FIFTH SECTION
CASE OF
OMELCHENKO v. UKRAINE
(Application no.
34592/06)
JUDGMENT
STRASBOURG
17 July 2014
This
judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44
§ 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.
In the case of Omelchenko v. Ukraine,
The European Court of Human
Rights (Fifth Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
Mark Villiger, President,
Angelika Nußberger,
Boštjan M. Zupančič,
Ann Power-Forde,
Helena Jäderblom,
Aleš Pejchal, judges,
Myroslava Antonovych, ad hoc judge,
and Claudia Westerdiek, Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 24 June 2014,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that
date:
PROCEDURE
The case originated in an application (no.
34592/06) against Ukraine lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the
Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the
Convention”) by a Ukrainian national, Mr Sergey Vladimirovich Omelchenko (“the
applicant”), on 13 July 2006.
The applicant, who had been granted legal aid,
was represented by Mr A.L. Lesovoy, a lawyer practising in Simferopol.
The Ukrainian Government (“the Government”) were represented by their Agent, most
recently Ms Nataly Sevostianova.
The applicant alleged, in particular, that his right to make use of the privilege against self-incrimination
and his right to obtain legal assistance in connection with criminal
proceedings against him had been breached.
On 12 October 2011 the application was
communicated to the Government.
Mrs G. Yudkivska, the judge elected in
respect of Ukraine, was unable to sit in the case (Rule 28 of the Rules of
Court). The President of the Chamber decided to appoint Ms M. Antonovych
to sit as an ad hoc judge (Rule 29 § 1(b)).
THE FACTS
I. THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
The applicant is a Ukrainian national who was
born in 1972. He is currently serving a prison sentence in Berdychiv.
On 27 October 2004 the body of Ms V. was
found on a deserted street in Simferopol. V. had suffered numerous knife wounds.
On 28 October 2004 the police obtained an expert
opinion that a fingerprint found on the cover of V.’s notebook could possibly
belong to the applicant (whose fingerprints were stored in the police database).
The police also discovered that some of V.’s belongings, including a mobile
telephone and one earring, were missing.
On 29 October 2004 several officers from the
Simferopol Kyivsky District Police arrived at the applicant’s home (some 120 kilometres away from Simferopol), inspected it, seized some of the applicant’s clothes and took
him to the police station in Simferopol.
No formal record of the applicant’s arrest was
drawn up.
On 29 and 30 October 2004 the applicant was
questioned as a witness about V.’s murder and the theft of her belongings.
On 30 October 2004 he confessed that on 27 October
2004 he had come to Simferopol from his village to enjoy himself and had
decided to murder a passer-by in order to steal her belongings. He had stolen
V.’s mobile telephone, which he had lost on his way back home, and had killed
her with a kitchen knife he had been carrying with him.
On 31 October 2004 the applicant was questioned
as a suspect. Before the questioning session, the applicant was informed that
he was suspected of having committed the murder of V. within the meaning of
Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code of 2001 and that as a suspect he
had right to legal assistance, which he waived in writing.
On the same date the applicant underwent a
medical expert assessment, according to which he had not sustained any injuries
in the period from 29 to 31 October 2004.
Again on the same date an undertaking not to
abscond was selected as the preventive measure to be used in the applicant’s
respect.
According to the applicant, it was not until 1 November 2004
that he was released from custody under the undertaking not to abscond.
During the afternoon of 1 November 2004 the
applicant was arrested in Simferopol on charges of breaching the public order (through
swearing, spitting and vagrancy) and detained for ten days as an administrative
punishment, pursuant to a decision of the Simferopol Zaliznychnyy District
Court.
On 4, 9 and 10 November 2004 the applicant, held
in administrative detention, was further questioned concerning the murder and
robbery. Before each of the questioning sessions the applicant signed waivers
of his right to legal representation.
On 11 November 2004 the Simferopol Kyivsky
District Court remanded the applicant in custody as a preventive measure in
connection with the criminal proceedings against him.
On 16 November 2004 lawyer E. was admitted to the
proceedings to represent the applicant. However, according to the applicant,
the lawyer did not visit him until 26 December 2004 and no questioning of the
applicant took place in his presence.
