FIRST SECTION

CASE OF KOVYAZIN AND OTHERS v. RUSSIA

(Applications nos. 13008/13, 60882/12 and 53390/13)

JUDGMENT

STRASBOURG

17 September 2015

This judgment will become final in the circumstances set out in Article 44 § 2 of the Convention. It may be subject to editorial revision.

In the case of Kovyazin and Others v. Russia,
The European Court of Human Rights (First Section), sitting as a Chamber composed of:
	András Sajó, President,
	Elisabeth Steiner,
	Khanlar Hajiyev,
	Mirjana Lazarova Trajkovska,
	Julia Laffranque,
	Ksenija Turković,
	Dmitry Dedov, judges,
André Wampach, Deputy Section Registrar,
Having deliberated in private on 25 August 2015,
Delivers the following judgment, which was adopted on that date:
PROCEDURE
1.  The case originated in three applications (nos. 13008/13, 60882/12 and 53390/13) against the Russian Federation lodged with the Court under Article 34 of the Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (“the Convention”) by three Russian nationals, Mr Leonid Nikolayevich Kovyazin, Mr Artem Viktorovich Savelov and Mr Ilya Vladimirovich Gushchin (“the applicants”), on 12 February 2013, 10 September 2013 and 19 December 2013 respectively.
2.  The applicants were represented by Mr D.V. Agranovskiy, lawyer practising in Elektrostal, F.T. Murtazin and Mr M.T. Rachkovskiy, lawyers practicing in Moscow. The Russian Government (“the Government”) were represented by Mr G. Matyushkin, Representative of the Russian Federation at the European Court of Human Rights.
3.  The applicants alleged that their arrest and pre-trial detention was not based on relevant and sufficient reasons and, as regards the second applicant, that his appeals against his detention were examined with unacceptable delays.
4.  On 10 September 2013 and 19 December 2013 the applications were communicated to the Government. The President also decided to grant the applications priority under Rule 41 of the Rules of Court on the following dates: on 13 June 2013 as regards application no. 13008/13, on 10 September 2013 as regards application no. 60882/12, and on 19 December 2013 as regards application no. 53390/13.
THE FACTS
I.  THE CIRCUMSTANCES OF THE CASE
5.  The first applicant, Mr Kovyazin, was born in 1986 and lives in Kostino, Kirov Region. The second applicant, Mr Savelov, was born in 1979 and lives in Moscow. The third applicant, Mr Gushchin, was born in 1988 and lives in Khimki, Moscow Region.
A.  Background facts and the scope of the case
6.  On 6 May 2012 a public demonstration entitled the “March of Millions” was held in central Moscow to protest against the allegedly rigged presidential elections. The event had been approved by the city authorities in the form of a march followed by a meeting at Bolotnaya Square which had to end at 7.30 p.m. Numerous clashes between the police and protesters occurred when the marchers arrived at Bolotnaya Square. At 5.30 p.m. the police declared the early closure of the meeting and began to disperse the participants. It took them about two hours to clear the protestors away from the square.
7.  On the same day the Moscow city department of the Investigative Committee of the Russian Federation opened criminal proceedings to investigate the suspected mass disorders and violent acts against the police (Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code). On 18 May 2012 the file was remitted to the headquarters of the Investigative Committee for further investigation. On 28 May 2012 the investigation was also launched into the criminal offence of organising mass disorders (Article 212 § 1 of the Criminal Code). The two criminal cases were joined on the same day.
8.  All applicants took part in the demonstration of 6 May 2012 at Bolotnaya Square. They were arrested on later dates indicated below and charged with participation in mass disorders; the second and the third applicants were also charged with having committed violent acts against the police officers. They were detained and tried on these charges, and the second and the third applicants have been convicted as charged, while Mr Kovyazin had been exempted of liability under the Amnesty Act.
9.  The complaints to be examined in the present case concern various aspects of the applicants’ pre-trial detention.
B.  The applicants’ arrest and pre-trial detention
1.  Mr Kovyazin (application no. 13008/13)
10.  From 2006 to 2012 the applicant studied culture and history at the Vyatskiy State University in Kirov while working part-time as a video‑operator for a newspaper “Vyatskiy Nablyudatel”. On 1 May 2012 he dropped out of the university.
11.  On 4 May 2012 the applicant received an assignment from the newspaper to attend the “March of Millions” on 6 May 2012 and to take video footage of the event.
12.  The applicant claimed that on 6 May 2012 he arrived at Bolotnaya Square, filmed the event and did not take part in any disorders or clashes with the police.
13.  On 15 May 2012 the applicant submitted the footage to the newspaper and it was published on its website.
14.  Until 5 September 2012 the applicant continued working and living at his usual address. On the latter date he was detained and charged under Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorders). He was accused of having breached public order during the demonstration on 6 May 2012, in particular, of having turned over portable toilet cabins and having piled them on the road to build a barrier obstructing the riot police.
15.  On 7 September 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 5 November 2012 on the grounds of the gravity of the charges and for the following reasons:
“Having regard to the circumstances of the offence under investigation, the personality of the accused, the information objectively put forward by the investigating authority, the court concludes that [the applicant], if at liberty, after being charged with a grave criminal offence will prefer, out of fear of sanctions, to abscond the investigation and trial, [or] may act in person or through proxy with the aim of avoiding criminal liability, continue [his] criminal activity, destruct the evidence and otherwise obstruct the investigation.
Operational-search activities are now underway, aimed at establishing [the applicant’s] possible connections with other active participants of the mass disorders which took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow and the adjacent territory, therefore, if at liberty, [he] may co-ordinate his position with unidentified accomplices whose identities are still being established by the investigation.
...
... selecting in respect of [the applicant] another, milder, preventive measure is not possible because it cannot rule out the very possibility for the suspect to obstruct the investigation of the criminal case, and to abscond from the bodies of criminal prosecution and trial.
...
No factual information excluding the detention of [the applicant] on health grounds has been submitted to the court ...”
16.  On 1 October 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 7 September 2012.
17.  On 30 October 2012 the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow examined a request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant requested to select another preventive measure pending trial. He offered a bail of 750,000 Russian roubles (RUB), or four personal guarantee signed by his professors and colleagues. His request for an alternative preventive measure was supported by six petitions signed by 45 journalists and editors of newspapers, periodicals and on-line media: “Novaya Gazeta”, “Esquire”, “Kommersant”, “Vyatskiy Nablyudatel”, “Afisha” and “Grani.ru”. The applicant also requested release on health grounds.
