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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Miles & Anor, R (on the application of) v Kent Police Authority & Anor [2001] EWCA Civ 236 (13 February 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/236.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 236

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE C/2000/3542/A
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(Mr Justice Jackson)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Tuesday 13th February, 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: There are before me three applications and one appeal. First, an application of November 2000 for permission to appeal an order dated 17th November 2000 made by Jackson J. Second, an application to stay an order of Sir Murray Stuart-Smith made on 20th December 2000. Thirdly, an appeal lodged on 2nd February 2001 against a direction of Master Venne contained in a letter signed by him dated 19th January 2001. Fourthly, an application for a stay of the hearing until certain matters had been determined.
2. The applicants are Mr and Mrs Miles. I will deal with the appeal and the applications in due course. But first I would wish to summarise the background facts, most of which were set out by Jackson J in his judgment.
3. I believe it right to go back earlier than he did, back to the birth of this dispute. The events which lead to it started back in 1984. In that year Mrs Miles instructed solicitors to advise her on the administration of a trust that had arisen out of her late father's will. The only asset of any substance was a house with a sitting tenant. She and her husband desired to occupy the house, and to enable that to happen the tenant was rehoused. Mrs Miles, her husband and children went into occupation in April 1984.
4. It seems the house was in serious need of repair. That of course was the responsibility of the trustees. One of the original trustees had died and the other had retired from being a solicitor. To enable the trust to be administered appropriately, new trustees were appointed. There were discussions as to how the trust was to be administered which resulted in disagreement between the trustees and Mr and Mrs Miles. The then trustees decided that they did not wish to continue to act. With that end in view, Mr and Mrs Miles approached Mr Busby, who was at that stage----
5. MRS MILES: Is it proper for me to intervene, my Lord, because that is not the fact. They are not giving accurate facts. We did not approach Mr Busby.
6. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: Who approached Mr Busby?
7. MRS MILES: I did. I was to be appointed as trustee. You said "Mr and Mrs Miles approached Mr Busby".
8. LORD JUSTICE ALDOUS: If you would like to sit down.
9. Mrs Miles approached Mrs Busby, who was the accountant to a company then owned by Mr Miles. He provisionally agreed to become a trustee, but indicated that he would need legal help. With that end in view, he introduced Mrs Miles to Mr Pengelly of the firm of solicitors of Pengelly & Rylands. After discussions, Mr Busby and Mr Pengelly were appointed as the trustees.
10. What followed in 1986 is at the root of these proceedings. In December 1986 Mr and Mrs Miles entered into a contract to purchase the house. Completion took place in January 1987. According to the applicants, the arrangement was that the purchase price would be used in part for paying school fees and in part to settle a bill, with the surplus (if any) being invested. The house was purchased as agreed, but the rest of the arrangement did not proceed to the satisfaction of Mr and Mrs Miles. In January 1989 a writ was served on Pengelly & Rylands claiming damages as a result of the advice that they had given. The suit was defended.
11. In 1991 Mr and Mrs Miles were advised that the action, which alleged deceit, negligence and fraud, could not succeed. They obtained a second opinion from leading counsel. He advised that he could see no evidence to support their claim. The result was that legal aid was withdrawn and the case collapsed.
12. Mr and Mrs Miles complained to the Bar Council about what they thought was inadequate professional services. Their complaint was dismissed. They complained to the Legal Services Ombudsman. Their complaint was not upheld. They complained to the Law Society. Their complaint was dismissed. They also complained about Mr Busby to the Institute of Chartered Accountants. Their complaint was dismissed.
13. In 1994 Mr and Mrs Miles made a complaint to Kent police against Mr Pengelly and Mr Busby. The police looked into their complaint and concluded that there was no grounds for prosecution. That did not satisfy Mr and Mrs Miles. They contacted Kent police again in November 1988. They asserted that they had new evidence.
14. I can move now to 1st February 1999. Detective Superintendent Grieve and Detective Inspector Croucher visited the applicants. They listened to what they had said, and after a lengthy discussion they were told that further statements would be taken for reference to the Crown Prosecution Service.
