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FIFTH
SECTION
CASE OF
ZHELTYAKOV v. UKRAINE
(Application
no. 4994/04)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
9 June
2011
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Zheltyakov v. Ukraine,
The
European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber
composed of:
Dean
Spielmann,
President,
Elisabet
Fura,
Boštjan
M. Zupančič,
Isabelle
Berro-Lefèvre,
Ann
Power,
Ganna
Yudkivska,
Angelika
Nußberger,
judges,
and
Claudia Westerdiek,
Section Registrar,
Having
deliberated in private on 17 May 2011,
Delivers
the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
- The
case originated in an application (no. 4994/04) against Ukraine
lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the
Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Oleg Oleksandrovych
Zheltyakov (“the applicant”), on 27 January 2004.
- The
applicant was represented by Mr O. Nagornyy, a lawyer practising in
Kyiv. The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Mr Y. Zaytsev, of the Ministry of
Justice.
- The
applicant alleged, in particular, a breach of the principle of legal
certainty on account of the reopening of the proceedings and quashing
of a final judgment and complained about lengthy partial
non-enforcement of that judgment and about the length of the court
proceedings.
- On
15 April 2009 the Court decided to give notice of the application to
the Government. It was also decided to examine
the merits of the application at the same time as its admissibility
(Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
- The applicant was born in 1955 and lives in Vinnytsya.
A. Background of the case
- In
March 1988 the local authorities decided to allocate to the
Podilskprommontazh Association, a State company (“the
Association”), a plot of land, on which the applicant’s
father’s house stood, in order to build a block of flats on
that land. In July 1991 the domestic courts rejected, as
unsubstantiated, the Association’s claim against the
applicant’s father, who had refused to vacate the house in
return for compensation.
- In
May 1992 the applicant’s father died and the applicant and his
relatives (Mrs D., Mrs M. and Mr Z.) inherited the house. According
to the applicant, in November 1992, despite the above-mentioned court
decision, the Association partially destroyed the house and he could
no longer live in it.
B. The first set of proceedings
- In
September 1994 the applicant instituted court proceedings against the
Association, seeking compensation for the partial destruction of the
house and reimbursement of the cost of renting a flat due to the
impossibility of living in the damaged house.
- On
19 November 1996 the Leninskyy District Court of Vinnytsya partially
granted the applicant’s action. On 3 April 1997, following an
objection (протест)
lodged by a local prosecutor, the Presidium of the Vinnytsya Regional
Court quashed that judgment and remitted the case for fresh
consideration.
- On
5 April 2000 the Leninskyy Court partially granted the applicant’s
action, awarded him 167,847
Ukrainian hryvnias (“UAH”) for pecuniary damage and UAH
5,000
for non-pecuniary damage and rejected, as unsubstantiated, his claim
for reimbursement of rental fees. The court based its
pecuniary-damage award on a report of 5
August 1999, prepared upon a request it made on 1 June 1999, by the
experts of the Kherson State Technical
Inventory Bureau (“the
Bureau”). As no appeal was lodged, the judgment became
final.
- On
22 June 2000 the Presidium of the Vinnytsya Regional Court rejected,
as unsubstantiated, a local prosecutor’s objection against
the judgment.
- Between
5 April 2000 and 28 September 2007 the Association repeatedly
challenged the initiation of the enforcement proceedings, sought
their suspension or variation of the manner of the enforcement of the
judgment. According to the Government, the judgment was enforced in
the amount of UAH 8,856.77.
- On
10 April 2006 the Association requested the Leninskyy Court to reopen
the proceedings in the light of newly-discovered circumstances. It
argued that the expert report had been prepared not by the Bureau
but, instead, by its experts acting in a private capacity. It stated
that it had learned about that from letters of the Bureau and
the local department of the State Security Service issued,
respectively, on 13 and 14 March 2006. The applicant filed his
comments challenging the request.
-
On 30 May 2006 the local police rejected, as unsubstantiated, a
criminal complaint by the Association’s chairman of 26 May 2006
against the above experts, based on the same submissions as the
Association’s request to the court, for lack of corpus
delicti in the experts’ actions.
- On
28 September 2007 the court granted the request, quashed the judgment
of 5 April 2000 and ordered a fresh examination of the case.
Referring to the aforementioned letters of the Bureau and the State
Security Service, it found that the experts of the Bureau, who had
prepared the impugned report, had acted in a private capacity and not
on behalf of the Bureau. In this respect, it noted that the report
had borne no stamp and no registration number of the Bureau. The
court thus concluded that its ruling of 1 June 1999 had not been
complied with, and found this to constitute a “newly-discovered
fact”.
