Neutral Citation Number: [2007] EWCA Civ 882
Case No: A3/2006/2565
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF JUDICATURE
COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
QUEEN’S BENCH DIVISION COMMERCIAL COURT
Mr Justice Morison
[2006] EWHC 2834 (Comm)
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 24/08/2007
Before :

LORD JUSTICE WARD
LORD JUSTICE THOMAS
and
LORD JUSTICE WALL
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Between :

	Sunrock Aircraft Corporation Limited	Respondent	
	- and -		
	Scandinavian Airlines System Denmark-Norway-Sweden	Appellant	
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

(Transcript of the Handed Down Judgment of
Smith Bernal Wordwave Limited, 190 Fleet Street
London EC4A 2AG
Tel No:  020 7404 1400, Fax No: 020 7831 8838
Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -

Philip Shepherd QC & Bajul Shah (instructed by Messrs Norton Rose) for the Appellant
Akhil Shah (instructed by Messrs Simmons & Simmons) for the Respondent

Hearing dates : 10 and 11 July 2007
- - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - - -
Judgement
Lord Justice Thomas: 
1.	On 29 December 1993, the appellant (SAS) entered into a sale and lease back arrangement for 2 Boeing 767-300ER aircraft in their fleet with the respondents (Sunrock), an Irish subsidiary of Sojitz Corporation, a large Japanese Corporation which specialised in such arrangements.  The arrangement was set out in a series of documents for each aircraft, including a sale and purchase agreement and lease.  These agreements were subject to English law and an unconditional submission was made to the jurisdiction of the English Courts 
2.	The aircraft had been built in 1989 and 1991; they each had Pratt and Whitney Engines.  The sale price was $70m and $65m respectively.  On 24 January 1994 the aircraft were sold by SAS to Sunrock on “an as is, where is” condition and then delivered by Sunrock to SAS under the leases; amongst the documents exchanged were Aircraft Transfer Receipts.  The term of the lease for aircraft 25365 (referred to as Aircraft 1) was 65 months; it was extended under an option clause so that it expired on 7 November 2003.  The lease on the other aircraft (aircraft 2) was for a period of 53 months; an option to extend was exercised so that it expired on 23 February 2004.  Payments of $714,000 per month were made under the leases; these totalled over the period of the leases over $85m on each aircraft.
3.	Prior to redelivery of aircraft 1, disputes arose between the parties under clause 19 of the lease, the redelivery clause, as to the obligations of SAS in relation to components in the engines known as Limited Life Parts (LLPs) in each aircraft and as to repairs on aircraft 1 referred to as “scab patches” on the aircraft fuselage.
4.	Sub-clause 19.7 of the redelivery clause contained provisions for the resolution of disputes on redelivery by an independent firm of aircraft technical consultants.  SAS did not consider that this was apposite for the disputes that had arisen; they entered into a redelivery agreement dated 4 November 2003 under which the dispute was nonetheless still to be referred to an independent firm of aircraft technical consultants nominated by SAS and approved by Sunrock.  Aircraft 1 was redelivered on 7 November 2003 and Aircraft 2 in January 2004.
5.	In circumstances set out in paragraphs 9-16 of the judgment of Morison J SAS declined to appoint a consultant and thereby broke the redelivery agreement; it is apparent that SAS considered that the issues of construction should be decided by the English courts rather than an expert.  Morison J commented:
“In other words, having procured Sunrock to accept re-delivery of the aircraft before these issues were resolved, by entering into the re-delivery agreement, SAS thereafter reneged on the agreement for no good reason other than, I infer, that they calculated they had a better chance of persuading a court to their view of the proper construction of the Lease than persuading an informed expert.”
6.	In consequence Sunrock had no alternative but to begin these proceedings in the Commercial Court in which they sought to recover from SAS the sums they contended were due in respect of the LLPs of the engines on both aircraft and the scab patches on aircraft 1; in respect of the latter, the claim was framed as a claim for breach of the dispute resolution agreement.
