A2/2002/1532 
Neutral Citation Number: [2002] EWCA Civ 1603
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION) 
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
(HIS HONOUR JUDGE GEDDES QC
(sitting as a deputy High Court judge))
Royal Courts of Justice 
Strand 
London, WC2 

Friday, 25th October 2002
 B E F O R E:

LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE 
 
SIR DENIS HENRY 
 
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(1) COMPENSATION SPECIALISTS LIMITED
(2) NIGEL CORRY
(3) BOB WRIGHT
(4) GE0RGE CHAPMAN 
Claimants/Respondents
-v-
 
COMPENSATION CLAIMS SERVICES LIMITED 
Defendant/Applicant 
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(Computer-Aided Transcript of the Palantype Notes of
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MR J MARTIN QC (instructed by Messrs Batt Broadbent, Salisbury SP1 3TZ) appeared on behalf of the Applicant
THE RESPONDENTS did not appear and were not represented 
 
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J U D G M E N T
1.	LORD JUSTICE LONGMORE:  This is a renewed application for permission to appeal after refusal by (as it happens) myself.  The outline of the matter is that the individual claimants acted before 1st April 2000 as franchisees, referring claims to the defendant appellants who acted as franchisors and allocated claims to solicitors.  Before April 2000 the remuneration for the claimants was a percentage of the recovery.  After the enactment of the Access to Justice Act that became impossible, and it was intended that new agreements or a new agreement should be made with fresh terms.  That never actually happened.  But the judge held that, as from 1st April 2000, the first claimant, as a separate entity from the individual claimants, and the defendant entered into a new contract which he calls in paragraph 32 of his judgment "the interim agreement", whose terms were identical, in so far as is relevant to these proceedings, to those contained in the old agreements, save that the franchise area was to be the whole of Kent and the term as to payment was to be different; that was agreed to be £550 per case.
2.	Mr Martin QC, on behalf of the defendants, takes two points and two points only by way of seeking to appeal, and it is only on those points that we give permission.  The first point is that the judge held that there was a termination of the interim arrangement made when no new agreement was or could be agreed.  Mr Martin submits that that was a wrongful termination and at trial there were arguments about repudiatory breach.  Those have now gone by the board but Mr Martin submits that termination could only be on some sort of notice.  He relies on the fact that the previous agreements with the individuals all had quite lengthy terms, as much as five or 10 years.  To have, therefore, an understanding by implication in relation to the interim agreement that it could be terminated without any notice, he submits, cannot possibly be right.
3.	I was unpersuaded by that when I dealt with the matter on the papers, but I am now persuaded that is at least an arguable point.  Mr Martin did not wish to be drawn on the question of how long a reasonable notice would be.  But as he pointed out, the matter had been submitted to the trial judge -- and one sees this from paragraphs 8 to 10 of the defendant's closing arguments -- on the basis that it would have to be at least a year.  In argument to us Mr Martin suggested that 3 years would in fact be appropriate.
4.	We think it right that he should have permission to appeal on that point.
5.	The second matter on which he seeks permission to appeal relates to cross-claims which he submits his clients were entitled to bring because there were, it is said, breaches (by either the first claimant or the individual claimants) of the old arrangements, albeit only occurring after the interim arrangement of 1st April.  On any view the old contracts, he submits, had to continue in order for payment eventually to be assessed.  But, he submits, the judge has held that that is the only purpose for which they continued and has held that no sums can be recovered and that there were no breaches which were actionable.  That is, submits Mr Martin, all very one-sided.
6.	We have been somewhat more reluctant to grant permission on this point, but since we are granting permission on the first point we will grant permission also on this point on condition that a supplement to the current skeleton argument is lodged with the court and served on the respondents, setting out, in such a way as is comprehensible, precisely what terms it is alleged that there were, what breaches it is alleged that there were and what loss was suffered from such breaches.  We are not satisfied that that is clearly identified in the current pleadings.  We have not encouraged Mr Martin to defend the pleadings, so that is not a final determination of any pleading point there might be; moreover we do not think it useful to require any amendment to the pleadings now.  But we consider that it should be on a piece of paper and everyone can understand what is in issue and have some idea as to the loss which has actually been suffered by the defendants.  But subject to that, we will grant permission on the second point also.
ORDER:  Application for permission to appeal granted; stay granted by the judge in relation to paragraph 3 of his order and paragraph 5 extended, save as to £14,000 which should be payable within 14 days; constitution of the court to be three judges, but could include a High Court judge; time estimate of one day.
(Order not part of approved judgment)