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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Barnes v Woolwich Plc & Ors [2001] EWCA Civ 1470 (18 September 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1470.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1470

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM CHANCERY DIVISION
(Application to reinstate the applications
dismissed by Jonathan Parker LJ)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday 18th September 2001

Tuesday 18th September 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: There are before me a number of applications made by Mr Peter Michael Barnes all having as their object a stay of the execution of a possession order obtained by Woolwich Plc in relation to property known as Hill Top, Henham in Essex. These applications follow, in time, applications which I heard this morning and on which I delivered a full judgment. The background facts in relation to the proceedings between Mr Barnes and Woolwich will be found in that judgment. It is unnecessary to repeat them.
2. Mr Barnes tells me that the possession order and the warrant for possession are due to be executed tomorrow. It is in those circumstances that these applications came before me for hearing at 5.15 pm. It is now 6.40 pm. It is time to rule upon them.
3. The first application of substance is for a stay of the possession order pending the hearing of an application to reinstate two applications for permission to appeal to this Court, which were heard and dismissed by Jonathan Parker LJ on 5th July 2001. The applications for permission to appeal were, respectively, an order made by Blackburne J on 8th June 2000 and an order made Hart J on 23rd June 2000. Both those orders were made in bankruptcy proceedings. The bankruptcy order had been made on 27th July 1998 on the petition of Uttlesford District Council.
4. The matter before Blackburne J was a further attempt to obtain relief which had been sought from Mr Registrar Baister, first on 22nd March 2000, and then at a rehearing on 18th April 2000. Blackburne J treated the applications before him as free-standing applications and dismissed them. Despite that, Mr Barnes appealed from Mr Registrar Baister's orders. That appeal was heard by Hart J on 23rd June 2000. He dismissed the appeal.
5. The nature of the applications appears from the judgments which Hart J gave on 23rd June 2000. I say 'judgments' because the first matter before him was an application by Mr Barnes for an adjournment; it was the second judgment which set out the substantial matters which Hart J had to decide.
6. The application to reinstate is made on two grounds: first, that Jonathan Parker LJ heard the matter in Mr Barnes' absence; and, second, that it is said that he did not have before him a full transcript of the judgment below. Jonathan Parker LJ explained in his judgment that he could see no basis whatever for adjourning the applications. He said that he was satisfied that Mr Barnes could have attended at court to make the applications in person if he had desired to do so. He went on to say that he could see no basis upon which either of the applications could be reinstated before the Court.
7. That is an unpromising start for an application that there should be a stay while an application to reinstate is made. Having read the judgments of Hart J and the judgment of Jonathan Parker LJ, I can see no basis upon which an application to reinstate the applications for permission to appeal which Jonathan Parker LJ refused should be acceded to. In those circumstances, the sensible and convenient course is to treat the application to reinstate as before me and to deal with it.
8. Mr Barnes has said a great deal about the circumstances in which he seeks reinstatement; and there is no reason to think that any material would be forthcoming which has not already been put in front of me --
9. THE APPLICANT: My Lord, I must protest, I have --
10. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: Mr Barnes, sit down.
11. In those circumstances, I propose to dismiss the application to reinstate. Accordingly, I dismiss the application for a stay, in so far as it is based upon that application to reinstate.
12. I should go on to say that, in any event, I am wholly unpersuaded that anything in the judgments of Blackburne J or Hart J would have any bearing on the question of whether or not the warrant for possession that has been issued should now be executed.
13. The second application is described by Mr Barnes as an application under Ord 114A of the rules of the Supreme Court. The probability is that he is referring to what is now SC 114.4 in the Schedules to the Civil Procedure Rules. The rule provides:

"Proceedings in which an order is made shall, unless otherwise ordered, be stayed until the European Court has given a preliminary ruling on the question referred to it."