15. On 10th February Detective Constable Knell visited them and it was agreed that Mr and Mrs Miles would produce the statements on their word processor. That was done. They produced their section 9 statements and it was arranged that Detective Constable Fairhurst would visit on 18th February to witness and collect them. That was carried out.
16. On 8th March 1999 Detective Superintendent Grieve telephoned and said that it had been decided not to send the section 9 statements to the Crown Prosecution Service, and that instead Detective Inspector Croucher would provide the Crown Prosecution Service with information.
17. On 28th February, following enquiries, the Deputy Chief Constable wrote to them stating that if it was the view of the Crown Prosecution Service that investigation into the allegations was warranted, then the force would allocate appropriate resources.
18. On 7th May 1999 Mr and Mrs Miles faxed Detective Inspector Croucher, complaining that the report that he had signed and given to the Crown Prosecution Service was a false account of the facts.
19. On 11th May 1999 Detective Superintendent Grieve replied saying that he had ordered Detective Inspector Croucher not to reply to the fax because he considered it contained a number of outrageous and ill-founded statements.
20. On 24th May the applicants wrote to the Chief Constable of Kent, drawing attention to what they called a false police report made and signed by Detective Inspector Croucher, which had been sent to the Crown Prosecution Service in mid-March. Mrs Miles said that she found it unpalatable to be in the position of having to make a complaint against a police officer whom she did not believe to be personally dishonest.
21. On 9th June 1999 Mr Ayling, the Deputy Chief Constable, wrote to them stating that the allegations against the policemen concerned, that they had attempted to pervert the course of justice, had been recorded and he had appointed a senior policeman to look into it.
22. On 22nd June 1999 Mr Ayling wrote to the applicants stating that the policeman had not been suspended and that the matter had been referred for further investigation.
23. On 24th June 1999 Superintendent Rogers and Detective Chief Inspector Ross visited the applicants and took notes of what was said. On 21st July 1990 Caroline Mitchell of the Police Complaints Authority wrote explaining what was going on. On 29th September 1999 the Police Complaints Authority wrote to the applicants stating about the allegation that Detective Inspector Croucher had sent a report with intent to pervert the course of justice. She informed them that the available evidence was not sufficient to support the allegation or to justify disciplinary action. She concluded that the complaint was therefore unproven. On 5th October Mr Ayling told them that the Police Complaints Authority's decision that the complaint could not be upheld had caused him to conclude there was no evidence of a criminal offence.
24. That was not the end of the matter. Mr and Mrs Miles then made complaints against Mr Ayling, in that his conduct had been dishonest and unfair, when obtaining and acting upon the Police Complaints Authority's decision. They also made complaint to HM Inspectorate of Constabulary against Mr Phillips for having delegated their requests for investigation.
25. On 21st February 2000 the Kent Police Authority informed the applicants that they had decided to dismiss their complaints against Mr Powis, the clerk to the Kent Police Authority, and to instruct Mr Powis to request the Police Complaints Authority for dispensation from further considering and investigating other complaints by her. Later that month, in letters communicated in February and May, the Police Complaints Authority decided not to investigate the complaints of Mr and Mrs Miles against Mr Peter Moorhouse and the authority members, and to grant the appropriate dispensation.
26. That is a very short summary of matters which have proceeded over the period 1984 to 2000. I come then to the recent history.
27. On 12th May 2000 Mr and Mrs Miles commenced the present proceedings against the Kent Police Authority and the Police Complaints Authority. They sought judicial review of (1) a decision of Kent police to request dispensation from further considering the complaints made by them; (2) a decision of 16th March 2000 by Kent police not to refer their complaints; (3) a decision of 25th February 2000, made by the Police Complaints Authority to grant Kent police's request for dispensation; (4) refusal by the complaints authority, communicated on 22nd February, not to investigate the complaints of Mr and Mrs Miles; (5) the decision of the Police Complaints Authority of 10th May to grant dispensation.
28. The matter was considered first on paper, and the judge who considered it decided that there was not sufficient substance for permission to be granted. It was reconsidered by Scott Baker J, who ordered an oral hearing. In the end it came before Jackson J.
29. In his full and careful judgment he set out the relevant regulations of the Police (Anonymous, Repetitious etc. Complaints) Regulations 1985. The submission made was that their complaints were not repetitious. He said this:

