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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Stevens, R (on the application of) Lewes District Council [2001] EWCA Civ 542 (4 April 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/542.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 542

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(Mr Justice Latham)

		The Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2A Wednesday 4 April 2001

Wednesday 4 April 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE SIMON BROWN: Mrs Stevens is a very unhappy lady. Her grievances are many and various. The papers presently before the court raise a whole series of complaints against a whole host of bodies of one sort or another. She complains of attempts to poison her, of torture, atrocity, assault, threats; even of breaches of the Genocide Convention. These and other complaints are variously directed, amongst others, at the police, at the Official Solicitor; but, perhaps more particularly, at the local authority and the Local Government Ombudsman.
2. However, I have to remind myself that the specific application before me is to reinstate a renewed application for permission to apply for judicial review to challenge the decision of the Local Government Ombudsman back in 1998, a decision rejecting Mrs Stevens' complaint of maladministration in relation to failures on the part of the Lewes District Council, as the local planning and enforcement authority, to control or prevent the extensive emission of pollutants from two commercial enterprises plying their respectively trades immediately to the rear of Mrs Stevens' house at 12 Nutley Avenue, Saltdean in Brighton.
3. I refer to it as the applicant's house, but in fact it appears to be an asset in the estate of her deceased husband, Mr Bright, and one of her many problems is that the Official Solicitor, as the administrator of that estate, appears intent upon selling it and paying any proceeds to the beneficiary of Mr Bright's will; that is to say, the present Mrs Bright.
4. Putting all that aside, however, the two commercial premises are, respectively, a launderette and dry cleaner at No 38 Longridge Avenue, and a car body repair and paint spraying garage at No 34 Longridge Avenue. Over many years now Mrs Stevens has complained bitterly about the fumes and noise emitted from these premises; the fumes in particular, she says, have caused extensive ill health to her and to her adult sons who live there with her.
5. The application to apply for judicial review came before Keene J (now Keene LJ) on the documents on 23 June 1999. He refused permission, in part on the ground of extensive delay, in part on the basis that the Ombudsman's decision was one which was open to him on the facts, so that there was no arguable basis on the merits for a substantive challenge to the decision. Next Mrs Stevens appeared at an oral hearing before Latham J (now Latham LJ) on 6 August 1999. He too refused permission, concluding his judgment thus:

"The right course for Mrs Steven to take is for her to obtain legal advice as to precisely how best to obtain an injunction, if the evidence justifies it, against those people said by her to be the polluters. Therefore, the remedy lies in her hands. There is nothing I can see in the papers to suggest that judicial review of any decision by the local authority or local Government Ombudsman would be an appropriate form of relief for her."

6. Mrs Stevens' renewed application was listed initially before this court on 14 January 2000 before Morritt LJ (now the Vice-Chancellor), May J (now May LJ) and Wall J. Mrs Stevens did not attend on that occasion. She says that she had the previous day been struck low with 'flu. Whatever the position as to that, the court dealt with the matter in her absence and Morritt LJ concluded that:

". . . having considered the papers in advance of the hearing, I see no ground on which permission should be granted. I entirely agree with the judgments and reasons given by Keene J on paper, and by Latham J after the hearing in open court."

7. The other two members of the court agreed with that conclusion.
8. Nothing daunted, Mrs Stevens has returned to court today and sought briefly (and, if I may say so, with considerable restraint and courteousness) to persuade me to a different view. Let me make plain that I have watched the whole of a home-made video which she has produced. I need not, I think, describe its contents. It starts with a picture of a black and white cat which Mrs Stevens says died because of the polluting fumes from her commercial neighbours; then shows a sore on her wrist which resulted, she says, from being handcuffed (that was in connection with a matter I need not go into when she was briefly restrained under the Mental Health Act legislation in December 2000); but, more particularly, it appears to show billowing clouds of what could well be pollutants from various vents behind the property.
9. As, however, I have sought to explain to her, it cannot avail her to demonstrate such problems to this court. This court can only accede to her application if she can demonstrate that, on the material she placed before the Ombudsman back in 1998, the Ombudsman had no alternative but to accede to her complaint of maladministration on the council's part. I have no doubt myself that Latham J (as he then was) was right in saying that her best way forward (assuming that she does indeed still propose to concentrate her efforts on seeking to alter the conduct of the commercial premises behind her property, rather than devote herself to moving as she is sensibly intent on doing) would be, perhaps with the help of a legal advice centre, to instigate nuisance proceedings against her neighbours, assuming always that she can find evidence that could persuade a court that she ought not to be required to live next to such activities.
10. Whatever she choose to do as to that, however, is for her and not for this court. I am bound, as I have I endeavoured to explain, to refuse this present application. No challenge here in my judgment could possibly succeed.
11. This renewed application accordingly fails.
ORDER: Application refused