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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> IIG Capital LLC v Van Der Merwe & Anor [2008] EWCA Civ 542 (22 May 2008) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2008/542.html Cite as: [2008] 2 Lloyd's Rep 187, [2008] EWCA Civ 542, [2008] 1 FCR 633 |
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COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
Chancery Division
Mr Justice Lewison
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
Vice-President of the Court of Appeal, Civil Division
LORD JUSTICE LAWRENCE COLLINS
and
LORD JUSTICE RIMER
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IIG Capital Llc |
Respondents |
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- and - |
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Van Der Merwe & Anr |
Appellants |
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Matthew Collings QC and Adam Smith (instructed by Messrs H L Miller & Co) for the Appellants
Hearing date : 2nd April 2008
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice Waller :
Introduction
The loan and demand
"2. In 2004 Mrs Van Der Merwe came across IIG Capital LLC ("IIG"), a company registered in New York and carrying on business there. She understood that it was interested in financing business start ups by trade finance and invoice discounting. IIG began affording finance to HPIE. However, the relationship had its ups and downs and Mr and Mrs Van Der Merwe transferred HPIE's business to Barclays. But in 2006 IIG recaptured HPIE's financing and a series of documents were entered into. All the documents were executed on the same day: 30 June 2006. One of those documents is at the heart of this dispute.
3. The first of the relevant documents is a loan agreement made between IIG and HPIE. The loan agreement contains a number of warranties given and obligations undertaken by HPIE. These include (for example) warranties about the accuracy of HPIE's accounts and financial statements (clause 8); obligations to provide regular accounts (clause 10.1); obligations to maintain insurance (clause 10.1.9); obligations not to enter into transactions otherwise than in the normal course of business (clause 11.4) and not to make loans to affiliates (clause 11.6). Clause 27.1 of that agreement said that the agreement was to be governed by New York Law. The second of the relevant documents was a debenture granted over the assets of HPIE. The third was a document described as a guarantee and signed by Mrs Van Der Merwe. I will refer to it as the guarantee, without prejudice to the contention of either party. Mr Van Der Merwe signed an identical document, although it was not in evidence.
4. On 12 January 2007 IIG demanded US$30,303,576 from HPIE said to be due under the loan agreement; and on the same day appointed administrators over HPIE. HPIE did not pay the amount demanded; and on 16 January 2007 IIG sent letters to Mr and Mrs Van Der Merwe reciting the failure of HPIE to pay and certifying that the amount due and payable by each of them under the guarantee was US$30,303,576. The letter demanded payment within 2 days. Mr and Mrs Van Der Merwe have not paid."
The terms of the guarantee
"6. The guarantee begins by describing itself as "THIS GUARANTEE" and Mrs Van Der Merwe is described as "the Guarantor". Recital (A) records the grant of the facility to HPIE (described as "the Borrower") of US$23,000,000. Recital (B) says that it was a condition precedent to the grant of the facility that the "Guarantor enters into this Guarantee of the obligations of the Borrower to the Lender under the [Loan] Agreement". Recital (C) says that the guarantee is an "all monies" guarantee.
7. The document contains a single definition in clause 1.2. The defined term is "Guaranteed Monies" and the definition is:
"(i) all moneys and liabilities (whether actual or contingent) which are now or may at any time hereafter be due, owing, payable, or expressed to be due, owing or payable, to the Lender from or by the Borrower (ii) all interest…costs, commissions, fees and other charges and expenses which the Lender may charge against the Borrower; and (iii) all legal and other costs, charges and expenses which the Lender may incur in enforcing or obtaining, or attempting to enforce or obtain, payment of any such moneys…"
8. Clause 2 contains the main payment obligation and reads:
"In consideration of the Lender agreeing to enter into the Agreement, the Guarantor as principal obligor and not merely as surety unconditionally and irrevocably:
2.1 guarantees to the Lender the due and punctual payment of the Guaranteed Moneys and agrees that, if at any time or from time to time any of the Guaranteed Moneys are not paid in full on their due date … it will immediately upon demand unconditionally pay to the Lender the Guaranteed Moneys which have not been so paid
2.2 As an original and independent obligation under this Deed, the Guarantor shall
2.2.1 indemnify the Lender and keep the Lender indemnified against any loss … incurred by the Lender as a result of a failure by the Borrower to make due and punctual payment of any of the Guaranteed Monies …"
9. Clause 3 is headed "Preservation of Guarantee" and provides:
"3.1 The Lender shall be at liberty without thereby affecting its rights hereunder at any time at its absolute discretion and with or without the consent or knowledge of or notice to the Guarantor:
3.1.1 to give time to any Obligor for the payment of all or any sums due or payable under the Agreement or any other Finance Document;
3.1.2 to neglect or forbear to enforce payment of all or any sums due or payable under the Agreement or any other Finance Document and (without prejudice to the foregoing) to grant any indulgence or forbearance to and fail to assert or pursue or delay in asserting or pursuing any right or remedy against any Obligor thereunder;
3.1.3 to accept, vary, exchange, renew, abstain from perfecting, or release any other security now held or to be held by it for or on account of the Financial Indebtedness;
3.1.4 to amend, add to or vary the terms of the Finance Documents;
3.1.5 to compound with, accept compositions from and make any other arrangements with any other Obligor.