"In my judgment, the complaints made against the Chief Constable and the Deputy Chief Constable are in substance repetitious of the complaints previously made against DI Croucher. This can be seen by comparing document 9 in the bundle, which sets out the complaints against DI Croucher, with the later correspondence containing complaints against Mr Ayling and Mr Phillips. Although the language used is different, the same grievances are being aired. I would add that the complaints against the Chief Constable and the Deputy Chief Constable are couched in extravagant language, and so far as I can discern from the documents, they are without any foundation.

22. The Kent Police Authority had every justification for seeking a dispensation under the 1985 Regulations from considering these complaints. The Police Complaints Authority had every justification under those regulations for granting the dispensation sought. The 1985 Regulations serve a valuable purpose. They do not exist to protect police officers against legitimate complaints. They exist to prevent valuable police resources being squandered on endless reinvestigation of the same matters.

23. Mrs Miles has developed a separate argument based upon the differences in the procedure for investigating complaints against police officers under Part IX of the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and under Part IV of the Police Act 1996. She contends that those who investigated the complaints against DI Croucher had the wrong statutory provisions in mind. Mr Chapman disputes that the various investigators had the wrong statute in mind. He further points out that, for present purposes, the procedure under the two statutes is the same. I accept Mr Chapman's submissions."

30. The judge went on to consider the other decisions under attack. He said this:

"24. I deal first with Mr Powis. The Kent Police Authority decided, with every justification, that the complaints against Mr Powis were unjustified. Accordingly, the Kent Police Authority took no action on those complaints.

25. Finally, there is the refusal of Mrs Meacher to investigate Mr and Mrs Miles' complaints against current and former members of the Authority. In my judgment, Mrs Meacher was quite right in this approach.

26. It is, of course, the function of this court to look critically at the actions of public bodies when the legality or rationality of their conduct is challenged. I have done so in this case. Essentially repetitive complaints have been advanced against an ever widening circle of public servants. I can see no justification for those complaints. There are no arguable grounds for attacking any of the decisions of the respondents in respect of which the applicants seek judicial review."

