FIFTH SECTION

CASE OF KUMMER v. THE CZECH REPUBLIC

(Application no. 32133/11)

JUDGMENT
(Merits)

STRASBOURG

25 July 2013

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Kummer v. the Czech Republic,
The European Court of Human Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
	Mark Villiger, President,
	Angelika Nußberger,
	Boštjan M. Zupančič,
	Ganna Yudkivska,
	André Potocki,
	Paul Lemmens,
	Aleš Pejchal, judges,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 9 July 2013,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in an application (no. 32133/11) against the Czech Republic lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by a Czech national, Mr Vladimír Kummer (“the applicant”), on 18 May 2011.
2.  The applicant was represented by Mr D. Netušil, a lawyer practising in Prague. The Czech Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, Mr Vít A. Schorm, of the Ministry of Justice.
3.  The applicant alleged, in particular, that he had been ill-treated while in police custody and that his complaints had not been investigated effectively.
4.  The application was communicated to the Government on 9 January 2012.
THE FACTS
I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5.  The applicant was born in 1956 and lives in Aš.
6.  At about 3 a.m. on 1 May 2010 the applicant was on his way home from a bar where he had been drinking alcohol when a municipal police patrol stopped him and asked to see his identity card. He had no identity documents with him, but told the patrol that he lived just fifty metres away and that they could accompany him home where he could prove his identity. The patrol, however, insisted on taking him by car to Aš police station, where he provided his name and address. He was then told that he had committed the administrative offence (přestupek) of urinating in a public place. A breathalyser test gave a result of 2 per mille of alcohol in the applicant’s blood.
7.  The following events at the police station are disputed between the parties.
A.  The applicant’s version of the events
8.  After establishing the applicant’s identity and the level of alcohol in his blood, the police invited the applicant to enter another room. He refused to do so and asked why he had been brought to the police station. A police officer twisted his arm, handcuffed him and led him to a police cell where the applicant was handcuffed to an iron ring on the wall. He attempted to free himself but was punched in the chest, the back of his head and his cheek bone. He was left handcuffed to the wall by one hand.
9.  After some time, the applicant started kicking in order to attract the attention of some other police officers who might free him. However, the same police officer entered the cell and knocked him to the ground. He then knelt on the applicant’s chest and thumped him several times with both hands. The police officer then stretched the applicant’s free arm and handcuffed it to an iron ring on the other side of the cell. He kicked the applicant’s legs so that he was hanging from his stretched arms. Lastly, he shackled the applicant’s legs and hit him several times on his back. Another police officer was watching these events in the cell. After being left in this agonising position for about thirty minutes, the applicant was told to go home.
B.  The Government’s version of the events
10.  According to the Government, the applicant was verbally aggressive when he was taken to the police station and was therefore placed in a cell. In the cell he started kicking the door and made a hole 6 cm in diameter. The value of the door was 500 Czech korunas (CZK) (24 euros (EUR)). The police officers reacted by attaching one of the applicant’s hands to an iron ring on the wall in order to prevent him from destroying the equipment in the cell. As the applicant did not stop kicking and shouting, his other hand was handcuffed to another iron ring on the opposite wall. Since even that did not prevent the applicant from kicking and trying to reach the door, his hands were handcuffed behind his back and attached to an iron ring, and his legs were tied with a leather strap. After fifty minutes in the cell, the applicant calmed down and was released.
C.  The ensuing investigations
11.  While still at the police station, the applicant called an ambulance and asked for a medical certificate confirming his injuries. However, the doctor who arrived examined him quickly and concluded that his injuries were old and that he did not need any medical treatment.
12.  Later in the morning of 1 May 2010 the applicant went to a hospital. The doctor issued a certificate stating that he had some old injuries on his back but also fresh injuries on his back, neck and head, bruises on his wrists and a painful chest. He was given sixteen days’ sick leave.
13.  On the same day, the applicant took the medical certificate to Cheb police station and lodged a criminal complaint that he had been ill-treated by the police.
14.  After questioning the applicant, the police sent the file to the Police Inspectorate (Inspekce Policie) on 3 May 2010. The file also contained a report on an inspection of the applicant’s cell in Aš police station conducted by the police officers responsible for the alleged ill-treatment.
