FOURTH SECTION
CASE OF
PETKO PETKOV v. BULGARIA
(Application no.
2834/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
19 February 2013
This judgment will become final in the circumstances set
out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial
revision.
In the case of Petko Petkov v. Bulgaria,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fourth Section), sitting as
a Chamber composed of:
Ineta Ziemele, President,
David Thór Björgvinsson,
George Nicolaou,
Ledi Bianku,
Zdravka Kalaydjieva,
Vincent A. De Gaetano,
Paul Mahoney, judges,
and Lawrence Early, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 29 January 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
2834/06) against the Republic of Bulgaria lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Bulgarian national, Petko Iliev Petkov, on
10 January 2006.
The applicant was represented by Ms M. Guncheva, a
lawyer practising in Haskovo. The Bulgarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by their Agent, Ms M. Dimova, of the Ministry of Justice.
The applicant alleged, in particular, that the
dismissal of his inheritance claim on the basis of an unforeseeable procedural
requirement stemming from an interpretative decision of the Supreme Court of
Cassation which had not been communicated to him had breached his rights to effective
access to court and peaceful enjoyment of his possessions.
On 15 March 2010 the application was communicated
to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the admissibility and merits
of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1972 and lives in Haskovo.
In a will dated 21 March 1991 the applicant’s
father bequeathed his whole estate to his brother, Mr L.I. Subsequently, in a
deed of donation dated 29 December 1997, the applicant’s father transferred to L.I.
a share in a house and yard which belonged to him.
The applicant’s father died on 22 December 2002.
On an unspecified date in 2003 the applicant
brought an action against Mr L.I., claiming that the will of 1991 and the
donation of 1997 infringed his right to a “reserved share” in his late father’s
estate. He also brought a partition claim against Mr L.I. in respect of two
real properties. It appears that the applicant was represented by counsel.
On 15 May 2003 the Haskovo District Court
rejected the applicant’s claim as inadmissible. It reasoned that the applicant
had not drawn up an inventory of the property in his father’s estate, which was
a procedural pre-requisite for claiming a reserved share from individuals
who were not heirs-at-law of the deceased. The applicant appealed against the
decision.
On 18 June 2003 the Haskovo Regional Court
quashed the decision of 15 May 2003 and remitted the case for further
examination. Relying on established case-law, it held that the applicant’s
uncle was an heir-at-law of the applicant’s father within the meaning of section
30(2) of the Inheritance Act and that, therefore, the applicant was not
required to have claimed his reserved share of the inheritance by means of an
inventory.
In a judgment of 29 July 2004 the Haskovo
District Court restored the applicant’s reserved share in the two real properties
and declared admissible his partition action. It held that the two dispositions
made by the applicant’s father had practically disinherited the applicant and had
therefore violated his right to a reserved share, which amounted to half of his
father’s estate.
Following an appeal by Mr L.I., on 3 January
2005 the Haskovo Regional Court upheld the judgment of 29 July 2004. Relying on
an interpretative decision of the Supreme Court of 1964, it rejected the
defendant’s objection that the applicant was not entitled to claim his reserved
share because he had not claimed the inheritance through the drawing up of an
inventory.
On 25 February 2005 Mr L.I. lodged an appeal on
points of law. In a request filed on 7 June 2005 Mr L.I. asked the court to
discontinue the proceedings relying on Interpretative Decision No. 1 of 2005, adopted
by the Supreme Court of Cassation (“the SCC”) on 4 February 2005, in which that
court declared the relevant part of the interpretative decision of 1964 no
longer applicable and considered that the term “heirs-at-law” in section 30(2)
of the Inheritance Act 1949 should be interpreted as meaning only heirs-at-law
who effectively succeeded to the deceased’s estate (see paragraph 17 below). It
is not clear whether the applicant was notified about this request before the hearing
of the SCC held on 14 June 2005. In a judgment of 14 July 2005 the SCC quashed
the judgment of 3 January 2005 and dismissed the applicant’s claims. Relying on
Interpretative Decision No. 1 of 4 February 2005, it held that the applicant
had not complied with the statutory requirements for claiming his reserved
share, since he had not claimed the inheritance by means of an inventory.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW AND PRACTICE
A. Statutory conditions for claiming a reserved share
and their interpretation by the domestic courts
The Inheritance Act of 1949 preserves to a certain
circle of heirs a reserved share in their deceased relative’s estate. If this
share has been infringed by donations or wills made by their relative during
his lifetime, such heirs may, within three years of his death, claim the
reduction of such dispositions up to the amount of their reserved share.
