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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Peekay Intermark Ltd. & Anor v Australia and New Zealand Banking Group Ltd. [2006] EWCA Civ 386 (06 April 2006) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2006/386.html Cite as: [2006] 2 Lloyd's Rep 511, [2006] EWCA Civ 386, [2006] 1 CLC 582 |
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION, COMMERCIAL COURT
(MR. RICHARD SIBERRY Q.C.)
2004 Folio 733
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK
and
MR. JUSTICE LAWRENCE COLLINS
____________________
(1) PEEKAY INTERMARK LIMITED (2) HARISH PAWANI |
Claimants/ Respondents |
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- and - |
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AUSTRALIA and NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP LIMITED |
Defendant/ Appellant |
____________________
Smith Bernal WordWave Limited
190 Fleet Street, London EC4A 2AG
Tel No: 020 7421 4040 Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
Mr. David Railton Q.C. and Mr. Shantanu Majumdar (instructed by Nelsons, Leicester) for the claimants/respondents
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Moore-Bick:
"ANZ makes the following disclosure to the Depositor. The payment of any amount by the Deposit Taker . . . . . is subject to the following Risks, in which event (an "Event") the Depositor may receive no income from the Deposit, and/or lose some or all of the initial Deposit Amount – See Settlement Procedures described in Appendix 2.
(1) Default Risk
Default including without limitation by the Central Bank of Russia . . . . . . . in making payments in respect of the underlying Reference Obligation . . . . ."
"The occurrence of any Event shall be determined by the Calculation Agent [ANZ] in good faith and in its sole discretion, which determination shall be final and binding. . . . . . . . .
(1) Payments following Default by the Central Bank of Russia
In the event of Default, the Deposit Taker will pay an amount to the Depositor equal to the Market Value of the Reference Obligation and the Deposit Taker's obligations with respect to the Deposit will then irrevocably cease."
"Market Value will be the bid value of the Reference Obligation inclusive of accrued interest on the day after the Default is deemed to have occurred, as determined by the Calculation Agent by reference to at least two dealers. The Market Value will then be converted into USD at an exchange rate determined by the Calculation Agent and paid to the Depositor, as soon as the Calculation Agent determines it is practicable to do so (after the deduction of any amounts determined to reflect the cost to the Deposit Taker)."
"The deposit transaction described in these Indicative Terms and Conditions involves a variety of significant risks including some risks not normally associated with investing in the developed capital markets in North America, Japan, and Western Europe. These risks include (but are not limited to) the risk of adverse or unanticipated market, financial or political developments in the Russian Federation . . . . . . and the default by the issuer of the Reference obligation . . . . . . In certain circumstances (more fully described above) ANZ Bank will be under no obligation to pay any amounts to you and you may lose all amounts you have paid under this transaction.
Before considering entering into this transaction you must make your own independent assessment as to whether it is appropriate for you based upon your own judgment and upon advice from such advisors as you consider necessary. ANZ Bank is not acting as your financial advisor or in a fiduciary capacity in relation to this transaction. It is an express term that you may enter into with ANZ Bank that you are not relying on any communication (written or oral) made by ANZ Bank as constituting either investment advice or a recommendation to enter into this transaction.
. . . . . . . . . Potential investors should refrain from entering into a transaction of the type described herein unless they fully understand their terms and risks, including the extent of their potential risk of loss and have independently determined that a transaction of this nature is appropriate for them."
"Before making any investment in an emerging markets instrument, you should independently satisfy yourself that you understand and appreciate the significance of the relevant risks, and that such an investment is appropriate and suitable for you or your managed accounts in light of your objectives, experience, financial and operational resources, and other relevant circumstances. You should also ensure that you fully understand the nature of the transaction and contractual relationship into which you are entering and the nature and extent of your exposure to risk of loss, which may significantly exceed the amount of any initial payment by or to you. The issuer assumes that the customer is aware of the risks and practices described herein, and that prior to each transaction the customer has determined that such transaction is suitable for him."
