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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Spiro, R (on the application of) v Immigration Appellate Authority [2001] EWCA Civ 2094 (21 December 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/2094.html Cite as: [2002] Imm AR 356, [2001] EWCA Civ 2094

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(ADMINISTRATIVE COURT)
(MR JUSTICE STANLEY BURNTON)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Friday 21 December 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: I will ask Lord Justice Laws to give the first judgment.
2. LORD JUSTICE LAWS: This is a renewed application for permission to appeal against the decision of Stanley Burnton J, made on 20 August 2001, when he refused permission to seek a judicial review of the refusal of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal on 27 February 2001 to grant permission to appeal against the earlier decision of the special adjudicator who in his turn had dismissed the applicant's appeal against the decision of the Secretary of State to refuse asylum.
3. The application is unusual. On 6 November 2001 I granted permission to appeal upon certain points relating to the Special Adjudicator's treatment of certain evidence and the alleged failure by the tribunal to consider fresh evidence which was put forward. However, I refused permission to appeal on what has been described by the applicant's counsel, I think at an earlier stage, as a preliminary issue. It is in relation to this issue that Mr Hawkin now pursues a renewed application.
4. The point may be shortly stated. Permission to seek judicial review in this case had first been refused on the papers by Collins J on 15 June 2001. The applicant was of course entitled to renew his application for permission in court. He did so and that application came before Stanley Burnton J. It was submitted to him, with the assistance of a separate skeleton argument headed "Preliminary Issue", that because Collins J was President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal, he should have had no role in deciding whether permission should be granted to alter by judicial review the decision of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal: his doing so gave rise to an apparent bias in favour of the Immigration Appeal tribunal.
5. With great respect to Mr Hawkin, whose skeleton argument put forward for our benefit is careful and scholarly, I regard the application as entirely misconceived. I cannot see how it can profit the applicant himself. He has permission to appeal on his substantive point. Thus, he is in as good a position as if Collins J gave judicial review permission on the first occasion. So much Mr Hawkin acknowledges, but he would wish to pursue the appeal on a public interest basis. Sometimes that is appropriate.
6. I see no reason to suppose that it is appropriate here. After the refusal by Collins J, as I have said, the applicant enjoyed a right of further application to Stanley Burnton J. That right was exercised. There is no suggestion, nor could there be, of any apparent bias on Stanley Burnton J's part. The decision of Collins J was totally subsumed by the later decision on reapplication that was made by Stanley Burnton J.
7. The point sought to be taken therefore is nothing short of arid and, as it seems to me, entirely moot. So far as it is suggested that the point is, in law, a real one and one of general importance, it seems to me that the starting point is to recognise that Collins J is a judge of the High Court. He is for the time being President of the Immigration Appeal Tribunal. Obviously he took no part whatever in the decision of that tribunal here sought to be impugned. To suggest that any reasonable person might apprehend bias on his part if he later adjudicates in his role as a judge of the High Court upon the decision of the IAT, seems to me to be simply unreal. Every decision of the IAT is taken independently by those members then sitting. In relation to any such decision, Collins J is, and to any informed person would seem to be, wholly and entirely independent. I do not think it could be suggested, for example, that the Vice President of the Queen's Bench Division or the Lord Chief Justice would be infected by apparent bias because he presides over an appeal against something done by a High Court judge of the Queen's Bench Division.
8. I consider that if this application were acceded to it would be to validate nothing short of a culture of neurotic suspicion in respect of the judicial system. Nothing could be more injurious to the public interest.
9. I would refuse permission.
10. LORD JUSTICE THORPE: I agree.
Order: Application refused.