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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Djaba v West London Mental Health Trust & Anor [2017] EWCA Civ 436 (28 June 2017) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2017/436.html Cite as: [2017] WLR(D) 429, [2017] MHLR 345, (2017) 20 CCL Rep 264, [2017] EWCA Civ 436, [2018] 1 WLR 1333, [2018] WLR 1333 |
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ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL,
(ADMINISTRATIVE APPEALS CHAMBER)
Upper Tribunal Judge Jacobs
HM/0405/2016
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE McCOMBE
and
LORD JUSTICE SALES
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JASMIN DJABA |
Appellant |
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- and - |
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(1)WEST LONDON MENTAL HEALTH TRUST (2) SECRETARY OF STATE FOR JUSTICE |
Respondents |
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Vikram Sachdeva QC (instructed by Bevan Brittan) for the First Respondent
The Second Respondent did not appear and was not represented
Hearing date: 25 May 2017
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Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice McCombe:
"72 Powers of tribunals
(1) Where application is made to the appropriate tribunal by or in respect of a patient who is liable to be detained under this Act or is a community patient, the tribunal may in any case direct that the patient be discharged, and –
…
(b) the tribunal shall direct the discharge of a patient liable to be detained otherwise than under section 2 above if it is not satisfied –
(i) that he is then suffering from mental disorder or from mental disorder of a nature or degree which makes it appropriate for him to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment; or
(ii) that it is necessary for the health of safety of the patient or for the protection of other persons that he should receive such treatment; or
(iia) that appropriate medical treatment is available for him; ...
73 Power to discharge restricted patients
(1) Where an application to the appropriate tribunal is made by a restricted patient who is subject to a restriction order, or where the case of such a patient is referred to the appropriate tribunal, the tribunal shall direct the absolute discharge of the patient if –
(a) the tribunal is not satisfied as to the matters mentioned in paragraph (b) (i), (ii) or (iia) of section 72(1) above; and
(b) the tribunal is satisfied that it is not appropriate for the patient to remain liable to be recalled to hospital for further treatment.
(2) Where in the case of any such patient as is mentioned in subsection (1) above –
(a) paragraph (a) of that subsection applies; but
(b) paragraph (b) of that subsection does not apply,
the tribunal shall direct the conditional discharge of the patient.
145 Interpretation
(1) In this Act, unless the context otherwise requires –
…
'medical treatment' includes nursing, psychological intervention and specialist mental health habilitation, rehabilitation and care (but see also subsection (4) below);
…
(4) Any reference in this Act to medical treatment, in relation to mental disorder, shall be construed as a reference to medical treatment the purpose of which is to alleviate, or prevent a worsening or, the disorder or one or more of its symptoms or manifestations."
"1. The Tribunal is satisfied that the patient is suffering from mental disorder of a nature and degree which makes it appropriate for the patient to be liable to be detained in a hospital for medical treatment.
2. The Tribunal is satisfied that it is necessary for the health and safety of the patient and for the protection of other persons that the patient should receive such treatment.
3. The Tribunal is satisfied that appropriate medical treatment is available for the patient."
"…shall be construed as a reference to medical treatment the purpose of which is to alleviate, or prevent a worsening of, the disorder or one or more of its symptoms or manifestations."
Ms Bretherton argued that treatment no longer had this purpose and that detention was not proportionate in a way that was compliant with Article 5.
"…the outcome of this case would be the same whether I dealt with it under Ms Bretherton's human rights analysis or under the normal interpretation of the Mental Health Act 1983".
"…would have been the same had I applied the human rights approach presented by Ms Bretherton. Essentially, the argument failed because it was founded on an approach to the tribunal's findings of fact that was not supported by the evidence".
"30. The preferable means is what happened in this case: that the Secretary of State uses her power under section 67(1) to refer the case to a tribunal. This is preferable because mental health review tribunals are much better suited to determining the merits of a patient's detention and doing so in a way which is convenient to the patient, readily accessible, and comparatively speedy. As already seen, a reference is treated as if the patient had made an application, so that the patient has the same rights within it as she would if she herself had initiated the proceedings. It can, of course, be objected that this solution depends upon the Secretary of State being willing to exercise her discretion to refer. But the Secretary of State is under a duty to act compatibly with the patient's Convention rights and would be well advised to make such a reference as soon as the position is drawn to her attention. In this case this happened at the request of the patient's own lawyers. Should the Secretary of State decline to exercise this power, judicial review would be swiftly available to oblige her to do so. It would also be possible for the hospital managers or the local social services authority to notify the Secretary of State whenever an application is made under section 29 so that she can consider the position. These applications are not common: they no longer feature in the annual published Judicial Statistics, but when they did feature they tended just to make double figures every year. So the burden on the authorities, the Secretary of State and the tribunals would not be high.
