NO:  A1/2001/0496

Neutral Citation Number: [2001] EWCA Civ 608
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM EMPLOYMENT APPEAL TRIBUNAL
(MR JUSTICE LINDSAY)
                                  Royal Courts of Justice  
                                  Strand  
                                  London WC2
 
                             Thursday, 26th April 2001
B e f o r e :

LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY

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MR KARL HUMPHREYS

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PERSIMMON HOMES (WALES) LTD

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Computer Aided Transcript of the Stenograph Notes of
Smith Bernal Reporting Limited
180 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2HD
Telephone No: 0171‑421 4040 Fax No: 0171‑831 8838
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
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No attendance.
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J U D G M E N T 
Thursday, 26th April 2001
1.	LORD JUSTICE MUMMERY: This is an application for permission to appeal. The application is made by Mr Karl Humphreys. He is not represented. He has sent a letter to the Court dated 4th April in which he explains that he does not intend to travel from South Wales to London today to make his application in person, as he cannot afford the £96 train fare which he would be have to pay. He has been unemployed for nearly two years following the dismissal from his employment which has given rise to the proceedings.
2.	Mr Humphreys has explained in detail in letters to the Court of 4th and 12th April 2001 the grounds on which he is seeking permission to appeal. I therefore propose to deal with these his applications on the papers.
3.	The background to the proceedings is that Mr Humphreys was employed as a general operative stores person by the proposed respondent to this appeal, Persimmon Homes (Wales) Limited. The period of his employment began in June 1998 and was terminated with effect from 26th April 1999 under the terms of a letter of 19th April which says:
“Dear Mr Humphreys, I am writing to confirm that your employment with this Company will be terminated on Monday 26th April 1999.
All wages due, tax forms and holiday credit statement will be forwarded to you as soon as possible after that date.” 
4.	The letter was signed by Mr P Thomas, Wages Supervisor, and was typed on Persimmon Homes letterhead.
5.	Mr Humphreys has been unemployed since that date. There is a letter supplied by him showing that Jobseekers Allowance has been claimed by him from 26th April 1999. The circumstances of the termination of his employment led Mr Humphreys to begin proceedings against Persimmon Homes claiming unfair dismissal. The application form is undated and unsigned, but that fact has not prevented the Employment Tribunal and the Employment Appeal Tribunal from dealing with the jurisdictional points raised by the case.
6.	The Employment Tribunal made a preliminary ruling on 19th May 2000 dismissing the claim. The order made by the chairman of that tribunal, sitting alone, was that the application be struck out. The reasons for that, which were sent to the parties on 22nd of May 2000, were these:
“The applicant complains of unfair dismissal. He was employed from June 1998 to April 1999. By Section 108 of the Employment Rights Act 1996 an employee does not qualify to complain of unfair dismissal unless he has one full year's service. The applicant has only 10 months' service. I therefore strike out these proceedings.” 
7.	Mr Humphreys then sought to appeal to the Employment Appeal Tribunal. His notice of appeal was received by that tribunal on 29th September 2000. That was 88 days out of time. Appeals to the Appeal Tribunal need to be lodged within 42 days.
8.	On 2nd November 2000 the registrar of the Employment Appeal Tribunal made an order on Mr Humphreys' application for an extension of time for entering the notice of appeal. The registrar stated that she had considered that no exceptional reason had been shown why an appeal should not have been presented within the time limits required by the Employment Appeal Tribunal Rules 1993 paragraph 3(2) and ordered that the extension of time be refused.
9.	Mr Humphreys then appealed to the President of the Employment Appeal Tribunal, Lindsay J. Mr Humphreys did not attend the hearing and was not represented. Lindsay J dismissed the appeal against the registrar's decision on the ground that there were no exceptional circumstances justifying the grant of an extension and that on the ground that the appeal was in any event hopeless, Mr Humphreys only having served ten months. Lindsay J said this:
“... there is really no practical prospect of success in his appeal. His complaint truly is not against the Employment Tribunal or even the Employment Appeal Tribunal, but against the legislation, and that, as I say, we can do nothing about. I am entitled in the unusual circumstances to take a view of the merits that they are truly hopeless and for that reason they, too, militate against any grant of an extension of time to Mr Humphreys.” 
10.	He reiterated at the end of his judgment that Mr Humphreys' claim was really about requiring a minimum qualifying period which Mr Humphreys was unable to satisfy.
11.	On 19th February Mr Humphreys lodged a notice of appeal in this Court. In his notice of appeal and in his correspondence with the Civil Appeals Office, Mr Humphreys has made a number of points. He makes a complaint of bias on the part of the tribunal and a lack of attention to detail. He contends that the health and safety requirements exception for the qualified period is applicable to his case. He makes a general complaint that he was disadvantaged in his case in the tribunal by the fact that he was acting in person. He also takes the point that he was sacked by the Wages Supervisor at a time when he, Mr Humphreys, was off sick and that the real reason for his dismissal was that they did not wish to pay him statutory sick pay. He therefore challenges the right to dismiss him. He says that he should have been given formal warning rather than being dismissed in that there was no just cause for dismissal. He also repeats a claim that he has in fact satisfied the qualifying period.
12.	I have considered those points. In my view, none of them amounts to a valid legal point. Appeals to this Court from the Appeal Tribunal are limited to questions of law and it has to be shown that there is a real prospect of success. In my judgment, the Appeal Tribunal was entitled to refuse the extension of time on the ground that this appeal was hopeless. The law laid down by the legislation for the present qualifying period applicable to Mr Humphreys' case is that he should have served in the relevant employment for a minimum of one year. His relevant period of service was less than one year. This means that he is not entitled to bring the claim for unfair dismissal which he has sought to bring in the Employment Tribunal. The Employment Tribunal were entitled to strike it out on that ground and the Employment Appeal Tribunal were entitled to refuse to extend the time for appeal both on the ground that the appeal was hopeless and on the ground that no exceptional cause had been shown for granting an extension in relation to an appeal so long out of time.
13.	For all those reasons this appeal has no real prospect of success. I refuse the application for permission.
(Application for permission refused)