FOURTH SECTION

CASE OF MICHAEL v. TURKEY

(Application no. 18361/91)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

27 January 2009

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Michael v. Turkey,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
	Nicolas Bratza, President,
	Lech Garlicki,
	Ljiljana Mijović,
	David Thór Björgvinsson,
	Ján Šikuta,
	Päivi Hirvelä,
	Işıl Karakaş, judges,
and Fatoş AracıDeputySection Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 6 January 2009,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in an application (no. 18361/91) against the Republic of Turkey lodged with the European Commission of Human Rights (“the Commission”) under former Article 25 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Cypriot national, Mr Michalis Michael (“the applicant”), on 7 June 1991.
2.  The applicant was represented by Mr K. Chrysostomides, a lawyer practising in Nicosia. The Turkish Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Z.M. Necatigil.
3.  The applicant alleged that the Turkish occupation of the northern part of Cyprus had deprived him of his home and properties.
4.  The application was transmitted to the Court on 1 November 1998, when Protocol No. 11 to the Convention came into force (Article 5 § 2 of Protocol No. 11).
5.  By a decision of 24 August 1999 the Court declared the application admissible.
6.  The applicant and the Government each filed observations on the merits (Rule 59 § 1). In addition, third-party comments were received from the Government of Cyprus, which had exercised its right to intervene (Article 36 § 1 of the Convention and Rule 44 § 1 (b)).
THE FACTS
7.  The applicant was born in 1957 and lives in Nicosia.
8.  The applicant stated that he had been living in a house in Kyrenia and was the owner of a field with trees in the village of Ayios Epiktitos. As a result of the 1974 Turkish military intervention he had been deprived of his property rights, his property being located in the area which was under the occupation and the overall control of the Turkish military authorities. The latter had prevented him from having access to and using his house and property. He was being continuously prevented from entering the northern part of Cyprus because of his Greek-Cypriot origin.
9.  The applicant produced two certificates from the Department of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus, stating that he was the legal and registered owner of the following immovable property in the District of Kyrenia:
-  Kyrenia, Ayios Epiktitos, Mevlitoudi, field with trees, sheet/plan 13/25, plot no. 120, surface: hectares 2, decares 2, sq. m 663, share: ¼.
10.  The applicant acquired ownership of this property on 27 June 1990, when it was transferred to him by way of inheritance from his grandfather and a gift from his parents.
11.  On 9 December 1990 the applicant made one further attempt to return to his property in northern Cyprus by participating in a convoy of cars of fellow refugees intending to return home during a peaceful march towards their villages. The applicant and his fellow refugees, who had informed the Commander of the United Nations (UN) forces in Cyprus of their intentions, stopped at the check point in the “buffer zone”, on the main road linking Nicosia with Ayios Amvrosios and Kyrenia. There, they asked the UN officer on duty to be allowed to return to their homes, property and villages. They requested the same officer to forward their demand to the Turkish military authorities. The officer replied that the latter had refused their request.
THE LAW
I.  THE GOVERNMENT'S PRELIMINARY OBJECTIONS
12.  The Government raised preliminary objections of inadmissibility ratione loci and ratione temporis, non-exhaustion of domestic remedies and lack of victim status. The Court observes that these objections were identical to those raised in the case of Alexandrou v. Turkey (no. 16162/90, §§ 11-22, 20 January 2009), and should be dismissed for the same reasons.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL NO. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
13.  The applicant complained of a violation of his right to peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. He submitted that he had been prevented from returning to and making use of his property in northern Cyprus.
He invoked Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, which reads as follows:
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or penalties.”
14.  The Government disputed this claim.
A.  The arguments of the parties
1.  The Government
15.  The Government submitted that the applicant had produced no evidence to show that at the time of the 1974 Turkish intervention he had been the owner of immovable property either in Kyrenia or in Ayios Epiktitos. The applicant had confined himself in producing a certificate obtained from the Greek Cypriot Department of Lands and Surveys on 21 October 1992, at the applicant's request and on the basis of information supplied by him. According to this document, a certain “Michail Michail” was the owner of a “field with trees” (plot no. 120) in Ayios Epiktitos, which he had acquired only on 27 June 1990. In the Government's opinion, this did not prove that the applicant had title to the land at issue at the material time.
