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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Rundle v Parole Board & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 1005 (15 June 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1005.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1005

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
APPLICATION FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Friday, 15th June 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE KENNEDY: This applicant, first, seeks judicial review of a decision of the Home Office to intervene, as he puts it, in deliberations of the Parole Board in relation to his release. Secondly, he seeks judicial review of what he describes as a decision of the Parole Board not to decide that question of release. Thirdly, he complains of the failure of the Parole Board, as he puts it, thereafter to decide the matter so far he is concerned. He wants the court to implement what he describes as the decision, as it would have been if the Home Office had not intervened. He also complains of delay in dealing with his affairs. He needs the permission of the court in order to proceed with his application for judicial review and he has so far not been able to obtain that permission. It is in those circumstances the matter now comes before me in this court.
2. Mr Rundle the applicant was sentenced to life imprisonment as a mandatory sentence on 4th July 1980, having been convicted of murder. He was released in February 1993 on life licence. In March 1994 he was recalled to prison, having failed, it appears, to comply with directions of the supervising probation officer. He has been in prison effectively since March 1994. In August 1997 he was on a scheme which involved him working in the community and he had, to some extent, on that occasion an involvement with the operation of a charity shop and was using some expertise which he had or purported to have in the valuation of antiques.
3. In January 1999 the prison authorities at the prison where he was at that time held indicated that the Parole Board would then be deciding relatively soon whether to recommend his re-release on licence. That decision was made, as is now apparent, on 19th February 1999 when the Parole Board did decide in his favour and passed their recommendation to the Secretary of State.
4. On 19th July, while the matter was still being considered by the Secretary of State, the applicant signed a condition imposed upon a temporary licence of a discretionary nature which was then about to be brought into effect. The condition read:

"You are not to seek employment in the antiques trade."

5. That was a condition which, under rule 9 of the Prison Rules, the prison service was entitled to impose when exercising discretionary powers in relation to temporary licences. It was, as it now appears, reasonable for the prison service to impose it in the circumstances which then existed because this applicant had previous convictions, not the conviction which resulted in his incarceration in July 1980 but previous convictions relating to handling stolen goods when working in the antiques trade; so it would be impossible for anyone to say that the condition imposed was unreasonable. No point at the time was taken by the applicant himself about agreeing to that condition. It was only to relate to a short period of one week during which he was to be on temporary licence.
6. Unfortunately, it appears that during that week, on the information now available to the court, he did not comply with that condition because he did, as he puts it, purport to assist a friend in the valuation of some drawings. Those drawings were sent to someone else whom he knew and then he wrote to that other person in order to seek to recover the drawings. Unfortunately, that letter went to someone else of the same name who complained to the police about receiving letters from someone in prison seeking to recover goods they did not have.
7. In those circumstances, on 6th August 1999 he was recalled and it was alleged by those responsible for him that he had breached the condition of his temporary licence. An investigation was made by the prison authorities involving 2 prison officers and a probation officer, and the applicant was given a chance to respond. He complains of the adequacy of the investigation. He complains that it was unreasonable to conclude that he had breached his licence. The prison authorities obviously had to report what had happened to the Secretary of State so that it could be taken into account when deciding whether or not to act on the recommendation of the Parole Board which was still before the Secretary of State. The Secretary of State did not accept the recommendation.
8. In November 1999 this applicant began proceedings for judicial review. It is worth noting that that was in fact more than four months after the imposition of the condition in relation to his temporary licence. As I have indicated, there was no basis upon which it could be said that the imposition of that condition was irrational. In the result, and in the light of the fresh information, in February 2000 the Parole Board reconsidered his case and did not recommend re-release into the community. On 15th February 2000 permission to move for judicial review was refused by Mr Justice Latham, as he then was, on paper.
9. The application was renewed and it was heard orally by Mr Justice Newman on 14th April 2000 when it was refused. At that time, as developed, the application appeared to take this form, first that the original condition was said to be illogical. Secondly, it was said on behalf of the applicant that he was only helping a friend. Thirdly, he complained of the delay in notifying him of the stance being taken by the Parole Board. He said he was doing valuable community service when he was at liberty to do so and no adverse view should be taken of what had apparently occurred.
10. When the application was brought before the Court of Appeal it was first considered on paper by Lord Justice Sedley on 12th December 2000 when he ordered that the matter be adjourned so as to get the assistance of the Secretary of State in relation to the imposition of the condition, the reason for which at that stage was not entirely clear.
11. On 27th February 2001 the Treasury Solicitor was able to report that the condition originally imposed, to which I have referred, would be removed from any temporary licence granted thereafter, and so as far as I am aware it is no longer effective.
12. The case then came before Lord Justice Schiemann on 12th April 2001. Lord Justice Schiemann took the view that it might be arguable, no further information at that stage having been obtained, that therefore, the condition itself was irrational and that there was no reason to conclude that the applicant had broken it, so he adjourned the matter so further assistance could be obtained.
13. That led to the preparation of a statement by Mr Truffet in response to the indication of the court that it would be of assistance to have some in-put from the respondent in relation to the condition and the circumstances in which it was said to have been breached. Mr Truffet is head of the Life Management Section at the prison service headquarters. His statement is dated 6th June 2001. It is from that statement, in part, that I have been able to draw the history which I have set out in the earlier part of this brief judgment.
14. In those circumstances it seems absolutely clear that there is no arguable ground at this stage, so far as the court can ascertain from any of the papers before it, to permit this applicant to proceed further in the direction of judicial review.
15. The matter first came before me on Friday of last week when there was placed before me also a brief report from a doctor in the prison service at Ford Prison where the applicant is at present held, indicating it might be inappropriate for him to attend at court. In those circumstances it was adjourned until today's date to enable the applicant, if so minded, to attend or to produce further evidence of his inability to attend. He wrote a letter which was dated 11th June indicating that he did not propose to attend, claiming that he was too ill to do so, too ill to travel, and that his affairs would be dealt with by Mr Glynn who is, as far as we can ascertain, not legally qualified and who is not here today though he has telephoned to seek a further adjournment of the matter.
16. Having carefully investigated the matter with the assistance not only of the statement of Mr Truffet but also having had the benefit of the outline submissions of Miss Ivimy, I am wholly satisfied there is no reason to grant the relief the applicant seeks, that is to say, permission to proceed with a substantive application for judicial review.
17. Accordingly, this application is now dismissed.
Order: Application dismissed