15.  On 19 May 2010 the Police Inspectorate requested an expert opinion on the origin of the applicant’s injuries. The report of 25 May 2010 by Doctor C. was based on photographs of the applicant and stated that the injuries to the wrist had probably been caused by the applicant trying to release his hands from the handcuffs. The expert did not find any other injuries that could have been sustained at the police station.
16.  On 26 May 2010 the applicant asked the Plzeň-město prosecutor’s office to supervise the investigation. He complained, inter alia, that the police officers had not yet been questioned, which had given them time to coordinate their statements. He also requested several other investigative measures.
17.  On 5 June 2010 the applicant further complained that some colleagues of the police officers against whom he had lodged his criminal complaint had been threatening him in order to make him withdraw his complaint. On 22 June 2010 the supervising prosecutor ordered the Police Inspectorate to commission a complex expert report on the causes of the applicant’s injuries, and to question the applicant again in order to explain certain inconsistencies in his statements.
18.  On 21 July and 28 July 2010 the Police Inspectorate questioned the police officers present at Aš police station on the night in question. They all testified that they had not ill-treated the applicant and that they had handcuffed and shackled him in the cell for his own protection and the protection of police property because he had been drunk and kicking the cell door.
19.  The Inspectorate further questioned two persons from the bar, who testified that when the applicant had left the bar in the morning of 1 May 2010 he had been slightly inebriated but had had no injuries. The following day the applicant had told them that he had been beaten up by the police and had shown them his injuries.
20.  The Inspectorate also questioned the doctor who had gone to the police station after the events. She stated that the applicant had been drunk and had been insulting the people around him. She had seen injuries on his back, but they had been of earlier origin. His wrists had been red, probably from the handcuffs.
21.  In the meantime, on 29 July 2010, the Karlovy Vary Regional Directorate of Police had written to the applicant stating that his complaints had been found to be unsubstantiated and that the internal investigation had therefore been closed. The letter provided very few reasons.
22.  On 28 August 2010, in the Inspectorate’s ongoing investigation, an expert submitted a report on the nature and origin of the applicant’s injuries, based on information in the investigation file. He stated that the fresh injuries must have been sustained at the police station, but he ruled out that they could have resulted from beatings. In his view, the injuries to the applicant’s head had been caused by a hard surface, such as a wall. The bruises on his wrists had been caused by straining to free his hands from the handcuffs, which were attached to a fixed object.
23.  On 6 September 2010 the applicant asked the Police Inspectorate to provide him with all the documentation in the file in order to commission another expert opinion, pointing out the serious deficiencies of the one commissioned by the Inspectorate. He also complained that for unknown reasons his notification of 5 June 2010 was missing from the investigation file.
24.  On 13 September 2010 the Police Inspectorate closed the investigation, finding that no crime had been committed. According to them, the events as submitted by the applicant contradicted the version of the events of all the other witnesses. Moreover, two doctors had found that the applicant’s injuries had been old. Relying on the expert opinion, it stated that the newer injuries could not have been caused in the way described by the applicant, that the wrist injuries had been self-inflicted by straining on the handcuffs and the other injuries could have been caused by low-intensity aggression.
25.  On 20 September 2010 the applicant appealed against the decision, challenging in particular the expert opinion as incorrect and one-sided.
26.  On 18 November 2010 the Plzeň-město district prosecutor’s office, having reviewed the investigation file, dismissed the applicant’s appeal, finding the conclusions of the Police Inspectorate correct. It referred to the facts that were unfavourable to the applicant: it had been established from an alcohol test that he had been drunk; the ambulance doctor had testified that he had been insulting everybody around him; and he had damaged the door of the cell.
27.  On 30 December 2010 the applicant obtained an opinion by another certified expert whom he had commissioned himself. The report concluded that the applicant had suffered injuries from hitting a hard surface. However, it had not been possible to conclude, or rule out for that matter, whether those injuries had been caused by active force (the applicant being hit) or passive force (the applicant falling). If they had been caused by active force, it had been of medium intensity.
28.  On 21 February 2011 the Constitutional Court dismissed an appeal lodged by the applicant against the decision to discontinue the investigation, holding that there was no constitutional right to have a third person prosecuted and that such a decision remained within the exclusive power of the prosecution.
D.  Ombudsman’s report
29.  On an unspecified date the applicant complained to the Ombudsman about his treatment by the police. On 7 December 2010, the Ombudsman issued a report finding that the police had violated the Police Act in several respects.
