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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Kides, R (on the application of) v South Cambridgeshire District Council [2002] EWCA Civ 926 (20 June 2002) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2002/926.html Cite as: [2002] EWCA Civ 926

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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
ADMINISTRATIVE COURT
(Mr Justice Ouseley)

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London Thursday 20 June 2002

Thursday 20 June 2002

1. LORD JUSTICE SEDLEY:On 10 January 2002 I refused permission to appeal on the papers. In the reasons which I gave in writing I indicated that I would have given permission but for the then extant decision of this court in Burkett, which had the effect of shutting out the claimant for delay.
2. I also said, however, that if the application were to be renewed, it would be important to know what had happened to Burkett in the House of Lords. Their Lordships' decision was given on 23 May and reported in the WLR on 7 June. Its effect seems to be to open a new chapter on time bars in public law. It appears to conclude the present time issue in the claimant's favour, the grant of planning permission having crystallised only on 16 October 2000 and the application for judicial review having been lodged on 27 November 2000. It is clear from paragraphs 53 and 59-60 of the report of their Lordships' decision that promptness within the three-month period is now an instrument to be handled with great circumspection.
3. In the light of the decision in Burkett both parties have invited me to reconsider my decision on permission to appeal without the need for further submissions. As I read CPR 52.3(4) my written decision cannot be reopened except by renewal, and I have accordingly directed that the application be listed in open court with notice to the parties that they are not expected to attend, so that I can formally revisit my decision.
4. In the light of the reasons given by me in writing and the further development which I have now outlined, this is in my judgment a proper case for the grant of permission to appeal. As I have previously indicated, the admirable judgment of Ouseley J, given after hearing full argument on both sides, makes it inappropriate to remit this case to the High Court. I will accordingly grant permission to apply for judicial review under CPR 52.15(3), and direct under 52.15(4) that the application remain in this court for determination.
5. There will be liberty to apply for any directions which cannot be agreed. The costs of this application will be costs in the case, with liberty to apply on the hearing of the appeal to vary this limb of my order if so advised.