In the case of Prizzia v. Hungary,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Second Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Guido Raimondi, President,
Peer Lorenzen,
Dragoljub Popović,
András Sajó,
Nebojša Vučinić,
Paulo Pinto de Albuquerque,
Helen Keller, judges,
and Stanley Naismith, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 21 May 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
20255/12) against the Republic of Hungary lodged with the Court under Article
34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental
Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a national of the United States, Mr Gary Prizzia
(“the applicant”), on 29 March 2012.
The applicant was represented by Ms E. Volni, a
lawyer practising in Budapest. The Hungarian Government (“the Government”) were
represented by Mr Z. Tallódi, Agent, Ministry of Public Administration and
Justice.
The applicant alleged, in particular, that the
Hungarian authorities failed to ensure the enforcement of judicial decisions
granting him visiting rights in respect of T.M.P, his minor son, in breach of
Article 8 of the Convention. Moreover, relying on Article 6 § 1, he submitted
that the proceedings had lasted an unreasonably long time.
On 14 November 2012 the application was
communicated to the Government. It was also decided to rule on the
admissibility and merits of the application at the same time (Article 29 § 1).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant was born in 1962 and lives in Glen
Allen, Virginia, USA.
The applicant married a Hungarian citizen, Ms
J.B., and the couple had one son, T.M.P., born on 3 February 2000. The family
lived in Virginia.
In 2003, following a visit to relatives in
Hungary, J.B. did not return to the USA and instituted divorce proceedings. The
applicant initiated proceedings before the Hungarian courts in order to have
the Hague Convention on the Civil Aspects of
International Child Abduction (“the Hague Convention”) applied and the
child taken back to the USA.
By a decision of 14 September 2004, the Hungarian Supreme Court
found that the retention of the child in Hungary by her
mother without the father’s consent was illegal but refused to grant a return
order under the Hague Convention. The applicant’s visiting rights were
regulated through a number of interim measures pending the divorce proceedings.
On 19 March 2005, following the pronouncement of
the divorce of the applicant and his wife, the Budapest Central District Court
placed the couple’s son with the mother. After appeals, on 27 March 2007 the
Supreme Court regulated by a final judgment the applicant’s access rights in a
way that he had access to his son four consecutive days every month and was
entitled to spend one month of the summer vacation with him, including the
possibility to take him to the USA. The mother was obliged to hand over the
necessary travel documents for this purpose.
The court explained that it was in the child’s best interest to
maintain emotional links with his father, which would become difficult should
he be disconnected from the linguistic environment. In addition, the court,
referring to the Hague Convention, found no evidence
to support J.B.’s supposition that the applicant would fail to return the child
to Hungary.
In August 2007 the applicant complained to the
Budapest XII District Guardianship Authority that his access granted in respect
of the months of August 2007 could not be exercised on account of the mother’s
reluctance to co-operate. In reply, J.B. maintained that the son was sick and
needed medical treatment.
Despite assurances from the applicant that he would accompany
T.M.P. to all medical appointments that were necessary, the mother left
Budapest with the child for a place unknown to the applicant.
The Guardianship Authority established that the mother and son
had not been available on 1 August 2007 as regulated in the Supreme Court’s
judgment. On 11 September 2007 the Authority warned the mother that she might
be fined for her conduct. The applicant for his part initiated enforcement
proceedings with no success.
On 1 July 2008 the mother again failed to comply
with the applicant’s access right. On 23 July 2008 the then competent Budapest
XIII District Guardianship Authority imposed a fine of 100,000 Hungarian
forints (HUF) (approximately 360 euros (EUR)) on her, ordering the handover of
the child to the applicant on 1 August 2008. The mother stated that she would
not comply with the court judgment as regards the child’s visit to the USA,
since there was an international warrant in place to locate the child, which might
impede his return to Hungary.
In the resumed first-instance administrative proceedings the
Guardianship Authority ordered J.B. to pay a fine and to reimburse the
applicant’s travel costs in the amount of HUF 396,375 (approximately
EUR 1,300). This decision was upheld by the Budapest Regional Court on 26
April 2010.
