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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Islam v London Pension Fund Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 1178 (9 July 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1178.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1178

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
(Application of Appellant for permission to appeal.)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Monday 9th July 2001

Monday 9th July 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE HENRY: The applicant, Mr Islam, was employed by the Inner London Education Authority Youth Service Department and rather more than eleven years ago now he was the subject of disciplinary proceedings which commenced in 1989 and which finally recommended that he should be dismissed. He was in fact dismissed on the grounds of redundancy (nothing to do, as I understand it, with disciplinary proceedings) when his then employers, the Inner London Education Authority, were wound up and ceased to exist as a body on 31st March 1990.
2. He had great difficulty with his employers and with certain claims. He pursued against them a claim for holiday pay. It involved him writing eight to ten letters over a period of approximately six years, until finally they reacted and he was paid his entitlement.
3. Three years after that, in November 1999, he brought proceedings alleging unfair dismissal, unlawful indirect racial discrimination and complaining of conspiracy against him by two fellow employees. These proceedings were very stale indeed.
4. In relation to the unfair dismissal the Employment Rights Act 1996 says:

"Complaints to the Employment Tribunal

A complaint may be presented to an employment tribunal against an employer by any person that he was unfairly dismissed. Subject to subsection (3), the employment tribunal shall not consider a complaint until it is presented to the tribunal before the end of the period of three months beginning with the effective date of termination or within such further period as the tribunal considers reasonable practicable in a case where it is satisfied that it was not reasonably practicable for the complaint to be presented before the end of that period of three months."

5. In relation to his complaints as to racial discrimination, the limitation period there is to the same effect as the complaint in relation to unfair dismissal, that is under the provisions of section 68(1) and 68(6) of the Race Relations Act 1976.
6. As the Employment Appeal Tribunal pointed out to him, their jurisdiction is limited to correcting errors of law. The question as to whether it was reasonably practicable for Mr Islam to have presented his complaint of unfair dismissal in time is largely a question of fact for the tribunal: see Palmer v Southend Borough Council [1984] ICR 372 (a decision of this Court) and the tribunal has a wide discretion to determine whether or not it is just and equitable to extend time for a complaint of racial discrimination.
7. This was, as I say, a very stale claim indeed. In explanation of his delay, Mr Islam put forward a medical report from his general practitioner saying that he had been suffering from hypertension from 1989 up to a point in the mid-1990s and he had been under medical advice, so it was said, not to proceed with the legal proceedings. Secondly, his first child had been born in February 1990 and his wife had had difficulties after the birth. Thirdly, he was resisting possession proceedings in relation to his home over that period and trying to extract his holiday pay from his employers.
8. The Employment Appeal Tribunal took all that into account, directed themselves in law properly as to it, including that it had been practicable for Mr Islam to institute proceedings. All he had to do was to start the proceedings, to then come before the Tribunal and ask for an adjournment, when all of those matters could have been gone into. Instead no proceedings were started until ten years after the events in question, which is simply leaving it too late in matters of this kind. It is impossible to have a fair trial of these events after all that period. Accordingly, the Employment Appeal Tribunal found that it was practicable for him to have instituted proceedings. Even if it would not have been, in any event proceedings were not commenced within reasonable time. There was no reason why he could not have commenced proceedings in the intervening period. There is no error of law in the employment tribunal's approach. These matters are questions of fact and discretion for them and not for this Court. They acted well within the bounds of the broad discretion given to them in all the circumstances of the case. For those reasons, this application is without sound basis and must be dismissed.
ORDER: Application for PTA dismissed.