7.	Two distinct issues arose for decision: 
i)	What was the obligation under the redelivery clause in respect of the LLPs? The judge decided this issue in favour of Sunrock and concluded that $1.762m was due to them on aircraft 1 and $1.976m on aircraft 2. The issue is one of construction of the terms of the lease.
ii)	Were SAS in breach of the redelivery clause of the lease and the dispute resolution agreement in relation to the scab patches on aircraft 1 and, if so, what was the measure of damages recoverable for the breach? Could a greater measure of damages be recovered for breach of the dispute resolution agreement? The judge also decided these issues in favour of Sunrock.  He concluded that, as the expert would have awarded the amount of the cost of the repairs in respect of the scab patches, the sum of $139,800 claimed as the cost of repairs should be paid as damages for breach of the dispute resolution agreement.  This issue turned on the evidence before the judge and a short point of law.
8.	SAS appeal to this court with the permission of Toulson LJ.  On the second issue, SAS did not appeal against the judge’s findings that they were in breach.
(1)	The issue in relation to LLPs
The factual background
9.	Before turning to the specific terms of the lease it is necessary to describe briefly the factual background as to the nature of LLPs and aircraft maintenance.  It was common ground that this background was known to both parties at the time the agreement was made and therefore to be taken into account on the issue of construction.
10.	In terms sufficiently expressed for the purposes of the issue before the court, the parts for each jet engine for this aircraft can be described as falling into three categories:
i)	LLPs: These are the engine parts on which the engine manufacturer in conjunction with the regulatory authorities imposes a maximum life, as they are critical to the operation of the engine and the effect of failure could be catastrophic.  If LLPs are damaged, they must be repaired or replaced.  But even if undamaged, they must be replaced at the end of the set life time; the set life time is calculated by reference to the number of cycles of landings and take offs, as it is at these times that the engines are subject to the greatest stresses.  Some LLPs for obvious reasons have a life designed to last beyond the life of the engine – 25 years or more.  The total value of the LLPs in an engine represents about 40% of the value of that engine when new.
ii)	On-condition parts: parts that remain in the aircraft and can be restored and repaired until their condition requires their replacement; they have no finite life measured in hours or cycles.
iii)	Consumables: Parts such as replaceable seals and washers.
11.	The maintenance of an aircraft engine is subject to strict conditions laid down by the manufacturer and approved by the regulatory authorities of the state of registration of the aircraft.  At set intervals measured in terms of cycles of landings and take-offs and total running hours (the aggregate of the time taken on flights), various maintenance checks and tasks have to be performed.  Some of these checks take place at overhauls.  On-condition parts are checked, maintained, replaced or repaired as required.  LLPs are cleaned and serviced and repaired or replaced if damaged; the evidence was that the work done to LLPs included cleaning, deblading (where blades which the parts hold in place are detached to allow for cleaning) and re-protection (measures to ensure the part’s continued reliability, such as spraying with protective chemicals).  The regular maintenance checks and overhauls were also used as occasions to replace LLPs if they have reached the expiry of their life. 
12.	The aircraft were extended range Boeing 767s and thus were more likely to be used on long haul routes; if the aircraft were used in this way, there would be fewer landings and take offs in a given year than if they were used on short haul routes and so fewer cycles would be used for the purpose of measuring the lifetime of the LLPs.  This point made by SAS is, in my view, of no significance as SAS were entitled to use the aircraft as it wished, the aircraft could be sub-leased and the engine and parts could be pooled or exchanged (see paragraph 21).
The nature of the dispute
13.	As is common in leases, SAS, as lessee, was required on redelivery to redeliver the aircraft at a specific location in a specific condition.  This lease required by the redelivery clause, clause 19, the condition of the aircraft to be such “as to demonstrate that the lessee has in all respects complied with its obligations on its part contained in clause 13” (the operation and maintenance clause to which I refer in more detail at paragraph 21) and also to comply, “subject to fair wear and tear generally” with specific terms; these included in respect of the engines by sub-clause 19.2:
“b) Components:
(i) each and every life-limited component shall have not less than 4,000 hours remaining to the next scheduled removal under the Lessee's Approved Maintenance Programme
…..
c)  Engines:
Each Engine shall be serviceable and no individual engine shall have less than 4,000 operating hours remaining before its next scheduled removal limit or its next shop visit (as measured by its most limiting component).