The applicant again requested the enforcement of
the access arrangements. On 28 July 2008 a bailiff ordered J.B. to deliver the
child’s passport to the applicant within three days. Nonetheless, she did not
comply with this decision but handed over the child’s passport to an employee
of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 August 2008. However, the Ministry did
not transfer the passport to the applicant upon the bailiff’s order but
returned it to the mother on 15 October 2008.
The applicant lodged a criminal complaint
against the employee of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on charges of abuse of
power. Eventually, on 19 October 2010 the Budapest Public Prosecutor’s Office
discontinued the investigation, finding no appearance of a criminal offence.
On 24 September 2009 the Authority established
the mother’s non-compliance with the access arrangements in respect of 1 August
2008 and imposed a further fine of HUF 200,000 (approximately EUR 720) for the
overdue visit. Moreover, she was ordered to compensate the applicant for the
costs incurred by travelling in vain. During the hearing before the Authority
the mother reiterated that she would not allow the child to travel to the USA
since the father would obstruct his return to Hungary. The mother’s request for
a judicial review was rejected by the Budapest Regional Court on 23 June
2010.
It appears that the applicant was otherwise able
to have contact with his son in compliance with the Supreme Court’s decision.
Meanwhile, both the applicant and the mother
initiated actions before the Buda Central District Court in February 2007, the
applicant seeking, in particular, a change in custody and the official deposit
of the child’s passport. The mother requested a restriction on the applicant’s
access rights, removing his entitlement to take the child to the USA. The cases
were joined.
On 11 December 2008 the court rejected both actions.
Nonetheless, the court allowed the applicant’s request to have the annual summer
visits moved to July (in which case a missed opportunity could be substituted
for by a visit in August) and modified the scheme accordingly. The decision was
upheld by the Budapest Regional Court, acting as a second instance court, on 25
January 2010.
The child’s envisaged stay with his father,
first scheduled for 1 July and then rescheduled for 1 August 2009, did not take
place. The mother stated that she would not co-operate in this respect, unless the
applicant saw to it that the criminal proceedings allegedly initiated against
her in the USA were discontinued.
On both occasions a police officer accompanied the applicant to
the mother’s flat, but his access right could not be enforced, since the mother
had left with the child for an unknown place.
The applicant’s first request seeking the enforcement of his right
to July visit was dismissed by the Guardianship Authority as premature, because
he was entitled to reschedule the visit to August. However, subsequent to the omission
of the visit in August, the applicant initiated enforcement proceedings,
following which a penalty in the sum of HUF 300,000 (approximately EUR 1,000)
was imposed on the mother by the Guardianship Authority. This decision was
confirmed by the Budapest Regional Court on 14 July 2011.
Furthermore, it appears that the applicant’s access
to his son of four consecutive days every month, as regulated by the Supreme
Court’s decision, did not take place at least in June 2009 and November 2009.
The applicant brought proceedings against J.B. in
respect of the missing visit of July/August 2011. Based on the mother’s
statement that she had stayed at home and been available on the prescribed day in
order to hand over the child to the applicant, his action was dismissed by the
Government Office for Budapest, acting as the second-instance administrative
authority, on 10 August 2012.
Meanwhile, the applicant initiated another
action before the Pest Central District Court, again seeking a change of
custody. In an interim measure of 15 June 2010, the court ruled that the
applicant’s access rights in respect of the 2010 summer holiday should be
exercised in Hungary.
In its judgment of 19 May 2011 the court
dismissed the applicant’s action. It limited his access rights to the effect
that the access visits during the child’s summer holiday could take place in
Hungary only, and this until the child’s sixteenth birthday, explaining that
the child was concerned about his father not bringing him back to Hungary. The
applicant was granted access visits for some days during autumn, Christmas and
spring holidays, to be exercised in Hungary as well. The court also regulated
the exact days of every other month when the applicant was entitled to visit
his son in Hungary in the coming years. It considered,
among other things, that the child did not consider the applicant as being a
member of his family, the disputes between the parents had negative impact on him
and he seemed to be reluctant to leave for the USA with his father alone.