16.  Moreover, the applicant had not applied through the proper channels to visit his alleged properties. He had not attempted to enter the northern part of Cyprus at an approved crossing point, and had not been prevented from doing so by Turkish or Turkish-Cypriot forces. He had been stopped on the southern side of the buffer zone by UNFICYP, in the vicinity of the Greek-Cypriot cease-fire line. The Turkish forces had not been in any way involved in the incident.
17.  Finally, the alleged interference with the applicant's property rights could not be seen in isolation from the general political situation on the island of Cyprus and was in any event justified in the general interest.
2.  The applicant
18.  The applicant observed that he had produced prima facie evidence that in 1990 he had become the owner of a field with trees in the village of Ayios Epiktitos. Relying on the principles laid down by the Court in the case of Loizidou v. Turkey ((merits), 18 December 1996, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996-VI), he alleged that the interference with his property rights had been unlawful, had not served a legitimate aim and had been in any event not a proportionate act maintaining a fair balance between the rights of the individual and the public interest.
B.  The third-party intervener's arguments
19.  The Government of Cyprus observed that their Department of Lands and Surveys had provided certificates confirming ownership in favour of those persons who did not have title deeds in their possession but whose title was entered in the District Land Offices registers in the Turkish-occupied area. These certificates were prima facie evidence of their right of property. The authorities of the “Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus” (the “TRNC”) were in possession of all the records of the Department of Lands and Surveys relating to the title to properties. It was therefore the duty of the respondent Government to produce them.
20.  The Government of Cyprus further noted that the present case was similar to that of Loizidou ((merits), cited above), where the Court had found that the loss of control of property by displaced persons arose as a consequence of the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus by Turkish troops and the establishment of the “TRNC”, and that the denial of access to property in occupied northern Cyprus constituted a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
C.  The Court's assessment
21.  The Court first notes that the applicant has submitted certificates issued by the Departments of Lands and Surveys of the Republic of Cyprus providing prima facie evidence that he had a title of ownership (in the share of ¼) over the “field with trees” located in the village of Ayios Epiktitos (see paragraph 9 above). As the respondent Government failed to produce convincing evidence in rebuttal, the Court considers that the applicant had a “possession” over this field within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
22.  The Court recalls that in the aforementioned Loizidou case ((merits) cited above, §§ 63-64), it reasoned as follows:
“63.  ... as a consequence of the fact that the applicant has been refused access to the land since 1974, she has effectively lost all control over, as well as all possibilities to use and enjoy, her property. The continuous denial of access must therefore be regarded as an interference with her rights under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Such an interference cannot, in the exceptional circumstances of the present case to which the applicant and the Cypriot Government have referred, be regarded as either a deprivation of property or a control of use within the meaning of the first and second paragraphs of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. However, it clearly falls within the meaning of the first sentence of that provision as an interference with the peaceful enjoyment of possessions. In this respect the Court observes that hindrance can amount to a violation of the Convention just like a legal impediment.
64.  Apart from a passing reference to the doctrine of necessity as a justification for the acts of the 'TRNC' and to the fact that property rights were the subject of intercommunal talks, the Turkish Government have not sought to make submissions justifying the above interference with the applicant's property rights which is imputable to Turkey.
It has not, however, been explained how the need to rehouse displaced Turkish Cypriot refugees in the years following the Turkish intervention in the island in 1974 could justify the complete negation of the applicant's property rights in the form of a total and continuous denial of access and a purported expropriation without compensation.
Nor can the fact that property rights were the subject of intercommunal talks involving both communities in Cyprus provide a justification for this situation under the Convention. In such circumstances, the Court concludes that there has been and continues to be a breach of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.”
23.  In the case of Cyprus v. Turkey ([GC], no. 25781/94, ECHR 2001‑IV) the Court confirmed the above conclusions (§§ 187 and 189):
“187.  he Court is persuaded that both its reasoning and its conclusion in the Loizidou judgment (merits) apply with equal force to displaced Greek Cypriots who, like Mrs Loizidou, are unable to have access to their property in northern Cyprus by reason of the restrictions placed by the “TRNC” authorities on their physical access to that property. The continuing and total denial of access to their property is a clear interference with the right of the displaced Greek Cypriots to the peaceful enjoyment of possessions within the meaning of the first sentence of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1.