On 12 January 2005 the charges against the
applicant were reclassified in law from those of simple murder within the
meaning of Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal Code of 2001 to those
of murder for profit (an aggravated form of murder) under Article
115 § 2 of the Code.
On 10 February 2005 a new lawyer, R., was
admitted to the proceedings to replace lawyer E.
On 28 February 2005 the applicant was indicted with
having robbed V. and having murdered her for profit within the meaning of Article
115 § 2 of the Criminal Code. On the same date he was questioned for
the first time as an accused in the presence of lawyer R. During the
questioning session, the applicant retracted his initial confessions and
pleaded innocent. He maintained that he had not left his village on the day of
V.’s murder and had previously confessed to the murder under pressure from the
police, who had detained him unlawfully, threatened and ill-treated him.
On the same date the prosecutor’s office refused
to institute criminal proceedings into the alleged breaches of the applicant’s
rights, having found that there was no case to answer, and declared the case in
respect of V.’s murder and robbery ready for trial.
On 5 April 2005 the Court of Appeal of the
Autonomous Republic of Crimea (hereafter “the ARC Court”), acting as a
first-instance court, convicted the applicant of armed robbery and murder for
profit and sentenced him to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
On an unspecified date the ARC Court also issued
a separate ruling noting that there was no record of the applicant’s arrest on
29 October 2004.
The applicant appealed in cassation against his
conviction. He alleged that his confessions given in October and November 2004
should have been excluded from the body of evidence for having been taken in
breach of applicable procedural guarantees. In particular, those statements had
been taken during the applicant’s unlawful detention. He maintained that he had
been held at the police station between 29 October and 1 November 2004
without any procedural records having been drawn up. On 1 November 2004 the
applicant had been released. However, almost immediately afterwards he had been
arrested under the false pretext of breaching the public order and subsequently
detained. This tactical move had enabled the police to question him at any time
and, in the absence of a lawyer, apply pressure on him to obtain self-incriminating
statements to best suit their purposes.
The applicant next stated that the
above-mentioned confessions had been obtained in breach of his right to legal
representation. In particular, while he had been brought to the police station
specifically in connection with the suspicion that he had killed V., initially
he had only been questioned as a witness. Furthermore, the applicant had been
initially charged with simple murder under Article 115 § 1 of the Criminal
Code, a charge which enabled a suspect to waive his right to a lawyer. In the
meantime, the scope of the accusation had clearly been pointing to “murder for
profit”. This charge fell within the ambit of Article 115 § 2 of the Criminal
Code, which could result in a life sentence and so entailed mandatory legal
representation of a defendant and allowed no waivers of this right. The
investigation had purposefully delayed reclassifying the charges in order to
exert unlawful pressure and extract confessions from the unrepresented
applicant.
The applicant also maintained that without his
initial confessions the prosecution would have collapsed, as the other evidence
had been contradictory and patchy.
On 21 July 2005 the Supreme Court of Ukraine
quashed the applicant’s conviction and remitted the case for additional
investigation. It noted, in particular, that the trial court should have
verified more carefully whether the applicant’s confessional statements had
been admissible evidence. In particular, as appeared from the case file, these
statements had been obtained during the applicant’s detention between 29
October and 10 November 2004. Part of this detention was covered by an
administrative detention decision and part was not covered by any records. In
these circumstances, the applicant’s allegations concerning the ulterior
motives in detaining him should have been carefully investigated. The Supreme
Court also found that the evidence of the applicant’s involvement in the crime had
been contradictory and needed to be reassessed, with various discrepancies
being reconciled.
On 18 November 2005 the ARC Court again found
the applicant guilty of armed robbery and murder for profit under Article 115 §
2 of the Criminal Code. It relied on various pieces of physical, forensic, and
witness evidence, as well as on the applicant’s confessions given at the
beginning of the investigation. The court concluded that there were no reasons
to exclude these confessions from the body of evidence. In particular,
according to the medical evidence, no injuries had been inflicted upon the
applicant by the police and there was no other evidence of his ill-treatment.