Pursuant to section 30(2) of the Inheritance Act, where the defendant to
such an action is not an heir-at-law, the plaintiff must have identified the
entirety of the inheritance by means of an inventory (“опис”), an official list drawn up by the district judge on the basis
of the heir’s statements describing all reported items of the deceased’s estate.
There is no need of an inventory where the legatee is an heir-at-law. The right
to take steps for the preparation of an inventory may be exercised within three
months after the heir has learned about his relative’s death. This period may
be extended by the District Court by up to three months (section 61 of the
Inheritance Act of 1949).
Pursuant to the case-law of the domestic courts,
section 30(2) serves as a guarantee against possible fraudulent claims from
heirs entitled to a reserved share against successors by will or donation who
are not as closely related to the deceased and may therefore be unaware of the deceased’s
aggregate assets, and accordingly of whether the reserved share has indeed been
infringed.
In a binding interpretative decision of 1964,
the Supreme Court defined “heirs-at-law” as all potential heirs specified in
the Inheritance Act of 1949, such as the surviving spouse, descendants,
ascendants, siblings and more distant relatives, whether or not they actually
inherited or were pre-empted by heirs of immediate priority.
On 4 February 2005 the SCC adopted Interpretative
Decision No. 1 of 2005, which expressly declared the relevant part of the
decision of 1964 no longer applicable. The court noted that there had been
“social and legal changes” since 1964, such as the inclusion in the Inheritance
Act of more distant relatives as potential heirs and the restitution of
property nationalised by the communist regime. In the court’s opinion, those
changes could effectively prevent successors by will or deed, if not closely
related to the deceased, from knowing the exact scope of his or her assets, and
hence from defending themselves successfully against heirs claiming that their right
to a reserved share had been infringed by such dispositions. On the basis of those
reasons, the court concluded that it was necessary to change the interpretation
of the term “heirs-at-law” for the purposes of section 30(2) of the Inheritance
Act to mean only heirs of immediate priority of succession, that is to say,
only the individuals who effectively succeeded to the deceased’s estate. As a
result, since 4 February 2005, claiming an inheritance through an inventory has
been considered a pre-requisite for bringing a claim against all successors by
deed or will, save those with immediate priority of succession. The
interpretative decision of 4 February 2005 did not envisage any interim
rules or transition period for its application to pending proceedings.
In a judgment of 2009 (реш.
№ 681 от 24.09.2009 г. по
гр.д. № 3189/2008 г., І г.о. на ВКС) the SCC found that the judicial
interpretation of legal provisions had an effect from the date on which the latter
had entered into force. It confirmed that the new interpretation of the term
“heirs-at-law” given in the interpretative decision of 2005 was the result of the
changing social and economic conditions described therein.
In subsequent judgments (реш.
№ 698 от 06.01.2010 г. по
гр.д. № 22/2009 г., IІ г.о. на ВКС;
реш. № 82 от 16.03.2011 г.
по гр.д. № 221/2010 г., IІ г.о. на ВКС;
реш. № 324 от 16.10.2012 г. по
гр.д. № 654/2011
г., I г.о.
на ВКС) the SCC noted that the courts
had misinterpreted Interpretative Decision No. 1 of 2005, applying the
requirement for an inventory also in cases where the plaintiff’s deceased relative
had bequeathed his entire estate in favour of the defendant. It held that in
such cases the defendant had effectively succeeded to the estate of the
deceased and therefore the disinherited plaintiff had not been required to make
an inventory. It based its conclusion on its well-established case-law,
according to which, in cases where the plaintiff had been disinherited in
favour of the defendant, the former was only required to show his status of an
heir entitled to a reserved share. The particular properties comprising the
estate were of no relevance and the plaintiff was not required to produce
evidence in that respect; in such cases the courts would reduce the
dispositions made by the deceased in proportion to the reserved share of the
plaintiff (реш. № 752 от
10.10.1994 г. по гр.д.
№ 628/1994 г., І г.о. на
ВКС; реш. № 187 от 20.04.2011
г. по гр.д. № 1780/2009
г., І г.о. на ВКС; опр.
№ 829 от 23.10.2012 г. по
гр.д. № 619/2012
г., І г.о. на
ВКС). It concluded that the requirement for an inventory
under section 30(2) of the Inheritance Act was applicable only in cases where
the defendant had succeeded to particular items of the deceased’s estate and
not to the entire estate.
B. Interpretative decisions of the SCC
Pursuant to the Judiciary Act 1994, in force
until 2007, interpretative decisions were adopted by the SCC in cases of
incorrect or contradictory case-law and were binding on
the judiciary and the executive. The Judiciary Act 1994 did not provide
that newly adopted interpretative decisions should be published or otherwise
communicated to parties to pending proceedings.
C. Normative Acts Act 1973
Section 50 of the above Act provides:
“1. The interpretation is
[regarded as having] effect from the day on which the instrument which is being
interpreted has entered into force.
2. Exceptionally, if
retrospective interpretation may give rise to complications, the authority
which has issued the interpretative decision may direct that the interpretation
shall have effect only prospectively. In that case, the interpretation shall
take effect three days after being published.”
D. Reopening of proceedings following a judgment of
the European Court of Human Rights
Pursuant to Article 303 § 1
(7) of the Code of Civil Procedure of 2007 (“the CCP”), civil proceedings may
be reopened when a judgment of the European Court of Human Rights establishes that
the Convention has been violated and when a fresh examination of the case is
necessary in order to eliminate the consequences of the violation. The interested
party may make the request no later than six months after the judgment has
become final (Article 305 § 2 of the CCP). The request is
examined by the SCC (Article 307 of the CCP).
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that the proceedings in
his case had been unfair because the SCC had dismissed his action exclusively
on the basis of a newly adopted interpretative decision which had not been
accessible to him and which had introduced an unforeseeable procedural
requirement. He relied on Article 6 § 1 of
the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ...
everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal ...”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
The applicant submitted that he had brought his
action in compliance with section 30(2) of the Inheritance Act, as construed in
the interpretative decision of 1964. He argued that the law, as it stood at the
relevant time, had not required him to have accepted the inheritance through the
drawing up of an inventory. However, the SCC had applied a new interpretation
of that provision to the facts in his case, thereby retroactively introducing
such a requirement. The applicant further complained that the SCC had relied on
an interpretative decision which had been neither published nor communicated to
the parties, and that he had therefore been unable to adduce any arguments as
to its applicability and relevance to his case.
The Government submitted that the SCC had
applied the domestic legislation correctly and in compliance with its own
jurisprudence, as it stood at the relevant time.
2. The Court’s assessment
. The
Court reiterates that Article 6 § 1 embodies the “right to a court”, of which
the right of access, that is, the right to institute proceedings before a court
in civil matters, constitutes one aspect. Whether a person has an actionable
domestic claim may depend not only on the content, properly speaking, of the
relevant civil right as defined under national law but also on the existence of
procedural bars preventing or limiting the possibilities of bringing potential
claims to court. In the latter kind of case Article 6 § 1 may be applicable (see
Al-Adsani v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 35763/97, § 47, ECHR 2001-XI).
. The
right to access to court is not absolute, but may be subject to limitations;
these are permitted by implication, since the right of access by its very
nature calls for regulation by the State, which enjoys a certain margin of
appreciation in this regard. Nevertheless, the limitations applied must not
restrict or reduce the access left to the individual in such a way or to such
an extent that the very essence of the right is impaired. Furthermore, a
limitation will not be compatible with Article 6 § 1 if it does not pursue a
legitimate aim and if there is not a reasonable relationship of proportionality
between the means employed and the aim sought to be achieved (see Tinnelly
& Sons Ltd and Others and McElduff and Others v. the United Kingdom, 10
July 1998, § 72, Reports of Judgments and
Decisions 1998-IV).
. The
Court notes that the Inheritance Act of 1949 creates a statutory right,
which arises at the time of the relative’s death, for an heir to claim the reduction
of the dispositions made by his relative during his lifetime if they happen to
infringe his or her entitlement to a reserved share. The heir may claim such a reduction
against any beneficiary. It is only when the beneficiary is not an “heir-at-law”
that the Act adds an additional requirement for bringing a claim: the
inheritance must have been claimed through the preparation of an inventory,
that is, a list of the property comprising the deceased’s estate. The domestic
courts uphold that procedural requirement only if they are satisfied that the
defendant is not an “heir-at-law”. The Court therefore considers
that the requirement should be seen not as qualifying a substantive right but
as a procedural bar to the domestic courts’ power to determine the right.
It follows that the action brought by the applicant fell
within the scope of Article 6 under its civil head.
. The
Court further notes that the SCC, in applying a
new interpretation of the term “heir-at-law”, dismissed the applicant’s claim
on the ground that he had not claimed the inheritance through the preparation
of an inventory (see paragraph 13 above).
. It
therefore falls to the Court to ascertain whether the procedural restriction
applied by the SCC was clear, accessible and
foreseeable within the meaning of the Court’s case-law, whether it pursued a
legitimate aim and whether it was proportionate to that aim (see, mutatis
mutandis, Lupaş and Others v. Romania, nos. 1434/02,
35370/02 and 1385/03, § 67, ECHR 2006-XV (extracts)).
. The
Court notes that the term “heir-at-law” was not defined in the Inheritance Act
of 1949. Until 2005, it was defined in an interpretative decision of 1964,
which was followed by the district and regional courts in the applicant’s case
(see paragraphs 11-12 above). According to that definition, “heir-at-law” meant
any potential heir specified in the Inheritance Act of 1949 (see paragraph 16
above). Therefore, the Court considers that when the applicant brought his
claim, he could reasonably have expected that his uncle (a potential heir under
the Inheritance Act of 1949) would be considered by the courts as an “heir-at-law”
and that the requirement to list the property comprising the estate in an
inventory would not apply to his case. It was only after the delivery of the
second instance’s judgment in the applicant’s case in 2005 that the SCC adopted
a new interpretative decision, which changed the scope of
the term “heir-at-law” to exclude the applicant’s uncle from that category. The
new interpretation not only prevented him from having his claim determined by a
court, but it also became an insurmountable obstacle to any future attempts on
his part to recover his reserved share, given that the time-limit for preparing
an inventory had long expired (see paragraphs 7 and 14 above).