"[Client] confirms it has read and understood the terms of the Emerging Markets Risk Disclosure Statement as set out above."
"You will receive US$245,250/- from ANZ Investment Bank, Minerva House for credit to our above mentioned account. Please add all amounts in the call accounts of Harish Pawani &/or Preeti Pawani viz US$12,735.26, US$1,250/- and US$275/- and transfer the same to the call account of Peekay Intermark Limited. A total of US$250,000/- should be utilised to buy the Russian Hedged GKO Note as per the attached document."
The reference to the attached document can only have been a reference to the FTCs and Risk Disclosure Statement. In accordance with those instructions ANZ debited Peekay's account in order to fund a share in the GKO-linked deposit described in the FTCs.
" 9. On the 1st or 2nd February 1998 Mr. Pawani was telephoned by Mrs. Balasubramaniam and she informed him . . . . . that:
(a) the Bank had a product which was being marketed, a US$2m Russian "hedged treasury bill note" known as a "Hedged GKO" ("the Note");
(b) the Note comprised a deposit structured note by which Russian roubles were hedged by a strong bank, the International Moscow Bank;
(c) the Note was short term, yielding 21.5% and maturing in October 1998;
. . . . . . . . . . . .
Mrs. Balasubramaniam gave to Mr. Pawani on behalf of Peekay Intermark a document entitled "High Yield Note linked to Russian GKO Bonds hedged into USD" [the Indicative Term Sheet].
. . . . . . . . . . . .
17. By reason of the statements referred to in paragraph 9 hereof [Mrs. Balasubramaniam] represented to Mr. Pawani on behalf of Peekay Intermark that the instrument sold by the Bank to Peekay Intermark was a GKO Note, the terms of which were represented as aforesaid.
18. Peekay Intermark relied as aforesaid on the said representations in entering into the Transaction."
"[Mrs. Balasubramaniam] knew that individual clients could not hold GKOs, and that they would have to be held by an institution. I am entirely satisfied that, based on what she had been told about the products, she understood that ANZ would be buying and holding GKOs on behalf of her clients, who would have the beneficial interest in the GKOs (a beneficial interest which she expected to be documented), and that the GKOs would have the benefit of a USD hedge. I accept her evidence that she told Mr. Pawani that he would have a GKO with a USD hedge, and that in the event of a sovereign default, he would end up holding roubles (as the GPB Indicative Term Sheet indicated). That may have been a rough and ready way to describe the situation as she understood it, but it was understandable shorthand for ANZ holding a GKO on behalf of clients who would have a beneficial interest therein. Mr. Pawani realised that he would have only a pro rata share in a GKO, but reasonably understood from this that ANZ would acquire and hold the GKO on his behalf and that of the other investors, and that he and the other investors would have the right to determine what was to be done with the GKO in the event, for example, of sovereign default . . . . . ." (emphasis added).
"I am satisfied that Mr. Pawani did no more than glance through the FTCs and the Risk Disclosure Statement. Having seen and heard Mr. Pawani give evidence, I do not find this at all incredible, as ANZ suggested it was. Mr. Pawani clearly placed great confidence in GPB as his private bankers, and he evidently had no prior cause to think that the FTCs would contain any nasty surprises. He did notice the heading to the FTCs, "USD Hedged Russian Treasury Bill", which he reasonably regarded as consistent with what he had been told about the product by [Mrs. Balasubramaniam]. He did not, however, take in either the fact that the FTCs described a structured deposit, which gave investors no interest, whether legal or equitable, in the GKO defined therein as the Reference Obligation, or the settlement procedures applicable in the event of default. Mr. Shah, the countersignatory, did no more than exactly what he was told to do by Mr. Pawani, i.e. to initial and countersign the documents."