If the aircraft was not in the condition required by sub-clause 19.2, the lessor was entitled to require the lessee to rectify any defects or deficiencies. 
14.	The redelivery clause then provided by sub-clause 19.9 for an adjustment; the dispute centred on the wording of this sub-clause and in particular the words which I have highlighted in bold:
“(a)	The Lessor and the Lessee agree that adjustment payments will be made based on the maintenance status of the Aircraft at re-delivery, and:
(i)	in the case of the airframe, “half time” (which shall be calculated by reference to the amount of time remaining before the next scheduled “S4C” check, as determined by Boeing's manufacturer’s planning document), or
(ii)	in the case of the Engines and Landing Gear, the maintenance status of the same at Delivery.
Adjustment payments will be made by the Lessor to the Lessee if the maintenance status of the Airframe, Engines and/or Landing Gear (as the case may be) is better than the applicable status specified in paragraph (i) or (ii) above and adjustment payments will be made by the Lessee to the Lessor if the maintenance status of the Airframe, Engines and/or Landing Gear (as the case may be) is worse than the applicable status specified in paragraphs (i) or (ii) above.
(b)	The amount of the adjustment payments referred to in clause 19.9(a) shall be determined by the Lessee choosing three facilities, each of which shall be a third party Federal Aviation Administration approved repair station (at least one of which will be European and two which shall be primarily based in the U.S.A.) from which Lessor will choose one based in the United States (for each of Airframe, Engines and Landing Gear) to provide the scope and work standards for each overhaul.  Lessee will then choose two of the three Federal Aviation Administration approved repair stations quotes (one of which must be European) for such applicable work.  The average costs of these two facilities shall provide the basis for adjustment payments between Lessor and Lessee.”
15.	On and after the redelivery of aircraft 1:
i)	It was common ground that the task under sub-clause 19.9 involved a comparison between the maintenance status on redelivery and, in the case of the engines and landing gear, the maintenance status on delivery. 
ii)	It was also common ground that the adjustment referred to under sub- clause 19.9 did not require an actual overhaul to take place on or about the time of redelivery.
iii)	The parties agreed the amount of the adjustment in respect of the fuselage, the landing gear and the on-condition part of the engine, but not in respect of LLPs. 
iv)	It was common ground that LLPs are the subject of maintenance, but the parties disputed what was meant by “maintenance status” in sub-clause 19.9. 
v)	It was also common ground that none of the LLPs actually required replacement at the next overhaul of the engine by reason of the expiry of their life limit.  The LLPs on the aircraft had been properly maintained under clause 13 and had a significant proportion of their life still available.
vi)	Sunrock, however, contended that an adjustment was required for the LLPs under the terms of sub-clause 19.9 in respect of that proportion of the life of the LLPs used during the lease.  SAS disputed this.  On this issue of construction the contentions of the parties were:
a)	The essence of Sunrock’s contention was that as the clause required the adjustment in respect of the engines to be made on the basis of maintenance status at redelivery and delivery, this meant that SAS was required to bear the cost of putting the maintenance status of the engines into the same status as that status was on delivery.  In respect of LLPs this entailed an adjustment calculated by reference to the proportion of the lifetime of the LLPs used during the period of the lease; as a proportion of the life had been used since delivery, the maintenance status of the LLPs at redelivery could only be compared with the status on delivery by reference to the cycles used and an adjustment being made on that basis.  Sunrock did not shy away from accepting that this was in fact an additional payment for use calculated by reference to the life of the LLPs.
b)	SAS contended that they were not obliged to make any such payment; their obligation was limited to making an adjustment by reference to what would ordinarily be described as the maintenance of the aircraft and the work that would actually have to be done on an overhaul of the engine as provided for in sub-clause 19(b).
vii)	The terms of the redelivery agreement dated 4 November 2003 did not affect the issue of construction, only the process for its resolution.  As I have said, SAS refused to abide by the terms of the agreement and hence Sunrock had to bring these proceedings.
