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FIRST
SECTION
CASE OF REDNIKOV v. RUSSIA
(Application
no. 18072/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
6
December 2011
This
judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Rednikov v. Russia,
The
European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a
Committee composed of:
Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
President,
Anatoly Kovler,
Linos-Alexandre
Sicilianos, judges,
and André Wampach,
Deputy Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 15 November 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 18072/04)
against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court
under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human
Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a
Russian national, Mr Valeriy Vasilyevich Rednikov (“the
applicant”), on 26 April 2004.
2. The
Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by
Mr G. Matyushkin,
the Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of
Human Rights.
- On
4 September 2008 the President of
the First Section decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and
merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 §
3).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The
applicant was born in 1938 and lives in Moscow.
A. First set of proceedings
- On 1 February 2001 the applicant brought proceedings
against a private company for breach of his patent rights.
- By a judgment of 10 November 2002 the Zamoskvoretskiy
District Court of Moscow (“the District Court”) dismissed
his claim.
- On 28 November 2003 the Moscow City Court (“the
appeal court”) upheld the above judgment on appeal.
B. Second set of proceedings
- On
4 November 2000 the applicant instituted another set of proceedings
against two private companies for breach of his patent rights.
- The
first hearing was scheduled by the District Court for 4 April 2001.
However, the first hearing and the next four hearings did not take
place because the judge was involved in different proceedings or was
on vacation, or due to the respondents’ failure to appear. In
the meantime the court sent inquiries to various State agencies for
information about the respondents’ place of registration.
- At
the hearing of 13 December 2001 the applicant requested to change the
names of the respondents, and the court repeatedly sent inquiries for
information about their place of incorporation.
- The
next two hearings were cancelled due to the respondent’s
default in appearance and because of the judge’s involvement in
different proceedings.
- At
the hearing of 8 April 2002, following lack of information about the
respondents’ exact whereabouts, the court suggested that the
applicant notify them himself based on the information available to
him.
- At
the hearing of 23 May 2002 the applicant relinquished his claims
against one of the respondents and asked the court to invite a third
party to join the proceedings.
- On
7 August 2002 the applicant motioned to replace the initial
respondents with a new set of five companies and specified his
claims. On 11 September 2002 he relinquished his claims
against one of the respondents.
- The
next three hearings were cancelled as the judge was involved in
different proceedings.
- The
hearing of 1 November 2002 was postponed to allow a respondent
to study the case.
- The
hearing of 10 November 2002 did not take place as the court did not
have information about due notification of the respondents.
- The
next three hearings took place as scheduled.
- On
9 December 2002 the court accepted the applicant’s
relinquishment of his claim against two respondents and severed his
claims against two other respondents into a separate case to avoid
delay in the proceedings. By a judgment of the same date the District
Court dismissed his claims against the remaining respondent.
- On
16 December 2002 the applicant filed preliminary grounds of appeal
and specified that he would submit reasoned grounds of appeal upon
receipt of the reasoned judgment. On the same day the District Court
left the appeal without consideration for failure to substantiate it
and suggested that the applicant remedy this defect until 30 December
2002.
- The
applicant submitted copies of his complaints concerning failure of
the District Court to produce the final text of the judgment of 9
December 2002 to the Zamoskvoretskiy District prosecutor’s
office of 14 August 2003, to the appeal court of 8 September 2003 and
30 September 2004 and to the Judicial Qualifications Board of 8 April
2004. According to the applicant, in May and June he came to see the
judge in his case, inquiring about the date of filing of the final
text of the judgment at the registry.
- The
applicant submitted a copy of the cover of the case file with a
handwritten note by a member of the court’s registry according
to which he had received a copy of the judgment on 23 June 2005.
- On
29 June 2005 the applicant submitted reasoned grounds of appeal of
the judgment of 9 December 2002. The heading of the document includes
a mention that the final text of the judgment had been obtained by
the claimant on 23 June 2005.
- On
30 June 2005 the District Court returned the applicant’s
appeal as submitted outside the procedural time-limit. This decision
was set aside by the appeal court on 27 October 2005. The court did
not give any reasons for its decision.
- On
14 March 2006 the Moscow City Court upheld the judgment of 9 December
2002 on appeal.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- Article
199 of the Code of Civil Procedure of Russia (in force since
14 November 2002) provides that drafting of the final reasoned
text of the judgment may be postponed for no longer than five days
after termination of the proceedings in the case.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE
CONVENTION
- The
applicant complained that the length of the
second set proceedings had breached the requirements of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention, which in the relevant part reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ... everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Government firstly pointed out that most of the delay
had been caused by the applicant’s failure to amend in due time
his grounds of appeal lodged on 16 December 2002 and his submission
of such an appeal only two years and six months after pronouncement
of the first-instance judgment. According to them, the fact that the
reasoned judgment had been filed in the case-file after the operative
version and before the applicant’s preliminary appeal served as
evidence of the judge’s timely actions. They did not submit an
extract from the case-file in support of their argument. They further
argued that on several occasions the applicant had changed the
respondents and amended his claims which had made it necessary for
the trial court to start hearing the case from the beginning. It had
been the applicant’s responsibility to indicate the
respondents’ addresses at which they could be notified of the
hearings but he had failed to do so. The trial court had also spent
some time helping the applicant establish the respondents’
whereabouts and had severed the claims against unidentified
respondents into a separate case to expedite the proceedings.