14. It is plain from that recitation that the rule is concerned with the procedure to be adopted in the domestic courts in circumstances in which a reference, with a request for a preliminary ruling, has been made to the Court of Justice of the European Communities.
15. The point which Mr Barnes wishes to have referred to the Court of Justice, as he has explained it to me, arises out of an order made by Laws J (as he then was) in 1997, that being the order which led to the making of the order for costs against Mr Barnes which founds --
16. THE APPLICANT: My Lord, it was --
17. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: -- the bankruptcy petition.
18. THE APPLICANT: My Lord, it was not that judge, it was a different judge.
19. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: Mr Barnes, I would appreciate it if you would be quiet. Laws J had before him, as Mr Barnes has explained to me, an application by way of case stated to challenge a decision made in the magistrates' court. There was a dispute whether the case stated accurately reflected what had happened and the contentions which Mr Barnes wished to advance. As Mr Barnes told me, he wished to have referred to some tribunal the question whether a man is presumed innocent until proved guilty.
20. That, as a question, is one which does not seem to me to be suitable for a reference to the Court of Justice of the European Communities for at least two reasons. The first is that I cannot conceive of any judge or court finding it necessary to have the view of the European Court on that question in order to reach a decision on any matter before them, because the domestic law on the point is settled; and, secondly, because no Article in the Treaty of Rome has been identified which would suggest that the European Court would have any interest in ruling upon the matter.
21. The problem appears to stem from what Mr Barnes tells me was a remark by Laws J which may be paraphrased as "Let him go to Europe". If Laws J made that remark - and, of course, I am in no position to decide whether he did or not - it seems to me overwhelmingly likely that what he had in mind was the practice in 1997 of taking a complaint as to the alleged violation of human rights to the European Court of Human Rights at Strasbourg; a matter with which RSC 114 has nothing to do.
22. In those circumstances it seems to me, first, that there is no pending reference to the European Court; and, secondly, that it is most unlikely that there would be any pending reference to the European Court in relation to the matters which Mr Barnes has sought to explain to me. RSC 114 has no application because there is no current reference and it is inconceivable, in my view, that it ever could have an application. There is no basis upon that ground to stay the execution of the possession order. For those reasons, I dismiss the applications in so far as they are based on those matters.
23. Mr Barnes has a fall-back position. He asks for a 24-hour stay of eviction to give him the opportunity to take his possessions out of the house. The position is that this possession order has been operative since, at least, the judgment of His Honour Judge O'Brien on 2nd February 2001. There has been no basis since then which could have led Mr Barnes to think that the possession would be stayed. But rather than make arrangements for alternative accommodation in an orderly way, what appears to have happened - and the details are set out in my earlier judgment - is that Mr Barnes has made repeated applications to the courts, all of which have failed. His attempts to stave off the inevitable have not been successful. To adopt that course was his choice. It has led to the position in which he now finds himself. I can see no basis upon which this Court should now stay the execution of this warrant for possession any further, and I do not do so.
24. Mr Barnes asks for a transcript at public expense. A transcript can be made available on application to the shorthand writers on the ordinary terms. I can see no reason in this case why public funds should be expended in providing it.
25. THE APPLICANT: I'd ask for leave to appeal to the House of Lords, my Lords. This is obviously -- I mean, words fail me. I ask for leave to appeal to the House of Lords, my Lord.
26. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: Your application is refused.
27. THE APPLICANT: I have no doubt.
28. Under the Human Rights, I will lodge a judicial review, because that is absurd. Just because a registrar has committed a criminal offence in this case I am being punished. It is a fact and I can prove it. And the court is trying to thwart me.
29. How can any person say that you cannot take -- how am I supposed to -- I have been waiting all day for the Court of Appeal to give a decision on this, and now you are saying the bailiff comes in tomorrow and nicks all the items, no doubt hoping that it nicks all the evidence.
30. LORD JUSTICE CHADWICK: What arrangements you make with the bailiff is entirely a matter for you. I am not staying the order for possession.
ORDER: Applications dismissed.