The approach to the issue: the so called “commercial background”
16.	The clauses of this aircraft lease followed in some respects standard forms that are in use in the industry.  However, as lawyers who specialise in this field craft each lease to the particular terms which the parties want and which reflect the financial terms agreed, each lease has some of its own distinct terms.  The terms may on occasions include not only a standard periodic payment but other provisions for other payments by way of compensation for the use and hire of the aircraft; such terms sometimes include a payment calculated by reference to the life of the LLPs used during the lease.  SAS contended that the judge’s conclusion that a significant amount was payable under sub-clause 19.9 was a conclusion that involved confusing rent and the servicing status of the aircraft.  In my view this was misconceived; the parties could easily have agreed that a further sum was payable by reference to the LLPs.  The question in this case was whether the terms of the lease so provided. 
17.	A considerable amount of time was taken at the trial in relation to evidence as to the practice of the industry in relation to the meaning of terms.  None of the terms of the lease had a customary meaning nor even a meaning used in practice, despite attempts made to show that terms such as “maintenance status” had a particular meaning.  No assistance can be derived from looking at other leases or allowing evidence to be given in relation to what those in the industry may have thought this lease or terms in it might have meant.  Unfortunately reports were provided and questions were asked of several witnesses before the judge in relation to these and many other irrelevant matters as appears from paragraphs 24-27, 32-35 and 36-41 of Morison J’s judgment.
18.	This case is an illustration of the importance of adhering to the well known rules of construction and excluding such evidence.  The rules curtail cost by concentrating the argument on the words used and excluding the irrelevant.  In this particular industry, the reality of the way in which such documents are produced is, as I have said, that they are crafted by expert lawyers very familiar with such documentation in accordance with instructions from their respective business clients.  The task of the court is simply to construe the text of what they have agreed in the light of the common factual background which I have set out in paragraphs 9-12.  The task of the court is not assisted by evidence of the type adduced before the judge.  The interests of the parties are not well served, as such evidence simply adds to the cost of what would otherwise be a fast, less expensive and authoritative interpretation of a contract by the court to the advantage of the parties, such as the international corporations in this case.  
My conclusion on construction
19.	The sale and purchase agreement for the aircraft specified the aircraft by reference to schedule 1 and required by clause 3.1(d) the aircraft to be delivered with an Aircraft Transfer Receipt in the form of schedule 2 to that agreement; schedule 2 provided for the attachment to the Aircraft Transfer Receipts of the latest status reports in a mutually agreed form for the airframe, landing gears and engines.  The Aircraft Transfer Receipts had attached to them Schedule 1 to the sale and purchase agreement which included in the information set out for each aircraft the total number of hours and cycles run and the number of hours and cycles since the last overhaul in respect of each engine; the Aircraft Transfer Receipt also had attached a list of the LLPs for each engine which showed the number of cycles that constituted the limit, the number of cycles used and the percentage of cycles remaining to the life of each part.
20.	As the aircraft was delivered under the lease as soon as it was sold to Sunrock, this certificate was used for the purposes of the lease. 
21.	Clause 13, the operations and maintenance clause, imposed specific obligations on SAS: 
i)	SAS was required by sub-clause 13.1(c) to ensure that the aircraft was maintained, serviced, repaired and overhauled in accordance with the manufacturer’s Approved Maintenance Programme so that the aircraft was kept in as good an operation condition as on delivery, “fair wear and tear excepted”.
ii)	SAS was obliged by sub-clause 13.1(d) in respect of the aircraft, the engine and its parts at its own expense to replace any part which might from time to time be worn out, lost, stolen, destroyed, damaged or rendered unfit for use. 
iii)	SAS was entitled under the same sub-clause to remove any engine or part provided it replaced it as promptly as possible; the sub-clause provided:
“Each Replacement Engine or Part shall be free and clear of all Encumbrances other than Permitted Liens and shall be in as good operating condition as, and shall have a value substantially equal to or greater than, the Engine or Part replaced assuming such replaced Engine or Part was then of the value and in the condition and repair required to be maintained by the terms hereof.”
iv)	SAS were entitled by sub-clause 13.3 to pool parts and engines.
