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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Archer v Employment Tribunal & Ors [2001] EWCA Civ 1965 (30 November 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/1965.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 1965

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
APPLICATION FOR PERMISSION TO APPEAL
THE DECISION TO REFUSE PERMISSION TO
APPLY FOR JUDICIAL REVIEW, A STAY OF
EXECUTION EXTENSION OF TIME)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Friday, 30th November 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE PILL: This is an application for permission to appeal against the refusal by Mr Justice Maurice Kay on 19th July 2001 to grant permission to apply for judicial review. Mrs Archer seeks a stay of execution on an order of the Employment Tribunal dated 26th/27th February 2001, and a further decision of the Employment Tribunal dated 14th May 2001. She also seeks to quash an order of the Mayor's and City County Court dated 27th June 2001, an Administrative Court order dated 12th July 2001 and a Supreme Court Costs Office order dated 20th July 2001.

2. Mrs Archer is a barrister. In November 1997 she claims to have been employed as an in-house lawyer by the London Cab Drivers' Club Ltd. She submits that initially that was a part-time employment. On 1st December 1999 it became full time employment. It was terminated on 19th May 2000 following a dispute. It appears that the club do not agree that they were the employers under a contract of service. Mrs Archer has told the court at some length about what happened in the course of her work for the club. She was paid the sum of £2,000 a year described as a retainer.
3. THE APPLICANT: That was amended to £2,400, £200 a month.
4. LORD JUSTICE PILL: I accept that; £2,400 a year which was described as a retainer. There was also an arrangement that when she appeared for members of the club in court and a successful costs order was obtained in favour of the relevant member then that part of it relating to legal fees would be paid to her. The question of drafting bills of costs arose. Eventually a costs draftsman was employed. Mrs Archer believes she was not paid the sum due to her under that arrangement. She now claims that a sum of over £100,000 is due to her.
5. A complaint was made by her to the Employment Tribunal. She complains that she has never had a fair hearing before a tribunal. Mrs Archer has prepared a bundle of documents which includes the rulings of employment tribunals amongst other things. Mr Justice Maurice Kay described her application for judicial review as utterly hopeless. Mrs Archer did not appear on 19th July. The Employment Tribunal, the proposed respondents, did not appear either. The only party represented were the London Cab Drivers' Club Ltd. They appeared by Mr Hayman, erroneously described on the cover sheet of the transcript of the hearing as being instructed by the Treasury Solicitor. The judge was correct when he said at paragraph 2 of his judgment that Mr Hayman appeared on behalf of the first interested party, namely London Cab Drivers' Club Ltd. I accept, first, that Mr Hayman did not appear for the Employment Tribunal and, second, that there is no question of him being instructed by the Treasury Solicitor. The judge put it correctly in his judgment.
6. Mrs Archer plainly feels aggrieved by the absence of a fair hearing. Orders had been made against her by the Employment Tribunal. These have been followed by applications for costs and, those not having been met, bankruptcy proceedings have been commenced against her. She has submitted the claim of over £100,000 in response to the attempts to make her bankrupt. Mrs Archer tells me, and I am quite ready to understand it, that it is her reputation as a barrister, albeit not in independent legal practice, she seeks to protect. She submits that she has been unfairly treated in the Employment Tribunal and subsequent proceedings. She did not appear before Mr Justice Maurice Kay on 19th July.
7. I see no power at all in this court to grant a stay of execution upon orders of the Employment Tribunal. The decision on 27th February (page 18 of the bundle) was that the originating application be struck out. A review was sought and the second decision upon which a stay is claimed is that of 14th May promulgated on 17th May 2001 in which the Employment Tribunal, by its chairman, refused application for a review of the earlier decision.
8. Mrs Archer has not attempted to appeal either of those decisions to the Employment Appeal Tribunal, the remedy provided by the statute. I am quite unable to see that this court is able to intervene. The avenue by which those orders can be challenged which the law provides is by way of an appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal.
9. The order of the Mayor's and City of London Court is at page 35 of the bundle. That transferred an application of the court's own initiative to the Supreme Court Costs Office. I see no power whatever in the High Court acting in its judicial review capacity to quash that order. The second is the Administrative Court order dated 12th July (page 32 of the bundle). That was an order in which the London Cab Drivers' Club Ltd were given permission to appear and make representations at the hearing of the applicant's application for permission to seek judicial review. They took advantage of that order and appeared on 19th July. I can see no basis upon which that order of the Administrative Court can be quashed or reversed. Moreover if, as Mr Justice Maurice Kay found, the application for judicial review was utterly hopeless then the fact that an interested party was permitted to make representations upon it makes no difference to the outcome of Mrs Archer's application.
10. Point 5 is the Supreme Court Costs Office order dated 20th July 2001 (page 46 of the bundle). I can see no basis upon which, by way of judicial review, the costs allowed by that order can be challenged by way of judicial review in this court. That is not an avenue of appeal which is open upon an order of the Supreme Court Costs Office. Whatever avenue of appeal there is from that decision, it does not involve and cannot involve invoking the present jurisdiction.
11. Mrs Archer plainly feels aggrieved about her treatment, first, by the club and then in the Employment Tribunal. I make no findings or even comments upon the merits of the decision in the Employment Tribunal. It is sufficient for present purposes to reach the conclusions I have. It would be wrong of me to attempt any assessment of the merits of her conduct in relation to the club and their conduct towards her and the proceedings before the Employment Tribunal. Mrs Archer has told the court of her difficulties and of the way she says she has been exploited over the years and attempted to remedy that by a workmanlike arrangement with the club. Unfortunately, that has broken down. Whether or not she has a civil claim against them is not a matter upon which I need to make, or should make, any comment.
12. I am in full agreement with Mr Justice Maurice Kay that her application for judicial review is a hopeless application. It has no prospect of success. Accordingly, the application to this court is refused.
Order: Application refused