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SECOND
SECTION
CASE OF TEMEL AND OTHERS v. TURKEY
(Application
no. 36458/02)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
3
March 2009
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Temel and Others v.
Turkey,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Françoise Tulkens,
President,
Ireneu Cabral Barreto,
Vladimiro
Zagrebelsky,
Danutė Jočienė,
András
Sajó,
Nona Tsotsoria,
Işıl Karakaş,
judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Section
Deputy Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 16 December 2008 and on 10 February
2009,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on the latter date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 36458/02) against the Republic
of Turkey lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention
for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by eighteen Turkish nationals (“the
applicants”)
on 13 August 2002.
- The
applicants were represented by Mr M. Rollas, a lawyer practising in
İzmir. The Turkish Government (“the Government”)
were represented by their Agent for the purposes of the proceedings
before the Court.
- On
15 September 2006 the President of the Second Section decided to give
notice of the application to the Government. It was also decided to
examine the merits of the application at the same time as its
admissibility (Article 29 § 3).
- By
a letter dated 16 December 2008 the applicants' representative
informed the Court that one of the applicants, Mr Hamit Çiftçi
had died.
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicants were students at various faculties attached to Afyon
Kocatepe University in Afyon, Turkey, at the time of the events.
- On
various dates between 27 December 2001 and 4 January 2002 the
applicants petitioned the University Rector's Office and requested
that Kurdish language classes be introduced as an optional module.
- Around
the same time similar petitions were submitted by students studying
at various Universities in Turkey.
- The
following are extracts from the petition submitted by the applicants:
“... When Article 42 of the Constitution
concerning the right to instruction and education is considered
together with the recent amendment to the Constitution, it must be
held to provide a constitutional right to education in the language
one knows the best: one's mother tongue...
... Unfortunately, for years, starting with the Kurds,
peoples in Turkey were treated as if they did not exist and, owing to
fears of secession, they were prevented from developing their
languages and cultures...
As a student who believes that I am taking a step to
assist the democratisation in Turkey, I request from the Chancellor
of our University that Kurdish be taught in our University, under
optional courses.”
- On
18 January 2002, relying on Regulation 9 (d) of the Disciplinary
Regulations of Higher Education Institutions, the Administrative
Board of Afyon Kocatepe University, after having heard the defence
submissions of the applicants, suspended them from the university for
a period of two terms starting from spring term, except for Mr Pulat,
who was suspended for one term after having shown remorse, on the
ground that although they appeared to be lodging individual
petitions, the petitions were the same as regards style and content,
and the applicants had acknowledged that their acts had constituted
an offence for which they showed no remorse.
- The
applicants, upon notification of the disciplinary sanctions in
question, lodged separate actions with the Denizli Administrative
Court, requesting a stay of execution of the disciplinary decisions,
to be followed by their annulment.
- On
various dates, the applicants' requests for a stay of execution were
rejected by the Denizli Administrative Court, without any further
elaboration, on the ground that the conditions required under
domestic law were not met.
- These
decisions were upheld by the Denizli Regional Administrative Court on
the ground that none of the arguments advanced by the applicants
provided sufficient reasons to set aside the first-instance court's
decision.
- In
the course of the proceedings the applicants claimed to have
unsuccessfully sought another stay of execution of disciplinary
decisions given in respect of them.
- In
the meantime, however, it appears that in a similar case brought
before the Istanbul Administrative Court, that court, on 9 May 2002,
had suspended the execution of the disciplinary sanction. In its
decision the court examined the content of the petition and the
manner in which the disciplinary procedure was handled. It found that
the disciplinary sanction in question was unlawful and that,
therefore, its application would cause irreparable damage to the
plaintiff.