3.2 This Guarantee and the rights of the Lender hereunder shall not be affected by:
3.2.1 the appointment of a receiver, trustee or similar officer of any other Obligor, its undertaking or all or any of its or his asset.
3.2.2 Any alteration of the status of any other Obligor or any defective or irregular exercise of the powers of the Borrower to raise finance
3.2.3 The insolvency, bankruptcy, death, incapacity, winding up, liquidation or dissolution of any other Obligor;
3.2.3 Any failure by the Lender to take any other security for all or any part of the indebtedness agreed to be taken by the Lender pursuant to the Finance Documents or any total or partial invalidity, voidability or unenforceability of any such security;
3.2.4 The doing by the Lender of anything referred to in clause 3.1 above; or
3.2.5 Any other act or circumstance which (apart from this provision) would or might constitute a legal or equitable defence for or discharge of a surety or guarantor,
and this Guarantee may be called and/or enforced without steps or proceedings first being taken against any other Obligor."
10. Clause 4.2 provided that:
"A certificate in writing signed by a duly authorised officer or officers of the Lender stating the amount at any particular time due and payable by the Guarantor under this Guarantee shall, save for manifest error, be conclusive and binding on the Guarantor for the purposes hereof."
11. Clause 5 said that the guarantee was "a continuing guarantee" and would remain in force until all sums "due from the Borrower under the Finance Documents have been paid in full". Clause 7.3 prevented the Guarantor from asserting any set-off against the Borrower. Finally, clause 14 said that the guarantee was to be governed by English law."
"Notice of default shall from time to time, be given by [plaintiffs] to [defendants] and on receipt of any such notice [defendants] will forthwith pay . . . the amount stated therein as due, such notice of default being as between [plaintiffs and defendants] conclusive evidence that [defendants'] liability hereunder has accrued in respect of the amount claimed."
"The fact that conclusive evidence clauses are strictly construed also means that the guarantor may raise arguments as to whether the document served upon him can properly be described as a "certificate" or "statement" and as to whether the person who has signed the certificate comes within the class of persons authorised to do so."
"Commenting on this kind of clause O'Donovan and Phillips say in The Modern Contract of Guarantee English Edition (2003) (¶ 5-107):
"The extraordinary effect of … the more usual conclusive evidence clause, in the context of a guarantee, however, is that a guarantee which is not phrased in terms of a performance bond payable simply on demand without proof of default becomes analogous to such a guarantee as a result of the inclusion of this clause."
"Such being the commercial practice, it is only right that brokers should be able to turn to the French bank and say: "On our giving you notice of default, you must pay."
The French bank can in turn recover the sum from their own customer, the French trading company. No doubt they have taken security for the purpose.
This does not lead to any injustice because if the figure should be erroneous, it is always open to the French trading company to have it corrected by instituting proceedings against the brokers, in England or in France, to get it corrected as between them."
"On the question of policy I do not wish to add anything to what has already been said by my Lord, the Master of the Rolls, and Lord Justice Megaw. Had I the slightest doubt about the effect of the clause, I think it would have been right to have accepted the submission of Mr Libbert that there was a triable issue; but there is nothing in the clause which precludes a subsequent adjustment as between the English broker and the French customer of the bank. The result of that adjustment, if it takes place, will ultimately enure to the benefit of the bank, always assuming that the bank has used its opportunities to regulate its relationship with its customer in a businesslike way."