- On
25 March 2008 the same court returned the applicant’s claim
unexamined on account of his alleged failure to attend several
hearings.
- On
26 June 2008 the Vinnytsya Regional Court of Appeal quashed that
ruling on the ground that the applicant had not been duly informed of
those hearings and remitted the case for fresh consideration.
- The
proceedings are still pending before the Pecherskyy District Court of
Kyiv, which on 29 July 2008 joined them to the second set of
proceedings (see below).
- In
the course of the proceedings seven hearings were adjourned at the
applicant’s request or due to his failure to appear and five
hearings were adjourned due to both parties’ failure to appear.
This protracted the proceedings to approximately ten months. Thirteen
hearings were adjourned at the respondent’s request, due to its
or third parties’ failure to appear, due to the absence or
illness of a judge or due to the applicant’s absence from
several hearings of which he was not duly informed (see paragraph 17
above). Two forensic examinations lasted in total for about three and
a half months.
C. The second set of proceedings
- In
October 1994 the applicant instituted court proceedings against Mrs
M. and Mr Z., seeking separation of the inherited property.
- On
11 July 1995 the Leninskyy Court endorsed the friendly settlement
reached by the parties.
- On
13 December 2000 the Supreme Court, following an objection lodged by
its Deputy Head, quashed the ruling of 11 July 1995 and remitted
the case for fresh consideration. Subsequently, the case was
transferred to the Popilnya Court.
- On
26 November 2001 the Association instituted proceedings in that court
against the applicant, Mrs M. and Mr Z., challenging the validity of
the inheritance certificate issued to them.
- On
16 April 2002 the court suspended the proceedings for separation of
the inherited property pending the outcome of the proceedings brought
by the Association.
- On
26 July 2002 the court transferred the case to the Polonne Court,
which on 2 August 2004 joined both proceedings.
- On
12 January 2005 the court returned the claims of the applicant and
the Association unexamined on account of their alleged failure to
attend several hearings.
- On
18 April 2005 the Khmelnytsk Regional Court of Appeal quashed that
ruling on the ground that the parties had not been duly informed of
those hearings and remitted the case for fresh consideration.
- On
an unspecified date the applicant lodged an additional claim against
Mrs D. for separation of the inherited property.
- On
21 July 2005 the case was transferred to the Pecherskyy Court, which
on 19 October 2005 joined that claim to the proceedings.
- On
15 November 2007 the same court, at the request of the Association,
returned the latter’s claim unexamined.
- Between
16 May and 29 July 2008 the proceedings were suspended at the
applicant’s request pending the outcome of the first set of
proceedings (see paragraphs 16-17 above).
- On
29 July 2008 the court joined the first set to the second set of
proceedings, which are still pending before it.
- In
the course of the proceedings twelve hearings were adjourned at the
applicant’s request or due to his failure to appear and eleven
hearings were adjourned due to both parties’ failure to appear.
This protracted the proceedings for approximately one year and three
months. Sixteen hearings were adjourned at the other parties’
requests, due to those parties’ or experts’ failure to
appear, due to the absence or illness of a judge or due to the
parties’ absence from several hearings of which they were not
duly informed (see paragraph 27 above). Three forensic examinations
lasted in total for about one year and eight months.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
- The
relevant provisions of the domestic legislation concerning the
ordering of a forensic examination and reopening of the proceedings
in the light of the newly-discovered circumstances read as follows:
A. Code of Civil Procedure of 1963 (repealed on 1
September 2005):
Article 57. Ordering forensic examination
“... A forensic examination shall be carried out
by experts of relevant establishments or by other specialists
appointed by the court. Any person who has the necessary knowledge
for giving an expert opinion may be appointed as an expert”.
B. Forensic Expert Examination Act of 25 February 1994
(as worded at the material time)
Article 7. Organisation of forensic expert activities
“... Forensic expert activities shall be carried
out on an entrepreneurial basis under special permission (licence),
as well as by the citizens on the basis of [individual] contracts...”
C. Code
of Civil Procedure of 2004 (entered into force on 1 September 2005):
Article 361. Grounds for review
“1. Judgments or rulings which have come into
force as well as court orders may be reviewed on the basis of the
newly-discovered circumstances.
2. The grounds for review ... shall be as
follows:
1) important circumstances which were not and could not
have been known to a party who requests review;
2) a knowingly erroneous expert conclusion ... as
established by a final court verdict, which entailed the adoption of
an unlawful or ungrounded judgment ...”
Article 365. Examination of requests
“...
2. Having examined a request, the court, by its ruling,
may either grant the request and quash the judgment, ruling or court
order or dismiss the request if it is unsubstantiated ...”
Article 366. Appeals against the ruling of the court
“1. A court decision by which an application for
review of a ... judgment ... in the light of newly-discovered
circumstances is granted shall not be subject to appeal ...”
THE LAW
I. REOPENING OF THE CASE AND QUASHING OF THE JUDGMENT
- The
applicant complained that the reopening of the first set of
proceedings and the quashing of the final judgment of 5 April 2000
had been in breach of the principle of legal certainty. This
complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention, which reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Article 6 § 1
“In the determination of his civil rights and
obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing within a
reasonable time by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government contended that the applicant had not complied with the
formal requirements for lodging an application with the Court, as he
had raised the complaint in a letter of 13 January 2008, rather than
in a separate application form, and had not referred to any provision
of the Convention.
- The
applicant disagreed, stating that in the above-mentioned letter he
had asked the Court to examine his complaint about the breach of the
principle of legal certainty along with his original application and
that this had been sufficient.
- The
Court considers that the applicant did not need to submit a separate
application form in respect of his complaint; in the circumstances,
requiring him to do so would be too formalistic. Nor was he required
to cite any provision of the Convention (see Guzzardi v. Italy,
6 November 1980, § 61, Series
A no. 39). Accordingly, it rejects the Government’s
objection.
- The
Court finds that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Government contended that there had been no violation of the
principle of legal certainty, as the quashing of the judgment of
5 April 2000 and the reopening of the proceedings in the light
of the newly-discovered circumstances had been aimed at rectifying
the court’s mistake.
- The
applicant disagreed, stating that the report had been thoroughly
examined by the court, while the Association could have requested the
appointment of another expert examination or could have appealed
against the judgment. He insisted that there had been no
newly-discovered circumstance warranting the reopening of the
proceedings.
- The
Court reiterates that the right to a fair hearing by a tribunal as
guaranteed by Article 6 § 1 of the Convention must be
interpreted in the light of the Preamble to the Convention, which
declares, among other things, the rule of law to be part of the
common heritage of the Contracting States. One of the fundamental
aspects of the rule of law is the principle of legal certainty, which
requires, inter alia, that where the courts have finally
determined an issue, their ruling should not be called into question
(see Brumărescu v. Romania [GC], no. 28342/95, § 61,
ECHR 1999 VII).
- That
principle presupposes respect for the finality of judgments and
insists that no party is entitled to seek a review of a final and
binding judgment merely for the purpose of a rehearing and a fresh
decision of the case. Departures from that principle are justified
only when made necessary by circumstances of a substantial and
compelling character (see Ryabykh v. Russia,
no. 52854/99, §Note
52, ECHR 2003–X).
- The
present case concerns a decision to reconsider a case completed by a
final judgment in the light of the newly-discovered circumstances
upon a request by a party to the proceedings. Such a procedure
does not in itself contradict the principle of legal certainty as
long as it is used to correct miscarriages of justice (see Pravednaya
v. Russia, no. 69529/01, §§
27-28, 18 November 2004, and Popov v.
Moldova (no. 2), no. 19960/04,
§ 46, 6 December 2005). However, the Court must determine
whether it was applied in a manner compatible with Article 6 of
the Convention.
- The
Court notes that the judgment of 5 April 2000 was not appealed
against and became final. More than seven years later the same court
quashed it on the ground that the expert report on which it was based
had been prepared by experts who had acted in a private capacity. The
court concluded that the Association, a party to the proceedings, had
not been aware of that fact back in 2000 and could not have known it
before 2006.
- Although
it is primarily for the domestic courts to assess the facts and
evidence before them (see, for instance, García Ruiz
v. Spain [GC], no. 30544/96, § 28, ECHR 1999-I), the
Court considers that such a conclusion is open to doubt. In
particular, it observes that the fact that the report of 5 August
1999 did not bear the Bureau’s stamp or registration number was
not hidden from the court or the parties during the first
consideration of the case.
- In
any event, the Court considers that the situation did not warrant
such a harsh interference with the final judgment. There is nothing
to suggest that it concerned a serious violation of procedural rules.
Nor was it argued that the report had been “knowingly
erroneous”. To the contrary, the local police rejected, as
unsubstantiated, the criminal complaint brought by the Association’s
chairman against the experts who had prepared it (see paragraph 14
above).