31. Judicial review and/or habeas corpus would, of course, also be available to challenge the lawfulness of the patient's detention. Any person with sufficient standing could invoke them. Before the Human Rights Act 1998, the European Court of Human Rights held that these were not a sufficiently rigorous review of the merits, as opposed to the formal legality, of the patient's detention to comply with article 5(4): see X v United Kingdom (1981) 4 EHRR 188. It may well be that, as the Administrative Court must now itself act compatibly with the patient's rights, it would be obliged to conduct a sufficient review of the merits to satisfy itself that the requirements of article 5(1)(e) were indeed made out. But it is not well equipped to do so. First, it is not used to hearing oral evidence and cross examination. It will therefore take some persuading that this is necessary: cf R (Wilkinson) v Broadmoor Special Hospital Authority [2002] 1 WLR 419 and R (N) v M [2003] 1 WLR 562. Second, it is not readily accessible to the patient, who is the one person whose participation in the proceedings must be assured. It sits in London, whereas tribunals sit in the hospital. How would the patient's transport to London be arranged? Third, it is not itself an expert tribunal and will therefore need more argument and evidence than a mental health review tribunal will need to decide exactly the same case. All of this takes time, thus increasing the risk that the determination will not be as speedy as article 5(4) requires.
32. Hence, while judicial review and/or habeas corpus may be one way of securing compliance with the patient's article 5(4) rights, this would be much more satisfactorily achieved either by a speedy determination of the county court proceedings or by a Secretary of State's reference under section 67. Either way, however, the means exist of operating section 29(4) in a way which is compatible with the patient's rights. It follows that the section itself cannot be incompatible, although the action or inaction of the authorities under it may be so."
"[57] So, as mentioned earlier, the First-tier Tribunal and thus the MHRT provide a tribunal in which patients are entitled to speedily challenge the lawfulness of their detention and obtain an order for release if it is not lawful. For example as to this in AMA v Greater Manchester West Mental Health NHS Foundation trust and Others [2015] UKUT 36 (AAC) I said in the different context of an application to withdrawal of an application:
'The role of the FtT
38 The FtT is a tribunal that has the function of reviewing detentions under the MHA. It therefore plays an important role in fulfilling the substantive and procedural requirements of Article 5(4) ECHR, and the underlying purposes of the MHA and the procedural fairness required by the common law. As appears from YA:
(i) The main purpose of Article 5 is to provide that no one should be deprived of their liberty in an arbitrary manner.
(ii) The reviewing body, and so the FtT, must consider whether the reasons that initially justified detention continue and review the substantive and procedural conditions that are essential for the deprivation of liberty to be lawful.
(iii) Article 5(4) applies to those reviews and is directed to ensuring that there is a fair procedure for reviewing the lawfulness of a detention.
(iv) To my mind the most important principles to take into account in the decision making process of the FtT are: (a) the underlying purpose and importance of the review and so the need to fairly and thoroughly assess the reasons for the detention, (b) the vulnerability of the person who is its subject and what is at stake for that person (ie a continuation of a detention for an indentified purpose), (c) the need for flexibility and appropriate speed, (d) whether, without representation (but with all other available assistance and the prospect of further reviews), the patient will practically and effectively be able to conduct their case, and if not whether nonetheless (e) the tribunal is likely to be properly and sufficiently informed of the competing factors relating to the case before it and so able to carry out an effective review. (As to this the tribunal should when deciding the case review this prediction).
(v) The presumption of capacity and the requirement for it to be assessed by reference to the relevant decision, issue or activity must be remembered but care needs to be taken not to embark on unnecessary assessments and to maintain flexibility to achieve the underlying purpose, namely a practical and effective review of a deprivation of liberty in an appropriate timescale.'
[58] In my view, it would therefore be surprising if those tribunals either (a) could not as a matter of jurisdiction take into account a breach of European Convention rights, or (b) in the exercise of their discretion should leave to other courts, and so effectively ignore, a breach of European Convention rights."
"… [T]hat language and the following, namely:
(i) the role and function of the MHRT (and so the First-tier Tribunal) (see paras [56]-[58] hereof), and so the points made by Baroness Hale on their role and the problems relating to and thus the adequacy of an available challenge in other courts,
(ii) sections 3, 6 and 7 of the HRA (the relevant terms and effects of which are set out a paras [59]-[65] hereof),
(iii) the positive obligations under Art 5 (see para [55] hereof),
(iv) the point that Parliament is most unlikely to have intended that any of the tests set by the MHA should or could be construed and applied in a way that created an unlawful result, and
(v) the point that Parliament is also most unlikely to have intended that a tribunal set up to determining challenges to and to review decisions made under the MHA could or should not address any such unlawful result and if it found one had been created do nothing about it.[sic]
found the conclusion that the MHRT (and so the First-tier Tribunal) in applying their statutory jurisdiction can and should take into account whether the decision that is the subject of the proceedings before them creates an unlawful result.
[97] It follows that in my view a First-tier Tribunal (and so the MHRT) cannot ignore and so effectively sanction a continuation of, or a possible continuation of, a deprivation of liberty in breach of Art 5 created by the implementation of the conditions of a CTO and so an unlawful, or possibly unlawful, state of affairs.
[98] If these conclusions are wrong issues of incompatibility would arise."