22.	No specific document similar to the Aircraft Transfer Receipt was required on redelivery, as the provisions of sub-clause 19.6 envisaged resolution of any issues by direct discussion and if this did not result in agreement, the dispute resolution mechanism of sub-clause 19.7.  It is therefore of no assistance to the issue of construction that on redelivery the receipt had attached to it the list of the LLPs and the number of cycles used and remaining.
23.	I have come to the clear conclusion that under sub-clause 19.9 the obligation of the parties in respect of the engines (including the LLPs) was to make an adjustment for the difference in maintenance status by reference to a comparison between what was required at the next overhaul as at delivery and redelivery and the difference in the length of time as at delivery and redelivery to that overhaul.  The clause plainly did not oblige SAS to pay Sunrock a sum calculated by reference to the proportion of the life of the LLPs used during the period of the lease.
i)	The phrase “maintenance status” must be interpreted by reference to the obligations under the other provisions of the lease.  As set out above, SAS was under an obligation by sub-clause 13.1(c) to comply with the Approved Maintenance Programme.  This was defined by clause 1 to mean the maintenance programme for aircraft with engines of the type fitted which had been approved by the regulatory authorities of the state of the aircraft’s registration.  It encompassed:
“scheduled maintenance (including block maintenance), condition monitored maintenance and on-condition maintenance of Airframe, Engines and Parts of the Aircraft including, but not limited to, servicing, testing, preventive maintenance, repairs, structural inspections, system checks, overhauls, approved modifications, service bulletins, engineering order, airworthiness directives, corrosion control, inspections and treatment. ”
ii)	As set out at paragraph 11, maintenance programmes required aircraft to undergo overhauls for such work at given intervals.  The obligation to maintain applied to the engine as a whole and to its parts; the maintenance status in paragraph 19.9 also plainly referred to both the engine as a whole and its parts.  As is also set out at paragraph 11, LLPs are serviced and it is plain that such servicing was maintenance of the LLPs.
iii)	The Aircraft Transfer Receipt on delivery set out as “the time since overhaul”, the number of cycles and hours since the last overhaul; it would have been known what was done on that overhaul.  The time of the last overhaul before redelivery was known as was the time when the next overhaul after redelivery would be required and what was to be done then in accordance with the Approved Maintenance Programme.
iv)	Redelivery could well occur at any point of time between such overhauls.  If it was redelivered just after an overhaul, Sunrock would, absent adjustment, have the benefit of a longer period before the next overhaul; if it was redelivered as close to the next overhaul as was permitted by the obligation under clause 19.2(b) (i), Sunrock would have a disadvantage of having to see to the overhaul in the immediate future.
v)	It made obvious commercial sense to provide for an adjustment to take place by reference to a comparison as at delivery and at redelivery in the timing and work required for maintenance at such an overhaul.
vi)	Looked at in this way, the phrase maintenance status plainly refers to the position of the aircraft in relation to the time between overhauls and what needed to be done at that overhaul.
vii)	That this is so is clear from the terms of sub-clause 19.9(b) which contemplated obtaining quotations for the cost of the “applicable work”. Thus although no actual overhaul was to take place on redelivery, the costs were to be calculated by reference to what would be done on the overhaul of the engine; it was for this reason quotes were to be obtained from the facilities.  Apart from servicing the LLPs in the way described in paragraph 11 above, none would be replaced, unless they needed replacing (either because of damage or the expiry of their life) on that overhaul.  It is self evident that the calculation of usage of an LLP for the purpose of calculating the cost of its usage is not what would happen on an overhaul and it is not “applicable work” in any sense of the term; the only work would be servicing and that as I have said is the maintenance of the LLPs.  The term cannot extend to their notional replacement.
viii)	The ordinary definition of maintenance is keeping in good condition or repairing regularly and thus the phrase “maintenance status” as ordinarily understood accords entirely with the meaning which I consider it bears under the contract.
ix)	Although sub-clause 13.3 of the lease gave SAS the right to pool parts and to change the engines, the position of Sunrock was protected by the provisions of clause 13 which, as I have set out at paragraph 21.iii) above, required SAS to replace what was removed with what was at least as good.