- Therefore,
the Court finds that the quashing of the judgment of 5 April
2000 was not justified and that there has, therefore, been a
violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. LENGTHY PARTIAL NON-ENFORCEMENT OF THE JUDGMENT
- The
applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1, 8 and 13 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about the lengthy partial
non-enforcement of the judgment of 5 April 2000. The Court considers
that this complaint falls to be examined solely under Article 6 §
1 of the Convention and under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. The latter
provision reads, in so far as relevant, as follows:
Article 1 of Protocol No. 1
“Every natural or legal person is entitled to the
peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived of
his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the
conditions provided for by law and by the general principles of
international law.
The preceding provisions shall not, however, in any way
impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it deems
necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the
general interest ...”
A. Admissibility
- The
Government contended that, after the judgment of 5 April 2000 had
been quashed on 28 September 2007, the applicant had lost victim
status within the meaning of Article 34 of the Convention.
Accordingly, they invited the Court to reject the complaint as
incompatible ratione personae.
- The
Court considers that the quashing of the
impugned judgment was clearly unfavourable to the applicant and it
thus did not deprive him of victim status in respect of the issue of
the delayed enforcement of that judgment (see Nikolayev
v. Russia, no. 37927/02, § 31,
2 March 2006). This objection should, therefore, be dismissed.
- The
Court considers that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded
within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It
further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It
must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Government maintained that there had been no
breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article
1 of Protocol No. 1, as the State Bailiffs had taken all the
necessary and possible measures in order to enforce the judgment,
which could not be fully enforced mainly due to the conduct of the
Association and due to its lack of funds.
- The
applicant maintained his complaint.
- The
Court notes that the judgment of 5 April 2000
was enforceable until 28 September 2007, when it was quashed, and
that it was incumbent on the Association, a State company, to abide
by its terms (see Velskaya v. Russia,
no. 21769/03, § 18, 5 October 2006). However, it had
remained unenforced for the most part. The Court further notes that
the quashing of a judgment in a manner which was found to have been
incompatible with the principle of legal certainty cannot be accepted
as justification for the failure to enforce it (see Sukhobokov
v. Russia, no. 75470/01, § 26,
13 April 2006, and Prisyazhnikova and
Dolgopolov v. Russia, no. 24247/04,
§ 35, 28 September 2006).
- The
Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 in similar circumstances
(see, for instance, Borshchevskiy v. Russia, 14853/03,
§§ 62-65, 21 September 2006; Murzatin v. Russia,
26338/06, §§ 38-42, 27 March 2008; and Yerogova,
cited above, §§ 48-53).
- Having
examined the material submitted to it, the Court notes that the
Government did not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court finds that by
failing for a substantial period of time to comply with the
enforceable judgment in the applicant’s favour the domestic
authorities violated his rights under Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1. There has accordingly
been a violation of those provisions.
III. LENGTH OF PROCEEDINGS
- The
applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the
Convention about the length of the first and second sets of
proceedings. The Court considers that this complaint falls to be
examined solely under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
A. Admissibility
- The
Court finds that the complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within
the meaning of Article 35 § 3 of the Convention. It further
notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must
therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
- The
Government maintained that there had been no violation of Article 6 §
1 of the Convention as the cases had been complex, the parties had
not attended several hearings, and the applicant had supplemented his
claim and lodged various procedural petitions, while there had been
no substantial delays attributable to the domestic courts.
- The
applicant did not comment on the above.
- The
Court reiterates that the reasonableness of the length of proceedings
must be assessed in the light of the circumstances of the case and
with reference to the complexity of the case and the conduct of the
applicant and the relevant authorities (see, for instance, Frydlender
v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, §
43, ECHR 2000-VII).
- The
Court notes that the applicant’s complaint concerns two sets of
proceedings instituted by him with the aim of protecting his right to
the peaceful enjoyment of his property. The two sets were joined by
the courts and the proceedings are currently pending. In these
circumstances, the Court considers that it is appropriate to examine
the length of both sets together. The Court further notes that the
periods to be taken into consideration began only on 11 September
1997, when the recognition by Ukraine of the
right of individual petition took effect. However, in assessing the
reasonableness of the time that elapsed after that date, account must
be taken of the state of proceedings at the time. The
proceedings have thus lasted for about twelve years and eight months
at two levels of jurisdiction, excluding the period between 5 April
and 13 December 2000, when no proceedings were pending.