18.  On the same day the court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 March 2013, having noted that the applicant was likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to threaten witnesses, or to otherwise obstruct the course of justice.
19.  On 28 November 2012 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 30 October 2013.
20.  On 4 March 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 July 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before.
21.  On 3 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 4 March 2013.
22.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow for the determination of the criminal charges.
23.  On 6 June 2013 the latter court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention until 24 November 2013. This decision concerned eleven defendants and read in so far as relevant as follows:
“... the court concludes that the preventive measure in respect of [all defendants] ... is to remain unchanged because the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...
... [the defendants] are accused of [grave crimes punishable by prison sentences] ...
Having regard to all information about the personality of [the defendants] and the nature of the crimes imputed to each of them, the court still has sufficient grounds to believe that the said defendants, if at liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges.
... no other measures of restraint would secure the aims and goals of the judicial proceedings.”
24.  On 2 July 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 6 June 2013.
25.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 24 February 2014 on the grounds of the gravity of charges. It held, in particular, as follows:
“[The defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code, which belongs to the category of grave crimes punishable by a prison sentence of over three years. Furthermore, [some defendants] are charged with a criminal offence provided for by Article 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code, also punishable by a prison sentence of over three years.
Despite the defendants being registered as having permanent residence addresses in the Russian Federation, the analysis of the overall information about [the defendants’] personalities, and the nature of the offences imputable to them, give the court sufficient grounds to consider that the defendants, if the preventive measure is changed to another one unconnected with the deprivation of liberty, may flee the trial or otherwise obstruct the course of justice, [motivated by] the gravity of the charges ... the reasons taken into account when these measures were chosen have not ceased to exist and have not changed ...”
26.  On 17 December 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the extension order of 19 November 2013.
27.  On 18 December 2013 the State Duma passed the Amnesty Act which concerned persons charged with offences punishable with prison sentences of up to five years.
28.  On 19 December 2013 the applicant requested the termination of the criminal proceedings against him by operation of the Amnesty Act. On the same day the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted the request and released him from detention.
2.  Mr Savelov (application no. 60882/13)
29.  At the time of arrest he applicant was unemployed and lived with his parents. On 6 May 2012 he took part in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square. According to the applicant, at one point a stampede occurred and he was accidentally pushed through the police cordon and was arrested without any resistance on his part. On the same day he was charged with non‑compliance with a lawful order by a police officer, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences, and he was released, having committed to attend the court hearing of the administrative case on 8 May 2012.
30.  On 8 May 2012 the applicant was convicted of non-compliance with a lawful order by a police officer, an offence under Article 19.3 of the Code of Administrative Offences. He was sentenced to a 24-hour’ detention.
31.  On 11 June 2012 the applicant was detained on suspicion of having participated in mass disorders on 6 May 2012. He was charged with the offences provided for by Articles 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorders) and 318 § 1 (violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of having attempted to break through the police cordon and of having pulled a police officer on the hands and wrists towards the crowd. On the same day the Basmannyy District Court authorised the applicant’s 72-hours’ detention.
32.  On 14 June 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined and granted the request to detain the applicant pending criminal investigation. It dismissed the applicant’s request for an alternative preventive measure, including a RUB 150,000 bail, a personal guarantee or a house arrest, and ordered the applicant’s detention on remand until 11 August 2012 for the following reasons:
“Assessing the circumstance under investigation, the submitted materials and the indicated information in their integrity, as well as the personality of [the applicant], who is suspected of having committed criminal offences characterised as grave, punishable by up to two years of deprivation of liberty, give sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant is likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to destruct evidence, or to otherwise obstruct the investigation of the criminal case.
... selecting another, milder, preventive measure is not possible because it cannot rule out the very possibility that the suspect will abscond from the bodies of criminal prosecution and trial, or obstruct the investigation of the criminal case.”
33.  On 18 June 2012 the applicant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 11 July 2012.
34.  On 9 August 2012 the Basmannyy District Court examined a request for an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention. The applicant objected, having reiterated his request for an alternative preventive measure. On the same day the court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 November 2012, having noted that there remained sufficient reasons to believe that the applicant was likely to abscond, to continue his criminal activity, to threaten witnesses, or to otherwise obstruct the course of justice.
35.  On 10 August 2012 the applicant filed an appeal, which was dismissed by the Moscow City Court on 10 September 2012.
36.  On 2 November 2012 the Basmannyy District Court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 6 March 2013, essentially on the same grounds and having noted that the circumstances which had justified the detention order had not changed. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 28 November 2012.
37.  On 28 February 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted another extension of the applicant’s detention, until 11 June 2013, essentially on the same grounds as before and having noted that the circumstances which had justified the detention order had not changed. This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 17 April 2013.
38.  On 23 April 2013 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request for the extension of the applicant’s detention and granted it until 6 July 2013. It held, in particular, as follows:
“The materials presented [by the investigator] reveal that the grounds for choosing the preventive measure in respect of [the applicant] were not only the gravity of the charges but also the information about the personality of [the applicant] who could abscond the investigation and trial, threaten witnesses or otherwise obstruct the proceedings in the case, if released.
The aforementioned grounds ... have not changed, have not lost their relevance to date, and the circumstances of the case [and] the nature of the crime committed by [the applicant] lead the court to conclude that the need for the [pre-trial detention] has not, at this stage, ceased to exist.
...
This term is reasonable, [it] is justified by the objective circumstances, it is not in conflict with the term of the pre-trial investigation, also extended on the same grounds.
...
In accordance with the Constitutional Court’s [case-law], the proportionality of the preventive measure to the [gravity of the] charges imputed to [the applicant] show that in this case the public interests, in particular those related to the criminal investigation, override the importance of the principle of respect of individual liberty.”
39.  On 27 June 2013 the Moscow City Court acting as appeal instance upheld the same court’s extension order of 23 April 2013.
40.  On 24 May 2013 the applicant’s criminal case was transferred to the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court for the determination of the criminal charges.
41.  On 6 June 2013 the latter court extended the pre-trial detention of all eleven defendants, including the applicant, until 24 November 2013 (see paragraph 23 above). This decision was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 2 July 2013.