On 29 November 2011 the Budapest Regional Court upheld the
first-instance decision, rejecting the applicant’s request to establish the
bi-monthly days of visit in a flexible way.
The applicant’s petition for review is pending
before the Supreme Court.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
The relevant rules concerning the enforcement of
contact orders are contained in Government Decree no. 149/1997 (IX. 10.) on
Guardianship Authorities, Child Protection Procedure and Guardianship
Procedure, which provides as follows:
Section 33
“(2) A child’s development is endangered where the person
entitled or obliged to maintain child contact repeatedly fails, by his or her
own fault, to comply or to properly comply with the [contact rules], and
thereby fails to ensure undisturbed contact.
...
(4) Where, in examining compliance with subsections (1)-(2),
the guardianship authority establishes [culpability on the parent’s side], it
shall, by a decision, order the enforcement of the child contact within thirty
days from the receipt of the enforcement request. In the enforcement order it
shall:
a) invite the omitting party to meet, according to the time and
manner specified in the contact order, his or her obligations in respect of the
contact due after the receipt of the order and to refrain from turning the
child against the other parent,
b) warn the omitting party of the legal consequences of
own-fault non-compliance with the obligations under subsection (a)
c) oblige the omitting party to bear any justified costs
incurred by the frustration of contact.
(5) Where the person entitled or obliged to maintain contact
fails to meet the obligations specified in the enforcement order under
subsection (4), the guardianship authority may ...
a) initiate to involve the child contact centre of the child
welfare service or to take the child into protection in case the maintenance of
contact entails conflicts, is continuously frustrated by obstacles, or the
parents have communication problems,
b) initiate child protection mediation procedure ....
...
(7) If it is proved that the person liable to contact brings up
the child by continuously turning him/her against the person entitled to
contact and, despite the enforcement measures specified under subsections
(4)-(5), fails to comply with the contact order, the guardianship authority:
a) may bring an action seeking change of placement if it is the
best interests of the child,
b) shall file a criminal complaint ...”
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 8 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant complained that his right to
respect for his family life had been infringed as a result of the
non-enforcement of the final judgments granting him visiting rights in respect
of T.M.P., his minor son, with the possibility to take him abroad. He relied on
Article 8 of the Convention as well as Article 2 §§ 2 and 3 of Protocol No. 4
and Article 5 of Protocol No. 7.
The Court considers that this complaint falls to be examined
under Article 8 of the Convention alone, which reads as follows:
“1. Everyone has the right to respect for his
private and family life, his home and his correspondence.
2. There shall be no interference by a public
authority with the exercise of this right except such as is in accordance with
the law and is necessary in a democratic society in the interests of national
security, public safety or the economic well-being of the country, for the
prevention of disorder or crime, for the protection of health or morals, or for
the protection of the rights and freedoms of others.”
The Government contested the applicant’s views.
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that this complaint is not
manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds.
It must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. Submissions of the parties
a. The applicant
The applicant submitted that although he had
used all the legal remedies available to him in order to enforce the final
judgment of the Supreme Court granting him access rights with the possibility
to take his son to the USA, they all had proved ineffective. He argued that despite
the mother’s non-cooperation, the authorities had failed to make sufficient
efforts to enforce the judgment. Furthermore, although his former wife had been
ordered by the Guardianship Authority to pay fines for not complying with the
Supreme Court’s decision, the situation remained unchanged.
Moreover, he submitted that an employee of the
Ministry of Foreign Affairs had obstructed the enforcement proceedings in that
she had unlawfully withheld the child’s passport and had not handed it over to
the bailiff. The applicant also observed that the administrative authorities had
committed a number of procedural errors when examining his requests for enforcement
of his access rights.
He further maintained that the non-enforcement
of his right to take the child abroad during summer holidays paradoxically resulted
in the complete revocation of this right by the domestic courts.
b. The Government
The Government emphasised at the outset, that
apart from the periodic summer visits to the USA, the applicant could exercise
his access rights undisturbed.