30.  First, on account of his intoxication, the applicant should not have been placed in a cell without a prior medical examination. Secondly, his shackling in the cell had been disproportionate. Moreover, while shackled, the applicant had had no possibility of calling for assistance other than by shouting or kicking the walls or the door, because he could not have reached the bell. His access to the bell was blocked when the police officers closed the cell door in addition to the iron grille of the cell. Moreover, the tying of his ankles had not been noted in the police records. In the Ombudsman’s view, there had been no legal grounds for detaining the applicant at all, so it looked as though he had been detained as a punishment for his drunken behaviour.
31.  The Ombudsman noted that it was not his primary task to investigate the alleged ill-treatment of the applicant, as there were other bodies, such as the Police Inspectorate, to do so. He nevertheless expressed some doubts about the veracity of the version of the events as submitted by the police officers. He noted that the doctor who had gone to the police station and found that the applicant’s injuries had been old had examined him only very briefly, whereas the following morning another doctor had found new injuries on the applicant’s body. In his view, assuming that the injuries had been caused by the applicant himself when straining to free his hands from the handcuffs and falling to the ground, the question arose as to whether, given his condition, he should have been placed in a cell and shackled at all.
32.  In reaction to the Ombudsman’s report, the Department of Internal Inspection of the Karlovy Vary Regional Directorate of Police reopened the investigation into the applicant’s detention.
33.  In its report of 9 March 2011, it concluded that police officer J.B. had breached the provisions of the Police Act by placing the applicant, who had been intoxicated, in a police cell without a prior medical examination. As a result disciplinary proceedings against J.B. were instituted.
34.  On 30 March 2011 the head of the Cheb Police Department found J.B. guilty of placing the applicant, who had been intoxicated, in a police cell without a prior medical examination and of not having reported appropriately and fully the circumstances of the applicant’s detention in the official record. As a punishment he received a written caution. The operative part of the decision reads:
“[J.B. has been found guilty] of a disciplinary offence of failing to observe the ‘basic obligations of an officer’ stipulated in section 45(1)(a) [of Act no. 361/2003] by not complying with ‘service discipline’ under section 46(1) of the Act. On 1 May 2010, while detaining Vladimír Kummer, he did not secure his medical examination and placed him in a police cell even though [the applicant] was evidently under the influence of alcohol. He thus contravened section 31(1) of the Police Act (law no. 273/2008) and section 12(6)(b) of Act no. 159/2009. He further contravened section 109(1) of the Czech Police Act by not sufficiently describing the facts of the detention in the official record, in which he did not include all the circumstances of the detention.”
Subsequently, the ombudsman closed the case under section 18(2) of Act no. 349/1999.
E.  Proceedings for damages
35.  On 13 May 2011 the applicant instituted civil proceedings against the State under Act no. 82/1998. He requested compensation for the violation of his right to liberty and freedom from ill-treatment. The proceedings are pending.
II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
36.  Under Article 12 § 2 of the Code of Criminal Procedure in force at the relevant time, the Police Inspectorate was the investigative body when a crime was allegedly committed by a police officer.
37.  Under section 103 of the Police Act (no. 273/2008) in force at the relevant time, the Police Inspectorate was under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Its director was appointed by the Government, to which he was responsible. It was composed of police officers who had been called to perform their duties at the Ministry of the Interior. These inspectors had the same powers in the carrying out of their duties as police officers.
38.  Under section 26(1)(b) of the Police Act, a person present at a police station could be detained if he or she was verbally insulting a police officer or other person. However, under section 31 a person who was demonstrably intoxicated could be placed in a police cell only after being checked by a doctor to determine whether there were reasons for taking the person to a sobering-up centre or other appropriate medical facility.
III.  RELEVANT INTERNATIONAL STANDARDS
39.  For the relevant international instruments see Julin v. Estonia (nos. 16563/08, 40841/08, 8192/10 and 18656/10, § 95-96, 29 May 2012).
40.  In addition, the European Committee for the Prevention of Torture and Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment (the “CPT”) has recently issued several reports on the use of restraints in police cells.
41.  In its 2012 report on a visit to Germany (CPT/Inf (2012) 6), the CPT commended Saxony for not using any restraints inside police cells. The CPT recommended that all the police authorities in Germany take the same approach and put an end to the resort of fixation in police establishments. It acknowledged that in the event of a person in custody behaving in a highly agitated or violent manner, the use of handcuffs may be justified. However, the person concerned should not be shackled to fixed objects but should instead be kept under close supervision in a secure setting and, if necessary, police officers should seek medical assistance and act in accordance with the doctor’s instructions.