42.  On 19 November 2013 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of nine defendants, including the applicant, until 24 February 2014 (see paragraph 25 above). This extension order was upheld by the Moscow City Court on 17 December 2013.
43.  On 21 February 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to two years and seven months of imprisonment. The applicant’s pre-trial detention was counted towards the prison term.
44.  On 20 June 2014 the Moscow City Court upheld the first-instance judgment.
45.  In December 2014 the applicant was released after having served his prison term.
3.  Mr Gushchin (application no. 53390/13)
46.  At the time of his arrest the applicant was a student, working part‑time. On 6 May 2012 he took part in the demonstration at Bolotnaya Square, and after that date until 6 February 2013 he continued living at his usual address and pursued his usual activities.
47.  On 6 February 2013 the applicant’s flat was searched and his travel passport was seized. The applicant was arrested on suspicion of having participated in mass disorders and of having used violence against the police during the demonstration of 6 May 2012. He was charged with the offences provided for by Articles 212 § 2 of the Criminal Code (participation in mass disorders) and 318 § 1 (violence against a public official). He was accused, in particular, of having snatched a police officer’s uniform and pulling him away to prevent him from arresting another protestor.
48.  On 7 February 2013 the Basmannyy District Court ordered the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 April 2013, having dismissed the applicant’s request for an alternative preventive measure, such as house arrest. The court reasoned as follows:
“In assessing the circumstances of the offence under investigation, the personality of the accused , who is suspected of having committed criminal offences one of which is characterised as grave and the other – of medium gravity, the court concludes that [the applicant], if at liberty, after being charged with a grave criminal offence, will prefer, out of fear of sanctions, to abscond the investigation and trial, [or] may act in person or through proxy with the aim of avoiding criminal liability, continue [his] criminal activity, destruct the evidence and otherwise obstruct the investigation.
Operational-search activities are now underway, aimed at establishing [the applicant’s] possible connections with other active participants of the mass disorders which took place at Bolotnaya Square in Moscow and the adjacent territory, therefore, if at liberty, [he] may co-ordinate his position with unidentified accomplices whose identities are still being established by the investigation.
The aforementioned circumstances are corroborated by the operational-search materials submitted to the investigator and the court under the procedure provided for by law.
Taking into account that ... [the applicant] has been [previously] charged with an administrative offence ... and that [he] has a travel passport and thus has no obstacles to travelling abroad ... the house arrest may not be granted.”
49.  On 27 February 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 7 February 2013.
50.  On 1 April 2013 the Basmannyy District Court extended the applicant’s pre-trial detention until 6 August 2013, on the grounds that the circumstances that had justified the detention – the gravity of charges and the risk of obstructing the course of justice – had not changed.
51.  On 24 April 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 1 April 2013.
52.  On 1 August 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted an extension of the applicant’s pre-trial detention on the following grounds:
“The investigator’s request indicates that ... during the investigation [the applicant] was making contradictory statements thus obstructing the investigation of the criminal case. Moreover, during the investigation it was found out that [the applicant] has acquaintances outside Moscow and the Moscow Region. Therefore, if [he] is subjected to a preventive measure other than detention in custody he may flee the investigation and trial.
... the victim and eye-witnesses have indicated [the applicant] as the perpetrator ...
...
[He] is charged with criminal offences one of which is of medium gravity and another is a grave one, punishable by over three years of deprivation of liberty.
...
These circumstances are substantiated, real, corroborated by the information about the defendant’s personality, including [the information] obtained through operational-search activities.”
53.  On 28 August 2013 the Moscow City Court upheld the detention order of 1 August 2013.
54.  On 1 October 2013 the Basmannyy District Court granted a new extension of the applicant’s detention, until 6 February 2014. In its reasoning it stressed the complexity of the case, reiterated the grounds given in the previous orders and noted that the circumstances which had justified the detention order had not changed. The Moscow City Court upheld the extension order on 23 October 2013.
55.  On 20 November 2013 the indictment was issued to the applicant, with the final charges defined under Articles 212 § 2 and 318 § 1 of the Criminal Code.
56.  On 3 February 2014 the Moscow City Court examined a fresh request for the extension of the applicant’s detention and granted it, until 6 June 2014. The court justified this extension as follows:
“The extension of the [applicant’s] pre-trial detention is necessary because of the need to allow him and his counsel sufficient time for access to the investigation case file, which has not been finished.
... the [applicant’s] partners in crime have not all been identified and have not been arrested, he knows the personal details of the victims and the witnesses accusing him of being the perpetrator. Taking into account the total of the aforementioned circumstances, the court considers that [the applicant] is likely to flee the investigation and trial, to continue his criminal activity, to put pressure on the victims and witnesses, to induce them to give false evidence, to destruct evidence or to otherwise obstruct the course of justice in the criminal case.”
57.  On 27 February 2014 the Moscow City Court acting as appeal instance upheld the same court’s detention order of 3 February 2014.
58.  On 14 April 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court granted another extension of detention in respect of three defendants, including the applicant. It ordered their detention until 30 September 2014 on the following grounds:
“The reasons taken into account by the court for selecting the preventive measure... have not changed [and] have not lost their relevance to date.
...
The Court takes into account the nature, the gravity and the factual circumstances of the offence imputable to the defendants, the existence of the unidentified perpetrators of the mass disorders, as a real ground for the defendants’ possible unlawful conduct.
Considering the foregoing, it is obvious that the defendants [M.,], [the applicant] and [G.], if at liberty, may abscond or otherwise obstruct the course of criminal procedure”
59.  On 18 August 2014 the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court found the applicant guilty as charged. He was sentenced to two years and six months of imprisonment. The applicant’s pre-trial detention counted towards the prison sentence.
60.  The applicant is currently serving the remainder of the prison term.
C.  Conditions of detention and medical assistance
61.  From 8 September 2012 to 9 June 2013 the first applicant was detained in remand prison IZ-77/4, consecutively in five different cells. In each cell the applicant had at least four square metres of personal space and an individual bed at all times; he had one hour of daily outdoor exercise.
62.  According to the Government, the applicant underwent a medical examination on his admission to IZ-77/4; on his request he received medical assistance on 8 November 2012, 9 January 2013 and 20 May 2013 and on 4 December 2012 he had a specialist consultation with an ophthalmologist.
