SECOND SECTION

CASE OF MAGYAR CEMENT KFT v. HUNGARY

(Application no. 33795/08)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

28 May 2013

This judgment is final but it may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Magyar Cement Kft v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Committee composed of:
	Peer Lorenzen, President,
	András Sajó,
	Nebojša Vučinić, judges,
and Françoise Elens-Passos, Acting Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 7 May 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in an application (no. 33795/08) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Hungarian limited liability company, Magyar Cement Kft (“the applicant”), on 14 July 2008.
2.  The applicant was represented by Mr I. Jarovinszkij, a lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and Justice.
3.  On 13 April 2011 the application was communicated to the Government. In accordance with Protocol No. 14, the application was allocated to a Committee of three Judges.
THE FACTS
THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
4.  The applicant is a limited liability company with its seat in Tokod.
5.  On 8 August 1994, the applicant, as the successful bidder in privatisation proceedings, acquired shares and non-current assets of a previously state-owned public company limited by shares.
6.  On 20 February 1995 a competing bidder business entity challenged before the Budapest Regional Court the validity of the privatisation contract and the sale and purchase agreement concluded by the applicant company.
7.  On 3 April 1998 the Budapest Regional Court delivered a partial judgment dismissing the plaintiff’s action.
8.  On 4 June 1999 the Supreme Court, acting as a second-instance court, held a hearing, quashed the partial judgment and remitted the case to the first instance.
9.  In the resumed proceedings the Budapest Regional Court delivered a partial judgment on 1 July 2002. This judgment was quashed again by the Supreme Court on 9 May 2003.
10.  In the resumed proceedings the Budapest Regional Court dismissed all the plaintiff’s claims.
11.  In its judgment of 15 April 2010 the Budapest Court of Appeal, acting as a second-instance court, partially upheld the first-instance judgment and as to the remainder of the claims, quashed the Budapest Regional Court’s judgment and remitted the case to the first instance.
12.  The plaintiff lodged a petition for review with the Supreme Court, which upheld the partial judgment of the Budapest Court of Appeal 15 November 2010.
13.  As to the remainder of the case, the Budapest Regional Court gave a partial judgment on 29 August 2012. The applicant appealed. The proceedings are still pending.
THE LAW
ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 § 1 OF THE CONVENTION
14.  The applicant complained that the length of the proceedings had been incompatible with the “reasonable time” requirement of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“In the determination of his civil rights and obligations ..., everyone is entitled to a ... hearing within a reasonable time by a ... tribunal...”
15.  The Government contested that argument.
16.  The period in question began in 20 February 1995 and has not yet ended. It has thus lasted over 18 years before three instances. In view of such lengthy proceedings, and in the absence of any other reason for inadmissibility, the application must be declared admissible.
17.  The Court has frequently found violations of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention in cases raising issues similar to the one in the present application (see Frydlender v. France [GC], no. 30979/96, § 43, ECHR 2000-VII). Having examined all the material submitted to it, the Court considers that the Government have not put forward any fact or convincing argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present circumstances. Having regard to its case-law on the subject, the Court considers that the length of the proceedings was excessive and failed to meet the “reasonable time” requirement. There has accordingly been a breach of Article 6 § 1.
18.  Relying on Article 41 of the Convention, the applicant made a global claim of 35,000 euros (EUR) in respect of pecuniary and non-pecuniary damage. The Government contested the claim. The Court does not discern any causal link between the violation found and the pecuniary damage alleged; it therefore rejects this claim. However, it considers that the applicant must have sustained some non-pecuniary damage and awards it EUR 17,000 under this head.
19.  The applicant also claimed EUR 2,800 for the costs and expenses incurred before the Court. The Government did not express an opinion on the matter. Regard being had to the documents in its possession and to its case-law, the Court considers it reasonable to award the sum of EUR 1,000 for the proceedings before the Court.
20.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;

3.  Holds
(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months, the following amounts, to be converted into Hungarian forints at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i)  EUR 17,000 (seventeen thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary damage;
(ii)  EUR 1,000 (one thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

4.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 28 May 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	 Françoise Elens-Passos	Peer Lorenzen
	 Acting Deputy Registrar	President