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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Momoniat v Lancashire Ambulance Service NHS Trust [2001] EWCA Civ 1778 (7 November 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1778.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1778

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
AN EXTENSION OF TIME AND A STAY OF EXECUTION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Wednesday, 7th November 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: This is an application for permission to appeal an order of His Honour Judge Gee, sitting in the Preston County Court, on 28th June 2001. He then dismissed an appeal from a decision of Deputy District Judge Featherston dated 30th October 2000. The deputy district judge had dismissed the applicant's claim for damages against his employers and awarded them their costs.
2. The background is that in August 1999 the applicant issued proceedings against the Lancashire Ambulance Service NHS Trust, his employers, in which he set out in detail a claim for damages based on his assertion that his employers had so treated him or so allowed his fellow employees to treat him that he had suffered from stress which had caused significant health problems for him. The employers filed a defence in which they admitted the applicant's employment, asserted that the applicant had not been treated in any different way from any other employee and denied that any stress or other psychiatric complaint from which he suffered could have been caused by any action or inaction on their part.
3. It was decided at a directions hearing on 1st November 1999 that a single consultant should be jointly instructed to consider the situation and to provide a report. The psychiatrist was Dr Halstead. The applicant tells me that he was a psychiatrist identified by his employers. Dr Halstead examined the applicant on 16th December 1999 and reported on 14th January 2000. The applicant asserts that the information that was provided for Dr Halstead was inadequate and incomplete. It follows, he submits, that the conclusion which Dr Halstead came to was an incomplete conclusion.
4. The conclusion that Dr Halstead came to was clear and unequivocal. It was that such psychiatric problems as the applicant has were and are in no way related to any action or inaction on the part of his employers. He considered the applicant either had a paranoid personality disorder or a delusion disorder and that there was no prospect of being able to establish that either of those conditions could have been caused by his employment.
5. In those circumstances, not surprisingly, the employers sought to have the claim dismissed. As I have related, Deputy District Judge Featherston acceded to that application and His Honour Judge Gee upheld the decision on appeal. The important point to note is that although the report of Dr Halstead has now been in existence since January 2000 and despite the fact that the applicant has been made aware of the fact that he is perfectly entitled to obtain further psychiatric evidence if he considers it appropriate, no further material has been put before the court to suggest that the expert opinion of Dr Halstead is in any way either deficient or open to doubt.
6. I therefore have to consider today, this being a second appeal, whether or not this application raises any issue of principle, either of law or of practice, or whether there is any other compelling reason for giving permission to appeal. It seems to me that, in the light of the material before both Deputy District Judge Featherston and His Honour Judge Gee, the conclusions to which they came were inevitable. The position might have been different if the applicant had been able to put before the court any material to suggest that there was or could be reason to doubt the views of Dr Halstead. No expert evidence was before the court which could suggest that Dr Halstead's view was one which could, in any way, be challenged. In those circumstances the action brought by this applicant was doomed to failure, and the only sensible course that could be taken in order to reduce the costs which Mr Momoniat, at the end of the day, would have to face was to dismiss the claim at that stage. It seems to me that was a proper and proportionate response to the material before both the deputy district judge and the circuit judge. There is no issue of principle that arises and nor is there any other compelling reason for granting permission to appeal. For those reasons, Mr Momoniat, I am afraid I must refuse your application.
Order: Application refused