...
189.  .. there has been a continuing violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the fact that Greek-Cypriot owners of property in northern Cyprus are being denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of their property as well as any compensation for the interference with their property rights.”
24.  The Court sees no reason in the instant case to depart from the conclusions which it reached in the Loizidou and Cyprus v. Turkey cases (op. cit.; see also Demades v. Turkey, (merits), no. 16219/90, § 46, 31 July 2003).
25.  Accordingly, it concludes that there has been and continues to be a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 by virtue of the fact that the applicant is denied access to and control, use and enjoyment of his property as well as any compensation for the interference with his property rights.
III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE CONVENTION
26.  The applicant submitted that in 1974 he had had his home in Kyrenia. As he had been unable to return there, he was the victim of a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
This provision reads as follows:
“1.  Everyone has the right to respect for his private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2.  There shall be no interference by a public authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
27.  The Government disputed this claim, observing that the applicant was no longer living in the area where he allegedly had had his “home”. In any event, the applicant's inability to return to northern Cyprus had been an inevitable consequence of the political state of affairs on the island and of the existence of the UN buffer zone. The alleged interference with his rights under Article 8 had therefore been necessary in the interests of national security, public safety, for the prevention of disorder and for the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.
28.  The applicant submitted that, contrary to the applicant in the Loizidou case, himself, his mother (the applicant in application no. 18360/91) and his father (the applicant in application no. 18364/91) had had their principal residence in the town of Kyrenia. He claimed that any interference with his Article 8 rights had not been justified under the second paragraph of this provision.
29.  The Government of Cyprus submitted that where the applicant's properties constituted the person's home, there was a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
30.  The Court notes that the Government failed to produce any evidence capable of casting doubt upon the applicant's statement that, at the time of the Turkish invasion, he was regularly residing in Kyrenia and that this house was treated by the applicant and his family as a home.
31.  Accordingly, the Court considers that in the circumstances of the present case, the house where the applicant was living with his parents qualified as “home” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention at the time when the acts complained of took place.
32.  The Court observes that the present case differs from the Loizidou case (merits, op. cit.) since, unlike Mrs Loizidou, the applicant actually had a home in Kyrenia.
33.  The Court notes that since 1974 the applicant has been unable to gain access to and to use that home. In connection with this the Court recalls that, in its judgment in the case of Cyprus v. Turkey (cited above, §§ 172‑175), it concluded that the complete denial of the right of Greek‑Cypriot displaced persons to respect for their homes in northern Cyprus since 1974 constituted a continuing violation of Article 8 of the Convention. The Court reasoned as follows:
“172.  The Court observes that the official policy of the 'TRNC' authorities to deny the right of the displaced persons to return to their homes is reinforced by the very tight restrictions operated by the same authorities on visits to the north by Greek Cypriots living in the south. Accordingly, not only are displaced persons unable to apply to the authorities to reoccupy the homes which they left behind, they are physically prevented from even visiting them.
173.  The Court further notes that the situation impugned by the applicant Government has obtained since the events of 1974 in northern Cyprus. It would appear that it has never been reflected in 'legislation' and is enforced as a matter of policy in furtherance of a bi-zonal arrangement designed, it is claimed, to minimise the risk of conflict which the intermingling of the Greek and Turkish-Cypriot communities in the north might engender. That bi-zonal arrangement is being pursued within the framework of the inter-communal talks sponsored by the United Nations Secretary-General ...
174.  The Court would make the following observations in this connection: firstly, the complete denial of the right of displaced persons to respect for their homes has no basis in law within the meaning of Article 8 § 2 of the Convention (see paragraph 173 above); secondly, the inter-communal talks cannot be invoked in order to legitimate a violation of the Convention; thirdly, the violation at issue has endured as a matter of policy since 1974 and must be considered continuing.
175.  In view of these considerations, the Court concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article 8 of the Convention by reason of the refusal to allow the return of any Greek-Cypriot displaced persons to their homes in northern Cyprus.”
