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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Aziz & Ors v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2018] EWCA Civ 1884 (08 August 2018) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2018/1884.html Cite as: [2019] WLR 266, [2018] WLR(D) 526, [2019] 1 WLR 266, [2018] EWCA Civ 1884, [2019] Imm AR 264

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL (CIVIL DIVISION)
ON APPEAL FROM THE UPPER TRIBUNAL (IMMIGRATION AND
ASYLUM CHAMBER)
THE HON. MR. JUSTICE MCCLOSKEY &
DEPUTY UPPER TRIBUNAL JUDGE HOLMES
[2017] UKUT 118 (IAC)

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand, London, WC2A 2LL
		08/08/2018

Lord Justice Sales:

1. The appellants are naturalised British citizens. At the time of the relevant decisions of the Secretary of State, the First-tier Tribunal ("FTT") and the Upper Tribunal, the appellants had dual nationality, being citizens of Pakistan. This appeal concerns the proposal of the Secretary of State to make an order to deprive the appellants of their British citizenship pursuant to section 40 of the British Nationality Act 1981.
2. The appellants are part of a group of men convicted in 2012 of a range of offences involving the grooming, sexual abuse and trafficking of girls in Rochdale in a case which attracted national attention and notoriety. The steps to deprive the appellants of British nationality are a prelude to possible deportation to Pakistan. Each of the appellants has children in the UK and an established private life in the UK. They maintain that deportation to Pakistan would violate their right to respect for family and private life as set out in Article 8 of the European Convention on Human Rights, as given effect in domestic law by the Human Rights Act 1998. They also maintain that deportation would be in breach of the obligation of the Secretary of State and the tribunals to have regard to the interests of their children as a primary consideration, pursuant to section 55 of the Borders, Citizenship and Immigration Act 2009 ("section 55").
3. If a decision is eventually taken to deport the appellants, they will each have a right of appeal to the FTT against such decision. Upon such an appeal, they will be entitled to rely on their Article 8 rights and section 55, so far as concerns the issues that would arise in relation to their deportation. They will be able to adduce evidence going to those issues as at the relevant time in the future, if and when the Secretary of State decides to make a deportation order in respect of them and if and when any appeal against such a decision is heard by the FTT. Any such decision and any appeal is likely to be many months away.
4. The present proceedings relate to the prior stage, namely that of deprivation of British citizenship. The principal issue on the appeal is whether the Secretary of State and the FTT have made a proper and lawful assessment at the deprivation stage of the impact of deprivation of citizenship upon the appellants and their children, so far as concerns their rights under Article 8 and section 55.
5. Section 40 of the 1981 Act, which is headed "Deprivation of Citizenship", provides:

 "(1) In this section a reference to a person's "citizenship status" is a reference to his status as-"

 (a) a British citizen,

 (b) a British overseas territories citizen,

 (c) a British Overseas citizen,

 (d) a British National (Overseas),

 (e) a British protected person, or

 (f) a British subject.

 (2) The Secretary of State may by order deprive a person of a citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that deprivation is conducive to the public good.

 ...

 (4) The Secretary of State may not make an order under subsection (2) if he is satisfied that the order would make a person stateless.

 ...

(4A) But that does not prevent the Secretary of State from making an order under subsection (2) to deprive a person of a citizenship status if-

 (a) the citizenship status results from the person's naturalisation,

 (b) the Secretary of State is satisfied that the deprivation is conducive to the public good because the person, while having that citizenship status, has conducted him or herself in a manner which is seriously prejudicial to the vital interests of the United Kingdom, any of the Islands, or any British overseas territory, and

 (c) the Secretary of State has reasonable grounds for believing that the person is able, under the law of a country or territory outside the United Kingdom, to become a national of such a country or territory.

 (5) Before making an order under this section in respect of a person the Secretary of State must give the person written notice specifying -

 (a)    that the Secretary of State has decided to make an order,

(b)    the reasons for the order, and

(c)     the person's right of appeal under section 40A (1) or under section 2B of the Special Immigration Appeals Commission Act 1997.

 (6) Where a person acquired a citizenship status by the operation of a law which applied to him because of his registration or naturalisation under an enactment having effect before commencement, the Secretary of State may by order deprive the person of the citizenship status if the Secretary of State is satisfied that the registration or naturalisation was obtained by means of -

 (a) fraud,

 (b) false representation, or

 (c) concealment of a material fact."

Factual background

6. In 2012, the appellants were part of a group of nine men convicted at the Crown Court in Liverpool in respect of the grooming and sexual exploitation of several girls aged in their early teens in Rochdale. The men were sentenced on 9 May 2012. The sentencing judge described how in some cases the girls were raped callously, viciously and violently; and in some cases they were driven round Rochdale and Oldham to be made to have sex with paying customers. All the men treated the girls as though they were worthless and beyond all respect. They were motivated by lust and greed.
7. The judge's sentencing remarks specific to the three appellants were as follows:

"Abdul Aziz, I have to sentence you for conspiracy to engage in sexual activity with a child by penetrative sex and trafficking for sexual exploitation a 15 year old girl. You are an intelligent man referred to by some of your co-accused as The Master. You took over from Shabir Ahmed and ran this operation with Melissa Kirk. You took the victim who was so many years younger than you to the Jackie Street flat. You knew that she had been or was to be plied with weed and vodka. You then coerced her into sex with men. You took her there several times a week for a period of three months. You also took her twice to a flat in Falinge and to Ashworth Valley. You received money from these men. You made her have anal sex when she was menstruating. I accept that you did not have sexual intercourse with her yourself.