The Court reiterates that the accessibility,
clarity and foreseeability of legal provisions and case-law, notably as regards
rules on form, time-limits and prescription, assure the effectiveness of
the right to access to court (see Legrand v. France, no. 23228/08, § 37, 26 May 2011; mutatis mutandis, Hoare v. the United Kingdom (dec.), no. 16261/08, §§ 54-55, 12 April 2011; and Lupaş and Others,
cited above, §§ 67-69). While case-law development is not, in itself,
contrary to the proper administration of justice (see Legrand, cited above, § 37), in previous cases where changes in domestic jurisprudence
had affected pending civil proceedings, the Court was satisfied that the way in
which the law had developed had been well-known to the parties, or at
least reasonably foreseeable, and that no uncertainty had existed as to their
legal situation (see Unédic v. France, no. 20153/04, § 75, 18 December 2008; Şen
and Others v. Turkey (dec.), no. 24537/10, 14 February 2012; Hoare (dec.), § 55, and Legrand, § 40, both cited above). In Legrand
the Court emphasised that the new legal principle introduced by the Court of
Cassation, and which had the effect of thwarting the applicant’s pending civil
action, had its origin in the need to address inconsistencies in the case-law
of which the applicant was aware at the time of initiating his proceedings (§
42). In C.R. v. the United Kingdom (22 November 1995, §
41, Series A no. 335-C), the Court found that the
principle of legality was not breached where the development of the law in a
particular area had reached a stage where judicial recognition was reasonably
foreseeable. In Hoare ((dec.), cited above, § 55), which concerned a change of the law
of limitation in sexual abuse cases, the Court noted that the unsatisfactory
character of the law as it stood at the relevant time had been raised long
before the proceedings against the applicant, and found that the departure from
the previous case-law in the applicant’s case had been no more than a
reasonably foreseeable development of the law of limitation, which, moreover, had
been very well explained and substantiated by the domestic courts.
. In
the instant case, however, while the restitution
process and the other legal developments which motivated the SCC to amend the
interpretation of the term “heir-at-law” were known, it appears that the side effect
of that new interpretation on cases pending at the cassation level such as the
applicant’s was not foreseen even by the SCC. In its subsequent
judgments the SCC found that the courts had interpreted
the formal requirement for an inventory too strictly and had applied it even in
cases where the defendant had succeeded to the deceased’s entire estate (see
paragraph 19 above). Thus, according to the SCC, the courts had unduly disregarded
the well-established case-law according to which, in cases where the defendant
had inherited the entire estate, the requirement for an inventory would not
apply and the disinherited plaintiff would only be required to prove that he
was entitled to a reserved share in that estate (ibid.). Therefore, in view of
the state of the law resulting from the Inheritance Act of 1949 and the
case-law of the SCC, it appears that at the relevant time the applicant was
unable to reasonably foresee that an interpretation of the subsequently
amended law would require him to make an inventory in order to claim his
reserved share from his uncle at the time when this possibility was open to him. The Court is not convinced that the otherwise
reasonable aim pursued by that requirement (see paragraph 15 above) could
not have been attained in an adversarial trial rather than by barring the
applicant’s claim, given that the success of such a claim depended on the
plaintiff’s ability to show that the dispositions made by his deceased’s
relative amounted to a certain portion of the estate affecting that plaintiff’s
reserved share. In the instant case the applicant was totally disinherited in
favour of his uncle (see paragraphs 6 and 19 above). The Court further notes
that the interpretative decision did not contain provisions on its
applicability to pending proceedings. Regrettably, the
SCC gave no consideration to those factors or to a possible different
approach, but applied the new interpretation automatically, regardless of its consequences
on the applicant’s right to have his pending case determined on the merits. The
extent of the prejudice suffered by the applicant thus sets his case apart from
the applicants in the above-mentioned Legrand case in which the Court
emphasised that the new legal principle established by
the Court of Cassation did not in the circumstances of the applicants’ case have
the effect of depriving them - even retrospectively - of their right to access
to court (see § 41 of that
judgment).
. For
the above reasons, the Court concludes that the unforeseeability of the procedural
requirement applied retroactively in the applicant’s pending case restricted his
access to court to such an extent that the very essence of that right was
impaired.
. It
follows that there has been a breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 1 OF PROTOCOL
No. 1 TO THE CONVENTION
. The
applicant also complained that his right to peaceful enjoyment of his
possessions had been violated because the new interpretation of the law
introduced retroactively requirements for his claim which had not existed when he
had brought it. He relied on Article 1 of Protocol No. 1,
which provides:
“Every natural or legal person is
entitled to the peaceful enjoyment of his possessions. No one shall be deprived
of his possessions except in the public interest and subject to the conditions
provided for by law and by the general principles of international law.