34.  The Court sees no reason in the instant case to depart from the above reasoning and findings (see also Demades (merits), cited above, §§ 36-37).
35.  Accordingly, it concludes that there has been a continuing violation of Article 8 of the Convention on account of the complete denial of the applicant's right to respect for his home.
IV.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
36.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.  Pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage
1.  The parties' submissions
(a)  The applicant
37.  In his just satisfaction claims of 29 October 1999, the applicant requested 14,804 Cypriot pounds (CYP – approximately 25,294 euros (EUR)) for pecuniary damage. He relied on an expert's report assessing the value of his losses which included the loss of annual rent collected or expected to be collected from renting out his field in Ayios Epiktitos, plus interest from the date on which such rents were due until the day of payment. The rent claimed was for the period dating back to January 1987, when the respondent Government accepted the right of individual petition, until 1999. The applicant did not claim compensation for any purported expropriation since he was still the legal owner of the property. The valuation report contained a description of Ayios Epiktitos village and of the applicant's field, which was a grove covered with olive and carob trees. It had mainly an agricultural use.
38.  According to the valuation report, the rent payable for agricultural lands depended on the nature of the use and on the productivity of the property. According to the information provided by the applicant, the trees in his field were in a very good condition and in full production. As olive and carob trees had an indefinite life span and there was a steady demand for their products, the rent payable in 1974 could be fixed at CYP 35 (approximately EUR 60) per decare per annum. As the applicant owned ¼ of a field of approximately 22 decares, the rent payable in 1974 was estimated at CYP 198 (approximately EUR 338). The expert further took into account the trends in rent increase (an average of 7% per annum for agricultural properties). Moreover, compound interest for delayed payment was applied at a rate of 8% per annum.
39.  On 25 January 2008, following a request from the Court for an update on developments in the case, the applicant submitted updated claims for just satisfaction, which were meant to cover the period of loss of use of the property from 1 January 1987 to 31 December 2007. He produced a revised valuation report which, on the basis of the criteria adopted in the previous report, concluded that the whole sum due for the loss of use was CYP 21,407 plus CYP 19,706 for interests (the interest applied from 2001 onwards was 6 percent per annum). The total sum claimed under this head was thus CYP 41,113 (approximately EUR 70,245).
40.  In his just satisfaction claims of 29 October 1999, the applicant claimed CYP 55,000 (approximately EUR 93,973) in respect of non‑pecuniary damage. This sum had been calculated on the basis of the sum awarded by the Court in the Loizidou case ((just satisfaction), 28 July 1998, Reports 1998-IV), taking into account, however, that the period of time for which the damage was claimed in the instant case was longer and that there had also been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention.
(b)  The Government
41.  the original applicant had passed away or the property had changed hands, questions might arise as to whether the new owners had a legal interest in the property and whether they were entitled to pecuniary and/or non-pecuniary damages.
42.  The Government further noted that some applicants had shared properties and that it had not been proved that their co-owners had agreed to the partition of the possessions. Nor, when claiming damages based on the assumption that the properties had been rented after 1974, had the applicants shown that the rights of the said co-owners under domestic law had been respected.
43.  The Government further submitted that as an annual increase of the value of the properties had been applied, it would be unfair to add compound interest for delayed payment, and that Turkey had recognised the jurisdiction of the Court on 21 January 1990, and not in January 1987. In any event, the alleged 1974 market value of the properties was exorbitant, highly excessive and speculative; it was not based on any real data with which to make a comparison and made insufficient allowance for the volatility of the property market and its susceptibility to influences both domestic and international. The report submitted by the applicant had instead proceeded on the assumption that the property market would have continued to flourish with sustained growth during the whole period under consideration.
44.  The Government produced a valuation report prepared by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities, which they considered to be based on a “realistic assessment of the 1974 market values, having regard to the relevant land records and comparative sales in the areas where the properties [were] situated”. This report contained two proposals, assessing, respectively, the sum due for the loss of use of the properties and their present value. The second proposal was made in order to give the applicant the option to sell the property to the State, thereby relinquishing title to and claims in respect of it.