24.	There are further reasons why I cannot accept the construction advanced by Sunrock:
i)	It gives the word maintenance a construction that its ordinary meaning and its meaning under the lease plainly does not bear.  Nothing was to be done to the LLPs by reference to the ordinary meaning of the word or the meaning used in the definition clause in the contract.
ii)	Although I accept as self evident that the purpose of maintenance is to ensure safety and serviceability and that replacement of LLPs on the expiry of their life will be part of that maintenance, it is also self evident that the maintenance of LLPs does not include their replacement until their life expires or they are damaged; their maintenance is their servicing as described in paragraph 11.  I reject as an artificial construct the argument that a maintenance cycle has two elements – the time for regular overhauls for on-condition parts and the fixed time for the replacement of LLPs; the artificiality of the construct is exemplified by the fact that LLPs need maintenance, such as cleaning and being given protective coatings, on the regular overhauls at which the whole engine, including the on-condition parts, is maintained.
iii)	Although as I have said it was common ground that there was to be no actual overhaul on redelivery, it is clear that the costs were by the terms of sub-clause 19(b) to be calculated by reference to the applicable work for the next overhaul.  A notional cost of replacement based on the percentage of time used during the lease could not be part of the applicable work at that overhaul, as no LLP was to be replaced and hence no work was to be done.
iv)	I also reject the argument that the overhaul referred to in sub-clause 19.9(b) was not the next scheduled overhaul, but was, as respects LLPs the replacement of the LLPs as and when their life expired.  It was accepted that the replacement of LLPs would be over a period of years stretching into the future.  The clause contemplated quotations being obtained for the applicable work at the overhaul of the engine.  That plainly provides for a single overhaul and not a series of notional overhauls as and when the life of the LLPs expired.
v)	The interpretation contended for by Sunrock deprives the meaning of “fair wear and tear” of all content.  It was suggested that the phrase applied to on-condition parts and not to LLPs; there is no reason for such an approach.  It seems to me that fair wear and tear is naturally applicable to the gradual expiry of the life cycle of LLPs.
vi)	The argument, in short, had nothing to do with adjustments for maintenance status which was the subject of sub-clause 19.9; it was simply a clever attempt to obtain more money for the use of the aircraft.
25.	Parties under contracts sometimes ingeniously try and see if the words in a contract can be made to bear a construction that will provide them with a benefit.  The words in this clause are clear.  Despite the ingenuity of the argument advanced by Sunrock, the construction of the words of sub-clause 19.9 is one they plainly do not bear.  If it had been intended that under this lease SAS was to pay for a proportion of the life of the LLPs used during the lease as contended for by Sunrock, this should have been clearly stated; the words of sub-clause 19 of this lease simply do not and cannot be made to bear that meaning.
26.	No evidence was adduced by Sunrock to show that the maintenance status of the LLPs on redelivery in the engine was worse than the maintenance status on delivery, in the sense in which I consider the phrase to mean; no doubt some maintenance of the LLPs was required and a cost could have been obtained for it.  None was.  The sole evidence adduced was the calculation for the proportion of the lifetime used.  It follows therefore than no sum is due to Sunrock.
27.	For these reasons, I consider that the judge was wrong in the view he reached on the meaning of the clause and in awarding the sums he did to Sunrock.  I would therefore allow the appeal on this issue.
(2)	The scab patches
28.	The obligation under sub-clause 19.2(d)(i) of the redelivery clause was to redeliver the aircraft frame without scab patches.  Scab patches are repairs to the fuselage which are effected by riveting a piece of metal over the damaged part of the skin; the doubler so created stands proud of the rest of the aircraft skin and is called a scab patch.  An alternative method of repair is a flush repair; this is effected by cutting out the damaged part of the skin and replacing it with a new part. 