They contended that in the present case the
mother had objected to the summer visits taking place in the USA, since she had
feared that the applicant would not return the child to Hungary. In this
respect they referred to the ambiguous situation as regards the mutual
recognition and enforcement of custody-related decisions. They argued that the
applicant should have behaved in a more cooperative manner by initiating
proceedings before the US courts, seeking the recognition and enforcement of
the final and binding court decision placing the child with J.B. They further
argued that the initiation of criminal proceedings against the mother and the
issuing of a warrant in the USA had constituted an obstacle to the access
visits during summer holidays.
The Government further submitted that the
Hungarian authorities had acted diligently and accomplished all their duties
provided under the law in order to enforce the domestic court’s decision. Amongst
others, on a number of occasions they had imposed procedural fines on J.B. and
ordered her to reimburse the applicant’s travel costs.
The Government moreover noted that the somewhat
protracted nature of the various enforcement proceedings was due to the fact
that the authorities needed to adjudicate a large number of submissions filed
by the applicant.
In sum, the Government were of the view that the State
authorities had complied with their positive obligations under Article 8.
2. The Court’s assessment
a. General principles
The Court reiterates that the mutual enjoyment
by parent and child of each other’s company constitutes a fundamental element
of “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (see Monory
v. Romania and Hungary, no. 71099/01, § 70, 5 April 2005).
The Court further reiterates that the essential
object of Article 8 is to protect the individual against arbitrary action by
public authorities. There are in addition positive obligations inherent in
effective “respect” for family life. In both contexts regard must be had to the
fair balance that has to be struck between the various interests involved,
namely the interests of the child, the parents and other family members as well
as the general interest in ensuring the respect for the rule of law; and in
both contexts the State enjoys a certain margin of appreciation (see, for
similar reasoning, Keegan v. Ireland, 26 May 1994, § 49, Series A
no. 290). In cases of this type, the child’s interest
must come before all other considerations (see Płaza v. Poland,
no. 18830/07, § 71, 25 January
2011).
In relation to the State’s
obligation to take positive measures, the Court has held that in cases
concerning the implementation of the contact rights of one of the parents,
Article 8 includes a parent’s right to the taking of measures with a view to
his or her being reunited with the child and an obligation on the authorities
to facilitate such reunion. In so far as the interests of the child so dictate,
those authorities must do their utmost to preserve personal relations and, if
and when appropriate, to “rebuild” the family. However, the State’s obligation
is not one of result, but of means (see, among
other authorities, Pascal v. Romania, no. 805/09, § 69, 17 April 2012).
In a case of this kind, the adequacy of a
measure is to be judged by the swiftness of its implementation, as the passage
of time can have irremediable consequences for relations between the child and
the parent who does not live with him or her (see Ignaccolo-Zenide v.
Romania, no. 31679/96, § 102, ECHR 2000-I).
The Court has also held that although coercive
measures against the children are not desirable in this sensitive area, the use
of sanctions must not be ruled out in the event of unlawful behaviour by the
parent with whom the children live (see Shaw v. Hungary, no.
6457/09, § 67, 26 July 2011).
The Court further
reiterates that active parental participation in proceedings concerning
children is required under Article 8 of the Convention in order to ensure the
protection of their interests, and that when an applicant applies for
enforcement of a court order, his conduct as well as that of the courts is a
relevant factor to be considered (see Glaser v. the United
Kingdom, no. 32346/96, § 70, 19 September
2000).
b. Application of those principles to the present
case
The Court observes that the applicant’s
complaint relates in essence to the non-enforcement of his access rights during
summer vacations to be exercised in the USA and their subsequent limitation to
the territory of Hungary until the child’s sixteenth birthday. In the Court’s
view, given that the applicant lives in the USA and these holidays would have
been the only way for him to spend time with his son in an appropriate
environment, the enforcement proceedings at issue concerned the substance of
the applicant’s future relations with his child and related to a fundamental
element of “family life” within the meaning of Article 8 of the Convention (see
H. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 90, Series A no. 120).
The Court’s task in the present case is
therefore to consider whether the measures taken by the Hungarian authorities
were adequate and effective, as could reasonably have been expected in the
circumstances, in order to facilitate summer reunions between the applicant and
his child.
The Court notes that the domestic courts granted
sole custody of the child to the mother and the applicant was granted the right
to take him for periodic summer visits to the USA. The problems concerning the
implementation of those contact rights arose immediately after they had been
determined by the domestic courts; the applicant thus had no choice but to
initiate execution proceedings before the Guardianship Authority and request
the services of a bailiff in order to enforce his contact rights.
In assessing the domestic authorities’ conduct
in respect of the enforcement of the relevant Supreme Court judgment, the Court
notes that while it is true that they allowed the majority of the applicant’s
requests for injunctions, nonetheless this occurred mostly following a
considerable lapse of time. In particular, the final decision on the applicant’s
request concerning the missing visit of August 2008 was issued on 23 June 2010
and the one concerning the missing visit of July/August 2009 only on 14 July
2011 (see paragraphs 13 and 16 above).
In this context to Court finds it difficult to
accept the Government’s explanation that the applicant contributed to the delays
by lodging a large number of motions. It has been the Court’s constant approach
- in the context of Article 6 - that an applicant cannot be blamed for taking
full advantage of the resources afforded by national law in the defence of his
interests (see Skorobogatova v. Russia, no. 33914/02, § 47, 1 December 2005),
and the Court finds it appropriate to apply the same approach in the present
circumstances.
In addition, the Court observes that the Supreme
Court’s judgment on access arrangements during summer vacations was in force but
not implemented from 27 March 2007 until 19 May 2011 (the date of the Pest
Central District Court’s decision amending the applicant’s access rights), that
is, for over four years. The Court considers that this delay proved decisive
for the applicant’s future relations with his son and had a particular quality
of irreversibility (see H. v. the United Kingdom, 8 July 1987, § 89,
Series A no. 120). The lapse of time in question led to the de facto
determination of the matter, in that the Pest Central District Court eventually
held that since the Supreme Court’s judgment new circumstances had occurred and
T.M.P no longer considered his father as a member of his family and seemed to
be unwilling to visit him in the USA (see paragraph 20 above).
The Court further observes that the enforcement
attempts were less than successful (see paragraphs 9 to 11 and 16 above). The
Court acknowledges that the difficulties in ensuring the applicant’s access
rights were essentially due to the mother’s behaviour. It is true that the
applicant’s enforcement requests led to the imposition on J.B. of an administrative
fine that was subsequently increased due to her continued non-compliance with
the final court judgment (see paragraphs 10, 13 and 16 above).
Nonetheless, the Court considers that the facts
of the case indicated that the financial sanctions imposed on J.B. were
inadequate to improve the situation at hand and overcome the mother’s lack of
cooperation. However, even if the domestic legal order did not allow for the
imposition of effective sanctions, each Contracting State must equip itself
with an adequate and sufficient legal arsenal to ensure compliance with the
positive obligations imposed on it by Article 8 of the Convention and the other
international agreements it has chosen to ratify (see Maire
v. Portugal, no. 48206/99, § 76, ECHR
2003-VII). In the present case, the Court notes that, in certain
circumstances, the Guardianship Authority could have filed an action to change
the child’s placement or file a criminal report against the mother notably on
the ground that the latter had been reluctant to respect the judicial decisions
on the other parent’s visiting rights, but it did not avail itself of these
legal avenues (see paragraph 22 above).
Concerning the Government’s argument that
non-compliance with the access arrangements was justified by the consideration
that the applicant would not return T.M.P. to Hungary, in particular given the
ambiguous situation concerning the mutual recognition of custody-related
decisions (see paragraph 30 above), the Court refers to the judgment of the
Supreme Court delivered on 27 March 2007. The Court is satisfied that, while
allowing the applicant to take his son abroad for summer visits, the judgment had
due regard to the mother’s arguments and the questions related to the applicability
of the Hague Convention, but no evidence was identified to support the mother’s
supposition (see paragraph 8 above).