45.  The report prepared by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities specified that it would not be possible to envisage restitution of the property described in paragraph 9 above, which could only give entitlement to financial compensation, to be calculated on the basis of the loss of income (by applying a 5% rent on the 1974 market value) and increase in value of the plot of land between 1974 and the date of payment. Had the applicant applied to the Immovable Property Commission, the latter would have offered CYP 39,644.51 (approximately EUR 67,736) to compensate the loss of use and CYP 42,226.78 (approximately EUR 72,148) for the value of the property. According to an expert appointed by the “TRNC” authorities, the 1974 open-market value of the applicant's plot of land was CYP 6,900 (approximately EUR 11,789). Upon fulfilment of certain conditions, the Immovable Property Commission could also have offered the applicant exchange of his property with Turkish-Cypriot properties located in the south of the island.
46.  The Government further noted that there was no specification of property in the application form or in the decision on admissibility, with the exception of a statement that the applicant was born and raised in Ayios Amvrosios village and that in 1973 he had moved his residence to Kyrenia, where he had been the owner of a “fully furnished house”. The only evidence submitted by the applicant was a certificate obtained from the Greek-Cypriot authorities on 21 October 1992 in respect of a plot of land in Ayios Epiktitos (and not in Ayios Amvrosios). No further detail about the property in question was contained in the applicant's updated claims for just satisfaction.
47.  
2.  The third-party intervener
48.  The Government of Cyprus fully supported the applicant's updated claims for just satisfaction.
3.  The Court's assessment
49.  The Court first notes that the Government's submission that doubts might arise as to the applicant's title of ownership over the property at issue (see paragraphs 41 and 46 above) is, in substance, an objection of incompatibility ratione materiae with the provisions of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. Such an objection should have been raised before the application was declared admissible or, at the latest, in the context of the parties' observations on the merits. In any event, the Court cannot but confirm its finding that the applicant had a “possession” over the field in Ayios Epiktitos within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 (see paragraph 21 above).
50.  In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the question of the application of Article 41 in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage is not ready for decision. It observes, in particular, that the parties have failed to provide reliable and objective data pertaining to the prices of land and real estate in Cyprus at the date of the Turkish intervention. This failure renders it difficult for the Court to assess whether the estimate furnished by the applicant of the 1974 market value of his plot of land is reasonable. The question must accordingly be reserved and the subsequent procedure fixed with due regard to any agreement which might be reached between the respondent Government and the applicant (Rule 75 § 1 of the Rules of Court).
B.  Costs and expenses
51.  In his just satisfaction claims of 29 October 1999, relying on bills from his representative, the applicant sought CYP 3,400 (approximately EUR 5,809) for legal fees and CYP 1,080 (approximately EUR 1,845) for the cost of the expert report assessing the value of his property. In his updated claims for just satisfaction of 25 January 2008, the applicant submitted additional bills of costs for the new valuation report and for legal fees amounting to EUR 517.5 and EUR 2,000 respectively. The total sum sought for cost and expenses was thus EUR 10,171.5.
52.  The Government did not comment on this point.
53.  In the circumstances of the case, the Court considers that the question of the application of Article 41 in respect of costs and expenses is not ready for decision. The question must accordingly be reserved and the subsequent procedure fixed with due regard to any agreement which might be reached between the respondent Government and the applicant.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT
1.  Dismisses by six votes to one the Government's preliminary objections;

2.  Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;

3.  Holds by six votes to one that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the Convention;

4.  Holds unanimously that the question of the application of Article 41 is not ready for decision;
      accordingly,
(a)  reserves the said question in whole;
(b)  invites the Government and the applicant to submit, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement that they may reach;
	(c)  reserves the further procedure and delegates to the President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 27 January 2009, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	Fatoş Aracı	Nicolas Bratza
	Deputy Registrar	President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74 § 2 of the Rules of Court, the dissenting opinion of Judge Karakaş is annexed to this judgment.
N.B.
F.A.

DISSENTING OPINION OF JUDGE KARAKAŞ
(Translation)
Unlike the majority, I consider that the objection of non-exhaustion of domestic remedies raised by the Government should not have been rejected. Consequently, I cannot agree with the finding of violations of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and of Article 8 of the Convention.
The rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies is intended to give Contracting States the opportunity to prevent or provide redress for violations alleged against them before such allegations are referred to the Court. That reflects the subsidiary nature of the Convention system.
Faced with the scale of the problem of deprivations of title to property alleged by Greek Cypriots (approximately 1,400 applications of this type lodged against Turkey), the Court, in the operative part of its Xenides‑Arestis v. Turkey judgment of 22 December 2005, required the respondent State to provide a remedy guaranteeing the effective protection of the rights set forth in Article 8 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in the context of all the similar cases pending before it. The State has a legal obligation not just to pay those concerned the sums awarded by way of just satisfaction under Article 41 of the Convention, but also to select the general or, if appropriate, individual measures to be adopted in its domestic legal order to put an end to the violation found by the Court and to redress so far as possible the effects. The Government submitted that by enacting the Law on Compensation for Immovable Properties (Law no. 67/2005) and setting up a Commission to deal with compensation claims it had discharged that obligation (see also Xenides‑Arestis v. Turkey (just satisfaction), no. 46347/99, § 37, 7 December 2006). It is that domestic remedy which, in their submission, the applicant failed to exercise in the present case.
The exhaustion of domestic remedies is normally assessed at the time when an application is lodged with the Court. However, there are exceptions to the rule which may be justified by the particular circumstances of each case (see Baumann v. France, no. 33592/96, § 47, ECHR 2001-V (extracts)).
Examples of such exceptions are to be found in the cases against Italy which raised similar questions and in which the Court found that certain specific facts justified departing from the general principle (see Brusco v. Italy, (dec.) no. 69789/01, ECHR 2001-IX).
In other examples the Court also took the view, in the light of the specific facts of the cases concerned, and having regard to the subsidiary nature of the Convention mechanism, that new domestic remedies had not been exhausted (see the following decisions: Nogolica v. Croatia, no. 77784/01, ECHR 2002-VIII; Slaviček v. Croatia, no. 20862/02, ECHR 2002-VII; Andrášik and Others v. Slovakia, nos. 57984/00, 60226/00, 60242/00, 60679/00, 60680/00 and 68563/01, ECHR 2002-IX; and Içyer v. Turkey, no. 18888/02, ECHR 2006-I).
In situations where there is no effective remedy affording the opportunity to complain of alleged violations, individuals are systematically compelled to submit to the European Court of Human Rights applications which could have been investigated first of all within the domestic legal order. In that way, the functioning of the Convention system risks losing its effectiveness in the long term (the most pertinent example is the Broniowski v. Poland case ([GC], no. 31443/96, ECHR 2004-V).
In my opinion the above examples provide an opportunity to review the conditions for admissibility in the event of a major change in the circumstances of the case. For the similar post-Loizidou cases, the Court can always reconsider its admissibility decision and examine the preliminary objection of failure to exhaust domestic remedies.
Since the Court may reject “at any stage of the proceedings” (Article 35 § 4 of the Convention) an application which it considers inadmissible, new facts brought to its attention may lead it, even when examining the case on the merits, to reconsider the decision in which the application was declared admissible and ultimately declare it inadmissible pursuant to Article 35 § 4 of the Convention, taking due account of the context (see, for example,  (dec.), no. 29958/96, 8 April 2003, and  [GC], no. 56679/00, §§ 37-43, ECHR 2004-III).
The existence of a “new fact” which has come to light after the admissibility decision may prompt the Court to reconsider that decision.
I consider that the Law on Compensation for Immovable Properties (Law no. 67/2005) and the Commission set up to deal with compensation claims, which are based on the guiding principles laid down by the Court in the Xenides-Arestis case, are capable of providing an opportunity for the State authorities to provide redress for breaches of the Convention's provisions, including breaches alleged in applications already lodged with the Court before the Act's entry into force (see Içyer, cited above, § 72). That consideration also applies to applications already declared admissible by the Court (see Azinas, cited above).
In order to conclude whether there has or has not been a breach of the Convention, complainants must first exercise the new domestic remedy and then, if necessary, lodge an application with the European Court of Human Rights, the international court. Following that logic, I cannot in this case find any violation of the Convention's provisions.