- The
applicant drew the Court’s attention to the fact that the
Government had failed to present any evidence that the final text of
the judgment of 9 December 2002 had been filed by the judge prior to
June 2005. He also emphasised that if the Government’s version
of the events had been true and he had indeed missed the time-limit
through his own fault, his reasoned grounds of appeal would have been
rejected by the appeal court as time-barred.
- The
Court observes that the proceedings in the applicant’s case
lasted between 4 November 2000 and 14 March 2006. Accordingly, it
took the domestic courts approximately five years and four months to
examine the applicant’s case at two levels of jurisdiction.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the following criteria: the complexity of the case,
the conduct of the applicant and the relevant authorities and what
was at stake for the applicant in the dispute (see, among many other
authorities, Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court accepts that during the time when the case was pending
consideration at the trial court, a significant number of hearings
did not take place due to the judge’s involvement in other
proceedings. However, it also notes that many hearings were cancelled
because of lack of proper identification of the respondents’
addresses which was ultimately the applicant’s responsibility
as a claimant. Finally, some delay stemmed from the applicant’s
decisions to replace the respondents and to alter his claims. With
this in mind, the Court considers that both the authorities and the
applicant equally contributed to the delay during the examination of
the case.
- The
Court notes, however, that the applicant’s case was not pending
consideration between 9 December 2002, the date of the trial court’s
judgment, and 29 June 2005 when the applicant filed his reasoned
grounds of appeal. This period amounted approximately to two years
and six months. It further notes that the parties disagree as to the
reasons for the void, with the applicant insisting that the judge
procrastinated in submission of the final text of the judgment and
the Government arguing that the applicant languished in amending his
appeal.
- The
Court observes that in support of his position the applicant
submitted copies of his complaints to various domestic instances in
2003 and 2004 concerning failure of the judge to file the final text
of the judgment, as well as a copy of the case-file cover indicating
that he had received a copy of the judgment on 23 June 2005, and a
copy of his grounds of appeal with the same information. It also
takes cognisance of the fact that the first-instance court’s
decision returning the applicant’s grounds of appeal as
time-barred was overturned by the appeal instance. At the same time,
the Government did not buttress their stance with any evidence. The
Court is not convinced that the position of the judgment in the
case-file served as proof of the timeliness of its drafting. In these
circumstances, the Court lends more credence to the applicant’s
version and finds that the State was responsible for the delay.
- Regard
being had to the above, in particular the lengthy failure of the
trial court to produce a reasoned judgment, the Court concludes that
the authorities breached the “reasonable time”
requirement.
- There
has accordingly been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
- The
applicant also complained about the outcome of the first set of the
proceedings, bias of the judges and violation of his property rights
by the courts that had dismissed his claims.
- Having
regard to all the material in its possession, and in so far as these
complaints fall within its competence, the Court finds that there is
no appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms set out in
these provisions in that respect. It follows that this part of the
application must be rejected as being manifestly ill-founded,
pursuant to Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the
Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- The
applicant claimed 10,500 United States dollars
(7,290 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary damage and EUR 10,000 in
respect of non pecuniary damage.
- The
Government did not provide any comments on the claims.
- As
regards the claim for pecuniary damage, the Court recalls that it
found inadmissible the applicant’s complaint of a breach of his
property rights above. It therefore rejects this claim in full.
- On
the other hand, the Court accepts that the applicant suffered
distress and frustration following the courts’ failure to
examine his case in an expeditious manner. Deciding on an equitable
basis, it awards the applicant EUR 2,400 in respect of non-pecuniary
damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant also claimed EUR 50 for the costs and
expenses incurred before the Court.
- The
Government made no comments on this claim.
- According
to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the
reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been
shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are
reasonable as to quantum.
48. In
the present case, the Court notes that the applicant did not
substantiate his claim and therefore rejects it in full.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaint concerning length of the
proceedings admissible and the remainder of the application
inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months, EUR 2,400 (two thousand four hundred euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary
damage, to be converted into Russian roubles at the rate applicable
at the date of settlement;
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 6 December 2011, pursuant
to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
André Wampach Mirjana Lazarova
Trajkovska
Deputy Registrar President