42.  The CPT issued the same recommendation to the French authorities and noted that restraints have no place in an already secure environment (see CPT/Inf (2012) 13), paragraph 32).
43.  The CPT had already criticised the use of restraints on people in police cells in the past and opined that a medical doctor should be called if the detainee was agitated or violent (see, for example, report on a visit to Slovakia (see CPT/Inf (97) 2, paragraph 45)). Following a visit to Austria (see CPT/Inf (2005) 13, paragraph 16), it stated the following:
“In a custodial setting, the practice of restraining a person in a hyper-extended position with hand and ankle cuffs linked together behind the back is not acceptable. Staff should be trained to use other, less hazardous, methods for controlling detained persons who represent a danger to themselves or to others, such as verbal instruction and manual control techniques. Further, the police should call in a medical doctor whenever it is found necessary to restrain an agitated or violent detainee, and act in accordance with his opinion. If recourse is had to means of physical restraint vis-à-vis such a detainee, they should be removed at the earliest opportunity; means of restraint should never be applied, or their application prolonged, as a punishment.”
THE LAW
I.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN ITS SUBSTANTIVE ASPECT
44.  The applicant complained that he had been ill-treated by police officers while detained at a police station. He relied on Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A.  Admissibility
45.  The Government considered the complaint premature, as proceedings for damages against the State under Act no. 82/1998 were pending. They argued that the applicant had a good chance of success in those proceedings and of being compensated for his injuries because his detention in a police cell had been acknowledged as illegal by the domestic police authorities.
46.  The applicant disagreed.
47.  The Court observes that the present complaint concerns not the issue of the applicant’s detention but his alleged ill-treatment. Therefore, the fact that the illegality of the applicant’s detention was acknowledged by the domestic authorities has no bearing on the present complaint. It reiterates its well-established case-law that in cases where an individual has an arguable claim under Article 3 of the Convention, the notion of an effective remedy entails, on the part of the State, a thorough and effective investigation capable of leading to the identification and punishment of those responsible (see Selmouni v. France [GC], no. 25803/94, § 79, ECHR 1999-V). Proceedings that can only result in the award of compensation to be paid by the State, but not in the punishment of those responsible for the ill-treatment, cannot be considered as satisfying the procedural requirement of Article 3 in cases of wilful ill-treatment of persons who are within the control of agents of the State (see Krastanov v. Bulgaria, no. 50222/99, § 60, 30 September 2004, and Kopylov v. Russia, no. 3933/04, § 130, 29 July 2010). Consequently, civil proceedings for damages are not an effective remedy that needs to be exhausted for the present complaint.
48.  The Court notes that the Police Inspectorate closed the investigation regarding the alleged ill-treatment and the applicant used all available remedies against that decision. Both his appeal to the prosecutor and his constitutional appeal were dismissed.
49.  Accordingly, the Court dismisses the Government’s objection.
50.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B.  Merits
1.  Arguments of the parties
51.  The applicant complained that he had been beaten up by a police officer while in a cell and that he had been handcuffed to the wall even though he had not behaved aggressively. He admitted to kicking the door, but alleged that that had been in order to call for help, as the position in which he had been handcuffed had been extremely painful. He considered that his version of the events had been supported by the expert opinion of 30 December 2010. He also referred to the inconsistencies in the police officers’ statements, which had made their version of the events less credible. Furthermore, he considered that the expert report of 28 August 2010 had been biased, as the expert concerned was often employed by the police and was economically dependent on them.
52.  The applicant further stated that the police officers had had a motive to ill-treat him: he had had a long-term dispute with the municipal police, who were friends of the police officers, about parking fines. The fines had been quashed by the administrative authorities, as a result of which he was unpopular with the municipal police and had suffered verbal attacks from them on many occasions.
53.  The Government argued that any suffering the applicant had sustained had not reached the minimum level of severity for the application of Article 3 of the Convention.
54.  They maintained that the applicant’s version of the events was not credible as he had kept changing it. Any use of force against the applicant had been proportionate and justified by his conduct. It had been necessary to protect the police property, as the applicant had damaged the cell door, and later to protect the applicant from harming himself, as he had tried to free himself from the handcuffs, which had caused him the injuries and pain.