The court further found that on 29 October 2004 the applicant had been taken to
the police station in connection with the suspicion that he had committed a
crime of violence and had duly been questioned first as a witness and then as a
suspect. It also noted that the applicant, informed of his rights as a suspect,
had voluntarily waived his right to legal representation. As at the material
time the applicant had been suspected of simple murder, which could not lead to
a life sentence, such a waiver had been compatible with applicable law. The ARC
Court then sentenced the applicant to fifteen years’ imprisonment.
On 16 March 2006 the Supreme Court of Ukraine
dismissed a further cassation appeal brought by the applicant and upheld the
ARC Court’s judgment of 18 November 2005.
II. RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
A. Constitution of Ukraine of 1996
The relevant provisions of the Constitution read
as follows:
Article 59
“Everyone has the right to legal assistance. Such assistance is
provided free of charge in cases envisaged by law. Everyone is free to choose
the defender of his or her rights.
In Ukraine, advocacy acts to ensure the right
to mount a defence against an accusation, and to provide legal assistance
during the determination of cases by courts and other State bodies.”
Article 63
“A person shall not bear responsibility for refusing to testify
or to explain anything about himself or herself, members of his or her family
or close relatives in the degree determined by law.
A suspect, an accused, or a defendant shall have the right to
mount a defence.
A convicted person shall enjoy all human and citizens’ rights,
except for the restrictions determined by law and established in court
judgments.”
B. Criminal Code of 2001
Under paragraph 1 of Article 115 premeditated
murder is punishable by imprisonment for a term of seven to fifteen years.
Under paragraph 2 of Article 115,
premeditated murder for profit is punishable by imprisonment for a term of ten
to fifteen years, or life imprisonment.
C. Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 (in force at the
material time)
Article 45 of the Code of Criminal Procedure of 1960 in force at the material time provided that legal representation during an inquiry, pre-trial
investigation and trial before a first-instance court was mandatory if, inter alia, the possible penalty was a
life sentence. It further specified that in such cases the legal representation
should have been provided from the time of arrest or the bringing of charges
against the person.
Under Article 46, a suspect, accused or defendant could waive his right to legal representation, except where legal
representation was mandatory under applicable law.
According to paragraph 1 of Article 370,
substantial violations of the requirements of criminal procedural legislation
were considered to be those which had impeded or could have impeded the court
in the complete and thorough examination of a case and in issuing a lawful,
reasoned and just verdict. Paragraph 2 of this Article listed a violation of
the right of an accused to mount a defence as being among the substantial
violations of the requirements of criminal procedural legislation which
warranted the quashing of a verdict.
THE LAW
I. ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 6 §§ 1 AND
3 (C) OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant complained that he had been hindered in the effective exercise of his right to
mount a defence in the criminal proceedings against him, as he had no access to
a lawyer at the beginning of the investigation and that the incriminating
evidence obtained from him in breach of his right to legal assistance was used
as a basis for his conviction.
. This
complaint falls to be examined under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c), which reads as
follows in the relevant part:
“1. In the determination of ... any criminal charge
against him, everyone is entitled to a fair ... hearing ... by [a] ... tribunal
...
3. Everyone charged with a criminal offence has the
following minimum rights:
...
(c) to defend himself
in person or through legal assistance of his own choosing or, if he has not
sufficient means to pay for legal assistance, to be given it free when the
interests of justice so require.”
A. Admissibility
The Court notes that the above complaints are
not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the
Convention. It further notes that they are not inadmissible on any other
grounds. They must therefore be declared admissible.
B. Merits
1. The parties’ submissions
The applicant submitted that the police had
forced him to renounce his right to legal assistance and to give false
self-incriminating statements by detaining him off the record between 29
October and 1 November 2004 and subsequently placing him under administrative
arrest from 1 until 10 November 2004. This arrest, which had been effected
under the false pretext that the applicant had breached the public order, had in
fact been necessary to ensure his availability for questioning as a criminal
suspect in the absence of procedural guarantees. As a result, the applicant,
detained and precluded from consulting a lawyer or obtaining outside support,
had been very vulnerable and afraid for his life. He had therefore signed all
the documents put before him by the police, including the false confessional
statements, which had been fabricated by the authorities.