29.	On redelivery, aircraft 1 had two small scab patches.  These had been affixed over small dents; one was near the passenger door and the other near the service door.  The scab patches had been applied in 1995 and 1997 and re-applied later; they were permanent repairs
30.	 Sunrock claimed that SAS were in breach of sub-clause 19.2(d)(i) as the aircraft had two small scab patches; they were therefore entitled to the reasonable costs of replacing the scab patches with a flush repair.
31.	The judge found that SAS were in breach of the sub-clause; SAS did not appeal from that finding.  They maintained their contention which they had advanced before the judge that no damages were payable as Sunrock had suffered no loss.   Neither Sunrock nor any company within the Sojitz group had repaired the damage by the time the aircraft was sold to Icelandair.  It would not in any event have been reasonable for them to do so and the failure to replace the scab patches with inserts had not affected the value of the aircraft.
The measure of damages for breach of the lease
32.	It was common ground that the measure of damages for redelivering a hired chattel in damaged condition was the cost of repairs, unless it was unreasonable to effect the repairs; if it was unreasonable to effect the repairs, then the measure was the diminution of value.  The applicable principles are set out in Ruxley Electronics v Forsyth [1996] AC 344, a case on a building contract.  It is only necessary to refer to two passages.  First a passage in the speech of Lord Jauncy at 357:
“Damages are designed to compensate for an established loss and not to provide a gratuitous benefit to the aggrieved party from which it follows that the reasonableness of an award of damages is to be linked directly to the loss sustained.  If it is unreasonable in a particular case to award the cost of reinstatement it must be because the loss sustained does not extend to the need to reinstate.”
Second, a passage in the speech of Lord Lloyd of Berwick at page 366; he referred to the judgment of Cardozo J in the Court of Appeals of New York in Jacob & Youngs v. Kent, 129 N.E. 889 and then continued:
“Cardozo J's judgment is important, because it establishes two principles, which I believe to be correct, and which are directly relevant to the present case; first, the cost of reinstatement is not the appropriate measure of damages if the expenditure would be out of all proportion to the benefit to be obtained, and, secondly, the appropriate measure of damages in such a case is the difference in value, even though it would result in a nominal award.”
33.	Sunrock’s expert, Mr Seymour, set out in his report dated 14 March 2006 reasons why scab patches can reduce the value of the aircraft and in particular the additional inspection requirements and its aesthetic effects. He estimated the cost of the repairs at $139,800.  There was no challenge to that figure.  He then calculated the diminution in the value of the aircraft, based on a book value of $30m as $457,000 by reference to the area of damage and its cosmetic and aesthetic appearance.
34.	The scab patches had not been repaired when the aircraft was sold to another company in the Sojitz group in March 2005 or when it was sold to Icelandair on 31 March 2006 for $25m.  The evidence was clear that the scab patches did not affect the marketability of the aircraft for leasing or its value; that was because in an aircraft of the age these were at time of redelivery, it would be extraordinary not to find scab patches on such an aircraft.  It was also clear that there was no point in repairing them as they had no effect on performance or on the value of the aircraft.  In cross examination, Mr Seymour, Sunrock’s expert accepted that the scab patches had no effect on the marketability of the aircraft and did not in fact reduce the value of the aircraft.  Mr O’Reilly, Sunrock’s senior marketing and finance manager, accepted that the scab patches were immaterial to the value of the aircraft.