63.  On 9 June 2013 the applicant was transferred to IZ-77/2. According to the Government, the cell allowed the applicant at least four square metres of personal space and he had an individual bed at all times; the toilet was separated by a solid partition from the rest of the cell in order to ensure the necessary privacy; the cells were treated for disinfection and pest-control once every three month and whenever necessary; the applicant was entitled to one-hour outdoor exercise per day; the cell was cleaned and the beddings were changed once a week; the cells were equipped with forced ventilation and could be aired through the hinged window pane. The artificial light was provided at 100 watt by day and at 75 watt by night. The glazed windows let in daylight.
64.  On 7 October 2013 and 20 October 2013 the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities visited IZ-77/2. The applicant made no complaints about the conditions of his detention.
II.  RELEVANT DOMESTIC LAW
65.  The Criminal Code of the Russian Federation provides as follows:
Article 212 Mass disorders
“1.  The organisation of mass disorders accompanied by violence, riots, arson, destruction of property, use of firearms, explosives and explosive devices, as well by armed resistance to a public official shall be punishable by four to ten years’ deprivation of liberty.
2.  The participation in the mass disorders provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article shall be punishable by three to eight years’ deprivation of liberty.
3.  The instigation of mass disorders provided for by paragraph 1 of this Article, or the instigation of participation in them, or the instigation of violence against citizens shall be punishable by restriction of liberty for up to two years, or community works for up to two years, or deprivation of liberty for the same term.”
Article 318 Use of violence against a public official
“1.  The use of violence not endangering life or health, or the threat to use such violence against a public official or his relatives in connection with the performance of his or her duties shall be punishable by a fine of up to 200,000 roubles or an equivalent of the convicted person’s wages for 18 months, or community works for up to five years, or up to five years’ deprivation of liberty ...”
66.  For a summary of the relevant domestic law provisions governing the conditions and length of pre-trial detention, see the cases of Dolgova v. Russia (no. 11886/05, §§ 26-31, 2 March 2006) and Lind v. Russia (no. 25664/05, §§ 47-52, 6 December 2007).
67.  For a summary of applicable regulations and the European standards for prison conditions, see Ananyev and Others v. Russia (nos. 42525/07 and 60800/08, §§ 55 et seq., 10 January 2012).
THE LAW
I.  JOINDER OF THE APPLICATIONS
68.  Given their similar factual and legal background, the Court decides that the three applications should be joined pursuant to Rule 42 § 1 of the Rules of Court.
II.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 §§ 1 and 3 OF THE CONVENTION
69.  All applicants complained under Article 5 § 1 of the Convention that their pre-trial detention was not based on a “reasonable suspicion” that they had committed a criminal offence. They also complained that their pre-trial detention had not been justified by “relevant and sufficient reasons”, as required by Article 5 § 3 of the Convention. Article 5, in so far as relevant, reads as follows:
“1.  Everyone has the right to liberty and security of person. No one shall be deprived of his liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law:
...
(c)  the lawful arrest or detention of a person effected for the purpose of bringing him before the competent legal authority on reasonable suspicion of having committed an offence or when it is reasonably considered necessary to prevent his committing an offence or fleeing after having done so;
...
3.  Everyone arrested or detained in accordance with the provisions of paragraph 1 (c) of this Article shall be brought promptly before a judge or other officer authorised by law to exercise judicial power and shall be entitled to trial within a reasonable time or to release pending trial. Release may be conditioned by guarantees to appear for trial.”
A.  Admissibility
70.  As regards the alleged unlawfulness of the applicants’ detention, the Court notes the Basmannyy District Court of Moscow ordered the applicants’ detention, which was subsequently extended on several occasions by the same court, the Moscow City Court and, after the case had been referred to court – by the Zamoskvoretskiy District Court of Moscow. The domestic courts acted within their powers in making those decisions and there is nothing to suggest that they were invalid or unlawful under the domestic law. Accordingly, the applicants’ detention was imposed and extended in accordance with a procedure prescribed by law.
71.  As regards the allegation that the applicants’ detention was not based on a reasonable suspicion that they had committed criminal offences, the applicant’s complaint under Article 5 § 1 overlaps to a large extent with his complaint under Article 5 § 3 about the authorities’ failure to adduce relevant and sufficient reasons justifying the extensions of his detention pending criminal proceedings. The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 1 (c) is mostly concerned with the existence of a lawful basis for a detention within criminal proceedings, whereas Article 5 § 3 deals with the possible justification for such detention. The Court deems is more appropriate to deal with this complaint under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention (see Khodorkovskiy v. Russia, no. 5829/04, § 165, 31 May 2011, and Taranenko v. Russia, no. 19554/05, § 46, 15 May 2014).
72.  As regards the alleged violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the Court finds that these complaints are not manifestly ill-founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that this part of the application is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B.  Merits
1.  The parties’ submissions
73.  The Government submitted that the applicants’ pre-trial detention had been necessary and that the judicial detention orders, as well as their extensions, had been based on the individual assessment of each applicant’s personal situation, had been substantiated by concrete facts and had been thoroughly reasoned. They pointed out, in particular, that the applicants had been charged with serious criminal offences mass disorder committed by an organised group and accompanied by riots and destruction of property and of violence against the police. These were serious offences punishable by prison terms of over two years. Further, they reiterated the reasons given by the domestic courts for detaining the applicants pending investigation and trial, in particular the risk of the applicants fleeing, or manipulating witnesses, or destroying the evidence, or otherwise obstructing the administration of justice. Even at the advanced stages of the proceedings this preventive measure remained necessary in view of the complexity of the case and the need to ensure the applicants’ familiarisation with the voluminous case file. Finally, in the proceedings concerning the preventive measures the applicants were represented by legal counsels and could make detailed submissions in favour of their release, including the medical grounds for the release, which the courts examined and dismissed by reasoned decisions.
74.  The applicants submitted that the domestic courts had not advanced “relevant and sufficient” reasons to hold them in custody for lengthy periods in excess of one year. They contested that the domestic authorities had examined their individual situations, or that they had demonstrated the existence of specific facts in support of their conclusion that they might abscond, interfere with the investigation or reoffend. The applicants considered that the charges against them had been political rather than criminal in substance, and that their alleged offences had in fact been rather trivial. Moreover, the courts took no account of the personal profiles of the defendants, none of whom had had a criminal record or antisocial past. On the contrary, they had been law-abiding citizens, with fixed places of residence, appropriate occupations and stable family ties, and there had been no need to apply the strictest possible prevention measure. Finally, the applicants alleged that the courts had not truly considered the alternative preventive measures, such as house arrest, bail or personal guarantees.