55.  The Government submitted that any injuries the applicant had sustained had been caused by his handcuffing and his behaviour in the cell. This conclusion had been supported by the medical experts, who had ruled out that the applicant’s injuries could have been sustained in the way that he had described.
2.  The Court’s assessment
56.  The Court reiterates that in respect of a person deprived of his liberty, any recourse to physical force which has not been made strictly necessary by his own conduct diminishes human dignity and is in principle an infringement of the right set forth in Article 3 of the Convention (see Ribitsch v. Austria, 4 December 1995, § 38, Series A no. 336). Accordingly, Article 3 of the Convention is engaged in the present case, as the applicant alleged that he had been subjected to physical force while detained in a police cell.
57.  The Court has held that where an individual is taken into police custody in good health but is found to be injured at the time of release, it is incumbent on the State to provide a plausible explanation of how those injuries were caused, failing which a clear issue arises under Article 3 of the Convention (see, Selmouni v. France, cited above, § 87; and Ribitsch v. Austria, cited above, § 34).
58.  The Court observes that the applicant was detained at a police station in the early hours of 1 May 2010. Immediately after release an ambulance doctor did not see any fresh injuries on the applicant. The Court notes, however, that the ambulance doctor examined the applicant only very briefly. Afterwards, the applicant went to see a doctor at a local hospital, who undertook a detailed examination of the applicant and confirmed that he had fresh injuries on his back, neck and head, bruises on his wrists and a painful chest. This examination took place the very morning and so there was not any unnecessary delay between release and the examination that could cast doubt on the relevance of the issued medical certificate (compare Balogh v. Hungary, no. 47940/99, § 49, 20 July 2004). It is thus incumbent on the Government to provide a plausible explanation as to how the applicant sustained those injuries and whether they were caused by an illegal use of force, in violation of Article 3 of the Convention.
59.  The Government relied on two expert medical opinions commissioned by the Police Inspectorate that ruled out that the injuries could have resulted from beatings. The opinions concluded that the injuries could have been caused by the applicant himself hitting or falling against a hard surface, such as a wall or the ground. The injuries to the wrists had been caused by straining to release his hands from the handcuffs. The expert opinion submitted by the applicant was more complete and did not rule out that the injuries could have been caused by beatings. On the other hand, it also admitted that the injuries might have been caused by passive force, namely, the applicant falling against hard surfaces.
60.  The Court further takes into account the state of intoxication of the applicant, which makes the Government’s version of the facts – that the applicant fell and hit himself – even more plausible.
61.  Accordingly, the Court is unable to conclude, based on the evidence in the case file, that the applicant was attacked and beaten by the police officers at the police station. However, assuming the plausibility of the Government’s version of the facts – that the injuries the applicant sustained were self-inflicted by his own violent behaviour in the cell – it remains to be decided whether restraining the applicant in the cell itself was in breach of Article 3 of the Convention.
62.  The Court reiterates that measures depriving a person of his liberty may often involve an inevitable element of suffering or humiliation. Nevertheless, it is incumbent on the State to ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for his human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Valašinas v. Lithuania, no. 44558/98, §§ 101-02, ECHR 2001-VIII).
63.  The Court has stated before that handcuffing does not normally give rise to an issue under Article 3 of the Convention where the measure has been imposed in connection with lawful arrest or detention and does not entail use of force, or public exposure, exceeding what is reasonably considered necessary and proportionate in the circumstances. In this regard, it is of importance, for instance, whether there is reason to believe that the person concerned would resist arrest or abscond, cause injury or damage, or suppress evidence (see Raninen v. Finland, 16 December 1997, § 56, Reports of Judgments and Decisions 1997‑VIII; Hénaf v. France, no. 65436/01, § 56, ECHR 2003‑XI; and Kashavelov v. Bulgaria, no. 891/05, § 38, 20 January 2011). In any case, the Court attaches particular importance to the circumstances of each case and examines whether the use of restraints was necessary (see Gorodnitchev v. Russia, no. 52058/99, § 102, 24 May 2007).