"Two principal issues arise in this appeal namely, first whether the bond is a guarantee with the consequent result that the appellants are entitled to rely on defences which would be available to Chambers and second whether the affidavits lodged by the appellants raise an issue which ought to be tried (the "triable issue"). For reasons which will become apparent it is appropriate to divide the first issue into two parts namely (1) whether the bond without the second part of the condition which I have italicised would be a guarantee (the "guarantee issue") and (2) if so, whether the addition of that second part alters the position (the "construction issue")."
"My Lords I have no doubt that the Court of Appeal were in error in concluding that the bond was not a guarantee but was akin to an on demand bond. No distinction can, in my view, properly be drawn between the effect of this bond minus the second part of the condition and the bond considered by Lord Atkin in the Workington case [1937] AC 1, 17 and other bonds using this or similar wording which have for many years been generally treated as guarantees: Hudson's building and Engineering Contracts, 11th ed. (1995), vol 2 pp 1499-1500, para 17-007. Thus in a second action arising out of the bond in the Workington case, Workington Harbour & Dock Board v Trade Indemnity Co Ltd (No 2) [1938] 2 All ER 101, 105, Lord Atkin said:
"My Lords, both actions were brought on the money bond." – That is the first and second actions. – "It is well established that in such an action the plaintiff has to establish damages occasioned by the breach or breaches of the conditions, and, if he succeeds, he recovers judgment on the whole amount of the bond, but can only issue execution for the amount of the damages proved."
"The construction issue
Mr Beloff argued that the words "damages sustained by the main contractor thereby" had the effect of defining the appellants' obligation solely by reference to the additional expenditure incurred by the respondents without reference to any sums which would normally be set against it in an action of damages against Chambers. Such a construction would involve treating these general words as an express exclusion of the normal legal incidents of suretyship. It would, as Mr Pollock for the appellants pointed out, also give rise to problems in the event of a final accounting between Chambers and the respondents producing an overall indebtedness by the latter to the former or a converse indebtedness less than the sum paid by the appellants under the bond. Mr Beloff's answer to this difficulty was that the court might in appropriate circumstances imply into the bond a condition of repayment by the respondents to the appellants. A solution which does not appear to be particularly attractive.
There is no doubt that in a contract of guarantee parties may, if so minded, exclude any one or more of the normal incidents or suretyship. However if they choose to do so clear and unambiguous language must be used to displace the normal legal consequence of the contract – language such as was used in Hyundai Shipbuilding & Heavy Industries Co Ltd v Pournaras [1978] 2 Lloyd's Rep 502, 503 where the letter of guarantee provided:
"the [defendant] hereby irrevocably and unconditionally guarantees the payment in accordance with the terms of the contact of all sums due or to become due by the buyer to you under the contract and in case the buyer is in default of any such payment in default on behalf of the buyer . . ."
This was construed as enabling the shipowner to recover from the guarantors of the buyers and amount due irrespective of the position between yard and buyers: per Roskill LJ at p 5088. The words relied upon by the respondents however do not clearly displace those legal consequences. Indeed the use of the word "damages" is far more consistent with the compensation arrived at after taking into account all sums due to or by Chambers and the appellants. If the parties had intended to produce the result contended for by Mr Beloff it would have been a simple matter to use a form of words such as "the additional expenditure incurred." Instead they have used words which if anything point away from such a result."
Discussion of the deeds of guarantee in this case
"52. Mr Collings fastened on the phrase in clause 4.2 "save in the case of manifest error". A "manifest error" is one that is obvious or easily demonstrable without extensive investigation. Mr Collings referred to the decision of Thomas J in Invensys plc v Automotive Sealing Systems Ltd (8 November 2001). That was a case in which a certificate made by an expert was to be conclusive save in the case of manifest error. Thomas J held that the expert's reasons could be examined in order to determine whether he had made a manifest error. But since the contract in that case provided for the expert to give reasons, Thomas J was undoubtedly right to say that the parties must have contemplated that those reasons could be examined to see whether any manifest error had been made. By contrast, in the present case the certificate was not required to contain any reasons. I did not derive any assistance from the Invensys case."
Lord Justice Lawrence Collins :
Lord Justice Rimer :