2.  The Court’s assessment
(a)  General principles
75.  The Court first reiterates that, in determining the length of pre-trial detention under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention, the period to be taken into consideration begins on the day the accused is taken into custody and ends on the day when the charge is determined, even if only by a court of first instance, or, possibly, when the applicant is released from custody pending criminal proceedings against him (see Idalov v. Russia [GC], no. 5826/03, § 112, 22 May 2012, with further references).
76.  The question whether a period of time spent in pre-trial detention is reasonable cannot be assessed in the abstract. Whether it is reasonable for an accused to remain in detention must be assessed on the facts of each case and according to its specific features. Continued detention can be justified in a given case only if there are actual indications of a genuine requirement of public interest which, notwithstanding the presumption of innocence, outweighs the rule of respect for individual liberty laid down in Article 5 of the Convention (see Idalov, cited above, § 139, and Kudła v. Poland [GC], no. 30210/96, §§ 110 et seq., ECHR 2000‑XI).
77.  The existence and persistence of a reasonable suspicion that the person arrested has committed an offence is a prerequisite for the lawfulness of the continued detention. However, after a certain time has elapsed it no longer suffices. In such cases, the Court must establish whether the other grounds cited by the judicial authorities continued to justify the deprivation of liberty. Where such grounds are “relevant” and “sufficient”, the Court must also ascertain whether the competent national authorities displayed “special diligence” in the conduct of the proceedings. Justification for any period of detention, no matter how short, must be convincingly demonstrated by the authorities. When deciding whether a person should be released or detained, the authorities are obliged to consider alternative measures of ensuring his appearance at trial (see Idalov, cited above, § 140, and Suslov v. Russia, no. 2366/07, § 86, 29 May 2012, with further references).
78.  The responsibility lies primarily with the national judicial authorities to ensure that, in a given case, the pre-trial detention of an accused person does not exceed a reasonable time. To this end they must, paying due regard to the principle of the presumption of innocence, examine all the facts arguing for or against the existence of a public interest which justifies a departure from the rule in Article 5, and must set them out in their decisions on the applications for release. It is essentially on the basis of the reasons given in those decisions and of the established facts stated by the applicant in his appeals that the Court is called upon to decide whether or not there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 (see Idalov, cited above, § 141, and McKay v. the United Kingdom [GC], no. 543/03, § 43, ECHR 2006‑X).
(b)  Application of those principles in the present case
79.  The period of detention to be taken into consideration in this case started on the dates of the applicants’ arrest and ended on the dates of their conviction by the first-instance court, except for the first applicant whose detention ended on the date of his release following the Amnesty Act. The relevant dates and the length of the resulting periods of detention as regards each applicant are indicated below:
- Mr Kovyazin was arrested on 5 September 2012 and was released following the Amnesty Act on 19 December 2013; accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration lasted one year and three and a half months;
- Mr Savelov was arrested on 11 June 2012 and was convicted on 21 February 2014; accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration lasted one year and eight months;
- Mr Gushchin was arrested on 6 February 2013 and was convicted on 18 August 2014; accordingly, the period to be taken into consideration lasted one year and six months.
80.  Having regard to these considerable periods of detention in the light of the presumption in favour of release, the Court finds that the Russian authorities were required to put forward very weighty reasons for keeping the applicants in detention for such extended periods of time.
81.  It follows from the applicants’ detention orders and the Government’s observations that the primary reason for their detention was the gravity of charges. Firstly, the domestic court considered that the applicants, faced with the risk of a prison term, were likely to abscond, tamper with the witnesses and interfere with administration of justice. Secondly, they seemed to suggest that the very nature of the offences in question revealed certain dangerous features of the applicants’ personalities making them likely to re-offend and generally calling for caution. The Court will examine whether in each applicant’s case these risks had been convincingly demonstrated and whether the reasons given by the domestic courts were “relevant and sufficient” to justify their continued detention.
(i)  Nature of the offence
82.  The Government pointed out that the applicants had been suspected of having played an active role in mass disorders accompanied by violence, riots, arson and destruction of property, a high-gravity criminal offence. Some of them had also been suspected of having engaged in violence against the police, a medium-gravity offence.
83.  The applicants from the outset contested the violent nature of their behaviour and denied that either the demonstration or its dispersal could have been characterised as mass disorders. They alleged that there had been disorientation and stampede caused by the deficient crowd‑control measures taken by the police, but the event in general had not turned violent or uncontrollable. Although they had admitted that there had been some clashes with the police they maintained that those episodes had been isolated and benign, and that they had been a reaction to the authorities’ unwarranted use of force against the protestors.
84.  The Court notes the parties’ conflicting views on the events underlying the criminal charges. Without entering into the substance of the applicants’ ensuing criminal conviction of mass disorders, the Court observes that the specific acts imputed to the individual applicants during the investigation included shouting political slogans, breaking through the police cordon, upsetting portable lavatories thus participating in mass disorders (classified as grave offences) and, in two cases, taking part in confrontations with the riot police officers causing no lasting harm (classified as offences of medium gravity). The Court finds that despite the domestic classification, this behaviour was not of a kind usually considered so serious as to justify the pre-trial detention by itself. By way of comparison, the Court has previously given weight to the Russian authorities’ reliance on the gravity of certain offences, such as kidnapping compounded with extortion (see Artemov v. Russia, no. 14945/03, § 75, 3 April 2014), or multiple aggravated gang kidnapping associated with extortion, robbery and possession and trafficking of firearms (see Khloyev v. Russia, no. 46404/13, §§ 7 and 98, 5 February 2015), or aggravated fraud by an organised group (see Sopin v. Russia, no. 57319/10, §§ 6 and 40, 18 December 2012), or an organised aggravated murder (see Amirov v. Russia, no. 51857/13, §§ 10 and 104, 27 November 2014), or an organised aggravated assault causing injuries of four and one death (see Arutyunyan v. Russia, no. 48977/09, § 103, 10 January 2012).
85.  In the present case, the Court is only prepared to accept that if the nature and the gravity of the offences could play any role in the choice of preventive measure, it was only at the very initial stages of the investigation.
(ii)  Severity of the sentence
86.  Closely linked with the gravity of the offence was the argument of the severity of the sentence faced by the applicants, that is prison term of over two years. The Court has repeatedly held that, although the severity of the sentence is a relevant element in the assessment of the risk of an accused absconding or reoffending, the need to continue the deprivation of liberty cannot be assessed from a purely abstract point of view. Nor can continuation of the detention be used to anticipate a custodial sentence (see Letellier v. France, 26 June 1991, § 51, Series A no. 207; Panchenko v. Russia, no. 45100/98, § 102, 8 February 2005; Goral v. Poland, no. 38654/97, § 68, 30 October 2003; and Ilijkov v. Bulgaria, no. 33977/96, § 81, 26 July 2001). The Court will therefore examine whether the above risks had been substantiated by concrete facts and whether they had been supported by other grounds relevant and sufficient to justify the applicant’s detention at all stages.
(iii)  Absconding, re-offending, tampering with witnesses and obstructing justice
87.  Every time the domestic courts ordered, extended or reviewed the pre-trial detention in this case they referred to the risks of the applicants absconding, continuing their criminal activity, co-ordinating their defence with other perpetrators, tampering with witnesses and otherwise interfering with the course of justice. These risks were inferred primarily from the gravity of the charges and the applicants’ assumed fear of receiving lengthy prison terms, the grounds discussed above.
88.  In addition to that, in Mr Gushchin’s case, the courts from the outset gave weight to three additional factors, i.e. the applicant’s possession of a travel passport, his previous conviction of an administrative offence and the fact that he had contacts in other regions of Russia. They considered that these circumstances increased the risks of absconding, tampering with the witnesses and destroying the evidence. The Court cannot discern any link between the administrative offence and the declared risks for want of any details. As regards the risks of absconding and re-offending, if any, they could have been effectively dealt with by other preventive measures.
89.  The Court further notes that on 3 February 2014 the court granted the extension of Mr Gushchin’s pre-trial detention, in particular, to allow him and his counsel sufficient time for access to the investigation case file. It is not clear, however, why the applicant had to remain in detention to do so. Certainly, if released, he could have accessed the file under the same arrangements as persons to whom the pre-trial detention had never been applied. Moreover, the Court has previously found that the provisions of Russian law concerning the extension of detention pending study of case file by a defendant were not foreseeable in their application, in violation of Article 5 § 1 of the Convention (see Tsarenko v. Russia, no. 5235/09, §§ 59‑63, 3 March 2011; Suslov, cited above, §§ 75-79; and Pyatkov v. Russia, no. 61767/08, §§ 86-91, 13 November 2012). It therefore dismisses this reason and considers that there had been no grounds for the applicant’s continued detention.
(iv)  Overall assessment
90.  The Court has already, on numerous occasions, examined applications against Russia raising similar complaints under Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in respect of the Russian courts’ failure to provide sufficient and relevant grounds for applicants’ detention (see, among many other authorities, Khudoyorov v. Russia, no. 6847/02, ECHR 2005‑X (extracts); Dirdizov v. Russia, no. 41461/10, §§ 108-11, 27 November 2012; Zherebin v. Russia, no. 51445/09, communicated on 13 November 2012; and Taranenko, cited above, §§ 52‑55). Each time, having found a violation of Article 5 § 3, the Court has noted a number of deficiencies in the reasoning employed by the Russian courts to authorise keeping an applicant in custody. From case to case it has pointed out the following major defects in the courts’ arguments: reliance on the seriousness of the charges as the primary source to justify the risk of the applicant absconding; reference to the applicant’s travel passport, financial resources and the fact that his alleged accomplices are on the run as the basis for the assumption that he would follow suit; a suspicion, in the absence of any evidence, that he would interfere with witnesses or use his connections in State bodies to obstruct justice; and a failure to thoroughly examine the possibility of applying another, less rigid preventive measure, such as release on bail.
91.  The Court observes that the Russian courts did not avoid that pattern of reasoning in the present case. They consistently relied on the seriousness of the charges and the likelihood that the applicants would abscond or influence witnesses, having based their fear on some of the assumptions made in the cases cited above as well as, occasionally, on the statements and undisclosed reports of the operational-search agencies. They gave no heed to important and relevant facts supporting the applicants’ petitions for release and reducing the above risks, such as clean criminal record, permanent place of residence and the numerous positive references and personal guarantees. There was no evidence that either applicant had ever tried to contact the victims or witnesses in the course of the criminal proceedings, or that they had intended to abscond. Furthermore, the courts gave no reason for dismissing the applicants’ requests for an alternative preventive measure, in particular, a bail, personal guarantee, or house-arrest.
92.  Finally, the Court finds that at the advanced stages of the proceedings, when the increasingly strong justification for the continued detention is needed, the courts reiterated the original reasons for the applicants’ pre-trial detention without giving consideration to the evolving circumstances, such as completion of the investigation file and the fact that the applicants had already spent a considerable amount of time in detention. Conversely, when the applicants’ criminal case files were submitted to court, it extended their detention by means of collective detention orders of 6 June 2013 and 19 November 2013 (in respect of the first and the second applicants), and of 14 April 2014 (in respect of the third applicant), having dispensed with proper regard to each applicant’s individual circumstances. The Court has previously found this practice incompatible, in itself, with the guarantees enshrined in Article 5 § 3 of the Convention in so far as it permitted the continued detention of a group of persons without a case-by-case assessment of the grounds or compliance with the “reasonable-time” requirement in respect of each individual member of the group (see Shcheglyuk v. Russia, no. 7649/02, § 45, 14 December 2006; Korchuganova v. Russia, no. 75039/01, § 76, 8 June 2006; and Dolgova, cited above, § 49).
93.  Having regard to all the materials in its possession, the Court finds that the Government have not put forward any fact or argument capable of persuading it to reach a different conclusion in the present case. Indeed, the domestic courts inferred the risks of absconding, reoffending or interfering with the proceedings essentially from the gravity of the charge against the applicants. By failing to address specific facts underpinning the existence of such risks or consider alternative preventive measures and by relying essentially on the gravity of the charges, the courts extended the applicants’ detention on grounds which cannot be regarded as relevant and sufficient in order to justify the length of the detention; these omissions only aggravated as the proceedings progressed. In these circumstances it is not necessary to examine whether the proceedings were conducted with “special diligence”.
94.  There has accordingly been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention as regards each applicant.
III.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 5 § 4 OF THE CONVENTION
95.  The second applicant (Mr Savelov) complained under Article 5 § 4 of the Convention about the delays in the judicial examination of his appeals against the detention orders of 14 June 2012 and 9 August 2012. Article 5 § 4 provides as follows:
“Everyone who is deprived of his liberty by arrest or detention shall be entitled to take proceedings by which the lawfulness of his detention shall be decided speedily by a court and his release ordered if the detention is not lawful.”
A.  Admissibility
96.  The Court notes that this complaint is not manifestly ill‑founded within the meaning of Article 35 § 3 (a) of the Convention. It further notes that it is not inadmissible on any other grounds. It must therefore be declared admissible.
B.  Merits
97.  The parties did not dispute the periods during which the appeal proceedings were pending as regards the detention orders of Mr Savelov. However, the Government considered their duration compatible with the “speediness” requirement of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention, the assessment contested by the applicant.
1.  General principles
98.  The Court reiterates that Article 5 § 4, in guaranteeing to persons arrested or detained a right to take proceedings to challenge the lawfulness of their detention, also proclaims their right, following the institution of such proceedings, to a speedy judicial decision concerning the lawfulness of detention and ordering its termination if it proves unlawful. Although it does not compel the Contracting States to set up a second level of jurisdiction for the examination of the lawfulness of detention, a State which institutes such a system must in principle accord to detainees the same guarantees on appeal as at first instance (see Navarra v. France, 23 November 1993, § 28, Series A no. 273-B, and Toth v. Austria, 12 December 1991, § 84, Series A no. 224). The requirement that a decision be given “speedily” is undeniably one such guarantee and Article 5 § 4, concerning issues of liberty, requires particular expedition (see Hutchison Reid v. the United Kingdom, no. 50272/99, § 79, ECHR 2003‑IV). In this context, the Court also observes that there is a special need for a swift decision determining the lawfulness of detention in cases where a trial is pending, because the defendant should benefit fully from the principle of the presumption of innocence (see Iłowiecki v. Poland, no. 27504/95, § 76, 4 October 2001).
2.  Application of those principles in the present case
99.  The Court notes that the appeal against the detention order of 14 June 2012 was lodged on 18 June 2012 and was examined on 11 July 2012. The appeal against the extension order of 9 August 2012 was lodged on 10 August 2012 and was examined on 10 September 2012. Accordingly it took the appeal court twenty three days to examine the applicant’s appeal against the original detention order and thirty days to examine his appeal against the first extension. There is nothing to suggest that the applicant caused delays in the examination of his appeals against the detention orders. The Court does not consider that in such an urgent matter as one concerning the right to liberty, the domestic courts acted diligently in taking up so long to schedule the hearing. It finds that these periods cannot be considered compatible with the “speediness” requirement of Article 5 § 4, especially taking into account that their entire duration was attributable to the authorities (see, for example, Mamedova v. Russia, no. 7064/05, § 96, 1 June 2006; Khudoyorov, cited above, §§ 198 and 203; and Rehbock v. Slovenia, no. 29462/95, §§ 85-86, ECHR 2000-XII, where review proceedings which lasted twenty-three days were not “speedy”).
100.  There has therefore been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as regards the second applicant.
IV.  ALLEGED VIOLATION OF ARTICLE 3 OF THE CONVENTION
101.  The first applicant complained about the poor conditions of detention in the remand prisons and alleged that throughout his detention he was not receiving adequate medical assistance in relation to myopia, arthritis and scoliosis. Article 3 of the Convention reads as follows:
“No one shall be subjected to torture or to inhuman or degrading treatment or punishment.”
102.  The parties’ submissions as regards the conditions of detention in IZ-77/4 and IZ-77/2 are set out in paragraphs 61-64 above. While they agreed on the sizes of the cells, the number of inmates detained there concurrently with the applicant, the sanitary and hygiene arrangements, they differed as to whether these conditions had amounted to degrading treatment within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention. The applicant maintained, in particular, that four square metres of personal space had been insufficient to avoid overcrowding, and that it was aggravated by other factors, such as inadequate ventilation and lighting, incomplete separation of the lavatory from the living space and the daily one-hour limit on the outdoor exercise per day. The Government, on the contrary, contended that the applicant’s detention conditions had been in conformity with the standards applicable to the personal space, light, room temperature, sanitary facilities and hygiene arrangements.
103.  The Court has consistently stressed that to fall under Article 3 the suffering and humiliation involved in the deprivation of liberty must go beyond that inevitable element of suffering and humiliation connected with detention. The State must ensure that a person is detained in conditions which are compatible with respect for human dignity, that the manner and method of the execution of the measure do not subject him to distress or hardship of an intensity exceeding the unavoidable level of suffering inherent in detention, and that, given the practical demands of imprisonment, his health and well-being are adequately secured (see Kudła, cited above, §§ 92-94, and Popov v. Russia, no. 26853/04, § 208, 13 July 2006).
104.  When assessing conditions of detention, account has to be taken of the cumulative effects of these conditions, as well as of specific allegations made by the applicant (see Dougoz v. Greece, no. 40907/98, § 46, ECHR 2001-II, and Idalov, cited above, § 94, 22 May 2012). The length of time a person is detained in the particular conditions also has to be considered (see, among other authorities, Alver v. Estonia, no. 64812/01, 8 November 2005).
105.  The extreme lack of space in a prison cell weighs heavily as an aspect to be taken into account for the purpose of establishing whether the impugned detention conditions were “degrading” from the point of view of Article 3 (see Karalevičius v. Lithuania, no. 53254/99, § 36, 7 April 2005). In Ananyev and Others, cited above, the Court set out the relevant standards for deciding whether or not there has been a violation of Article 3 on account of a lack of personal space. In particular, the Court has to have regard to the following three elements: (a) each detainee must have an individual sleeping place in the cell; (b) each must dispose of at least 3 square metres of floor space; and (c) the overall surface area of the cell must be such as to allow detainees to move freely between items of furniture. The absence of any of the above elements creates in itself a strong presumption that the conditions of detention amounted to degrading treatment and were in breach of Article 3 (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, § 148; see further Olszewski v. Poland, no. 21880/03, § 98, 2 April 2013).
106.  In cases where a larger prison cell is at issue – measuring in the range of three to four square metres per inmate, a violation of Article 3 will be found only if the space factor would be coupled with other aspects of inappropriate physical conditions of detention related to, in particular, access to outdoor exercise, natural light or air, availability of ventilation, adequacy of heating arrangements, the possibility of using the toilet in private, and compliance with basic sanitary and hygienic requirements (see Ananyev and Others, cited above, § 149; Jirsák v. the Czech Republic, no. 8968/08, §§ 64-73, 5 April 2012; Culev v. Moldova, no. 60179/09, §§ 35‑39, 17 April 2012; Longin v. Croatia, no. 49268/10, §§ 59-61, 6 November 2012; Torreggiani and Others v. Italy, nos. 43517/09 etc., § 69, 8 January 2013; and Barilo v. Ukraine, no. 9607/06, §§ 80-83, 16 May 2013).
107.  In the present case, the Court observes that during the whole period of detention the applicant was held in the cells that allowed him about four square metres of personal space. Accordingly, he was not subjected to severe overcrowding which could in itself lead to sufferings incompatible with Article 3 of the Convention. He was provided with an individual bed and he never alleged that the arrangements of the cells, due to their fixtures such as tables, beds and toilets, impeded him from moving freely within the cell (compare Vladimir Belyayev v. Russia, no. 9967/06, § 34, 17 October 2013; and, by contrast, Yevgeniy Alekseyenko v. Russia, no. 41833/04, § 87, 27 January 2011, and Manulin v. Russia, no. 26676/06, § 46, 11 April 2013).
108.  Furthermore, the Court notes that lavatories in the cells were separated from the living space, albeit the partition did not reach the ceiling. Also, each cell had unobstructed access to natural light. Windows were not fitted with metal shutters or other contraptions preventing natural light from penetrating into the cell. Where available, a small window pane could be opened for fresh air. Cells were additionally equipped with artificial lighting and ventilation. The applicant was allowed a one-hour period of outdoor exercise daily. Cold running water was available in cells and detainees had access to showers once every seven days.
109.  Taking into account the cumulative effect of those conditions, the Court does not consider that the conditions of the applicant’s detention reached the threshold of severity required to characterise the treatment as inhuman or degrading within the meaning of Article 3 of the Convention (see Fetisov and Others v. Russia, nos. 43710/07 etc., §§ 137-38, 17 January 2012, compare Vladimir Belyayev, cited above, § 36).
110.  As regards the medical assistance, the Government referred to four occasions when the applicant asked for medical help and was seen by a doctor, including one consultation by an ophthalmologist. The parties provided no further details on the applicant’s ailments or treatments.
111.  Having regard to the information in its possession, the Court is unable to establish that the applicant had any health issues that required the authorities to take any steps beyond the consultations he had received. Moreover, there is no track of any complaints lodged by the applicant or his counsel about the lack of medical care. The Court notes, in particular, that no such complaints were made to the members of the public commission for the monitoring of detention facilities who visited the applicant on 7 October 2013 and 20 October 2013.
112.  Having regard to the above, the Court finds that the applicant’s complaints under Article 3 should be rejected in accordance with Article 35 §§ 3 (a) and 4 of the Convention.
V.  APPLICATION OF ARTICLE 41 OF THE CONVENTION
113.  Article 41 of the Convention provides:
“If the Court finds that there has been a violation of the Convention or the Protocols thereto, and if the internal law of the High Contracting Party concerned allows only partial reparation to be made, the Court shall, if necessary, afford just satisfaction to the injured party.”
A.  Damage
114.  In respect of non-pecuniary damage Mr Kovyazin claimed 100,000 euros (EUR), Mr Savelov claimed EUR 56,000 and Mr Gushchin claimed EUR 50,000.
115.  The Government contested those claims as excessive and out of line with the awards made by the Court in similar cases. They considered that the acknowledgment of a violation, if found by the Court, would constitute sufficient just satisfaction for the applicants.
116.  The Court observes that it has found a violation of Article 5 § 3 in respect of all the applicants, combined, in the second applicant’s case (Mr Savelov) with a violation of Articles 5 § 4. It is undeniable that the applicants suffered distress, frustration and anxiety caused by these violations. However, the Court accepts the Government’s argument that the specific amounts claimed appear excessive. Making its assessment on an equitable basis, it awards Mr Kovyazin and Mr Gushchin EUR 2,000 each, and to Mr Savelov EUR 3,000.
B.  Costs and expenses
117.  The applicants did not claim any costs or expenses. Accordingly, there is no call to make an award under this head.
C.  Default interest
118.  The Court considers it appropriate that the default interest rate should be based on the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank, to which should be added three percentage points.
FOR THESE REASONS, THE COURT, UNANIMOUSLY,
1.  Decides to join the applications;

2.  Declares the complaints raised under Article 5 §§ 1, 3 and 4 of the Convention admissible and the remainder of the applications inadmissible;

3.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 3 of the Convention as regards all applicants;

4.  Holds that there has been a violation of Article 5 § 4 of the Convention as regards the second applicant (Mr Savelov);

5.  Holds
(a)  that the respondent State is to pay the applicants, within three months from the date on which the judgment becomes final in accordance with Article 44 § 2 of the Convention, the following amounts in respect of non-pecuniary damage, to be converted into the currency of the respondent State at the rate applicable at the date of settlement:
(i)  EUR 3,000 (three thousand euros) to Mr Savelov, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(ii)  EUR 2,000 (two thousand euros) to Mr Kovyazin and Mr Gushchin each, plus any tax that may be chargeable;
(b)  that from the expiry of the above-mentioned three months until settlement simple interest shall be payable on the above amounts at a rate equal to the marginal lending rate of the European Central Bank during the default period plus three percentage points;

6.  Dismisses the remainder of the applicants’ claims for just satisfaction.
Done in English, and notified in writing on 17 September 2015, pursuant to Rule 77 §§ 2 and 3 of the Rules of Court.
	André Wampach	András Sajó
	Deputy Registrar	President