Neutral Citation Number: [2011] EWCA Civ 643
Case No: C1/2011/0699 & 0701
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(ADMINISTRATIVE COURT)
Mr. Justice Ouseley
[2011] EWHC 996 (Admin)
[2011] EWHC 1007 (Admin)

Royal Courts of Justice
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL

Date: 26/05/2011
Before :

LORD JUSTICE WARD
LORD JUSTICE MOORE-BICK
and
LORD JUSTICE ELIAS
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	RE: GRANT	Appellant	

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The appellant appeared in person
Mr. Rupert Jones appeared for the Crown Prosecution Service

Hearing date : 5th May 2011
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Judgment

Lord Justice Moore-Bick : 
1.	This is the judgment of the court.
2.	On 9th March 2011 Ouseley J. made an order committing the appellant, Caul Grant, to prison for contempt of court and a second order appointing a receiver over his interest in a property known as 133 Cobden Road, South Norwood, London under s. 29 of the Drug Trafficking Act 1994. Mr. Grant now appeals as of right against the committal order and renews his application for permission to appeal against the appointment of a receiver following refusal on paper by the single Lord Justice.
3.	The circumstances giving rise to the two orders are described in the judgments below, on which the following summary is directly based.
4.	On 12th December 2003 Mr Grant was convicted on eight counts of conspiracy to import cannabis contrary to section 170(2) of the Customs and Excise Management Act 1979 and on 6th February 2004 he was sentenced to 8 years’ imprisonment. On 9th February 2004 a confiscation order in the sum of £85,000 was made against him under the Drug Trafficking Act, that sum to be paid  by 9th June 2005, with an order that he serve 18 months’ imprisonment in default.  
5.	Mr. Grant failed to pay any part of the sum due under the confiscation order and accordingly, on 6th September 2005, when he was almost due for release, he was ordered to serve the default period of 18 months’ imprisonment. He was eventually released on 14th September 2009, having served half of the prison sentence and the 18 month default term.  Still nothing was paid towards the confiscation order and, as at 2nd June 2010, £118,906.85 including interest remained outstanding.  
6.	After Mr. Grant’s release from prison further investigations revealed that he might have an interest in 133 Cobden Road. Accordingly, on 4th June 2010 His Honour Judge Waksman Q.C. sitting as a High Court Judge made a restraint order, to which a penal notice was attached.  The order was served personally on Mr Grant on 11th June 2010. It included an order that by 2nd July 2010 he make and file a witness statement disclosing his assets. Mr. Grant failed to provide a statement of his assets; indeed, he made it clear that he did not intend to do so. Her Majesty's Revenue and Customs (“HMRC”), the original prosecutor in this case, therefore made two applications, one for the appointment of a receiver in respect of the Mr. Grant’s interest in 133 Cobden Road and one to commit him to prison for contempt. The judge decided to deal with the application for the appointment of a receiver first.
7.	In relation to the receivership application HMRC contended that Mr. Grant held a one third beneficial interest in the property, being one of three owners of the legal estate.  The two other co-owners contended that his interest was limited to £15,000. Ouseley J. heard evidence from Mr. Grant and from the other two owners of the property. Much of what Mr. Grant said comprised a series of complaints directed against those involved in the administration of justice, including the judiciary, various Lord Chancellors, ministers, Members of Parliament, the police and the Crown Prosecution Service (“CPS”). In the event, the judge held that Mr. Grant had a beneficial interest in the property to the extent of £15,000 and no more. He then made a receivership order in respect of that interest.
8.	Mr. Grant was not present when the judge started to hear the committal application, but as a result of the manner in which he had conducted himself in court the previous day, the judge decided to continue with the application in Mr. Grant’s absence. Although he considered whether he should adjourn the matter in order that Mr. Grant might be brought to court, he decided not to take that course because he was satisfied that he was well aware of the nature of the proceedings and of the fact that the hearing of both applications would be continuing into a second day.
9.	Having considered the evidence contained in the witness statements filed on behalf of HMRC, the judge expressed himself entirely satisfied that Mr Grant had wholly failed to comply with the requirements of the restraint order, either by 2nd July 2010 or at all. Indeed, Mr. Grant did not seek to pretend that he had done so.  Instead, he simply asserted a right not to comply with them, while at the same time making it clear that he had no intention of doing so.  Not surprisingly, the judge found Mr. Grant to be in contempt of court and sentenced him to a total of 3 months’ imprisonment.
10.	Mr. Grant settled his own grounds of appeal and represented himself at the hearing. His grounds of appeal run to sixteen paragraphs and raise arguments based on Articles 6 and 7 of the European Convention on Human Rights. He says that his original trial violated his rights under the Convention with the result that not only was his conviction unlawful, but all the proceedings that flow from it, including the orders made by Ouseley J., were equally unlawful.