- On
24 October 2002 the Denizli Administrative Court examined the merits
of the cases and dismissed them. In its decisions, the court noted,
inter alia, that the University Rector's Office had received
information from the Afyon Governor's Office about the PKK's
new strategy of action within the framework of civil disobedience,
which included, inter alia, petitioning for education in
Kurdish. The administration considered therefore that the identical
petitions submitted around the same time by the applicants, who were
persistent and threatening in their requests, were part of a planned
and organised action contrary to Article 9 (d) of the Disciplinary
Regulations of Higher Education Institutions.
- In
December 2003 the Supreme Administrative Court quashed those
decisions and remitted the case to the first-instance court.
- On
12 May 2004 the Denizli Administrative Court adhered to the Supreme
Administrative Court's ruling and annulled the disciplinary sanctions
against the applicants. In its decision, the court noted, inter
alia, that section 74 of the Constitution enables Turkish
nationals to petition the authorities in matters concerning their own
or the public interest. It further noted that, pursuant to section 4
(a) of Higher Education Law, higher education aimed to train students
in becoming citizens who are, inter alia, objective,
broad minded, and respectful of human rights, developed
physically, mentally, psychologically,
morally and emotionally, in a balanced
way, and who contribute to the country's
development and welfare and at the same time acquire the necessary
knowledge and skills for their future vocations. Accordingly,
the applicants' petitions to the authorities for optional Kurdish
language classes could not be construed as acts which gives rise to
polarization on the basis of language, race, religion or denomination
within the meaning of Regulation 9 (d) of the Disciplinary
Regulations of Higher Education Institutions and did not run counter
to the aims sought by higher education under section 4 (a) of Higher
Education Law. The court further noted that the latest legislative
amendment of 9 August 2002 permitted the creation of private
courses in order to allow Turkish citizens to learn different
languages and dialects which they would traditionally use in their
daily life.
- In
the meantime, criminal proceedings brought against the applicants had
ended with their acquittal on charges of aiding and abetting an
illegal armed organisation.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
- A
description of the relevant domestic law at the material time can be
found in Leyla Şahin v. Turkey ([GC], no. 44774/98, §§ 48
and 50-51, ECHR 2005 XI), and in Mürsel Eren v. Turkey
(no. 60856/00, § 24, ECHR 2006 II).
- Regulation
9 (d) of the Disciplinary Regulations of Higher Education
Institutions provides that a person who engages in activities which
give rise to polarization on the basis of language, race, religion or
denomination is to be suspended from the institution in question for
either half or a whole term.
- Under section 13 of the Administrative Procedure Act
(Law no. 2577
of 6 January 1982), those who have suffered damage on account
of a wrongful act by the administration may bring compensation
proceedings against the latter within a year from the date on which
they learned of the impugned act and, in any event, within five years
from the commission of that act. The proceedings before the
administrative courts are in writing.
- Persons
who have sustained damage as a result of an administrative act may
also file an application with the superior authority of the relevant
administrative body and request the annulment, withdrawal or
alteration of the impugned act (section 11 of the Administrative
Procedure Act). The administrative authorities' failure to reply
within sixty days is considered to be a tacit refusal of that request
(section 10 of the Administrative Procedure Act). The persons
concerned may then bring an action before the administrative courts
requesting the annulment of the administrative act and compensation
for the damage they have sustained (section 12 of the Administrative
Procedure Act).
- Article
27 § 2 of the Administrative Procedure Act stipulates that the
Supreme Administrative Court or a lower administrative court may
decide to stay the execution of an administrative act if its
implementation would result in damage which would be difficult or
impossible to compensate, and if this act is clearly unlawful.
THE LAW
I. PRELIMINARY REMARKS
- By
a letter dated 16 December 2008 the applicants' lawyer informed the
Court that one of the applicants, Mr Hamit Çiftçi
had died. By a letter dated 9 January 2009 the applicants' lawyer
submitted to the Court that Mr Hamit Çiftçi had no
surviving first degree relatives and had grown up in children's
homes. However, the lawyer had found out that Mr Hamit Çiftçi
had a maternal uncle. In a letter dated 13 January 2009 the
applicants' lawyer maintained that he had not been able to obtain
authority from the applicant's maternal uncle and that he was trying
to establish whether Mr Hamit Çiftçi had other
surviving relatives. The Court has not yet received any further
information.
- The
Court observes that Mr Hamit Çiftçi died and that
no request has been submitted by that applicant's heirs to pursue the
examination of the case. Furthermore, in accordance with Article 37 §
1 in fine, the Court finds no special circumstances regarding
respect for human rights as defined in the Convention and its
Protocols which require the examination of this application to be
continued in so far as it concerned the applicant, Mr Hamit
Çiftçi.
- Accordingly, the part of the
application which relates to Mr Hamit Çiftçi
should be struck out of the list of cases.
Therefore, he may no longer be regarded as an applicant for
the purposes of the judgment below.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLES 7, 9 AND 10 OF THE CONVENTION
AND ARTICLE 2 OF PROTOCOL No. 1
- The
applicants complained about the imposition of a disciplinary sanction
for having petitioned the university authorities to provide optional
Kurdish language courses. They submitted that this sanction had
infringed their freedom of thought and expression and that their
actions could not have been reasonably construed as a criminal
offence. In addition, they maintained that they had been denied their
right to education as the domestic courts had rejected their request
for a stay of execution of the disciplinary decisions. The applicants
relied on Articles 7, 9 and 10 of the Convention and on Article 2 of
Protocol No. 1.
- The
Court considers that these complaints need only be examined under
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1, read in the light of Article 10 of
the Convention (see Kjeldsen, Busk Madsen and
Pedersen v. Denmark, 7 December 1976, § 52 in
fine, Series A no. 23).
- The
relevant part of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 reads as follows:
“No person shall be denied the right to
education.”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government asked the Court to dismiss the application for failure to
comply with the requirement of exhaustion of domestic remedies under
Article 35 § 1 of the Convention. In this connection they first
maintained that it would have been open to the applicants to sue the
university administration for damages in accordance with sections 12
and 13 of the Administrative Procedure Act (Law no. 2577). The
Government submitted copies of decisions in a number of previous
cases. Secondly, they pointed out that the applicants had lodged
their application with the Court before the conclusion of the
administrative proceedings before the Denizli Administrative Court
concerning the annulment of the disciplinary sanctions.
- The
applicants claimed that the remedy provided under Law no. 2577
did not afford any prospect of success. In this connection, they
submitted, firstly, that obtaining compensation would not have
redressed the fact that they had lost one year of their education.
Secondly, they maintained that even if they had lodged such actions
they would not have been entitled to any compensation for pecuniary
and non pecuniary damage because they were students and did not
feel remorse for their actions. In this connection, the applicants
submitted copies of decisions in two cases in which the domestic
courts had dismissed claims for compensation by the plaintiffs
(students whose disciplinary sanctions on account of having
petitioned the university administration to provide optional Kurdish
language courses had subsequently been annulled by the administrative
courts). The domestic courts had held, inter alia, that the
plaintiffs' claims in respect of pecuniary damage were speculative
(future loss of earnings) and that they were not entitled to
compensation for non pecuniary damage since the disciplinary
sanctions imposed on them had resulted from the administration's
misinterpretation of the relevant provisions and not from an
arbitrary decision. In this connection, the courts emphasised that,
in order to award non-pecuniary damages, the fault and unlawfulness
attributable to the administration had to be significant, which was
not the situation in the cases before it. The first-instance court
decisions in those cases had been given in 2004. They had become
final in 2006, when the Supreme Administrative Court had upheld them.
- As
regards the first limb of the Government's objections, the Court
reiterates that the rule of exhaustion of domestic remedies referred
to in Article 35 § 1 of the Convention obliges applicants first
to use the remedies that are normally available and sufficient in the
domestic legal system to enable them to obtain redress for the
breaches alleged. The existence of the remedies must be sufficiently
certain, in practice as well as in theory, failing which they will
lack the requisite accessibility and effectiveness (see Burden
and Burden v. the United Kingdom, no. 13378/05, § 35,
ECHR 2007 ...).
- In
the instant case, the Court notes that the applicants successfully
brought an action for annulment before the administrative courts. As
to whether they were also required to embark on another attempt to
obtain redress by bringing a compensation claim, the Court notes
that, although, in principle, persons who have sustained damage as a
result of an administrative act can successfully claim compensation
by using the remedy offered by sections 12 and 13 of Law no. 2577, it
is clear from the decisions in previous cases submitted by the
applicants that, in their particular situation, the remedy in
question would not have afforded them any prospect of obtaining
damages. The Government have not submitted any examples to the
contrary. The Court considers, therefore, that the applicants were
not required to use the remedy provided under administrative law in
respect of their complaint. Consequently, it dismisses the
Government's preliminary objection under this head.
- As
to the second limb of the Government's objections, the Court
reiterates that the last stage of domestic remedies may be reached
shortly after the lodging of the application, but before the Court is
called upon to rule on its admissibility (see, for example, Sağat,
Bayram and Berk v. Turkey (dec.), no. 8036/02, 8 March 2007,
and Yıldırım v. Turkey (dec.), no. 40074/98,
30 March 2006). The Court observes that the proceedings concerning
the applicants' allegations were concluded on 12 May 2004,
before the Court had delivered its decision on admissibility. The
Court therefore dismisses the Government's preliminary objection
under this head.
- Moreover,
the Court notes that the application is not manifestly ill founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties' submissions
- The
Government, referring particularly to the positive outcome of the
administrative proceedings brought by the applicants, submitted that
the suspension of the applicants from the university had neither
impaired the essence of the right guaranteed by Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 nor amounted to a denial of their right to education.
- The
applicants maintained their allegations. In particular, they
submitted that the imposition of a disciplinary sanction for
petitioning for the introduction of an optional Kurdish language
course – a legitimate and democratic request – had been
unjustified and disproportionate and had denied them their right to
education for one year. They pointed out that they had already served
their disciplinary sanction by the time it had been annulled.
2. The Court's assessment
- The
Court reiterates the basic principles laid down in its judgments
concerning Article 2 of Protocol No.1 (see, in particular, Leyla
Şahin, cited above, §§ 152-156 and the references
therein). It will examine the present case in the light of these
principles.
- It
further reiterates that access to any institution of higher education
existing at a given time is an inherent part of the right set out in
the first sentence of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 and that therefore
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 is applicable in the instant case
(see Mürsel Eren v. Turkey, cited above, § 41).
Indeed, this has not been contested by the parties.
- The
applicants' suspension from the university for either one or two
terms, in the Court's view, constituted a restriction on their right
to education, notwithstanding the fact that they had been admitted to
the university to read the subject of their choice in accordance with
the results they had achieved in the university entrance examination
(see, mutatis mutantis, Leyla Şahin, cited above,
§ 157).
- In
order to ensure that the restrictions which are imposed do not
curtail the right in question to such an extent as to impair its very
essence and deprive it of its effectiveness, the Court must satisfy
itself that they were foreseeable for those concerned and pursued a
legitimate aim. However, unlike the position with respect to Articles
8 to 11 of the Convention, it is not bound by an exhaustive list of
“legitimate aims” under Article 2 of Protocol No.1.
Furthermore, a limitation will only be compatible with Article 2 of
Protocol No.1 if there is a reasonable relationship of
proportionality between the means employed and the aim sought to be
achieved (Ibid, § 154).
- In
the instant case the Court accepts that there was a legal basis for
the restriction, namely Regulation 9 (d) of the Disciplinary
Regulations of Higher Education Institutions, and that it was
accessible. However, the Court has serious doubts whether the
application of this Regulation in the present case served any
legitimate aim in Convention terms. Nevertheless, the Court does not
deem it necessary to determine the question because, in any event,
the key issue to be examined is that of proportionality, i.e. whether
a fair balance was struck between the means employed and the aim
sought to be achieved.
- As
regards the principle of proportionality, the Court observes that the
applicants were subject to a disciplinary sanction for merely
submitting petitions which conveyed their views on the need for and
the necessity of Kurdish language education and requested that
Kurdish language classes be introduced as an optional module, without
committing any reprehensible act. In this connection, the Court finds
that, in view of the information contained in the case file, the
applicants did not resort to violence or breach or attempt to breach
the peace or order in the university.
- The Court finds therefore that the applicants were
sanctioned because of the views expressed in their petitions. For the
Court, neither the views expressed therein nor the form in which they
were conveyed could be construed as an activity which would lead to
polarisation on the basis of language, race, religion or denomination
within the meaning of Regulation 9 (d). In this connection,
the Court reiterates that freedom of expression, as secured in
paragraph 1 of Article 10,
constitutes one of the essential foundations of a democratic society
and one of the basic conditions for its progress and for each
individual's self-fulfilment. Subject to paragraph 2, it is
applicable not only to “information” or “ideas”
that are favourably received or regarded as inoffensive or as a
matter of indifference, but also to those which offend, shock or
disturb; such are the demands of pluralism, tolerance and
broadmindedness, without which there is no “democratic society”
(see, among many other authorities, Oberschlick v. Austria
(no. 1), judgment of 23 May 1991, Series A no. 204, § 57,
and Nilsen and Johnsen v. Norway [GC], no. 23118/93, §
43, ECHR 1999-VIII).
- The
Court reiterates that the right to education does not in principle
exclude recourse to disciplinary measures, including suspension or
expulsion from an educational institution in order to ensure
compliance with its internal rules (see Yanasık v. Turkey,
no. 14524/89, Commission decision of 6 January 1993, DR 74, p. 14,
and Sulak v. Turkey, no. 24515/94, Commission decision of
17 January 1996, DR 84-A, p. 98). However, such regulations must not
injure the substance of the right nor conflict with other rights
enshrined in the Convention or its Protocols (see Campbell and
Cosans v. the United Kingdom, 25 February 1982, § 41, Series
A no. 48). In the instant case the applicants were suspended from the
university for either one or two terms as a result of the exercise of
their freedom of expression.
- In
the particular circumstances of the case and for the reasons stated
above, the Court considers that the imposition of such a disciplinary
sanction cannot be considered as reasonable or proportionate.
Although, it notes that these sanctions were subsequently annulled by
the administrative courts on grounds of unlawfulness, regrettably by
that time the applicants had already missed one or two terms of their
studies and, thus, the outcome of the domestic proceedings failed to
redress the applicants' grievances under this head.
- It
follows that there has been a violation of Article 2 of Protocol
No. 1 to the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicants each claimed 5,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary
damage. This sum concerned living expenses incurred as a result of
the prolongation of their university studies. The applicants each
further claimed EUR 10,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested the amounts.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found –
the denial of the right to education – and the pecuniary damage
alleged; it therefore dismisses this claim (see, for example, Mürsel
Eren, cited above, § 56).
- However,
the Court finds that the applicants may be taken to have suffered a
certain amount of frustration and distress in the circumstances of
the case. It considers, therefore, that an award of compensation is
justified. Deciding on an equitable basis, the Court awards each
applicant the sum of EUR 1,500.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicants also claimed, in total, EUR 2,000 for the costs and
expenses incurred before the domestic courts and before the Court.
They further claimed EUR 75,000 for lawyers' fees. In support of this
claim the applicants submitted the İzmir Bar Association's
recommended scale of fees in 2007. However, they did not submit any
receipts or other relevant documents.
- The
Government contested the amounts.
- Since the applicants submitted no substantiation of
their claims, as required by Rule 60 of the Rules of Court, the Court
makes no award under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Decides to strike the application out of its
list of cases insofar as it was submitted by Mr Hamit Çiftçi;
- Declares the remainder of the application
admissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
2 of Protocol No. 1;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay each applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 1,500 (one
thousand five hundred euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in
respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into new Turkish
liras at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicants' claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 3 March 2009, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Françoise Elens-Passos Françoise
Tulkens
Deputy Registrar President
In accordance with Article 45 § 2 of the Convention and Rule 74
§ 2 of the Rules of Court, the following separate opinion is
annexed to this judgment:
Separate
opinion of Judge Ireneu Cabral Barreto;
F.T.
F.E.P.
SEPARATE OPINION OF JUDGE CABRAL BARRETO
(Translation)
The
Chamber decided to examine the applicants' complaints under Article 2
of Protocol No. 1.
I
personally had a clear preference for examining the case under
Article 10.
- The
applicants received disciplinary sanctions for drawing up a petition
requesting the introduction of Kurdish language classes at their
university.
The
sanctions in question manifestly interfered with the applicants'
right to freedom of expression, and although the interference was
prescribed by law, it was not at all necessary in a democratic
society.
Accordingly,
there was a clear violation of Article 10 of the Convention.
- The
Chamber pursued a new approach, which was dangerous and in my view
not at all sound.
The
applicants were suspended from university for two terms, except
Mr Pulat, who was suspended for one term.
After
serving their disciplinary sanctions, all the applicants resumed
their studies.
We
are a long way from situations where, as a result of disciplinary
sanctions, people have been permanently refused access to education.
The
case before us was more concerned with a restriction of the right to
education (see paragraph 40 of the judgment); in my opinion, the very
essence of the right in issue was not impaired.
It is
true that, in reaching the finding of a violation, the judgment
introduced the idea of proportionality, concluding that the sanctions
were not reasonable or proportionate.
Although
I could agree with this point in principle, I am not sure that
Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 permits such reasoning.
Firstly,
the wording of Article 2 of Protocol No. 1 does not contain any
reference to restrictions; and, above all, the introduction of the
notion of proportionality will, in my view, paradoxically weaken the
right in question.
Assessing
the proportionality of the sanction will make it possible, on the one
hand, to accept a sanction which permanently denies a person access
to education and, on the other, to find a violation in the case of a
mere one-day suspension which was in itself disproportionate because,
for example, the person concerned did not do anything.
Moreover,
this approach requires the Court to set criteria in order to be able
to speak of a violation based on the lack of proportionality between
the individual's conduct and the sanction imposed; while that was not
impossible, for the sake of caution I would have preferred the Grand
Chamber to intervene.
Appendix to the judgment
List
of applicants
İrfan TEMEL,
born in 1981, lives in K. Maraş
Adnan ARICA, born in
1980, lives in İzmir
Hasan YILDIRIM, born
in 1971, lives in Muğla
Atay ATMACA, born in
1980, lives in Ankara
Beşir AYLAK,
born in 1972, lives in Diyarbakır
Hasan RAZİ,
born in 1983, lives in K. Maraş
Şahturna
AKTÜRK, born in 1980, lives in Tekirdağ
Şehmus ÇİÇEK,
born in 1978, lives in Adana
Ercan SAYGIN, born
in 1981, lives in Aydın
Nuran DUMAN
(ÇELEBİ), born in 1977, lives in Adana
Cihan PÜLAT,
born in 1979, lives in İzmir
Mehmet SEVER, born
in 1979, lives in Diyarbakır
Hamit ÇİFTÇİ,
born in 1982, lives in Istanbul
Mustafa KAYA, born
in 1982, lives in Aydın
Yunus GÜNEŞ,
born in 1980, lives in Kars
Arafat ERTUNÇ,
born in 1979, lives in Hakkari
Mehmet Emin AKKÖPRÜ,
born in 1978, lives in Konya
Hasan KARAL, born in
1980, lives in Ş. Urfa
