[Home] [Databases] [World Law] [Multidatabase Search] [Help] [Feedback]
	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Cameron v Royal School, Hampstead [2001] EWCA Civ 1109 (3 July 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1109.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1109

[New search] [Printable RTF version] [Help]

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE CHANCERY DIVISION
(Mr Justice Rimer)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday, 3rd July 2001

Tuesday, 3rd July 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE PETER GIBSON: Sheila Cameron by an Appellant's Notice on 12th April 2001 applied for permission to appeal from the order of Rimer J on 2nd April 2001. By that order the judge dismissed her application for an order staying the proceedings in her bankruptcy and restraining the advertisement of the bankruptcy order made against her by Mr Registrar Baister as long ago as 25th November 1999. Her application for permission to appeal has for some weeks been listed to come before me today. By a fax sent yesterday afternoon just before 4.00 p.m. she asked for an adjournment on the ground that she had outstanding applications which needed to be heard before the hearing of the application for permission to appeal. In particular she said that she needed to have heard her application dated 22nd November 1999 to set aside an order of 8th April 1999 taxing costs which she had been ordered to pay. She claims that she could have the bankruptcy annulled. But that matter has already been considered judicially in the course of the lengthy history of her grievances which she has taken to the courts. As I pointed out in my judgment on 8th February 2001 on another application by her for permission to appeal, she failed to follow the procedure provided by the rules for a review of the taxation of costs which she had been ordered to pay, she applied unsuccessfully to His Honour Judge Hallgarten QC for a stay, and her application which she now wants heard was adjourned by His Honour Judge Ryland on 17th March 2000 pending application by her for permission to appeal from another order for costs made against her by His Honour Judge Zucker QC on 14th May 1999. That application was refused by Brooke LJ on 3rd May 2000. She now, it seems, belatedly wants to revive her adjourned application. It cannot affect the bankruptcy order against her, as Ferris J held on 4th May 2000 and as I agreed in my judgment, for reasons which I fully explained in the judgment which I gave on 8th February 2001.
2. This application illustrates two characteristics of Miss Cameron's behaviour in the litigation which she brings. One is that she makes applications to the court and then, when they are about to be heard, she asks for an adjournment. The other is that she appears to be wholly unable to accept the finality of judicial decisions against her. There are other applications which she says she has made or is about to make. She says that she has applied to this court for permission to appeal from an order of Burton J on 11th May 2001, refusing her leave to move for judicial review of alleged maladministration by the Central London County Court. But I have no reason whatever to think that she is likely to have more success in this court than she did in the Administrative Court, particularly as she told Rimer J that all the points she was making in her judicial review application were points made unsuccessfully to Ferris J. She also says that she is in the process of applying, or perhaps has applied, to this court for permission to appeal out of time against Judge Hallgarten's order of 24th November 1999 and for permission to appeal against another order by Judge Ryland on 27th June 2001. I see no prospect whatever of a successful application in respect of the order made by Judge Hallgarten. I have no material on which to judge what are her prospects of appealing Judge Ryland's order. But, in any event, the proliferation of applications provides no basis for granting her an adjournment of today's hearing of her application for permission to appeal from Rimer J's order. Accordingly, I refuse that adjournment application.
3. I return to the application for permission to appeal. This was listed for 10 o'clock this morning. I was informed this morning that she was unable to attend today. She left my clerk with a message to that effect. She asked for it to be heard tomorrow. It was indicated to her that she had to make her application to me this afternoon or else she was in danger of having her application struck out.
4. The background to the decision of Rimer J was this. She had on 6th March 2001 applied in the High Court for a stay and restraint of advertisement of the bankruptcy order. That came before Mr Registrar Jaques on 27th March, when she asked for and obtained an adjournment, but, whilst she obtained that adjournment, she was not granted any interim stay or injunction. When she applied to Rimer J for a stay or injunction she gave no notice to the petitioning creditor but the Official Receiver was represented. She asked for a stay for a short period so that she could give notice to the petitioning creditor. The Official Receiver opposed the application. The judge refused to grant a stay.
5. In her Appellant's Notice and skeleton argument which has been put before me Miss Cameron repeats many of the matters which were put to me in February and which I rejected. She complains that Ferris J was wrong in his decision, even though I had refused permission to appeal from him. She says that Rimer J did not give proper consideration to the facts of the matter. I can see nothing to justify that accusation and it is quite impossible to say that the judge erred in any way in the exercise of his discretion. As the judge pointed out, her attitude appears to be that so long as she has some proceedings on foot directed at challenging the bankruptcy, she is entitled to hold up the operation of the bankruptcy indefinitely. The judge thought that quite wrong, and so do I. She says that she is seeking permission to appeal from this court to the House of Lords. She tells me that she has not heard the result of her application, although it was made in February. Again, I do not see that that application provides any basis for saying that the judge erred in any way in the exercise of his discretion when refusing her application.
6. In my judgment there is no real prospect of success on the proposed appeal and no other compelling reason has been shown why this appeal should be allowed to go ahead. I must therefore refuse this application.
7. However, I feel compelled to go further. Court time is valuable. The interests of other litigants must be taken into account when the court is exercising its powers. Miss Cameron's numerous applications appear to me to have reached the point of amounting to a serious abuse of the process of the court. It seems to me that the appropriate course for me to adopt is this. I shall refer the matter to the Attorney General so that consideration can be given to whether or not an order should be made against her under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981. In the meantime I shall make what is known as a Grepe v Loam order in relation to the current bankruptcy proceedings, which bear reference no. 8645 of 1999. The order that I make is in the following terms:

(1)that she be not allowed to make any further applications or to take any steps in this court or in any court below in or arising out of the bankruptcy proceedings without leave of a High Court judge of the Chancery Division first being obtained;

(2)that if she desires to apply for such leave, then such application must be made without notice in writing and will be dealt with by the judge on paper;

(3)that if any summons notice of application or any other form of document which is within the scope of this order is served on or given to any other person without the leave of this court having first been obtained, that person shall not be required to appear and the application will stand dismissed without being heard; and

(4)that the papers in this matter be sent to Her Majesty's Attorney General for consideration as to the institution of proceedings under section 42 of the Supreme Court Act 1981.

Order: Application dismissed.
8. (Order does not form part of approved judgment)