11.	When he addressed the court Mr. Grant described in moving terms the train of events which has led to his present predicament. They began with the death of his infant son in hospital in distressing circumstances seventeen years ago, which led in turn to the failure of his marriage. In 1999 he was committed for contempt of court at a hearing at which he was apparently not present. That led to his being arrested and held in prison for two months. His inability, as he saw it, to obtain proper redress for his grievances led him to commit the offences of which he was convicted in 2003, which he saw as the only means of ensuring that he would appear before a court. His defence of justification was rejected by the trial judge, who directed the jury (wrongly, he says) that no such defence exists in English law. His application for leave to appeal against conviction was dismissed by the Single Judge on paper and by the Full Court on renewal. He complains that the court’s refusal to allow him to be present and to address it in person on the renewed application was a violation of his Convention rights. However, Mr. Grant told us that his attempt to obtain redress before the European Court of Human Rights was rejected on the grounds that there had in fact been no breach of his Convention rights.
12.	Mr. Grant has clearly been deeply affected by all these matters, but two psychiatrists who examined him while he was in custody were satisfied that he did not suffer from any mental illness. He says that no member of the judiciary is able to give him a fair hearing, because they all have an interest in suppressing the truth about the level of criminality in which the judiciary itself is engaged. He has described the current attempt by the CPS (which has taken the matter over from HMRC) to recover the outstanding amount due under the confiscation order as cruel and wicked, inasmuch as it is seeking to strip him of an investment he made for his children 23 years ago.
13.	When considering these matters it is important to bear in mind that this court is concerned with a relatively narrow question, namely, whether either of the orders made by Ouseley J. should be set aside. We have no power to interfere with orders made by other courts on other occasions, even if we wanted to. We are obliged to proceed on the basis that they were correctly made in accordance with the law. Whatever the rights and wrongs of the earlier proceedings, they can have no bearing on the lawfulness of the orders made by Ouseley J. 
14.	When he refused permission to appeal against the order appointing a receiver the Single Lord Justice observed that Mr. Grant’s notice of appeal did not attempt to engage with the judge’s reasons for making the order. Unfortunately, that is correct and it is equally true in respect of his appeal against the committal order. Moreover, none of Mr. Grant’s submissions were directed to challenging those orders, save in the general terms we have indicated.
15.	Ouseley J. went to great lengths to examine the case against Mr. Grant with care and to ensure that whatever findings he made were well supported by the evidence before him. Nothing that Mr. Grant has said, whether on paper or in the course of the hearing, begins to undermine the judge’s decision in relation to the extent of his interest in 133 Cobden Road. His failure to comply with the terms of the restraint order is self-evident; indeed, he has not sought to argue otherwise. In these circumstances Mr. Grant has failed to put forward any grounds for challenging either of the judge’s orders. The sentence he passed in respect of the contempt was entirely merited, given Mr. Grant’s failure to make any attempt to comply with the order for disclosure. 
16.	In those circumstances we should ordinarily have had no choice but to dismiss the appeal against the committal order and dismiss the application for permission to appeal against the receivership order. However, with some encouragement from the court the CPS has very helpfully given careful consideration to whether it should continue to press for Mr. Grant’s committal. Having heard from his own mouth, apparently for the first time, his account of the experiences which led him to commit the offences of which he was convicted and to disobey the disclosure requirements of the inevitable confiscation order, it has concluded that it would no longer serve the public interest for him to be sent to prison over this matter. Accordingly, it has agreed that, although the committal order was properly made, his appeal against it should be allowed by consent. However, for the reasons we have given his application for permission to appeal against the receivership order must be dismissed.