64.  Moreover, in order to fall within the scope of Article 3, the handcuffing, like any other treatment, must attain a minimum level of severity. Treatment is considered to be “degrading” when it humiliates or debases an individual, showing a lack of respect for, or diminishing, his or her human dignity, or arouses feelings of fear, anguish or inferiority capable of breaking an individual’s moral and physical resistance (see M.S.S. v. Belgium and Greece [GC], no. 30696/09, § 220, ECHR 2011). Publicity may be a relevant factor in assessing whether a treatment is “degrading” within the meaning of Article 3, but the Court does not consider that absence of publicity will necessarily prevent a given treatment from falling into that category: it may well suffice that the victim is humiliated in his own eyes, even if not in the eyes of others (see Tyrer v. the United Kingdom, 25 April 1978, § 32, Series A no. 26). Application of measures of restraint to an applicant in a non-public setting may still give rise to a violation of Article 3 in a situation where no serious risks to security could be proved to exist (see Ashot Harutyunyan v. Armenia, no. 34334/04, § 125, 15 June 2010, referring to Hénaf v. France, cited above, §§ 51 and 56).
65.  Recently, the Court has had occasion to decide on the use of restraints in a cell, and noted that the application of such a measure calls for a thorough scrutiny of its lawfulness as well as of the grounds for, and the manner of, its use (see Julin v. Estonia, cited above, § 124).
66.  Turning to the present case, the Court first notes that there are minor factual disputes about the restraining of the applicant in the police cell. The Government denied that the applicant had been shackled to an iron ring immediately upon placement in the cell. However, the parties agree on the ensuing nature of the restraints used on the applicant. First, one hand was shackled to an iron ring in order to prevent him, according to the Government, from kicking the door, which he had damaged. Later, as the applicant was still agitated, his other hand was also shackled to an iron ring on the opposite wall. This stretched position was later changed when the applicant’s hands were secured behind his back and handcuffed to one of the iron rings. Lastly, his legs were tied with a leather strap to prevent him from kicking the cell door. This treatment lasted for about fifty minutes. As a result of his stay in the cell, the applicant sustained injuries to his back, neck, head and chest, and bruises on his wrists, which prevented him from working for sixteen days.
67.  As to the justification of the treatment, the Court considers that using restraints on a person already in a police cell, namely a secure environment, can be justified only in exceptional circumstances (see also the recommendations of the CPT in paragraphs 41-43 above and Julin, cited above, § 127). The Court cannot accept the argument that the small hole which the applicant made in the cell door constituted serious damage to property, justifying the use of restraints to such an extent (see, mutatis mutandis, the European Prison Rules, paragraph 68.2). In this context, it is crucial to note that the applicant’s banging on the door was not a wilful act of destruction. Rather, as noted by the Ombudsman, it was the only way in which the applicant could call for assistance, given that his access to the bell was blocked when the police officers closed the door in addition to the iron grille. Furthermore, instead of ensuring that the applicant would be subjected to the least intrusive measure available in the circumstances (see Julin v. Estonia, cited above, § 127), he was increasingly restrained: in the end, both his hands were tied behind his back and shackled to an iron ring, and his legs were tied together with a leather strap.
68.  As regards the Government’s argument that the restraints were aimed at preventing the applicant from harming himself, the Court notes that not only were the handcuffs ineffective in keeping the applicant from causing harm to himself, but they caused bruising to his wrists at least.
69.  As to the severity of the treatment, the Court notes that the shackling of the applicant lasted only a limited time, that is a maximum of fifty minutes. In Kazakova v. Bulgaria (no. 55061/00, § 53, 22 June 2006) a likewise limited duration of the shackling of the applicant was one of the reasons why the Court found that the minimum level of severity of the ill-treatment had not been reached. Unlike in that case, however, here the restraints were applied in an environment that was already secure and were far more intrusive. The police officers in the present case, in breach of the domestic law (see paragraphs 30, 33 and 34 above), placed the applicant, who due to his drunkenness was in a vulnerable state, in a cell with no possibility of asking for assistance other than by banging on the door. When he did so, he was handcuffed to an iron ring. As the applicant did not calm down, the police officers continued to apply increasingly intrusive restraints. The Court considers that such a situation must have aroused in the applicant feelings of fear, anguish and inferiority and was an attack on his dignity.
70.  The Court also accepts, as evidenced by the injuries noted in the medical reports (see paragraphs 12, 22 and 27 above), that the shackling and stretching of the applicant must have caused him considerable pain, which is an important factor to take into account in assessing the severity of the treatment (see Archip v. Romania, no. 49608/08, § 55, 27 September 2011; conversely, Kuzmenko v. Russia, no. 18541/04, § 45, 21 December 2010, where the Court did not find a violation of Article 3 in respect of the handcuffing of the applicant because, inter alia, she had not contended that the handcuffing had affected her physically; and Raninen, cited above, §§ 57-59, where the Court did not find a violation, in spite of the fact that the handcuffing had not been justified, because it had not affected the applicant physically or mentally).
71.  The Court also cannot lose sight of the whole picture. The events unrolled from a minor offence when the applicant was allegedly urinating in a public place. The applicant was apprehended only because he did not carry any identity documents with him, even though there is no obligation under domestic law to carry identity documents at all times.
72.  In the final analysis, the Court considers that the national authorities’ treatment of the applicant was not compatible with the provisions of Article 3 of the Convention. It concludes in the instant case that the use of restraints in the conditions outlined above amounted to degrading treatment.
73.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive aspect.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION IN ITS PROCEDURAL ASPECT
74.  The applicant complained that the investigation of his ill-treatment had been ineffective. He relied on Articles 6 and 13 of the Convention. The Court, however, considers that his complaint is to be examined under Article 3 of the Convention, which reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
A.  Admissibility
75.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B.  Merits
1.  Arguments of the parties
76.  The applicant argued that the investigation had been one-sided and its conclusions had given too much weight to the police officers’ statements and the expert opinion of 28 August 2010, which was biased and unreasoned. At the same time, the prosecuting authorities had ignored his requests for the admission of additional evidence, including a reconstruction of the events.
77.  The applicant further maintained that the investigation had not been independent because, like the police, the Police Inspectorate was under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior. Furthermore, the inspectors were members of the police who had been only temporarily assigned to perform the duties of the Police Inspectorate.
78.  The Government maintained that the investigation had satisfied all the requirements of an effective investigation under Article 3 of the Convention, despite some minor delays in questioning the police officers present at the police station. The Police Inspectorate had questioned all the relevant witnesses and gathered all the necessary evidence.
79.  The Government further maintained that the independence and impartiality of the Police Inspectorate were beyond doubt. Although officially under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior, the Inspectorate was fully independent from the Minister of the Interior because its director had been appointed by the Government. Furthermore, its independence and impartiality had been guaranteed by the fact that the present investigation had been closely supervised by a prosecutor.
2.  The Court’s assessment
80.  The Court reiterates that where an individual makes a credible assertion that he has suffered treatment infringing Article 3, that provision, read in conjunction with the State’s general duty under Article 1 of the Convention to “secure to everyone within their jurisdiction the rights and freedoms defined in ... [the] Convention”, requires by implication that there should be an effective official investigation (see Labita v. Italy [GC], no. 26772/95, § 131, ECHR 2000‑IV).
81.  In its case-law the Court has established that for an investigation to be considered effective it must be capable of leading to the establishment of the facts of the case and to the identification and punishment of those responsible. The authorities must have taken the reasonable steps available to them to secure the evidence concerning the incident, including, inter alia, eyewitness testimony, forensic evidence, and so on. Any deficiency in the investigation which undermines its ability to establish the cause of injuries or the identity of the persons responsible will risk falling foul of this standard (see Denis Vasilyev v. Russia, no. 32704/04, § 100, 17 December 2009). A requirement of promptness and reasonable expedition is implicit in this context (see Yasa v. Turkey, judgment of 2 September 1998, Reports 1998-VI, pp. 2439-40, §§ 102-04, and Çakici v. Turkey [GC], no. 23657/94, §§ 80, 87 and 105-06, ECHR 1999-IV).
82.  In the past, the Court has found a violation where police officers were not kept separated after the incident and were not questioned until nearly three days later, notwithstanding the fact that no evidence indicated any collusion among them or with their colleagues. It was found that the mere fact that appropriate steps were not taken to reduce the risk of such collusion amounted to a significant shortcoming in the adequacy of the investigation (see Ramsahai and Others v. the Netherlands [GC], no. 52391/99, § 330, ECHR 2007‑VI).
83.  The investigation must also be independent, in that it may generally be regarded as necessary for the persons responsible for and carrying out the investigation to be independent from those implicated in the events. This means not only a lack of hierarchical or institutional connection but also a practical independence (see Đurđević v. Croatia, no. 52442/09, § 85, ECHR 2011 (extracts)). In Eremiášová and Pechová v. the Czech Republic (no. 23944/04, 16 February 2012), the Court found that the Supervision Department, a predecessor of the Police Inspectorate, was not independent from the police. It based its conclusion on the fact that the Supervision Department was, like the police, under the authority of the Ministry of the Interior and directly managed by the Minister of the Interior.
84.  Turning to the present case, the Court notes that the applicant lodged his criminal complaint on the day of the alleged ill-treatment. However, the police officers who were allegedly responsible for it were questioned almost three months later, after the applicant had complained about the inactivity of the Police Inspectorate. Such an approach by the Police Inspectorate can hardly be reconciled with their obligation to conduct the investigation with exemplary diligence and promptness (see Tarkan Yavaş v. Turkey, no. 58210/08, § 35, 18 September 2012).
85.  Regarding the question of the independence of the Police Inspectorate, the Court notes that it was still a unit of the Ministry of the Interior. Yet, unlike the Supervision Department considered by the Court in Eremiášová and Pechová, cited above, the head of the Police Inspectorate was appointed by, and responsible to, the Government and not to the Minister of the Interior. While the Court agrees that this aspect increased the independence of the Police Inspectorate vis-à-vis the police, the Court does not consider that this sole difference can justify reaching a different conclusion from the one reached in the case of Eremiášová and Pechová.
86.  The Court must also take into account that members of the Police Inspectorate remained police officers who had been called to perform duties in the Ministry of the Interior. This fact alone considerably undermined their independence vis-à-vis the police. In the Court’s view, such an arrangement did not present an appearance of independence and did not guarantee public confidence in the State’s monopoly on the use of force (see Eremiášová and Pechová, cited above, § 154, and Ramsahai and Others, cited above, § 325).
87.  The Court notes that in this case the investigation by the Police Inspectorate was supervised by the prosecutor. However, while the prosecutor was independent from the police, his merely supervisory role was not sufficient to make the police investigation comply with the requirement of independence (compare with Ramsahai and Others, cited above, §§ 342-346, which concerned an investigation under the direct responsibility of the public prosecution service).
88.  Accordingly, the Court considers that the investigation in the present case did not comply with the requirements of an effective investigation under Article 3 of the Convention and that there has been a violation of that provision in its procedural aspect as well.
III.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
89.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.  Damage
90.  The applicant claimed CZK 5,040 (EUR 198) in respect of pecuniary damage for the injuries he had sustained at the police station and CZK 100,000 (EUR 3,935) for non-pecuniary damage.
91.  The Government considered that the medical reports the applicant submitted did not prove any causal link between the alleged treatment of the applicant and the injuries sustained. Furthermore, they disputed the accuracy of the medical reports. Regarding non-pecuniary damage, the Government considered that the Court should award a maximum of EUR 2,000.
92.  The Court notes that domestic proceedings in which the applicant claims damages for his ill-treatment are pending. Consequently, the question of the application of Article 41 is not yet ready for decision and should be reserved pending a final domestic decision on this matter, due regard being had to the possibility that on this point and during the domestic proceedings a friendly settlement may be reached between the respondent State and the applicant (Rule 75 § 1 of the Rules of Court; see Salah v. the Netherlands, no. 8196/02, § 82, ECHR 2006‑IX (extracts)).
B.  Costs and expenses
93.  The applicant also claimed CZK 4,800 (EUR 189) for the cost of the expert medical report which he had commissioned.
94.  The Government accepted that the amount claimed was justified and supported by the relevant documents.
95.  According to the Court’s case-law, an applicant is entitled to the reimbursement of costs and expenses only in so far as it has been shown that these have been actually and necessarily incurred and are reasonable as to quantum. In the present case, regard being had to the documents in its possession and the above criteria, the Court awards the applicant EUR 189 under this head.
C.  Default interest
96.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT UNANIMOUSLY
1.  Declares the application admissible;

2.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its substantive aspect;

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 3 of the Convention in its procedural aspect;

4.  Holds that as far as any damage resulting from the violations found in the present case is concerned, the question of the application of Article 41 is not ready for decision and accordingly,
(a) reserves the said question in this respect;
(b) invites the parties to submit, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, their written observations on the matter and, in particular, to notify the Court of any agreement that they may reach;
(c) reserves the further procedure and delegates to the President of the Chamber the power to fix the same if need be;

5.  Holds
(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicant, within three months of the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 189 (one hundred and eighty-nine euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable to the applicant, in respect of costs and expenses, to be converted into Czech korunas at the rate applicable at the date of settlement;

(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement, simple interest shall be payable on the above amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 25 July 2013, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	Claudia Westerdiek	Mark Villiger
	Registrar	President