31. Against that background I turn to the grounds sought to be raised on this appeal.
32. The applicants' complaints arise in large measure from a distrust - which is quite clear from the papers that were put in front of me - in the capacity of officials, whether administrative, executive or judicial, to deal with the applicants' concerns properly and in accordance with the law.
33. I come to the specific complaints. First, with regard to the applicants' argument that the Police Complaints Authority did not have the power to deal with complaints referred to them by the Kent Police Authority in the way they have. This argument is, I believe, unfounded. Firstly, as Jackson J pointed out in his judgment, the relevant procedures were the same under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 and the Police Act 1986. The differences which do exist are not engaged in this case. Secondly, upon this particular matter, Mrs Miles seeks to avoid that conclusion of the judge by suggesting that the complaints were that the actions of the policeman had amounted to a criminal act, namely that he had attempted to pervert the course of justice. There is not one shred of evidence to support that allegation. If and insofar as he has not got the facts right, that could not stand as a basis for a prosecution against him for attempting to pervert the course of justice.
34. Second, on the evidence before the court, the claim that Mr Ayling and Mr Phillips knowingly misled the applicants as to the statutory powers of the Police Complaints Authority or the Kent Police Authority cannot be sustained. In any case, these proceedings were for judicial review. Thus, the court was only concerned with whether the decision was wrong in law or Wednesbury unreasonable. Clearly neither are capable of being established in this case.
35. Third, the applicants seek to argue that the employment by the Police Complaints Authority of section 3(1) of the Schedule to the 1985 Rules in respect of the Kent Police Authority's referral of the complaints against Mr Phillips and Mr Ayling, and of the complaints against Peter Moorhouse and other authority members, was unjustified. In order for the investigation of a claim to be dispensed with on the ground of it being repetitious, the criteria identified in section 3(1)(a)-(d) of the Schedule of the 1985 Regulations needs to be satisfied.
36. In view of the nature of the complaints and in light of the relevant pieces of correspondence contained in the larger ring binder submitted for my consideration, it is my view that it was lawful for the Police Complaints Authority to decide as they did.
37. In my view, the attack made upon the judge's judgment before me today amounts to niggling complaints. His judgment was clear and cannot be faulted. For those reasons I have come to the conclusion that there is no real prospect of any appeal succeeding, and therefore the application for permission to appeal the order of Jackson J must fail.
38. I turn to the other applications and the appeal before me. They must also fail. If the application for permission to appeal the order of Jackson J has no merit, then the others must fall away; as success on one or all of them could not result in worthwhile relief if the appeal against the judgment of Jackson J is not permitted. However, I will deal with them in turn.
39. The normal procedure carried out when a person seeks permission to appeal is for the papers to put before a single Lord Justice who sets out in writing the conclusion that he has reached upon the material before him. In general that procedure is not followed with a litigant in person, as it is better for the litigant in person to be able to present their arguments orally with the help of the judge. In any case if a person is dissatisfied with the result, the person who seeks to appeal can obtain an oral hearing at which he can seek to persuade the court that the view reached was wrong. In some cases for administrative purposes it is better that there is an oral hearing without a decision on the papers first.
40. Thus, Mr and Mrs Miles have no right to have any application considered on papers. Their right is to have an oral hearing, and they have exercised that right and they have come before this court to advance the submissions that they wish to make. Mrs Miles has produced cogent and clear submissions and she has addressed this court with considerable courtesy. She is quite clearly an intelligent person who is capable of putting her views down on paper, no doubt with the aid of her husband. Therefore, the matters that she wishes to advance have been considered.
41. In the present case the papers were placed before Sir Murray Stuart-Smith. In essence he concluded that the applicants' case had no merit. When stating his views he referred to the application as a renewed application, which it was not. That was spotted by Mr and Mrs Miles. They sought an order seeking to stay the order of Sir Murray Stuart-Smith. That matter was considered by the Civil Appeals Office. Master Venne, in his letter of 19th January, explained the position and stated that he had put the matter in the list to be heard today.
42. At that stage the papers then came before me. The applicants sought a stay of the hearing pending a decision on the papers. I took the view that all the concerns of the applicants should be considered at a single oral hearing. If the basic application for permission needed to be stayed pending a further consideration, then such an order could be made. If, however, the basic application for permission contained no merit, then the proper administration of justice would best be achieved by one oral hearing in front of one Lord Justice.
43. In any case, the decision of Master Venne was clearly right. These proceedings were such that an oral hearing would in my view have been inevitable. Having read the papers it is clear that Mr and Mrs Miles persistently challenged decisions that are made. Thus to put in place the two-step procedure of, first, a decision on the papers followed by, second, an oral hearing would have been a waste of judicial time.
44. As to the wording of the conclusion of Sir Murray Stuart-Smith; it is a clear conclusion. The slip that occurred was irrelevant to the decision. In my view, as I pointed out, his conclusion was correct. In any case, the applicants had a right to put their point of view, and Mrs Miles wished that it should be considered as an original application before me and I have considered it on that basis.
45. In my view, this is a case where there is no real prospect of any appeal succeeding. In those circumstances, the application should be refused.
46. I only add this. To give the applicants permission to appeal, with the result that there would be an appeal, would be against their interests. An appeal would result in the Kent Police Authority and the Police Complaints Authority being represented on the appeal. I have no doubt that the appeal would fail, with the result that they would be ordered to pay the costs. That would be a substantial burden upon them which could not be in their interest.
47. I therefore refuse the applications and dismiss the appeal.
ORDER: Applications refused; appeal dismissed; application for permission to appeal to the House of Lords refused. (Order not part of approved judgment)