"If a man is induced to enter into a contract by a false representation it is not a sufficient answer to him to say, "If you had used due diligence you would have found out that the statement was untrue. You had the means afforded you of discovering its falsity, and did not choose to avail yourself of them." I take it to be a settled doctrine of equity, not only as regards specific performance but also as regards rescission, that this is not an answer unless there is such delay as constitutes a defence under the Statute of Limitations."
". . . . . . . when a person makes a material representation to another to induce him to enter into a contract, and the other enters into that contract, it is not sufficient to say that the party to whom the representation is made does not prove that he entered into the contract, relying upon the representation. If it is a material representation calculated to induce him to enter into the contract, it is an inference of law that he was induced by the representation to enter into it, and in order to take away his title to be relieved from the contract on the ground that the representation was untrue, it must be shewn either that he had knowledge of the facts contrary to the representation, or that he stated in terms, or shewed clearly by his conduct, that he did not rely on the representation. . . . . . . . Where you have neither evidence that he knew facts to shew that the statement was untrue, or that he said or did anything to shew that he did not actually rely upon the statement, the inference remains that he did so rely, and the statement being a material statement, its being untrue is a sufficient ground for rescinding the contract."
"The person who has made the misrepresentation cannot be heard to say to the party to whom he has made that representation, "You chose to believe me when you might have doubted me, and gone further." The representation once made relieves the party from an investigation, even if the opportunity is afforded. I do not mean to say that there may not be certain circumstances of suspicion, which might put a person upon inquiry, and make it his duty to inquire, but under ordinary circumstances, the mere fact that he does not avail himself of the opportunity of testing the accuracy of the representation made to him will not enable the opposing party to succeed on that ground."
"63. Where the insured or reinsured corrects the misrepresentation or discloses the material fact before the insurer or reinsurer enters into the contract, the latter will not be entitled to avoid the contract for misrepresentation or non-disclosure. In such circumstances it may be said that there was no longer any or any material misrepresentation or non-disclosure or it may be said that there was no inducement. Perhaps it does not matter.
64. The correction must be fairly made to the insurer or reinsurer such that the corrected picture is fairly presented on behalf of the insured or reinsured and comes to the knowledge of the insurer or reinsurer. It is not sufficient to say that he would have discovered the true position if he had acted with all due care: see e.g. Chitty on Contracts, 28th edition, vol. 1 paragraph 6-036 and Redgrave v Hurd (1881) 20 ChD 1. As I see it, it will in each case be a question of fact whether the misrepresentation was corrected so as to ensure that the corrected facts came to the knowledge of the insurer or reinsurer or whether, when the contract was made, the insurer or reinsurer was induced to make it by the original material misrepresentation or non-disclosure."
"I am satisfied that Mr. Pawani was in fact induced to invest US$250,000 in the name of Peekay by Mrs B's misrepresentation as to the nature of the product. I accept his evidence that he would not have made the investment if he had known the true position, namely that Peekay would have no interest whatsoever in any GKO, which would merely be the Reference Obligation for the purpose of a derivative product, and no control over what was to happen in the event of a default in relation to that Reference Obligation. The element of control was important to Mr. Pawani, and he would, for example, have wanted at least the opportunity to participate in any restructuring option in the event of sovereign default. . . . . . . . . . Although he realised that he would be one of several investors with an interest (so he thought) in the GKO, and had given no thought to how, in the event of a default, the position would be resolved between the participating investors, he would at least have had some control: the liquidation of the investment would not have been entirely out of his hands, as was in fact the case."
"You should also ensure that you fully understand the nature of the transaction and contractual relationship into which you are entering."
and
"The issuer assumes that the customer is aware of the risks and practices described herein, and that prior to each transaction the customer has determined that such transaction is suitable for him."
which Mr. Pawani on behalf of Peekay confirmed by his signature that he had read and understood. Mr. Pymont submitted that as a result of having done so Mr. Pawani and Peekay were estopped from asserting that they had not understood the nature and effect of the FTCs and so could not maintain that they had been induced by misrepresentation to enter into the contract.
Mr. Justice Lawrence Collins:
Lord Justice Chadwick: