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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Chandler v Chandler [2011] EWCA Civ 143 (27 January 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2011/143.html Cite as: [2011] EWCA Civ 143

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE PRINCIPAL REGISTRY, FAMILY DIVISION
(MRS JUSTICE BARON)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		27 January 2011

Lord Justice Thorpe:

1. The applicant was married to the respondent in 2004.  The marriage was tempestuous and resulted in the filing of a petition for divorce in this jurisdiction.  The petition was struck out for want of jurisdiction by order of Baron J, explained in a judgment of 14 September 2010. 
2. An application for permission to appeal was provisionally refused by Sir Mark Potter on 12 November and this is the renewed application at oral hearing advanced by Mr Marsh Finch.  I say at once that Mr Marsh Finch has presented his case impeccably.  He has filed a statement pursuant to the practice direction which focuses on the reasoning of Sir Mark Potter and advances the case that both Sir Mark and the judge below were wrong in law.  He quite rightly draws attention to Article 3 of Brussels II Revised where the broad jurisdictional basis for divorce is defined including the provision in Article 3.1(b) that an alternative basis for divorce is in the case of the United Kingdom and Ireland the domicile of both spouses.  He draws attention to Article 66 which decrees that with regard to states that have two or more legal systems, any reference to 'domicile' shall refer to the territorial unit designated by the law of that state.  He correctly points out that Gibraltar is a dependent territory.  It is a member state of Europe as a dependent territory.  It is part and parcel of the United Kingdom but applies its own system of law, just as Scotland applies its own system of law whilst being within the United Kingdom. 
3. The concept of domicile of dependency was abolished statutorily in 1973 in England and Wales but was not similarly abolished in Gibraltar, so that it is said that the wife acquired a domicile of dependency until Gibraltar effectively incorporated the consequences of the regulation, which of course applied throughout the member states directly without the need for any internalisation.  So all that leads to the submission that, in answering the question was the wife domiciled in the United Kingdom for the purposes of jurisdiction as at the date of the filing of her petition, what was the law to be applied?  The law of England and Wales, where she has petitioned, or the law of Gibraltar where she was married and where her husband has his business interests?  I add by way of parentheses that it seems that the parties' habitual residence has been in Spain and that there are doubts as to the domicile of the husband although there must be a strong leaning in favour of his English domicile of origin. 
4. This point was addressed confidently by the trial judge, Baron J.  She recognises that the legal system in Gibraltar is distinct and that the domicile of dependency was only abolished in that jurisdiction by the provisions of the Matrimonial Causes (Amendment) Act 2009.  The judge then directed herself to leading authorities, Dicey, Morris & Collins on the Conflicts of Law, Cheshire North & Fawcett Private International Law, Rayden and Jackson on Divorce and Matrimonial Matters, all of which confirm that in deciding a person's domicile for the purposes of jurisdiction the applicable law is the lex fori, namely, the law of England and Wales.  It was not possible for the court in this jurisdiction to apply the law of Gibraltar under the provisions of Article 3.1(b).
5. I am quite satisfied that the judge was right in that conclusion.  It is a very important feature of our relationship with the developing family law of Europe that we tenaciously uphold our principle that only the lex fori applies in the courts of England and Wales.  We have exercised our right to abstain from developing European family law that would require us to apply the law of some other jurisdiction.  I think that the proposition identified by the judge is one of long standing, I think it is a clear proposition and I think that the contention that a petitioner in this jurisdiction asserting domicile is to be judged by the law of some other territory, whether it be dependent or independent, can not be accepted.  So for all those reasons I think Sir Mark Potter was right to refuse this application and I endorse his provisional refusal. 

Order: Application refused