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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF NADEZHKIN v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 42940/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
12 June
2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Nadezhkin v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos
Rozakis,
President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly
Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar
Hajiyev,
Giorgio
Malinverni,
George
Nicolaou,
judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 22 May 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 42940/02) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Mr Yevgeniy Viktorovich
Nadezhkin (“the applicant”), on 23 November 2002.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev, the Representative of the Russian Federation
at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
28 April 2005 the Court decided to communicate the complaint
concerning non-enforcement of a domestic judgment to the Government.
It also decided to examine
the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility
(Article 29 § 3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1967 and lives in Khabarovsk, the Khabarovsk
Region.
- In
2000 the applicant sued the General Prosecutor’s Office and the
Ministry of Finance for an unfounded criminal prosecution. On 15
December 2000 the Yelizovskiy District Court of the Kamchatka
Regional Court awarded the applicant damages. This judgment became
binding on 22 March 2001, but was not enforced immediately.
- The
applicant mailed enforcement papers to the bailiff’s service
having territorial jurisdiction over the Ministry of Finance’s
head office. The service returned the papers and explained that they
should be mailed to the Treasury.
- The
applicant mailed the papers to the Treasury, but the Treasury
returned them because of several defects: the copy of the judgment
was not certified, the writ of enforcement contained no time-limit,
and the name of the court indicated in the papers mismatched that
indicated in the seals.
- The
applicant removed these defects and on 23 May 2002 resubmitted the
papers. On 19 November 2002 the judgment was enforced.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Under
section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July
1997, a bailiff must enforce a judgment within two months. Under
section 242.2.6 of the Budget Code of 31 July 1998, the Ministry of
Finance must enforce a judgment within three months.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- The
applicant complained of the lengthy non-enforcement of the judgment.
The Court examined this complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. As far as relevant, these
Articles read as follows:
Article 6
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government argued that this complaint was manifestly ill-founded. The
delay was attributable to the applicant’s failure to follow the
correct enforcement procedure. The authorities had strictly respected
the time-limits laid down in domestic law. Besides, at the material
time, the rules of enforcement had been undergoing change in order to
improve budgetary efficiency.
- The
applicant argued that this complaint was well-founded. The court had
delayed the issue of the enforcement papers, and the papers which it
did issue were defective.
- The
Court considers that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that a person who has obtained a judgment against
the State may not be expected to bring separate enforcement
proceedings (see Metaxas
v. Greece, no. 8415/02,
§ 19, 27 May 2004). Where a judgment is against the
State, the defendant State authority must be duly notified
thereof and is thus well placed to take all necessary initiatives to
comply with it or to transmit it to another competent State authority
responsible for compliance. This especially applies where, in view of
the complexities and possible overlapping of the execution and
enforcement procedures, an applicant may have reasonable doubts about
which authority is responsible for the execution or enforcement of
the judgment.
- The
Court already admitted in the past that a successful litigant may be
required to undertake certain procedural steps in order to recover
the judgment debt, be it during a voluntary execution of a judgment
by the State or during its enforcement by compulsory means (see
Shvedov v. Russia,
no. 69306/01, § 29–37, 20 October 2005).
Accordingly, it is not unreasonable that the authorities request the
applicant to produce additional documents, such as bank details, to
allow or speed up the execution of a judgment (see,
mutatis mutandis,
Kosmidis and Kosmidou v.
Greece, no. 32141/04, §
24, 8 November 2007). In the Court’s view, the
requirement of the creditor’s cooperation must not, however, go
beyond what is strictly necessary and, in any event, does not relieve
the authorities of their obligation under the Convention to take
timely and ex officio action, on the basis of the
information available to them, with a view to honouring the judgment
against the State.
- In
the present case, by taking no initiative to comply with the judgment
during one year and seven months, the State has breached Article 6 of
the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see Burdov
v. Russia, no.
59498/00, § 33–42, ECHR 2002–III).
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained under Article 7 about the conduct of the
proceedings by the domestic courts. However, in the light of all the
material in its possession, and in so far as the matters complained
of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do not
disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set
out in the Convention or its Protocols.
- It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
- The
applicant submitted a claim for just satisfaction, without, however,
specifying and substantiating it. Accordingly, the Court considers
that there is no call to award him any sum on that account.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning
non-enforcement of the judgment admissible and the remainder of the
application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention and of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1;
- Dismisses the applicant’s claim for just
satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 12 June 2008,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