35.	On the evidence, it was therefore clear that it would have been unreasonable to effect the repairs; furthermore the scab patches had no effect on the value of the aircraft.  It followed therefore that on the evidence before the court, the damages to which Sunrock were entitled for the breach of the lease were nominal damages as they had in fact suffered no loss.  Morison J reached that conclusion at paragraph 53 of his judgment
The measure of damages for breach of the agreement to refer the dispute for expert determination
36.	Sunrock contended that they were nonetheless entitled to damages for breach of the agreement to refer the matter for expert determination under clause 19.7 and the redelivery agreement; the amount of the damages was the cost of the repairs as that is the amount the expert would have awarded on such a reference.  The judge accepted that argument at paragraphs 58 and 59
“In my judgment, there is every good reason to consider that had SAS not reneged on clause 19.7 of the Lease [and an equivalent provision in the Redelivery Agreement] an expert third party would have approached the matter as did Mr Seymour; that is, they would have adopted a repair value since it is difficult to say whether the scab patches had or would have any impact on the marketability of the aircraft.  The clauses were aimed at providing a quick and easy monetary value on items in dispute on redelivery.  In my judgment, it was in the contemplation of the parties that an expert determination would adopt a cost of repair methodology and that it was intended that financial adjustments should be made on that basis.  That approach would obviate the need for research into market values and is a simple approach within the spirit of the mediation provisions.
In my judgment, to put the parties into the position they would have been in had SAS complied with their obligations under clause 19.7 and the Redelivery Agreement, an award of compensation on the basis of the cost of flush repairs would be appropriate. … It follows, I think, that Sunrock are entitled to judgment for the sum of US$139,800 as damages for breach of their obligation to participate in the mediation processes which they had agreed to.
37.	It is established that damages can be awarded for a loss incurred by the failure to comply with the terms of an exclusive jurisdiction clause or alternative dispute resolution clause: for example, in Union Discount v Zoller [2002] 1 WLR 1517, this court held that a party was entitled to claim as damages the costs reasonably incurred by it in foreign proceedings which had been brought in breach of an exclusive jurisdiction clause.  Another example is the decision in Croudace v London Borough of Lambeth (Court of Appeal Transcript 21 March 1986). 
38.	In the present case damages for breach of the alternative dispute resolution clause are claimed in the amount of the cost of the repairs, although, for the reasons I have set out, such a claim for the cost of the repairs could not and did not succeed on the evidence through the application of well known principles of law to the claim for breach of the repair obligation in the lease.  It was nonetheless successfully contended that Sunrock were entitled to be awarded damages for failure to have the dispute determined by the expert and those damages were assessed in the amount of the cost of the repairs for breach of the repair obligation on the basis that such a claim would succeed in that way before the expert.  As there was no suggestion that the evidence available to the expert would be any different to that adduced before the court, the decision must be premised on the assumption that the expert would have approached the issue of damages for breach of the repair obligation on a basis contrary to the applicable law and would have award substantial damages in the amount of the cost of the repairs contrary to established principles of law. 
39.	I can see force in the argument that such a result might follow if the terms of the contract permitted resolution by the type of clause recognised by s. 46(1)(b) of the Arbitration Act 1996, such as permitting the expert or arbiter to determine the dispute in accordance with “equity and good conscience” or ex aequo et bono”; in such a case it would not be necessary to decide the case according to law.  But where the agreement is governed by English law, it is to be assumed that the expert will determine the matter in accordance with the law.
40.	Mr Akhil Shah on behalf of Sunrock accepted that, if Sunrock could not establish that damages were recoverable as a matter of the ordinary principles of English law on the evidence that would be the same before a court and an arbitrator, he could not contend that the result would be different before an expert or arbitrator determining the issue under a contract governed by English law.  He was right to accept this, as otherwise it would involve acceptance of an argument that, if it could be shown that the expert or arbitrator would or might get the law wrong in a case where there was no issue about the evidence, either the whole or a percentage (on the basis of the loss of a chance of the expert or arbitrator getting it wrong) of the damages could be recovered before a court as damages for breach of the dispute resolution clause, even though if the issue had been determined in accordance with the law nothing, other than nominal damages, would be recoverable.  
41.	In any event, there was on the evidence before the judge no basis on which the judge could have reached the conclusion that an expert would, once the law was explained to him, have awarded damages on an incorrect basis.
42.	I therefore consider that the judge reached an incorrect conclusion on this issue and the appeal should be allowed.  An award for nominal damages should be substituted for the award of $139,800.
Conclusion
43.	It follows that I would allow SAS’s appeal on both issues. 
Lord Justice Wall
44.	I agree.
Lord Justice Ward
45.	I also agree.