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FOURTH
SECTION
CASE OF KESZELI v. SLOVAKIA (No. 2)
(Application
no. 34200/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
21 December 2010
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Keszeli v. Slovakia (no. 2),
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Nicolas Bratza, President,
David
Thór Björgvinsson,
Ján Šikuta,
Päivi
Hirvelä,
Ledi Bianku,
Nebojša
Vučinić,
Vincent A. de Gaetano, judges,
and
Lawrence Early, Section
Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 30 November 2010,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application
(no. 34200/06) against the
Slovak Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34
of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Slovak national, Mr Vojtech Keszeli (“the applicant”), on
17 August 2006.
- The
Government of the Slovak Republic (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mrs M. Pirošíková.
- On
5 March 2009 the
President of the Fourth Section decided to give notice of the
application to the Government. It was decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article
29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1952 and lives in Šaľa.
A. Proceedings concerning the applicant's action of 1999
- On
3 June 1999 the applicant lodged a civil action with the Bratislava
IV District Court against the Slovak Television (a State-owned public
television network). He mainly claimed compensation for the damage
allegedly caused by the defendant company in breach of the
applicant's intellectual property rights. The claim was based on a
contract concluded between the parties, under which the applicant had
been obliged to create documentaries and several short films.
- The
applicant's requests for an exemption from the obligation to pay the
court fees were repeatedly examined by the District, Regional and
Supreme Courts. Finally, in 2004 the applicant was exempted from the
obligation to pay 50 % of the court fees.
- On
26 January 2005 the District Court discontinued the proceedings on
the ground that the applicant had not paid the fees. The applicant
appealed.
- On
31 August 2005 the above decision was quashed by the Bratislava
Regional Court and the case was remitted to the District Court. It
was established that the District Court had not correctly calculated
the amount of the fees.
- On
19 October 2005 the District Court judge asked the applicant to pay
the court fees. The applicant was also notified that his failure to
pay the fees would lead to the discontinuation of the proceedings.
- On
16 November 2005 the applicant lodged an appeal which was directed
against “any future decision to discontinue the proceedings for
a failure to pay the court fees”.
- As
the applicant had not paid the fees, the District Court discontinued
the proceedings on 29 November 2005. The decision was served on the
applicant on 8 December 2005. It became final on 26 December
2005.
- On
10 August 2006 the applicant learned that his appeal of 16 November
2005 had been archived by the District Court and had not been
transferred to the court of appeal.
B. Constitutional proceedings
- On
1 December 2004 the Constitutional Court found that the District
Court had violated the applicant's right to a hearing within a
reasonable time. It awarded the applicant 20,000 Slovakian korunas in
respect of non-pecuniary damage and ordered the reimbursement of the
applicant's costs. Despite the applicant's request, it did not order
the District Court to proceed without further delay.
- On
8 September 2006 the applicant relied on Article 6 of the Convention
and complained that the District Court had refused to deal with his
appeal of 16 November 2005. On 4 October 2006 the Constitutional
Court declared the complaint inadmissible as being manifestly
ill-founded. It noted that pursuant to the Code of Civil Procedure an
appeal could be filed within fifteen days counted from the date when
a decision had been served on the party to the proceedings. The law
clearly set the beginning and the end of the time-limit. Although the
applicant could have foreseen the consequences of his failure to pay
the fees, there was no possibility, envisaged by the law, to appeal
against a decision which had not yet been adopted. The Constitutional
Court's decision was served on the applicant on 13 November 2006.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. The Constitution
- Article
127 §§ 1, 2 and 3 of the Constitution provides:
“1. The Constitutional Court shall
decide complaints by natural or legal persons alleging a violation of
their fundamental rights or freedoms ... unless the protection of
such rights and freedoms falls within the jurisdiction of a different
court.
2. If the Constitutional Court finds a
complaint justified, it shall deliver a decision stating that a
person's rights or freedoms as set out in paragraph 1 have been
violated by a final decision, specific measure or other act and shall
quash such decision, measure or act. If the violation that has been
found is the result of a failure to act, the Constitutional Court may
order [the authority] which has violated the rights or freedoms to
take the necessary action. At the same time it may remit the case to
the authority concerned for further proceedings, order such authority
to refrain from violating the fundamental rights and freedoms ... or,
where appropriate, order those who have violated the rights or
freedoms set out in paragraph 1 to restore the situation to that
existing prior to the violation.
3. In its decision on a complaint the
Constitutional Court may grant appropriate financial compensation to
the person whose rights under paragraph 1 have been violated.”
B. The Code of Civil Procedure
- Pursuant
to Articles 201 and 204 § 1 of the Code of Civil Procedure, a
party to the proceedings can lodge an appeal against a first-instance
decision within fifteen days after the decision has been served on
the party.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION IN RESPECT OF THE LENGTH OF THE PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been
incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement, laid
down in Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal...”
A. Admissibility
1. As to the applicability of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention
- The
Government argued that the proceedings before the ordinary courts had
not fallen within the scope of Article 6 § 1, because they had
been concluded by a decision of a procedural nature (decision to
discontinue the proceedings), which had not had any direct impact on
the applicant's civil rights and obligations. Since the proceedings
before the ordinary courts did not fall within the scope of Article
6, the ensuing constitutional proceedings were equally not covered by
that provision.
- The
applicant argued that Article 6 § 1 had been applicable to the
proceedings before the ordinary courts as well as the Constitutional
Court. He pointed out that the Slovakian Constitutional Court could
quash decisions of the ordinary courts and thus reverse the outcome
of the civil proceedings complained of.
- The Court notes that the proceedings before the
ordinary courts concerned the applicant's pecuniary claim in respect
of the damage allegedly caused by the defendant. It therefore finds,
contrary to the Government's arguments, that there existed a dispute
over “civil rights and obligations” within the meaning of
Article 6 § 1 (see, among others, Ringeisen v.
Austria, 16 July 1971, § 94, Series A no. 13, and also
Roche v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 32555/96, §§
117 and 120, ECHR 2005 X). The Court also
notes that, in respect of the alleged violation of the applicant's
right to a hearing within a reasonable time, it is irrelevant that
the ordinary courts did not ultimately determine the merits of the
case (see, mutatis mutandis,
ČíZ
v. Slovakia, no. 66142/01, §
61, 14 October 2003). Article 6 was thus
applicable to the proceedings before the ordinary courts.
- As
regards the ensuing constitutional proceedings, the Court observes
that in his complaint of 8 September 2006, the applicant alleged
a violation of his right to a fair trial and complained that the
District Court had not transferred his appeal to the court of appeal.
- The
Court reiterates that Article 6 is applicable to the constitutional
proceedings where the outcome of such proceedings is directly
decisive for one's civil rights and obligations (see Süßmann
v. Germany, 16 September 1996, §§ 41-46,
Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1996 IV). It observes
that the Slovakian Constitutional Court, when finding a violation of
one's fundamental rights and freedoms (such as the right to a fair
trial), has the power to quash final decisions of the ordinary
courts. It follows that, even though the Constitutional Court did not
ultimately rule in the applicant's favour, the constitutional
proceedings leading to the decision of 4 October 2006 were
directly decisive for the applicant's civil rights and obligations
(see, a contrario, Slovenské telekomunikácie,
š.p., Herold Tele Media, s.r.o. and František Eke v.
Slovakia (dec.), no. 47097/99, 23 March 2004).
- The
Court therefore finds that Article 6 § 1 was applicable to the
proceedings in issue, including the constitutional proceedings
leading to the decision of 4 October 2006.
2. As to the applicant's victim status
- The
Government drew the Court's attention to the Constitutional Court's
judgment of 1 December 2004. They left it up to the Court to
determine whether the applicant could still claim to be a victim of
a violation of his right to a hearing within a reasonable time.
- The
applicant stated that the redress awarded by the Constitutional Court
had not been sufficient to deprive him of his victim status.
- The
Court notes that at the time of the
Constitutional Court's judgment of 1 December 2004 the period of the
proceedings complained of (that is the period attributable to the
District Court) lasted four years and three months for one level of
jurisdiction. The Court concludes, in view of its established
case-law, the Constitutional Court's judgment, the amount awarded to
the applicant and the fact that the Constitutional Court did not
order the responsible court to proceed with the case, that the
applicant did not lose his victim status within the meaning of
Article 34 of the Convention (see Becová
v. Slovakia (dec.),
no. 23788/06, 18 September 2007).
-
Accordingly, he was not required to again resort to the complaint
procedure under Article 127 of the Constitution in respect of the
period after the Constitutional Court's judgment. The Court notes
that the proceedings were pending for another year and that the
Constitutional Court examined the applicant's complaint for
approximately one month. The period under the Court's consideration
thus lasted until 13 November 2006.
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
applicant argued that the proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long
time.
- The
Government agreed with the Constitutional Court's finding of
1 December 2004. They admitted that the complaint of the length
of the proceedings in the present case had not been manifestly
ill-founded.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present
case (see Frydlender, cited above).
- Having
examined all the materials submitted to it and having regard to its
case-law on the subject, the Court concurs with the view expressed by
the Constitutional Court on 1 December 2004 that the length of the
proceedings had been excessive and had failed to meet the “reasonable
time” requirement. It finds further delays in the period after
that judgment.
There
has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
II. OTHER
ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- Relying
on Article 6 § 1 and Article 13 of the Convention the applicant
complained that his right of access to a court had been infringed by
the refusal to accept his appeal lodged on 16 November 2005.
- He
further complained that his rights under Article 6 § 1 and
Article 14 of the Convention had been violated in that he had not
been exempted from the obligation to pay the court fees.
- Under
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 and Article 14 of the Convention the
applicant complained that the State had prevented him from obtaining
a just decision in the above proceedings.
- However,
in the light of all the materials in its possession, and in so far as
the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court finds
that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights
and freedoms set out in the Convention or its Protocols.
It
follows that this part of the application is manifestly ill-founded
and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 and
4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 82,527.09 euros (EUR), with interest, in respect of
pecuniary damage and EUR 28,000 in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
- The
Government contested these claims.
- The
Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found
and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. On
the other hand, it considers that the applicant must have sustained
non pecuniary damage. Ruling on an equitable basis and having
regard to the fact that the applicant obtained partial redress at the
domestic level, it awards him EUR 1,800 under that head.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 1,000 for the costs and expenses incurred
before the Constitutional Court and the Court.
- The
Government left the matter to the Court's discretion.
-
Having regard to the supporting documents submitted by the applicant,
the Court considers it reasonable to award EUR 300 under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint under Article 6 § 1
concerning the excessive length of the proceedings admissible and the
remainder of the application inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts:
(i) EUR 1,800 (one thousand eight hundred euros), plus any tax that
may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 300 (three hundred euros), plus any tax that may be
chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate
equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank
during the default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant's claim
for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 21 December 2010,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Nicolas Bratza
Registrar President
