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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Goodger v London Borough Of Ealing [2002] EWCA Civ 36 (17 January 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/36.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 36

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
CIVIL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT
BRENTFORD COUNTY COURT
(His Honour Judge Oppenheimer)

		The Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London Thursday 17 January 2002

Thursday 17 January 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE LATHAM: This is an application for permission to appeal a decision of His Honour Judge Oppenheimer given on 19 September 2001. On that occasion the judge was dealing with an appeal under section 204 of the Housing Act 1996 against a decision of the respondent Council dated 23 May 2001. The decision was that the then appellant was intentionally homeless on the ground that the Council had enforced an order for possession on the ground that he had broken a term of his tenancy because he had permitted the sale of cannabis from the premises in question.
2. The grounds of appeal were numerous but the judge himself dealt with the case simply and solely on the basis that there had been a breach of natural justice. The basis of his decision was that this applicant (the appellant before him) had through his solicitors indicated, as far back as the beginning of February 2001, that they required the housing file so that they could properly advise their client. Nonetheless the Council proceeded to an original decision without having provided that file. When the appellant then asked for a review, the solicitors repeated the request for the file and, for reasons which do not appear in the papers before us, that file was not made available to the appellant's solicitors until six working days before the hearing by the review body on 23 May 2001.
3. The judge accordingly concluded that there had been a breach of natural justice in that they had not been given sufficient opportunity to see, and therefore make submissions based upon, the contents of that file.
4. The basic ground of appeal before us in support of the application is that the judge was wrong to conclude that there was any breach of natural justice in that regard. Firstly it is said that there was nothing to suggest that six working days was indeed an insufficient period within which to make submissions based upon the contents of the file; nothing to suggest that the file was so voluminous that it required any lengthy consideration and nothing to suggest that there was any other circumstance which precluded the solicitors from making an appropriate representation before the hearing, albeit the time was short. It is further submitted that in any event it is noteworthy that at no stage up to and including the hearing before His Honour Judge Oppenheimer did the appellant identify any material in the file which could have in any way benefited his case or formed the subject matter of a new and valid ground for his assertion that the original decision of the Council was wrong.
5. I consider that there is substance in those arguments, to the extent that they provide a reasonable ground for an appeal to this court on the basis that there is some real prospect of success. In coming to that conclusion, I bear in mind that this is technically a second appeal but, in truth, this is the only appeal against a reasoned decision and the decision of the judge was on appeal from a tribunal, which is not to be treated in the same way as the decision of a court or a specialist tribunal.
6. Equally, there is a further ground of appeal based upon the judge's conclusion that he was precluded from coming to a decision such as no order by the provisions of section 204(iii), and it seems to me that the judge may arguably have fallen into error there. In any event, it may be helpful if this court identified the scope of the orders available to a judge in dealing with appeals such as this. So the applicant in my judgment should be entitled to permission to appeal on that ground.
7. LADY JUSTICE ARDEN: I agree.
ORDER: Application allowed. Costs to be in the appeal.