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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Ahmed v Habib Bank Ltd [2001] EWCA Civ 40 (15 January 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/40.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 40

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(MR JUSTICE CARNWATH)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2 Monday, 15th January 2001

Monday, 15th January 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: This is an application for permission to appeal a judgment of Carnworth J which he gave on 12th October of last year. By the order that the judge made on that occasion he dismissed the applicant's application to set aside the registration of a judgment given in Karachi in favour of a bank ordering him to pay approximately £5.6m plus a markup from 7th September 1995 and costs.
2. There are three grounds upon which the applicant seeks permission to appeal. The first ground is that the order which was registered does not meet the requirements of the Judgment (Reciprocal Enforcement) Act 1933, and the Order made thereunder in relation to Pakistan Judgments. The short point is whether or not the order of the court which was registered can properly be described as a judgment of a High Court for the purposes of both the Act and the order.
3. The applicants have put before this court, as they did before Carnworth J, decisions in Pakistan suggesting that in Pakistan the order may well be considered to be an order not of the "High Court" but of the High Court exercising a particular jurisdiction as a banking court, and therefore not falling within the appropriate order and therefore the Act. There seems to me sufficient in the argument to justify the conclusion that there is a realistic, as opposed to a fanciful, chance of success and that justifies the granting of permission to appeal.
4. The second ground of appeal is that the judgment in Pakistan was obtained by fraud within the meaning of the 1933 Act, and accordingly should not be enforced in this court; that depended upon conclusions of fact which the judge concluded against the applicant. However, there are matters which are set out in the papers before us which suggests that a court could come to a contrary conclusion and that again the chances of success would justify the granting of permission to appeal. I do not think it is appropriate for me to say any more about that aspect of the matter today.
5. Finally, the applicant seeks permission to appeal on the ground that it would be contrary to public policy for this court to seek to enforce the judgment. The basis upon which that ground is put forward is that by reason of the situation in Pakistan the applicant was deprived of the opportunity of appealing in circumstances which should attract this court to the argument that that would be unjust in all the circumstances. Having been given an indication by this court that the applicant would have permission to appeal on the other two grounds, Mr Salter has realistically accepted that the third ground is one which does not fall into the same category as the other two; it is not one which, in my judgment, is arguable. Accordingly, no permission is granted in relation to that ground.
6. However, for the reasons that I have given I am of the view that permission should be given on the other two grounds.
7. The consequence of the granting of permission is that the applicant seeks a stay of execution. I consider that it would be appropriate for a stay to be granted on the usual terms that the appeal is pursued with due expedition.
8. We have been informed by Mr Salter, having considered the matter, that it will be necessary to reconstitute the bundles before the court because they do not include all the material which he considers to be appropriate, the bundles having been put before the court without his having had the opportunity to consider them in the first instance. Another term of the stay is that the appellant's bundle be put in proper order before this court within 28 days.
(Application granted; no order for costs).