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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Pedley, R (on the application of) v Birmingham County Court [2001] EWCA Civ 670 (26 April 2001) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2001/670.html Cite as: [2001] EWCA Civ 670

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(ADMINISTRATIVE COURT)
(MR JUSTICE MITCHELL)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL Thursday 26 April 2001

1. LORD JUSTICE KEENE: This is a renewed application by Mr Pedley for permission to appeal against a decision of Mitchell J, made on 20 March 2000, an extension of time and permission to appeal having been refused on the documents by Sedley LJ. Mr Pedley does not appear this afternoon, nor is he represented. It is appropriate that I say a brief word about the circumstances relating thereto.
2. This matter was listed for hearing at 10.30 this morning at which stage, as Mr Pedley did not appear, I adjourned the matter until 2 pm. Telephone calls between the Civil Appeals office and Mr Pedley had revealed that he was not proposing to attend because he said that he was too ill to do so. I made it clear this morning that, if he wished an adjournment on the grounds of ill health, he should fax a doctor's certificate to the Civil Appeals office in the course of the morning. No such certificate has been received by the office during that time, but a letter from Mr Pedley has been faxed. In that letter he asks that the matter be adjourned because he says he cannot walk as a result of his operation. He also says that his doctor is not available for seven days and therefore he is not in a position to produce any doctor's certificate. I find the last of those two matters unpersuasive because, even when a person's regular general practitioner is not available, there is normally a locum who will be available to produce certificates of the kind required in this case.
3. I have had the advantage of looking at the court file relating to this matter. There is on file a letter from the Castle Practice dated 22 February 2001, which refers to the applicant having been admitted to hospital on 19 October 2000 having sustained a right parietal lobe stroke leading to expressive dysphasia and a left hemiparesis (paralysis). The letter states that the applicant is making a steady recovery but is currently unfit to travel or attend any court proceedings at this stage. It is not able to say when he will be fit to do so. That letter is signed on behalf of Dr Chitnis.
4. It appears from that letter that the applicant may well be suffering from medical problems but they appear to be of an enduring nature without any indication that in the reasonably foreseeable future he is going to be fit to attend this hearing.
5. This is a matter where the refusal of permission to appeal, as made on the documents by Sedley LJ, took place as long ago as 31 October 2000. As I shall indicate, there have been continual problems of delay on the part of the applicant at all stages in this matter. In those circumstances it appears to me to be contrary to the interests of justice that this matter should be delayed yet further. I have read the papers, I have seen the arguments which have been put forward in writing by the applicant in support of his application and, in my judgment, I am in a position to deal with this matter appropriately on the documents before me.
6. One of the points made by Sedley LJ was that the application for permission to appeal was substantially out of time, having been filed only on 1 August 2000 when the decision of Mitchell J was dated 20 March 2000. Consequently, the application for permission to appeal was almost four months out of time. I have sought to discern from the papers whether there is any reasonable explanation for the delay. I can find no such explanation despite the fact that that point was expressly made by Sedley LJ in his refusal.
7. In considering whether or not to grant the extension of time sought, it is relevant to bear in mind that this is not the only relevant element of delay on Mr Pedley's part in this case. The case is one of judicial review where the applicant is seeking to review decisions of various county court judges. Those decisions were dated 13 February 1998, 22 June 1998, 4 January 1999 and 8 November 1999. Form 86A seeking permission to apply for judicial review was only lodged with the Crown Office, as it was then called, on 30 November 1999 so that the proceedings themselves were well outside the normal three months time limit applicable under RSC Order 54 rule 4 for all but the last of the decisions sought to be challenged.
8. The delay in seeking permission to appeal Mitchell J's decision is to be seen in that context and is the less excusable for that reason. In all the circumstances, I agree with Sedley LJ that there is no adequate reason shown for the degree of delay in seeking permission to appeal. Nonetheless, like him, I have considered the merits of the proposed appeal.
9. The decisions which it is sought to challenge all arise out of claims made by a firm of solicitors, Southalls, for payment for work done for the applicant. On 13 February 1998 District Judge Hamilton carried out, in effect, a taxation of the solicitor's bill of costs arriving at a conclusion with which Mr Pedley was not happy. The matter came before His Honour Judge Perrett on a review on 22 June 1998. He dismissed Mr Pedley's application. On 4 January 1999 His Honour Judge Hamilton gave judgment on an application by Mr Pedley to set aside Judge Perrett's decision on the ground that it had been procured by fraud and on certain other grounds. Judge Hamilton declined to do so.
10. Mitchell J went through the merits of the case in some detail. He considered various newspaper cuttings about the activities of the firm of solicitors but, in particular, he looked at the reality of the situation. By that I mean that he noted that Mr Pedley had paid a certain amount to that firm but was not prepared to pay the balance which he challenged. The firm had in fact closed down and, according to Mr Pedley, no-one was trying to obtain the balance of the money from him. In addition, Mitchell J observed that Mr Pedley had not sought to appeal the various county court judgments.
11. In his documentation the appellant seeks to raise the issue of fraud on the part of the solicitors. This is an allegation which is supported only by a number of newspaper cuttings but, having made the allegation, reference is then made to certain statements by Lord Denning in the past that fraud unravels everything. It is on that basis that Mr Pedley seeks to suggest that the decision by Mitchell J could be upset on appeal.
12. I quite appreciate that the applicant feels aggrieved by the events of this case. Nonetheless, in my judgment it is clear that this is a hopeless appeal. Quite apart from the delay to which I have referred, judicial review is not an appropriate process by which to seek to challenge decisions in the county court. In addition I cannot see that any of the judges in the county court acted in breach of natural justice, or otherwise ultra vires, so as to render their decisions susceptible to being quashed by way of judicial review.
13. Judges in cases such as this have to manage their courts so as to avoid the unnecessary consumption of court time and resources. That appears to have been the basis upon which Mr Pedley was on occasions cut short in the arguments which he was presenting. So far as the argument about fraud is concerned, any allegations of fraud have to be supported by clear evidence. Allegations by themselves fall far short of establishing any such basis for challenging a decision. As Sedley LJ indicated in his reasons for refusing on the documents, "assertion is not proof". Consequently, even on the merits, there is no reasonable prospect of success on this appeal and it follows that in those circumstances this renewed application must be dismissed and the extension of time refused.