Furthermore, the Court emphasises that the
interests of the child are paramount in such cases, which requires that the
question of access be determined primarily with regard to this consideration,
rather than to the parents’ own perceived interests.
As it was established by the Supreme Court’s judgment, the
child’s best interest would have required the exercise, to some extent at
least, of the father’s access rights in the USA so that no linguistic - and, as
a consequence, emotional - barriers arose between him and his father.
There is nothing in the case file indicating that, until a late
stage in the period complained of, the child was reluctant to meet his father.
However, even when such reluctance eventually developed (see paragraph 20
above), it does not appear that this element was assessed by the authorities as
an element justifying the non-enforcement of the Supreme Court’s judgment -
rather, those authorities merely acquiesced in the mother’s obstructive
behaviour.
. Finally,
the Court recognises that the passage of time may change the circumstances -
which may call for an eventual re-assessment of the child’s ties to his parents
and their environments respectively and the re-regulation of access
arrangements. The decisions of the Hungarian courts to the effect that the
applicant’s access rights as regards summer vacations should be exercised in
Hungary until the child’s sixteenth birthday can be seen as reflecting this
principle. The Court would note in this connection that, in its judgment of 19
May 2011, the Pest Central District Court pointed to the child’s own wishes as
its reason for modifying the applicant’s access rights established in the Supreme
Court’s judgment of 27 March 2007 (see paragraphs 8 and 20 above). However, the
fact remains that the considerable time, during which the Supreme Court’s above
judgment remained unenforced, frustrated the applicant’s rights, and had the
eventual effect that his son became alienated from him.
Having regard to the above considerations, the
Court concludes that, notwithstanding the margin of appreciation afforded to
the State, the national authorities did not take all the steps which could be
reasonably required to enforce the applicant’s access rights.
. The
Court therefore finds that there has been a violation of Article 8 of the
Convention.
II. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 OF THE
CONVENTION
The applicant also complained that the domestic
proceedings, including the enforcement, lasted an unreasonably long time, in
breach of Article 6 § 1 of the Convention.
The Government contested that argument.
The Court notes that this complaint is linked to
the one examined above and must therefore likewise be declared admissible.
Having regard to the finding relating to Article
8 (see paragraph 51 above), the Court considers that it is not necessary
to examine whether, in this case, there has been a violation of Article 6 § 1.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed EUR 3,876 in respect of
pecuniary damage. This amount corresponds to his expenditure incurred when
hiring private investigators to locate his son.
In addition, he claimed EUR 100,000 euros in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government found the claims to be excessive.
The Court finds no causal link between the
violation found and the pecuniary damage claimed. It therefore rejects this
claim. However, it considers that the applicant must be regarded as having
suffered anguish and distress as a result of the withering ties with his son
and the insufficient measures taken by the Hungarian authorities. On the basis
of equity, the Court awards him the sum of EUR 12,500 in non-pecuniary damage.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant also claimed altogether EUR 99,526
for the costs and expenses incurred through his efforts to exercise his access
right. From his submissions, the following items belonging under this head
could be deciphered: EUR 18,869 as travel costs, EUR 27,840 as legal fees
billed by his lawyers for his representation before the domestic courts and EUR
5,000 for costs and expenses incurred before the Court.
The Government found the claim to be excessive.
According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant
is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has
been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable
as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its
possession and the above criteria, the Court considers it reasonable to award
the sum of EUR 10,000 covering costs under all heads, also having regard to the
fact that the authorities repeatedly ordered the mother of the applicant’s
child to compensate him for the costs incurred by travelling in vain to Hungary
(see paragraphs 10 and 13 above).
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1. Declares the application admissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 8 of the Convention;
3. Holds that there is no need to examine the
complaint under Article 6 § 1 of the Convention;
4. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the applicant,
within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in
accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following
amounts, to be converted into the currency of the
respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i) EUR 12,500 (twelve thousand five hundred
euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of non-pecuniary
damage;
(ii) EUR 10,000 (ten thousand euros), plus any tax
that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
5. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 11 June 2013,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Stanley Naismith Guido
Raimondi
Registrar President
