the absence of a
fundamental defect in the previous proceedings a party's disagreement
with the assessment made by the first-instance and appeal courts is
not a circumstance of a substantial and compelling character
warranting the quashing of a binding and enforceable judgment and
re-opening of the proceedings on the applicant's claim (see
Dovguchits v. Russia, no. 2999/03, § 30, 7 June
2007; and Kot v. Russia, no. 20887/03, § 29, 18 January
2007). The Government did not claim that the previous proceedings
before the first-instance and appeal courts had been tarnished by a
fundamental defect. In fact, the judgment in the applicant's favour
was quashed because of incorrect application of substantive law. That
ground was not a fundamental defect within the meaning of the Court's
case-law and could not justify a departure from the principle of
legal certainty.
- The
Court has already found a violation of an applicant's “right to
a court” guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in
the cases in which a judicial decision that had become final and
binding, was subsequently quashed after a substantial delay for the
sole purpose of re-arguing the case (see the Dovguchits, Kot
and Ryabykh judgments, cited above). The Government did
not put forward any arguments which would enable the Court to reach a
different conclusion in the present case. The Court therefore finds
that the quashing of the judgment of 4 March 2003, as upheld on
appeal on 21 April 2003, by way of supervisory review, infringed the
principle of legal certainty and the applicant's “right to a
court”. There has been, accordingly, a violation of Article 6
§ 1 of the Convention.
2. Alleged violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
- The
Court reiterates that the existence of a debt confirmed by a binding
and enforceable judgment furnishes the judgment beneficiary with a
“legitimate expectation” that the debt would be paid and
constitutes the beneficiary's “possessions” within the
meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Quashing of such a
judgment amounts to an interference with his or her right to peaceful
enjoyment of possessions (see, among other authorities, Androsov
v. Russia, no. 63973/00, § 69, 6 October 2005).
- The
Government denied that there had been an interference with the
applicant's rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 because she
could still apply for redemption of the promissory note.
- The
Court observes that the applicant obtained a binding and enforceable
judgment in her favour, by the terms of which the Ministry of Finance
was to pay her a substantial sum of money. She was prevented from
receiving the award through no fault of hers. The quashing of the
enforceable judgment frustrated the applicant's reliance on the
binding judicial decision and deprived her of an opportunity to
receive the money she had legitimately expected to receive. In these
circumstances, even assuming that the interference was lawful and
pursued a legitimate aim, the Court considers that the quashing of
the enforceable judgment in the applicant's favour by way of
supervisory review placed an excessive burden on her and was
incompatible with Article 1 of the Protocol No. 1. There has
therefore been a violation of that Article.
II. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 21,000 euros (EUR) in respect of non-pecuniary
damage and 11,000 US dollars in respect of pecuniary damage,
representing the present-day value of a Russian-made passenger car.
- The
Government submitted that the claim was excessive and unreasonable.
They claimed that no compensation for the pecuniary damage should be
awarded because there had been no violation of the applicant's
rights.
- The
Court recalls that in the instant case it found a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1, in that the judgment in the applicant's favour had remained
unenforced for a long period of time and had been subsequently
quashed. The applicant was thereby prevented from receiving the money
she had legitimately expected to receive. There has been therefore a
causal link between the violations found and the applicant's claim
for the pecuniary damage in so far as it concerned the original award
(compare Prisyazhnikova and Dolgopolov v. Russia,
no. 24247/04, § 45, 28 September 2006). The
applicant's right to receive any additional amount was not upheld in
the domestic proceedings. Accordingly, the Court awards the applicant
EUR 4,100 in respect of the pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may
be chargeable on that amount, and dismisses the remainder of her
claim for the pecuniary damage.
- The
Court further considers that the applicant suffered distress and
frustration because of the State authorities' decision to quash the
judgment in her favour. The particular amount claimed is, however,
excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, the Court
awards the applicant EUR 2,000, plus any tax that may be chargeable
on this amount.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed RUB 4,650 for legal costs incurred before the
Court. She submitted receipts for payment for legal services.
- The
Government pointed out that only reasonable and necessarily incurred
expenses should be reimbursed.
- The Court notes that the applicant was not represented
in the Strasbourg proceedings. However, she must have incurred
expenses in preparing her written pleadings (see Lauko v.
Slovakia, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports of
Judgments and Decisions 1998 VI, § 75). The Court
further notes that the applicant submitted receipts showing the
amount of expenses. Regard being had to the information in its
possession, the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 150 to the
applicant, plus any tax that may be chargeable on this amount.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR
4,100 (four thousand one hundred euros) in respect of pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR
2,000 (two thousand euros) in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(iii) EUR
150 (one hundred and fifty euros) in respect of costs and expenses,
(iv) any
tax that may be chargeable on the above amounts;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three
months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European
Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 24 April 2008, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos
Rozakis
Registrar President