"54. The CTO scheme is provided for in a statutory framework that is a procedure prescribed by law. The criteria for the imposition of conditions that may deprive a patient of his liberty are specified in sections 17A(4) to (5) and 17B(2) MHA. They are limited to the purposes of the legislation, for example, for medical treatment. They are time limited by section 17C and they are subject to regular rights of review by sections 20A and 66 which are equivalent to the rights enjoyed by a patient detained in hospital so that there is no incoherence or lack of equivalence in the safeguards provided by the scheme. The conditions in a CTO have to be in writing: see, for example sections 17A(1) and 17B(4). The responsible clinician has the power of recall (sections 17E(1) and (2)) and the powers of suspension and variation (sections 17B(4) and (5)). Accordingly, in our judgment, the framework provides both practical and effective protection of a patient's Convention rights.
The powers of the tribunal:
55. The tribunal has a distinct and separate power: that of discharge if the statutory criteria for detention are not met. The statutory framework does not provide for the intervention of a tribunal to regulate the conditions made by the responsible clinician. In particular, there is no power in the CTO scheme for a tribunal to consider the terms of a CTO or to change those terms. The power vested in the tribunal is to discharge the patient if the circumstances described in section 72 MHA permit or to leave the CTO in place subject to the conditions made by the responsible clinician. The power exercisable by the tribunal is to discharge the patient from detention not to 'discharge the CTO'. There is no power to revise the conditions or examine the legality of the CTO including the proportionality of the interference with the patient's article 5 or other ECHR rights. Likewise, the tribunal does not have power to defer discharge on an application for discharge of a community patient. There is no analogous provision to that contained in section 73(7) which confers a power on the tribunal to defer a direction for the conditional discharge of a restricted patient "until such arrangements as appear to the tribunal to be necessary for that purpose have been made to its satisfaction".
56. The remedy for any illegality, including any Convention illegality, is to challenge the CTO by judicial review. The absence of a power in the tribunal does not create a Convention incompatibility if the statutory scheme has effective and practical safeguards. Furthermore, a tribunal which exercises a jurisdiction which is itself Convention compatible i.e. possessing effective and practical safeguards for the patient is not as a public authority acting unlawfully in not assuming what would have to be an inherent jurisdiction to scrutinise the Convention compatibility of the CTO.
57. It is accordingly inappropriate for the tribunal to create an extra-statutory checklist which might lead to the discharge of a patient because of an alleged Convention incompatibility, in particular an objective deprivation of liberty. There is a statutory test for discharge in section 72(1) MHA the criteria for which mirror the criteria for making a CTO under section 17A(5). The criteria are part of the safeguards provided for in the statutory scheme. There is no mandate to alter them. To do so involves the assumption of a jurisdiction that the tribunal does not possess with the unintended consequence that tribunals engaged in a straightforward specialist task would become diverted into time consuming and procedurally irrelevant exercises.
58. The MHRTW analysed the CTO scheme as taking precedence over human rights issues. It would have been better to reason that the statutory framework contains all the safeguards that are required and that the safeguards can be read compatibly with human rights jurisprudence. Individual decisions of responsible clinicians that breach those safeguards can be remedied in judicial review.
59. Neither the Convention nor the Human Rights Act 1998 confer jurisdiction on a tribunal. There is nothing in the general role and function of a tribunal that permits it to exercise a function that it does not have by statute."
"62. The power to discharge a patient in the circumstances provided for in section 72 MHA does not extend to a power exercisable by a tribunal to scrutinise the lawfulness of the conditions imposed by the responsible clinician. That challenge must go to the High Court in judicial review where the court can take steps to remedy an unlawful condition without risking discharge of a patient in respect of whom the criteria for discharge are not made out.
63. The logical conclusion of the UT's analysis is that a patient may have to be discharged under section 72 MHA if a Convention non-compliance is made out despite the criteria for discharge not being satisfied i.e. at a time when the statutory criteria for the power of recall to be exercised still exist. That could be dangerous both for the patient and the public because if the need for treatment and/or protection has been identified (and it must be for the tribunal not to exercise its mandatory power to discharge) then the need also has to be provided for: any other circumstance is contradictory and in terms of the statutory purpose, perverse. The power of discretionary discharge in section 72 is limited to the defined statutory purposes. The UT's analysis involves an exercise in interpretation of the statutory framework that is inconsistent with a fundamental feature of the legislation which is impermissible."
"18. Accordingly, as a matter of statutory construction, having regard to domestic law principles, the Act does not provide a power in the FtT / MHRTW to impose conditions on a conditional discharge that extend to the imposition of an objective deprivation of liberty. There is no other power in the FtT / MHRTW to impose conditions on a conditional discharge than that set out in section 73 MHA. The analysis of Convention jurisprudence in RB is to the same effect. We are of the view that RB is correct and it is binding on us. It cannot be said to be per incuriam but in any event that submission was not pursued and the Respondent's Notice asserting that it was per incuriam and/or wrongly decided was withdrawn with our leave."
Lord Justice Sales:
Lady Justice Arden: