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England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions


You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Barnett v Department Of Social Security [2001] EWCA Civ 1191 (18 July 2001)
URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1191.html
Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1191

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Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 1191
B2/2001/0203

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CLERKENWELL COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Reynolds)

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London WC2
Wednesday 18th July, 2001

B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY
____________________

DAVID BARNETT
Claimant/Applicant
- v -
DEPARTMENT OF SOCIAL SECURITY
(BENEFIT SERVICES AGENCY)
Defendant/Respondent

____________________

(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2AG
Tel: 020 7421 4040
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

____________________

THE APPLICANT appeared on his own behalf
THE RESPONDENT did not appear and was not represented

____________________

HTML VERSION OF JUDGMENT
____________________

Crown Copyright ©

  1. LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY: Mr Barnett came before me on 14th June seeking permission for a second appeal against the Department of Social Security. The history of the case can be found in the judgment that I gave on that day when I adjourned his application.
  2. The upshot is this. There seems prima facie to me to be a question of principle which might have justified the grant of permission for a second appeal. That issue of principle was the failure of the District Judge who struck out the claim to make any record at all of his reasons for doing so. The real problem, however, seemed to be one that was eminently soluble. It was that the amounts which Mr Barnett was claiming against the DSS, essentially two income support payments from 1994 and a 1997 cold weather payment, might very well have been due to him and that the Department ought to think again about whether the right thing was not simply to pay these amounts to him.
  3. The judgment was transcribed and went to the Department who have responded, it seems to me intelligently, by issuing (though it appears not yet sending) a giro cheque for those full amounts totalling £134.50. They have also offered to pay the sum of £35 towards Mr Barnett's expenses.
  4. In the light of their offer they have asked for this adjourned application to be further adjourned. I declined to do this, but told them that they need not attend. Today I have heard Mr Barnett who does not want to let go of the application for permission to appeal. Essentially he says two things. One is that his associated claim for damages for misfeasance in public office deserves to remain in being, at least as a bargaining counter. The other is that the £35 offered in relation to his expenditure is completely inadequate, even at the modest rate of £9.60 an hour which is allowed to litigants in person for preparation. He reckons that something like 100 hours should be the multiplier.
  5. There are two other things I need to mention. One is that the offer does not include interest. The other is that it does not mention the £50 which the District Judge ordered Mr Barnett to pay as costs upon the striking out of his claim. So far as the latter is concerned, however, it seems evident to me that since nothing is said in the Department's open offer about deducting this sum from what they are proposing to pay Mr Barnett, they are prepared not to enforce the costs order, and what I now say is based upon that assumption.
  6. It seems to me that whatever issues of principle may be discernible in relation to the processing of a claim such as this, it is a claim for money, and if the money or the essential part of it is forthcoming, there is no reason any longer for letting the case go forward on appeal simply because there remains a theoretical issue of principle underlying it. In my judgment the Department's offer, on the assumption that I have made about it, is a sufficient satisfaction of everything that Mr Barnett could hope to achieve if he were to succeed in an appeal to make it inappropriate to grant him permission to appeal.
  7. What I propose therefore to do at this stage is to refuse permission to appeal, for the reasons that I have given. I am, however, going to give Mr Barnett liberty to apply to me - and I shall reserve the matter to myself – if for any reason the offer does not materialise in the sums and in the way that I have inferred that it is going to materialise; i.e. in the form of a payment of £134.50, together with £35 towards his expenses and with a waiver of the £50 costs order below. If, however, that is the upshot, then in my judgment it is a sufficient satisfaction of all Mr Barnett's legitimate claims in this case, to put a term to it. Upon that basis there will be no ground for further entertaining the possibility of an appeal.
  8. ORDER: Application for permission to appeal refused.
    (Order not part of approved judgment)


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URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1191.html