In addition, the applicant averred that at the
material time he had not been fully aware of the possible consequences of
renouncing his right to a lawyer. The charges pressed against him at the
material time had concerned simple murder, punishable by a fixed term of
imprisonment. They had been reclassified as murder for profit (potentially
entailing a life sentence) only at a later stage of the investigation. The
milder initial classification of the offence had been artificial, as the
authorities, who had been well aware from the very beginning that V. had been
stripped of her belongings, had wanted to dispense with the mandatory legal
representation requirement and exert pressure on the applicant in order to
obtain self-incriminating statements.
Once the applicant had finally had a meeting
with lawyer R., he had retracted his false confessions. Nevertheless, these
confessions had not only influenced the course of the investigation, but had
also been unfairly used by the domestic courts to convict him. The courts had
taken these statements at face value, notwithstanding that they had contained
details irreconcilable with objective evidence. In addition, they had failed to
investigate the applicant’s allegations concerning police pressure and a breach
of his right to mount a defence in the beginning of the investigation. The
applicant’s rights under Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention had
consequently been breached.
. The
Government disagreed. They pointed out that at the initial stage of the
investigation the applicant had deliberately renounced his right to be legally represented
and, being fully informed, had signed waivers to this effect on 31 October, 4,
9 and 10 November 2004. Once the applicant had expressed his wish to be legally
represented, a lawyer had been admitted to the proceedings without delay. The
charge against the applicant had been reclassified from simple to aggravated
murder only after the applicant’s lawyer had been admitted to the proceedings.
Thus the applicant’s right to mandatory legal representation guaranteed by
domestic law to defendants in aggravated murder proceedings had been observed. Only
in his cassation appeals had the applicant started complaining of having been
coerced to waive his right to legal representation. The judicial authorities
had duly examined and dismissed this allegation as unsubstantiated. Likewise,
the domestic authorities had duly rejected the applicant’s allegation that he
had been coerced to give self-incriminating statements. Absent any evidence of
coercion, the use of the applicant’s early confessions in his conviction had not
been incompatible with the fair trial guarantees. An array of other sources of
evidence, including the fingerprints on the victim’s notebook likely belonging
to the applicant, had corroborated the finding of the applicant’s guilt.
2. The Court’s assessment
The Court reiterates that the requirements of
paragraph 3 of Article 6 of the Convention are to be seen as particular
aspects of the right to a fair trial guaranteed by paragraph 1 of that Article
and are thus to be examined together (see Van Geyseghem v. Belgium [GC],
no. 26103/95, § 27, ECHR 1999-I). On the whole, the Court is
called upon to examine whether the proceedings in their entirety were fair (see Balliu
v. Albania, no. 74727/01, § 25, 16 June 2005).
The Court next notes that, although not
absolute, the right of everyone charged with a criminal offence to be
effectively defended by a lawyer, assigned officially if need be, is one of the
fundamental features of the notion of a fair trial (see Krombach
v. France, no. 29731/96, § 89, ECHR 2001-II). As a rule,
access to a lawyer should be provided from the first time a suspect is
questioned by the police, unless it can be demonstrated in the light of the
particular circumstances of each case that there were compelling reasons to
restrict this right (see Salduz v. Turkey [GC],
no. 36391/02, § 55, 27 November 2008). The right to mount a defence will
in principle be irretrievably prejudiced when incriminating statements made
during police questioning without access to a lawyer are used for a conviction
(ibid.). While a defendant in criminal proceedings may, under various
circumstances, waive his right to legal representation, such a waiver may not
run counter to any important public interest, must be established in an
unequivocal manner, and must be attended by minimum safeguards commensurate to
the waiver’s importance (see e.g. Sejdovic v. Italy [GC],
no. 56581/00, § 86, ECHR 2006-II).
Turning to the facts of the present case, the
Court observes that as is clear from the available materials, on 28 October
2004 while investigating the murder of V. and the theft of her belongings, the
police obtained an expert opinion that a fingerprint found on the cover of her
notebook could have belonged to the applicant. Based on this information, on 29 October 2004
the police officers inspected the applicant’s home, seized his clothes, and
brought him to the police station, where he was questioned and confessed to the
murder on the following day (30 October 2004). It is apparent from these police
actions that they already suspected the applicant of having been involved in V.’s
murder on 28 October 2004. In its judgment of 18 November 2005 the ARC Court
likewise noted that on 29 October 2004 the applicant had been brought
to the police in connection with the suspicion that he had murdered V. In the
meantime, as can be seen from the case file, on 30 October 2004 the applicant
was questioned not as a suspect, but as a witness and was not provided with the
option of appointing a lawyer to assist him during questioning. It also appears
that at the material time the applicant remained in police custody without a
record of that custody having been drawn up (see paragraphs 26 and 30 above).
It follows that the applicant’s confessional statement of 30 October 2004 was
obtained in a setting where he was deprived of basic procedural guarantees of the
fundamental rights not to incriminate himself and to obtain legal assistance.
The guarantees of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention were therefore
not observed in respect of the applicant’s questioning on 30 October 2004 and
the taking of his confessional statement.
As regards the subsequent questioning sessions
on 31 October, 4, 9 and 10 November 2004, it is notable that they took place
after the applicant had been notified of his status as a suspect and had signed
waivers of his right to legal assistance. However, in assessing whether these
waivers were genuine and unequivocal, the Court notes that the applicant signed
them while remaining in police custody. The first waiver of 31 October 2004
dates to the period, when, according to the applicant, he remained in off-the-record
detention. There is nothing in the case file to rebut his submissions in this
respect. The fact that the applicant signed this waiver while arbitrarily held
in police custody and having no ability to consult a lawyer gives rise to a
strong suspicion that it was obtained in defiance of the applicant’s will. This
waiver cannot therefore be regarded as compliant with the Convention
requirements.
The regularisation of the applicant’s detention
from 1 until 10 November 2004 did not, in the Court’s view, substantially
affect the legitimacy of the waivers signed by him on 4, 9 and 10 November 2004. In particular, at the material time the applicant was held under administrative arrest. The
Court takes note of the applicant’s allegations that this arrest was effected
with an ulterior motive, namely, to ensure his availability for questioning as
a criminal suspect and to exert unlawful pressure on him. Similar allegations
were examined in a number of other cases against Ukraine, where the Court condemned
the practice of placing a person under administrative arrest to ensure his
availability for questioning as a criminal suspect (see, for example, Nechiporuk and Yonkalo v. Ukraine,
no. 42310/04, § 264, 21 April 2011; and Grigoryev v. Ukraine,
no. 51671/07, § 87, 15 May 2012).
In the case of Balitskiy v. Ukraine the Court also found that
such a practice resulting in questioning the criminal suspects in defiance of applicable procedural guarantees constituted
a structural problem in Ukraine (no. 12793/03, §§ 50-51 and 54, 3 November
2011). Regard being had to the above findings
and the fact that the applicant was arrested under the pretext that he had
committed an administrative offence almost immediately upon his release from
the initial off-the-record custody, as well as his intense questioning as a
criminal suspect throughout the period of his administrative detention, the
Court finds his allegations credible. It considers that the present case
discloses another example of the aforementioned structural problem. It
therefore finds that the waivers of the right to legal assistance obtained from
the applicant on 4, 9 and 10 November 2005 were signed by him in a state
of particular vulnerability and in the absence of proper procedural guarantees.
They can therefore not be regarded as compliant with the Convention
requirements.
. The
Court notes, in addition, that, as appears from the case file, at the material
time the applicant was not fully aware of the potential consequences of
renouncing his right to legal assistance. In particular, it was not until later
in the proceedings that the investigation advanced a charge of murder for
profit, which could entail life imprisonment and so required mandatory legal representation
under domestic law.
. Insofar
as the applicant submitted that the investigative authorities had purposefully
substituted the charge of murder for profit with that of simple murder in the
beginning of the investigation in order to dispense with the mandatory legal
representation requirement, the Court observes that from the beginning of the
investigation the authorities had information, including the applicant’s
confessions, indicating that V. had likely been robbed. Nevertheless, the
applicant was initially charged with simple murder and only several months
later, after most questioning sessions and other investigative activities had
been carried out in absence of a lawyer representing the applicant’s interests,
was the offence reclassified as murder for profit, which required mandatory
legal representation under domestic
law.
. The
Court notes that in other cases against Ukraine it has already examined and
condemned the practice, according to which in the beginning of an investigation
the authorities “artificially” classified offences under an article of the
Criminal Code which did not require mandatory legal representation of the
suspect and subsequently advanced a more severe charge, after having obtained
confessional statements from unrepresented suspects (see Yaremenko v. Ukraine, no.
32092/02, §§ 87 and 88, 12 June 2008; Leonid
Lazarenko, cited above, § 54; and Balitskiy, cited above,
§ 40). The Court finds that the circumstances of the present case are
strikingly similar to those which gave rise to the above findings.
. Regard
being had to all the above considerations, the Court concludes that
confessional statements obtained from the applicant between 30 October and 10
November 2004 were received in breach of basic guarantees of procedural
fairness in criminal proceedings. It also notes that in February 2005, after
having obtained an opportunity to consult a lawyer, the applicant retracted his
confessions and consistently pleaded innocent throughout the further
proceedings. Nevertheless, the domestic courts relied on the applicant’s
confessions as a basis for his conviction and failed to act upon his complaints
of a breach of his right to mount a defence. Although the confessional
statements at issue were not the sole basis for the conviction, in the above
circumstances, the Court finds this fact of little relevance. Regard being had
to the use of these statements in the body of evidence held against the
applicant in convicting him and the failure of the domestic courts to take
action to condemn the breach of the applicant’s defence rights in the beginning
of the investigation, the Court considers that this breach was not remedied by
the subsequent legal assistance provided to the applicant or by the adversarial
nature of the ensuing proceedings (see Leonid Lazarenko, cited above,
§ 57).
There was, therefore, a breach of Article
6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention on account of the applicant’s
inability to obtain legal assistance in the beginning of the investigation and
the use of his confessional statements as a basis for his conviction.
II. OTHER ALLEGED VIOLATIONS OF THE CONVENTION
The applicant also complained that his arrest
and detention between 29 October and 10 November 2004 had been unlawful and
arbitrary and that the judicial authorities had incorrectly interpreted the
evidence in his case, which had led to his conviction in spite of his
innocence. The applicant relied upon Article 1, Article 5 §§ 1,
2 and 3 and Article 6 § 3 (a) - (d) of the Convention in making the
above complaints.
Following communication of the application to
the respondent Government, the applicant additionally cited Article 3 of the
Convention in connection with the facts of the present case.
In the light of all the material before it, and
in so far as the matters complained of are within its competence, the Court
finds that they do not disclose any appearance of a violation of the rights and
freedoms set out in the provisions relied upon by the applicant.
It follows that this part of the application is
manifestly ill-founded and must be rejected in accordance with Article 35
§§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
III. APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
Article 41 of the
Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there
has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the
internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial
reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction
to the injured party.”
A. Damage
The applicant claimed 20,000 euros (EUR) in
respect of non-pecuniary damage.
The Government submitted that the above claim
was exorbitant and unsubstantiated.
The Court considers that the distress and
frustration caused to the applicant cannot be compensated for by the mere
finding of a violation of Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention. Having
regard to the nature of the issues in the present case and making its
assessment on an equitable basis, the Court awards the applicant EUR 3,000
in respect of non-pecuniary damage, plus any tax that may be chargeable.
B. Costs and expenses
The applicant did not submit any claims under
this head. Consequently, the Court does not make any award.
C. Default interest
The Court considers it appropriate that the
default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the
European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1. Declares the applicant’s complaints that he
had been hindered in the effective exercise of his right to mount a defence in
the criminal proceedings against him, as he had no access to a lawyer at the
beginning of the investigation and that the incriminating evidence obtained from
him in breach of his right to legal assistance was used as a basis for his
conviction admissible, and the remainder of the application inadmissible;
2. Holds that there has been a violation of
Article 6 §§ 1 and 3 (c) of the Convention in respect of the above complaints;
3. Holds
(a) that the respondent State is to pay the
applicant, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes
final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, EUR 3,000
(three thousand euros), plus any tax that may be chargeable, in respect of
non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the
currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of
settlement;
(b) that from the expiry of the above-mentioned
three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above
amount at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central
Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;
4. Dismisses the remainder of the applicant’s
claim for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 July 2014,
pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
Claudia Westerdiek Mark
Villiger Registrar President
