A2/01/2339/2340/2344
Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 2002
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE    
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE 
(MR JUSTICE CURTIS, MR JUSTICE GRIGSON)

							Royal Courts of Justice
							Strand
							London WC2A 2LL

							Friday 14 December 2001

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE MANTELL

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1.  RAISA FRADKINA
2.  YEFIM FRADKINA
3.  VLADLEN KARPENKO
Claimants/Appellants

- v -

LONDON BOROUGH OF BARNET & ORS
Defendants/Respondents

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(Computer Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited, 190 Fleet Street,
London EC4A 2AG
Tel: 020 7421 4040  Fax: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)

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MISS FRADKINA appeared in person.

MISS S BROOKS was present as a noting barrister.
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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE MANTELL: There are three applications before the court. Those three applications have been consolidated. The first is in relation to a claim brought by Raisa Fradkina on her own behalf and on behalf of her son Vladlen Karpenko against the London Borough of Barnet and Ors. The second claim, also against the London Borough of Barnet and Ors, is by Mrs Fradkina alone. There is a third claim by Yefim Fradkin, who is Raisa Fradkina's father against the University College Hospital Trust. 
2.	The first claim against the London Borough of Barnet is in relation to what is said to be the failure of the council to provide housing of an adequate standard and in relation to the care order which has been made with regard to Vladlen Karpenko, who is now in foster care. The second claim, also against the London Borough of Barnet Social Services department, is in respect of various alleged breaches of the appellant's human rights arising out of a search of their premises and the arrest of Vladlen and the mother. The third claim is by Yefim, the father, who received treatment at Univesity College Hospital which he said was carried out negligently with the result that he has suffered injury. It is convenient to begin with the last of those three claims. 
3.	There was an application which came before Grigson J for judgment in default. The judge ruled that there was no proof of service of the notice. Accordingly he dismissed the application. Mrs Fradkina, on behalf of her father, submits that the judge was wrong to take the view that there had been no notice because she says she is now able to produce evidence to show that a notice had been served. However, there would be no purpose at all in granting permission to appeal because the matter would only be returned before a judge, not necessarily Grigson J, for a renewed application for judgment in default. That is the most that Mrs Fradkina could hope for if successful in her appeal. 
4.	Accordingly, I refuse permission to appeal but make it plain to Mrs Fradkina that that is not the end of the road. The action continues against the hospital and no difficulty ought to arise in Mrs Fradkina taking the next step. 
5.	I turn to the second claim. That was an application arising out of what was said to be an abuse of Mrs Fradkina; and her family's human rights when the house in which they were living was searched and she and her son were, as she claims, arrested. That matter also came before Grigson J. On this occasion Grigson J refused to accede to an application that the claim be tried because the stage had not been reached in the proceedings where that would be appropriate. It seems that the necessary allocation questionnaire form had not been completed, which is necessary before the matter can even be allocated to a track. Mrs Fradkina says that she did not complete the questionnaire because she had not been provided with one. I can understand perfectly well that that would be a difficulty. But there is no reason now why she should not complete the questionnaire and continue the action from that point onwards. Accordingly, in refusing permission to appeal in relation to that claim, as I do, I am not putting an end to her action. How it progresses from here will be a matter entirely for her. 
6.	I turn, finally, to the first of her three applications, which is a claim against the London Borough of Barnet for failing to provide an adequate standard of housing and also a complaint with regard to her son having been taken into care, or made the subject of a care order. 
7.	It seems, so far as housing is concerned, that Mrs Fradkina, who has, in most unfortunate circumstances, been driven from her homeland in Russia, thinks that it is the responsibility of the council not only to provide adequate housing but to provide the means by which she may buy a house for herself. In that I think she will always be disappointed. It is of course the duty of the housing authority to look to her housing needs. It appears from a reading of the judgment of Curtis J, before whom this matter came on in October, that that has been done. The hearing before Curtis J was in itself an appeal from the Master. Accordingly this is what is called a second tier appeal. I can see no particular reason which would justify a further appeal and on that ground alone, so far as the housing claim is concerned, I would refuse permission. 
8.	As is apparent from the judgment of Curtis J, a copy of which Mrs Fradkina now has and can read at her leisure, it would seem to me that there is absolutely no merit in the proposed appeal. 
9.	The second limb of her application with regard to the hearing before Curtis J relates to the taking into care of her son. She has a number of complaints to make about the way in which it was done. The main objection to her having permission to appeal at this stage is, as the judge found, that she has in fact already exhausted her remedies with regard to that matter. I see from the chronology that she has sought permission to appeal and it has been refused with regard to the making of the care order. 
10.	It is perhaps worth mentioning that she also complains about the lack of contact with her son. There has been no contact since the early summer of last year. That is extremely unfortunate, but, it is entirely Mrs Fradkina's own fault that that has come about. She has been offered contact on a regular basis; she has been offered the taxi fare to the station and the costs of rail tickets. She seems to think that she is entitled to have a taxi to take her the whole way there and back. That is entirely unreasonable. In so far as that complaint forms any part of her application for permission to appeal, it is entirely without merit. 
11.	Accordingly, I refuse that application for permission to appeal also. 
12.	Before leaving this matter, I should record what passed at an earlier stage in the hearing. I enquired of Mrs Fradkina whether or not she thought it would be helpful to seek advice from the Alternative Dispute Body which operates in this building. I invited observation from Miss Brookes of counsel, who has very kindly attended this afternoon in order to assist me in understandding the issues given that Mrs Fradkina is not fluent in English and lacks any interpreter. The matter was discussed and Mrs Fradkina indicated that she would be prepared to seek such help if her present applications could be adjourned. 
13.	I was persuaded that it was not right to adjourn the applications given the history of this matter, and also the expense which has already been incurred on behalf of the council. I do hope that Mrs Fradkina will, nevertheless, take the opportunity of seeking the advice from qualified people working in this building as to how she might sensibly proceed after this. In so suggesting, I am not encouraging her in any way to add to the very large number of proceedings for which she has been responsible up to now. 
Order: Applications refused. Transcript of judgment to be provided at public expense.