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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Daphne Parish v Sharman [2000] EWCA Civ 3038 (15 December 2000) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2000/3038.html Cite as: [2001] WTLR 593, [2000] EWCA Civ 3038

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM WINCHESTER COUNTY COURT
(Her Honour Judge Bonvin)

		The Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2A
		Friday 15 December 2000

Friday 15 December 2000

1. LORD JUSTICE JONATHAN PARKER: This is an appeal by the applicant in the proceedings, Mrs Daphne Parish, against the dismissal by Her Honour Judge Bonvin on 17 January 2000 of the applicant's claim under the Inheritance (Provision for Family and Dependants) Act 1975 ("the Act") for reasonable financial provision from the estate of Kenneth Roy Parish, who died on 25 October 1996 ("the deceased"). The respondent in the proceedings and the respondent to this appeal is Miss Evelyn Sharman, with whom Mr Parish was cohabiting at the date of his death and who is the residuary legatee under his Will and his sole personal representative. Permission to appeal was granted by Hale LJ on the papers on 27 March 2000.
2. The notice of appeal is, as I understand it, one day out of time, and an extension of time is sought. I for my part would see no basis for refusing that extension, and I would accordingly grant it.
3. The appellant appears by Mr Egleton of counsel; the respondent by Mr Gerrey of counsel.
4. I turn to the factual chronology, as it appears from the Judge's careful judgment. I summarise it as follows. The appellant and the deceased were married on 28 October 1967. The appellant was then aged 30; the deceased 35. It was the deceased's second marriage, his first marriage having ended in divorce. The appellant was at that time a teacher, and the deceased a police officer. Following the marriage, they purchased a house at Anstey Gate, Anstey, near Alton in Hampshire. The purchase was taken in joint names. The appellant paid the deposit and provided furniture for the house; the deceased made the mortgage repayments. On 17 October 1968 their eldest child, Robert, was born. Following his birth, the appellant gave up her job as a teacher. In July 1972 the deceased left the police force, the house in Anstey was sold and the appellant and the deceased, together with Robert, moved to a nearby property called Cadnams Farm, Upper Anstey Lane in Alton.
5. Cadnams Farm is, it appears, a substantial property, comprising five bedrooms and three reception rooms, together with with a kitchen and a breakfast room, plus a considerable area of surrounding agricultural land. It was at that time owned and occupied by the appellant's parents. It appears that the original plan was that the appellant and the deceased would build a separate house for theselves in the grounds of Cadnams Farm, but planning permission for a separate dwelling was not forthcoming, and in the event the main farmhouse was extended to accommodate them.
6. Following the move to Cadnams Farm, the deceased tried his hand at farming but was apparently not particularly talented at it and accordingly he decided to set up in business on his own account as a road haulier. It appears that at or about the time of the move to Cadnams Farm the appellant's father transferred a half beneficial share in Cadnams Farm to the appellant, although it is not clear whether that transfer was by way of purchase or a voluntary transfer. On November 1972 a second child, Sarah, was born to the appellant and the deceased. In about December 1972 the appellant's father (acting, it would appear, on behalf of the appellant's mother and the appellant herself) entered into a deal with a development company, whereby the greater part of the agricultural land comprised in Cadnams Farm was sold to the development company for future development. In consequence of that deal, the appellant received a sum of £15,000 which (as the Judge found) was used by herself and the deceased as a family asset. According to the appellant, in 1975 she received a further sum of £5,000 from the developers, but the Judge was not satisfied on the evidence that the payment had been made.
7. In December 1979 the appellant's father died. According to the appellant, he died intestate. In consequence, according to the appellant, she became entitled to an additional one sixth beneficial share in Cadnams Farm, giving her an overall two thirds beneficial interest in it. By 1984, if not before, the appellant had become a partner in the deceased's road haulage business, which operated under the trading name "Machine Tools Movements".
8. In 1985 the appellant and the deceased separated. Robert was at that time aged 18 and Sarah (known as Susie) was 14. In her judgment, the Judge described the separation in the following terms:

"On separation the deceased appears to have made no formal maintenance payments to the Applicant, either for herself or for the children. . . In financial terms. . . the deceased and the Applicant simply went their own ways with neither seeking to make any claim on the other, the Applicant retaining her interest in Cadnams Farm where she ran a livery business and the [deceased] retaining the road haulage business."

9. Later in 1985 the appellant issued a divorce petition. A decree nisi was pronounced on 28 August 1985, although, as will appear, the decree nisi was in the event never made absolute. It is material to this appeal to note that the appellant made no application for ancillary relief in the divorce proceedings, notwithstanding that she was legally represented at the time. Nor did she take any proceedings in relation to such interest as she may have had in the deceased's road haulage business. The Judge concluded that the likely reason why no application was made by the appellant for financial provision in the divorce proceedings was that she had been advised by her solicitors to the effect that if she did not seek maintenance herself then the deceased would have no claim on any interest she had had in Cadnams Farm.
10. In 1986 the deceased, who had continued to live at Cadnams Farm notwithstanding the divorce proceedings, bought a house at 35 Thorpe Gardens in Alton and moved there. In 1987 the deceased met the respondent. He was then 56; she was 26. In the autumn of 1988 the respondent moved to 35 Thorpe Gardens where she and the deceased thereafter cohabited. The respondent worked in the deceased's haulage business and she may have become a partner in it.
11. On 18 October 1998 the deceased made a Will. Subject to a specific legacy of his business assets to a friend, a Mr Cousins, the deceased left his entire estate to the respondent. The Judge accepted the respondent's evidence that the deceased told the respondent that he had made no provision for the appellant in his Will because

". . . he felt that he had already provided for them adequately by leaving them all that he had except his business assets when he left the former matrimonial home".

12. That is, of course, a reference to Cadnams Farm.
13. In March 1992 the appellant's mother assigned the one sixth share in Cadnams Farm to which she had become entitled upon the death of the appellant's father to Robert for £40,0000. The Judge found that it was not clear on the evidence who had paid the £40,000; that is to say whether it was paid by the appellant or by Robert. Later in that year, 1992, the appellant's mother died, and the remaining one sixth share in Cadnams Farm (in which the appellant's mother had had a life interest) passed to the appellant. Accordingly, the appellant now owns five sixths of the beneficial interest in Cadnams Farm, with Robert owning the remaining one sixth.
14. On 25 October 1996 the deceased died, aged 64. His death was sudden and unexpected. At the time of his death the deceased and the respondent were planning to sell 35 Thorpe Gardens and buy a house in joint names.
15. The Judge found that the deceased had many times asked the respondent to marry him, and that the respondent had believed that the deceased was free to marry until, a few day's before the deceased funeral, the appellant informed her that the divorce had never been finalised by a decree absolute. On 9 March 1998 probate of the deceased's Will was granted to the respondent. The deceased's estate was valued at some £215,000 gross, £173,000 net (including Thorpe Gardens at a value of £110,000).
16. On 12 March 1998 the originating application in the present proceedings was issued by the appellant, whereby she sought periodical payments and/or a lump sum out of the deceased's estate. The hearing of the application took place before Her Honour Judge Bonvin at Southampton County Court on 22 and 23 November 1999. At the hearing it was made clear to the Judge that what the appellant was seeking was not periodical payments but a lump sum payment. There was a good deal of evidence before the Judge as to various loans obtained on the security of Cadnams Farm by the appellant and/or by Robert. This documentary evidence was considered by the Judge to be confusing in many respects. In the event the appellant, through her counsel Mr Egleton, invited the Judge to proceed on the basis that the appellant owed the bank some £28,0000 secured on Cadnams Farm and that Robert owed some £40,000. The Judge accepted that invitation and proceeded upon that basis. She reserved judgment, delivering it on 17 January 2000.
17. The current situation at the date when the Judge delivered judgment, a situation which (so far as I am aware) has not changed in any material particular, was as follows. The appellant continues to live at Cadnams Farm with Robert and Susie. Cadnams Farm was valued in June 1998 at £450,000. A five sixths beneficial share in that property, net of borrowings, is worth some £350,000. The Judge accepted the valuation of £450,000 for the purposes of her judgment. In addition, the appellant apparently has some prospect of receiving a share of profits of a future half acre development at Cadnams Farm. As to income, the appellant (who suffers from ill health) is in receipt of a disability living allowance of £191.60 per month. That is £44.21 per week. She also receives income support in the sum of £140.52 per week and a state pension in the sum of £67.05 per week. Her total income is accordingly £251.78 per week, out of which she has to make mortgage repayments and pay interest on her bank borrowings. The evidence as to the appellant's liabilities was confused, and the Judge found herself unable to rely on her evidence in that respect. Robert and Susie (now aged 31 and 27 respectively) apparently make no contribution to the joint household expenses at Cadnams Farm. The Judge concluded that the appellant has for some time been subsidising her children; that she is living in a house which is larger than she needs; and that her motivation is to hold on to the farm and the land for her children's sake.
18. Turning now to the respondent, she is presently running the deceased's haulage business as sole proprietor, and continuing to live at 35 Thorpe Gardens. As I have already mentioned, 35 Thorpe Gardens is worth some £110,000 (that is to say, about one quarter of the open market value of Cadnams Farm). Taking into account her interest under the will, the respondent has some £80,000 of free capital, in addition to 35 Thorpe Gardens, such capital being represented mainly by the proceeds of life policies taken out by the deceased. This, however, makes no allowance for the costs of these proceedings.
19. Having set out the factual chronology and described the current circumstances of the appellant and the respondent, the Judge turned to the relevant provisions of the Act. It is not suggested on this appeal that the Judge misdirected herself in any way as to the law, and I accordingly need not take time reciting all the provisions of the Act to which she referred. Suffice it to say that section 1(1)(a) of the Act enables a wife or husband of the deceased to apply for an order under section 2 of the Act on the ground that the disposition of the deceased's estate effected by his will is not such as to make reasonable financial provision for the applicant. Section 1(2) defines "reasonable financial provision" in the context of an application by a wife or husband of the deceased as meaning (see section 1(2)(a)):

". . . such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for a husband or wife to receive, whether or not that provision is required for his or her maintenance".

20. This is to be contrasted with the meaning of the same expression in the case of any other application under section 1. In such cases the meaning is (see 1(2)(b)):

". . . such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for the applicant to receive for his maintenance."

21. Under section 2 of the Act the court has wide powers in relation to the orders which it may make on an application under the Act. In particular, the court may order periodical payments, or a lump sum payment, or the transfer of property from one party to another.
22. Section 3(1) of the Act sets out a list of specific matters to which the court is to have regard in considering whether to exercise its jurisdiction under the Act. The list ends with:

"(g) any other matter, including the conduct of the applicant or any other person, which in the circumstances of the case the court may consider relevant."

23. Section 3(2) provides that, in the case of an application by a wife or husband, the court shall additionally have regard to:

"(a) the age of the applicant and the duration of the marriage;

(b) the contribution made by the applicant to the welfare of the family of the deceased, including any contribution made by looking after the home or caring for the family".

24. The subsection continues:

". . . and, in the case of an application by the wife or husband of the deceased, the court shall also. . . have regard to the provision which the applicant might reasonably have expected to receive if on the day on which the deceased died the marriage, instead of being terminated by death, had been terminated by a decree of divorce."

25. Having directed herself correctly as to the law, the Judge addressed, first, the question whether, given that no decree absolute had ever been obtained, the court should treat the appellant as still married to the deceased at the date of his death. The Judge accepted Mr Egleton's submission on behalf of the appellant that that was the correct approach, and there is no cross appeal on that issue. The Judge went on to comment as follows:

"However, that is not to say that I should ignore completely the fact that a decree nisi of divorce had been pronounced in 1985 and that the deceased was under the misapprehension that he was properly divorced from the Applicant as will appear later in this judgment".

26. The Judge then turned to the various specific matters to which the court is to have regard, pursuant to section 3 of the Act, and addressed each one in turn. When she reached section 3(1)(g) she said this:

"Here I have to say that I believe it to be relevant that the Applicant did not apply to make the decree nisi absolute and that, as I find, she allowed the deceased to labour under the misapprehension that they were divorced. In addition, by not applying for financial ancillary relief in the divorce proceedings she lulled him into a false sense of security that their financial affairs had been sorted out between them once and for all."

27. Complaint is made by the appellant of the Judge's finding that she (the appellant) allowed the deceased to labour under a misapprehension that they were divorced. The appellant asserts that that was not case, and that the deceased was aware that the divorce had never been finalised by a decree absolute. She seeks permission to adduce additional evidence to prove that. The respondent counters with an application on her own account to adduce further evidence in support of the finding made by the Judge. I shall return to this aspect in a moment.
28. Turning to section 3(2) of the Act, the Judge concluded that if the marriage had terminated by divorce on the date of the deceased's death, it was not likely in the circumstances that the court would order the transfer of any further capital over to the appellant had she applied for a lump sum order. The Judge concluded her judgment as follows:

"However, when one takes into account all the factors which I have gone through including the fact that by her delay the Applicant lulled the deceased into a false sense of security that their financial affairs had been settled once and for all, I have little hesitation in saying that in the present case the Applicant has failed to show that the deceased failed to make reasonable financial provision for her, applying the definition laid down in section 1(2)(a), ie such financial provision as it would be reasonable in all the circumstances of the case for a wife to receive whether or not the provision is required for her maintenance.' I should add that it seems to me that even if I am wrong about the law and the correct test to be applied in this case is that set out in section 1(2)(b) in the statute, then the case must also fail.

Accordingly, the application will be dismissed."

29. I can now turn to the appellant's grounds of appeal.
30. In the first place she submits through Mr Egleton that the Judge was in error in concluding that the appellant and the deceased had arranged their affairs conclusively following their separation, and that there was no evidence, alternatively no cogent evidence, of that having happened. That ground of appeal is connected with grounds 2, 3 and 4, all of which relate to the Judge's finding (to which I have already referred) that the applicant had misled the deceased into believing that he was divorced. It is submitted that there was no evidence before the Judge to support such a finding; that by making such a finding the Judge formed an adverse opinion of the appellant which tainted the Judge's other findings of fact; that additional evidence is available to prove that the deceased knew that the divorce had never been finalised by a decree absolute (being evidence which the appellant could not reasonably have anticipated would be relevant); and that the Judge erred in law in taking that finding into account under section 3(1)(g) of the Act.
31. In support of grounds 1 to 4, Mr Egleton submits that the Judge failed to consider the possibility that the appellant and the deceased may purposely have left the divorce unfinalised, and that the deceased may have said one thing to the appellant and another to the respondent. He points out that it was no part of the respondent's case that the appellant had misled the deceased about the Decree Absolute. He submits that the Judge's finding that the appellant misled the deceased in this respect influenced her decision and, effectively, vitiated it.
32. For my part, I have no hesitation in rejecting these submissions. In the first place, it was in my judgment fully open to the Judge on the evidence before her to conclude (as she did in the passage in her judgment which I read earlier) that at the time of the divorce proceedings the appellant accepted legal advice to let sleeping dogs lie, and that in financial terms the partedies "simply went their own ways neither seeking to make any claims on the other".
33. Nor can I accept that those findings are to any extent vitiated by the possibility (and I emphasise (possibility) that the Judge's finding as to the appellant having misled the deceased about the divorce might (if further evidence were to be adduced) turn out to be incorrect. Had that been the critical finding in the case, the position might have been different, but the finding must be set in context.
34. In the first place, the Judge made a very unfavourable assessment of the reliability of the appellant's evidence. Thus, at page 2 of the transcript of the judgment, she described the appellant, in giving her evidence, as having been on occasions "muddled" and "disingenuous". The Judge rejected the appellant's evidence that she had made a loan of the £15,000 which she had received from the development company to the deceased. As to the appellant's evidence that she had received a further sum from the development company in 1975, the Judge plainly had doubts whether any such further payment was in fact made. In relation to certain allegations of violent conduct made by the appellant against the deceased, the Judge concluded that these allegations had only been "mentioned by her in these proceedings in an attempt to blacken the deceased's name". The Judge rejected the appellant's reasons for not applying for ancillary relief in the divorce proceedings, the appellant having suggested in evidence that she was hoping that a reconciliation might subsequently take place between herself and the deceased, and that she harboured a lingering hope that he might return to her. As I say, the Judge rejected that evidence. The Judge also pointed out that whereas in her originating application the appellant had stated that at the time of the divorce proceedings she was not legally represented, in oral evidence she had accepted that she was then legally represented. The Judge also found the appellant's evidence as to her liabilities to be untruthful. In this connection, the Judge said:

"It seems to me that either the Applicant is in fact making repayments not only in respect of her own borrowing but also in respect of that of her son or she is not telling the truth to the court. When she was pressed on this subject she claims to have been confused, but in my judgment the confusion only started when it become clear during cross-examination she could not have been giving accurate figures to the court."

35. In other words, the Judge found her evidence on this aspect to be untruthful.
36. The Judge also identified a tendency on the appellant's part to be economical with the truth in an attempt to "blacken the name of the deceased". I read from page 25F-G of the judgment, where the Judge said this:

"In my judgment the Applicant's lack of initial frankness on this subject is yet another example of her tendency to be economical with the truth in an effort to blacken the name of the deceased."

37. In the second place, the Judge's finding that the appellant had misled the deceased about the divorce is not to be confused with or conflated with her finding that in financial terms the parties had agreed to go their separate ways in 1986. That is a different finding, which is not affected by what may or may not have happened subsequently with reference to the finalisation of the divorce. Moreover, it was a finding which was amply borne out by the evidence before the Judge, as the following extracts from the appellant's oral evidence demonstrate. Turning firstly to her evidence in chief, she was asked:

"Q. Did you ever make an application for financial relief? A. No.

Q. Is there any reason for that? A. No. We just kind of carried on as we were, really.

Q. When you say you just carried on as you were, in what way? A. Well, I was trying to make a living by having a livery yard and I didn't wish to make any -- have any help from him. The only thing that happened was that the lorry was still with me and, I mean, I saw him every day and he paid me £60 a week to rent the whole yard for his lorry and equipment."

38. Later in her examination in chief the appellant said on two occasions that she did not consider it to be fair to ask the deceased for money.
39. In cross-examination the appellant said this:

"Q. You told Her Honour this morning, fairly early on in your evidence, that basically after the divorce you basically just carried on. 'I was trying to make a living. I didn't want anything from him.' That is what you said? A. Yes, I didn't ask him for money.

Q. Putting it colloquially, you went your own separate ways? A. Yes.

Q. And you never made any attempt to claim financial provision through the divorce court? A. No.

Q. And equally, Mr Parish never made any claim for anything at Cadnam's Farm. He left you the home, the contents and and everything? A. Yes.

Q. And again, you made no application for support for your son or your daughter? A. No."

40. I conclude that there there is no substance in grounds 1 to 4 inclusive of the grounds of appeal.
41. Ground 5 of the grounds of appeal reads as follows:

"The Learned Judge failed to take into account the fact that on all material points where her evidence had been questioned she was in fact proved to be correct."

42. This proposition is, however, flatly inconsistent with the Judge's assessment of the reliability of the appellant's evidence: an assessment which in my judgment the Judge was fully entitled to make. Moreover, as I noted earlier, the Judge commented at various points in her judgment on the fact that she found the documentary evidence confusing. As I see it, the position which the Judge reached, and properly reached, was that she regarded the appellant's evidence as inherently unreliable and in the absence of some corroboration from another source she would not be disposed to accept it. However, where the documentary evidence, although confusing, provided that corroboration, the Judge was quite rightly prepared to accept that evidence. In my judgment, there can be no possible complaint about that approach by the Judge, which in my judgment was entirely right.
43. Mr Egleton, in the course of his oral submissions, referred to the appellant's evidence about bank interest payments. The position in relation to that seems to me to be equally simple. The appellant had failed to make a full disclosure of her liabilities, that being a relevant matter for the Judge to consider in the context of the appellant's financial resources. In the circumstances, it is hardly surprising if the Judge was critical of that fact and if that fact did not contribute to her assessment of the appellant as a thoroughly unreliable witness. Accordingly, I can for my part see no substance in ground 5 of the grounds of appeal.
44. Grounds 6, 7 and 8 of the grounds of appeal all relate to the weight to be attached to various specific matters of evidence, namely: first, the ability of the appellant to sell Cadnams Farm, given that her two children are continuing to live there with her; secondly, the appellant's undoubted ill health; and, thirdly, evidence of contributions made by the appellant to the deceased's haulage business prior to the separation.
45. However, it was in my judgment a matter for the Judge to decide what weight to attach to these various factors. I for myself can see no scope for any challenge to the weighing up process which the Judge undertook in this respect.
46. By ground 9 of the grounds of appeal the appellant contends that:

"The Learned Judge failed to take into account the fact that the deceased had not intended, by his Will, to let the haulage business come into the hands of the Defendant."

47. This, as Mr Egleton has made clear, is intended to refer to the specific legacy of the deceased's business assets to Mr Cousins, part of which legacy was apparently adeemed. Mr Egleton refers in this context to the fact that Miss Sharman may have been admitted as partner in the business on the date on which the Will was made. Mr Cousins had made a claim in respect of this legacy, seeking a determination as to the assets to which it related, but his claim was settled by a monetary payment. For my part, I am quite unable to see what relevance Mr Cousins' legacy or the subsequent transaction agreed with Miss Sharman has to the appellant's claim under the Act.
48. Ground 10 of the grounds of appeal is in the following terms:

"The Learned Judge erred in law in finding that the rent paid for parking the deceased's lorry after the separation in 1986 was indirect child maintenance in that this was not the Defendant's case and had not been put to the Claimant."

49. In connection with this aspect of the case, the Judge said this in the course of her judgment (I read from page 13F-G):

"It would therefore seem that although the deceased did not pay any formal maintenance for the children the rental he was paying for his lorry was in excess of the market rate by about £35 per week, probably more in the earlier years after the separation, and that in that way he contributed indirectly to the living costs of the Applicant and the two children."

50. Later in her judgment, at page 36F-G of the transcript, the Judge said this:

"On the other hand, I accept that he was reasonable to take the view that he had discharged his obligations towards the Applicant by leaving her undisturbed in Cadnams Farm and by making no claim against her in respect of that. In addition, he continued to contribute indirectly to the living expenses of the Applicant and the children by making very generous weekly payments for the right to park his lorry at the farm."

51. In my judgment, these were conclusions which the Judge was fully entitled to reach on the basis of the evidence before her. In any event this was a peripheral matter which cannot be said to bear on the Judge's central conclusion that, as between the appellant and the deceased, they effectively went their separate ways and made a clean break in financial terms in 1986.
52. Ground 11 of the grounds of appeal relates to the proceeds of the life policies. It is said that the Judge failed to take into account the fact that substantial assets had been, as it is put, "unlocked" by the deceased's death. I can see no substance in this ground of appeal. The Judge conducted a full and careful review of the financial circumstances of both the appellant and the respondent, as she was required to do by the Act.
53. Lastly, as a catch-all, it is alleged in ground 12 of the grounds of appeal that the Judge's incorrect findings of fact resulted in the dismissal of the claim. However, I am unable to accept the premise that the Judge made any incorrect findings of fact, save possibly (and once again I emphasise "possibly") in relation to her finding that the appellant misled the deceased about the divorce. But, as I have already indicated, that finding was by no means a central or critical finding: it was one of of a number of findings adverse to the appellant, and it was one which it was open to the Judge to make on the evidence before her. It is in the nature of proceedings under the Act that one cannot always foresee all the detailed factual issues which may arise in the course of the hearing, particularly where oral evidence is adduced. I for my part can see no purpose whatsoever in allowing this issue to be relitigated afresh on new evidence, since, for the reasons I have already given, even if the appellant should succeed on that issue, that would not in my judgment serve to vitiate in any degree the decision which the Judge reached.
54. The Judge is very experienced in matters of family law. In my judgment she carried out an exceptionally careful review of all the facts and circumstances in the instant case and properly directed herself as to the law. In the circumstances, her decision not to exercise her jurisdiction under the Act in favour of the appellant cannot in my judgment be impugned. I would accordingly dismiss this appeal.
55. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: Where the applicant under the Inheritance Act is the widow of the deceased, the task that the Judge must perform is akin to the task that must be performed upon the determination of claims brought under the Matrimonial Causes Act 1973 following the dissolution of marriage. Once the Judge found, as on the evidence she was not only entitled but bound to find, that the applicant had accepted legal advice to let sleeping dogs lie, and that she and the deceased simply went their own ways, neither seeking to make any claims on the other, it became manifest that on the application of Matrimonial Causes Act principles, this was a hopeless claim.
56. It was plainly appropriate that the case should be listed in front of a circuit judge ticketted for Matrimonial Causes Act applications. The careful judgment delivered by Judge Bonvin demonstrates that she brought all her expertise to bear. Whilst I can understand the applicant's feelings of distress at some of the findings made against her by the trial judge, that, sadly, is one of the hazards of litigating.
57. For all the reasons that my Lord has very carefully explained, this is an appeal which in my estimation has very little substance and I agree it must be dismissed.
ORDER: Application for extension of time allowed. Appeal dismissed with costs to be borne by the Legal Aid Commission subject to application, the appellant's contribution being assessed as nil. The appellant to take such steps as are necessary to remove the caution registered against 35 Thorpe Gardens. (Order not part of approved judgment)