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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF LYUDMILA SMIRNOVA v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 8910/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3
July 2008
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Lyudmila Smirnova v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Christos Rozakis, President,
Nina
Vajić,
Anatoly Kovler,
Elisabeth
Steiner,
Khanlar Hajiyev,
Dean
Spielmann,
Sverre Erik Jebens, judges,
and Søren
Nielsen, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 12 June 2008,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 8910/04) against the Russian
Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Russian national, Ms Lyudmila Ivanovna
Smirnova (“the applicant”), on 2 February 2004.
- The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr P. Laptev and Mrs V. Milinchuk, the Representatives of
the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
- On
25 October 2006 the Court decided to give notice of the application
to the Government. Under the provisions of Article 29 § 3 of the
Convention, it decided to examine the merits of the application at
the same time as its admissibility.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1951 and lives in Shakhty, a town in Rostov
Region.
- In
1998–2001 the applicant’s father obtained seven judgment
debts against his employer OAO Rostovugol, a joint-stock company
managing coal mines in the Rostov Region. To enforce the judgments,
bailiffs attached the company’s bank accounts, means of
transport, and property, and audited the company’s cashow.
- On
12 March 2002 the company’s shareholders voted for the
company’s liquidation.
- On
8 October 2002, the applicant’s father died, having signed away
the judgment debts to the applicant. On 1 December 2003 the Shakhty
Town Court acknowledged the applicant as a beneficiary of the
judgment debts. This judgment became binding on 11 December 2003.
Five judgment debts were paid on 6 April 2004, and two on 17 February
2005
- On
9 March 2005 the company was declared bankrupt.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Under
section 9 of the Federal Law on Enforcement Proceedings of 21 July
1997, a bailiff must enforce a judgment within two months.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION AND OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- The
applicant complained under Article 6 of the Convention and Article 1
of Protocol No. 1 about the non-enforcement of the judgments. Insofar
as relevant, these Articles read as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ...
by [a] ... tribunal...”
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other
contributions or penalties.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government argued that this complaint was inadmissible. The State had
not been responsible for the company’s debts. The State had
owned 48.42% of the company’s stock, and had not managed the
company. The State had been responsible only for the bailiffs, but
they had acted efficiently. All the debts had eventually been
paid.
- The
applicant argued that her complaint was admissible. The State had
been responsible for the company’s debts, because it was the
State’s representatives who had initiated the company’s
liquidation. Under the law, the federal budget had had to contain
allocations for workers from liquidated mines. The bailiffs had idled
and had had a poor knowledge of laws concerning enforcement.
- The
Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Court reiterates that an unreasonably long delay in the enforcement
of a binding judgment may breach the Convention (see Burdov v.
Russia, no. 59498/00, ECHR 2002 III). However, it has
earlier found that the State was not responsible for the debts of OAO
Rostovugol (see Anokhin v. Russia (dec.), no. 25867/02, 31 May
2007). Hence, the Court’s role in this case is limited to
ascertaining that the State diligently urged the debtor to comply
with the judgment (see Fociac v. Romania, no. 2577/02, §§
69–70, 3 February 2005).
- In
the case at hand, the bailiffs do not seem to have idled: they
attached the company’s assets and monitored its finances.
The bailiffs’ efforts resulted in reasonably fast payment: five
judgments were enforced three months after the applicant had acquired
the title to them, and two other judgments were enforced one year and
two months after the applicant had acquired the title to them.
- There
has, accordingly, been no violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the application admissible;
- Holds that there has been no violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention or Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 July 2008,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Søren Nielsen Christos Rozakis
Registrar President