The preceding provisions shall not,
however, in any way impair the right of a State to enforce such laws as it
deems necessary to control the use of property in accordance with the general
interest or to secure the payment of taxes or other contributions or
penalties.”
The Government reiterated the arguments they had
put forward in respect of the complaint under Article 6.
The Court notes that the
complaint under Article 1 of Protocol No. 1 is directly connected with the one
examined under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, and should therefore be
declared admissible.
Having regard to its conclusions under
Article 6 that the applicant was unduly prevented from obtaining a
determination of his alleged entitlement to recover his reserved share in his
father’s estate, and without prejudice to the question whether the applicant
had a possession within the meaning of Article 1 of Protocol No. 1, Court
considers that it is not necessary to rule on the complaint under this head.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
The applicant did not submit a claim for just
satisfaction. Accordingly, the Court considers that there is no call to award him
any sum on that account.
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 17,425 levs (BGN), the equivalent of approximately
8,909 euros (EUR), in respect of pecuniary damage. He submitted that
this had been the value of two real properties inherited
by his uncle and subsequently sold to third parties. He also claimed EUR 1,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government contested that claim as
unsubstantiated and excessive.
The Court notes that in the present case an award of
just satisfaction can only be based on the fact that the applicant did not have
the benefit of the guarantees of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention. It
reiterates that where a violation of Article 6 is found, the applicant should,
as far as possible, be put in the position that he would have been in had the
requirements of that provision not been disregarded, and that the most
appropriate form of redress would, in principle, be a retrial or the reopening
of the proceedings, if requested (see Yanakiev v. Bulgaria, no. 40476/98, §§ 89-90, 10 August 2006). It notes, in this connection, that
Article 303 § 1 (7) of the CCP
(see paragraph 21 above), allows the reopening of domestic proceedings if the
Court has found a violation of the Convention or its Protocols. On the
other hand, the Court considers that the applicant must have suffered
non-pecuniary damage for which the finding of a violation does not constitute
sufficient reparation. Ruling on an equitable basis as required by Article 41
of the Convention, the Court awards the entire amount claimed by the applicant
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, that is, EUR 1,000.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant claimed EUR 1,000 in respect of
legal fees for twenty hours of legal work at an hourly rate of EUR 50. He further
claimed EUR 200 in respect of translation and postage expenses. He
submitted a fees agreement drawn up with his legal representative and an
invoice for translation services for the sum of BGN 110 (EUR 56). He requested
that any award made in respect of legal fees be paid directly into the bank
account of his legal representative, Ms M. Guncheva.
The Government considered that the claims were
excessive.
According to the Court’s case-law, costs and
expenses claimed under Article 41 must have been actually and necessarily
incurred and reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, having regard to
the information in its possession and the above criteria, the Court considers
it reasonable to award the applicant the sum of EUR 1,000 in respect of legal
fees, plus any tax that may be chargeable to him, to be paid into the bank
account of his legal representative.
As for the claim for other expenses, the Court
observes that the applicant has provided supporting documents only for the sum
paid for translation services (EUR 56). It therefore awards him that amount,
plus any tax that may be chargeable to him.
C. Default interest rate
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
3. Holds that it is not necessary to rule on the alleged violation of Article 1 of
Protocol No. 1 to the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with
Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts, to be converted into Bulgarian levs at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement:
(i) EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii) EUR 1,056 (one thousand and fifty-six euros),
plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and
expenses, of which EUR 56 (fifty-six euros) is to be paid to the applicant
himself, and the remainder is to be paid into the bank account of his legal
representative;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 19 February
2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Lawrence Early Ineta Ziemele
Registrar President