- The
Court considers that although the case might have been somewhat
complicated by the examination of several claims, all of them having
been eventually joined, that fact alone cannot explain the overall
length of the proceedings. Nor does the conduct of the applicant, who
somewhat delayed the proceedings (see paragraphs 19 and 33 above),
explain such length. Indeed, the Court notes that the major delays
were caused by the lengthy consideration of the cases by the
first-instance courts and by their repeated adjournments of the
hearings (see paragraphs 9, 10, 19, 25, 26, 29, 30, 32 and 33 above).
It concludes that the responsibility for the
protracted length of the proceedings rests with the State.
- The Court has frequently found
violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising
issues similar to the one in the present case (see, for instance,
Pavlyulynets v. Ukraine,
no. 70767/01, § 53, 6 September 2005; Moroz
and Others v. Ukraine, no. 36545/02,
§ 62, 21 December 2006; and Golovko
v. Ukraine, no. 39161/02, § 65,
1 February 2007).
- Having
examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that
the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of
persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case.
Having regard to its case-law on the subject and to the overall
length of the proceedings, the responsibility for which to a large
extent rests with the State, the Court considers that in the instant
case such length has been excessive and failed to meet the
“reasonable time” requirement laid down in Article 6 §
1 of the Convention. There has accordingly been a breach of that
provision.
IV. THE REMAINDER OF THE COMPLAINTS
- The
applicant complained under Articles 6 § 1 and 13 of the
Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 about and on account of
the quashing of the ruling of 11 July 1995; under Articles 6 §
1 and 13 of the Convention that the judges in the second set of
proceedings had been biased and lacked independence and that he had
not been informed of the hearing of 12 January 2005; and under
Articles 8 and 13 of the Convention on account of the damage to his
house caused by the Association.
- Having
carefully examined the applicant’s submissions in the light of
all the material in its possession and in so far as the matters
complained of are within its competence, the Court finds that they do
not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and freedoms
set out in the Convention.
- It
follows that this part of the application must be declared
inadmissible as being manifestly ill-founded, pursuant to Article 35
§§ 3 and 4 of the Convention.
V. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
- Article
41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a
violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only
partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford
just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A. Damage
- In
respect of pecuniary damage, the applicant claimed UAH 167,847,
representing the amount awarded to him as pecuniary damage by the
judgment of 5 April 2000 increased to take into account inflation, as
well as UAH 140,910
for the cost of renting a flat due to the impossibility of living in
the damaged house. He also claimed EUR 30,000 for non-pecuniary
damage.
- The
Government contested these claims as unsubstantiated.
- Having
regard to the circumstances of the case, the Court finds it
appropriate to award the applicant EUR 30,640, representing the
outstanding sum he had legitimately expected to obtain under the
judgment of 5 April 2000, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
- The
claim for losses as a result of inflation is unsubstantiated and
unsupported by any documents; the Court, therefore, rejects it. It
also rejects the claim for reimbursement of rental payments, as there
is no causal link between the violations found and the sum claimed.
- The
Court further considers that the applicant must have suffered
distress as a result of the violations found.
Ruling on the equitable basis, it awards him EUR 6,200 for
non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
- The
applicant claimed EUR 2,000 for the expenses incurred in the domestic
proceedings and the proceedings before the Court, without providing
any supporting documents.
- The
Government challenged these claims as unsubstantiated and unsupported
by documents.
- Regard
being had to the information in its possession, the Court makes no
award under this head.
C. Default interest
- The
Court considers it appropriate that the default interest should be
based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to
which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
- Declares the complaints under Article 6 § 1
of the Convention about the quashing of the judgment of 5 April 2000,
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol
No. 1 about the lengthy partial non-enforcement of that judgment, and
under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention about the length of the
court proceedings admissible and the remaining
complaints inadmissible;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the quashing of the
judgment of 5 April 2000;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention and Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 on
account of the lengthy partial non enforcement of the judgment
of 5 April 2000;
- Holds that there has been a violation of Article
6 § 1 of the Convention on account of the excessive length of
the court proceedings;
- Holds
(a) that
the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months
from the moment when the judgment becomes final, EUR 30,640 (thirty
thousand six hundred and forty euros) in respect of pecuniary damage
and EUR 6,200 (six thousand two hundred euros) in respect of
non pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable on the
above amounts, to be converted into its national currency at the rate
applicable at the date of settlement:
(b) that
from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement
simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal
to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the
default period plus three percentage points;
- Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 9 June 2011, pursuant to
Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Dean Spielmann
Registrar President