Society finds this sort of behaviour repugnant. In my view, having watched you carefully during this trial, I am satisfied that the degree of coercion you used towards her was real and severe and that this constitutes an additional aggravating factor. As far as the conspiracy count is involved you were aware that a large number of men were involved and several girls.

The sentence on you, despite your previous good character must be severe. On the count of trafficking you will go to prison for nine years, on the count of conspiracy nine years concurrent.

…

Abdul Rauf, you have to be sentenced with trafficking a 15 year old girl and conspiracy. The trafficking varied between your driving her to a lonely area near Heywood and having sex with her in your taxi and driving her to a flat in Rochdale where you and others had sex with her. On the evidence this happened from 10 to 20 times. The image you gave during this trial was of a deeply hypocritical individual. I accept that you have health issues. On the count of trafficking you will go to prison for six years, on the count of conspiracy for six years concurrent.

…

Adil Khan, you fall to be sentenced for two offences of conspiracy and trafficking a 15 year old girl. During the course of this case the jury heard that you, in your forties had formed a relationship with a 15 year old girl from which she became pregnant. Until you were forced to do so by scientific proof you refused to admit that relationship. Having met another 15 year old at one address you trafficked her to another, where she had sex with you and another about four times. When she remonstrated with you about what you were ordering her to do, you used violence towards here. You too are an intelligent man and also in my view a hypocrite. On the trafficking count you will go to prison for eight years with eight years concurrent on the conspiracy counts. …"

8. In July 2015, the Secretary of State gave notice to each of the appellants pursuant to section 40(5) of the 1981 Act that she proposed to make an order to deprive him of citizenship, acting under section 40(2), on the grounds that it would be conducive to the public good to do so. Representations were made on behalf of each appellant to complain that the Secretary of State had not given adequate consideration to the interests of the appellants' children when deciding to give such notice. In the light of those representations the Secretary of State withdrew those notices.
9. By further notices dated 2 December 2015 sent to each of the appellants, the Secretary of State again gave notice under section 40(5) that she proposed making an order to deprive him of citizenship, again in reliance on section 40(2). These notices stated in each case that the Secretary of State took the view that the offences of which the appellant had been convicted were "serious and organised offences, involving collusion with others as is evident from the length of your sentence". In each notice the Secretary of State stated that she was aware that the appellant had children aged under 18, but took the view that "Deprivation of [his] citizenship (as distinct from deportation) will not, in itself, have a significant effect on the best interests of [his] children". She referred in that regard to her duty under section 55, and stated that she considered "that the public interest in depriving [the relevant appellant] of citizenship clearly outweighs any interest your children might have in [his] remaining a British citizen." The notices continued as follows:

"British citizenship is a privilege that confers particular entitlements and benefits, including the right to a British passport and the right to vote in general elections. It is not in the public interest that individuals who engage in serious and/or organised crime, which constitutes a flagrant abuse of British values, enjoy those entitlements and benefits."

10. Each notice advised that the appellant had a right of appeal under section 40A(1) of the 1981 Act against the decision to deprive him of his citizenship. Each notice also stated that, in the eventuality that the appellant was deprived of his British citizenship, the Secretary of State would also give consideration to pursuing his removal or deportation from the UK.
11. The appellants duly exercised their right of appeal to the FTT against the notices under section 40A of the 1981 Act. Mr Rauf and Mr Aziz were represented at the hearings in the FTT in their cases, but Mr Khan represented himself. They protested their innocence, but the FTT correctly proceeded on the footing that they had committed the offences of which they had been found guilty.
12. Each appellant relied on three principal grounds of appeal: (i) deprivation of citizenship would involve a breach of his and his family's rights under Article 8 and a breach of the duty set out in section 55; (ii) deprivation of citizenship would be incompatible with EU law; and (iii) deprivation of citizenship was in breach of the Secretary of State's own policy regarding the exercise of her power under section 40(2) of the 1981 Act, as set out in para. 55.4.4 of the Home Office Nationality Instructions. That paragraph states:

"Conduciveness to the public good means depriving in the public interest on grounds of involvement in terrorism, espionage, serious organised crime, war crimes or unacceptable behaviours."

13. In a lengthy decision in each case, the FTT dismissed the appeal. It is only the FTT's decision on ground (i) and on ground (iii) which is in issue on the appeal to this court.
14. As to ground (i), in each case the FTT directed itself by reference to guidance given by the Upper Tribunal in Delialissi v Secretary of State for the Home Department [2013] UKUT 439 (IAC) and gave extensive consideration to, among other things, the impact upon the appellant's and his family's rights under Article 8 and section 55 should the appellant be deported after being deprived of his citizenship under section 40 of the 1981 Act.
15. In each case, the FTT found that depriving the appellant of his British citizenship would not in itself prevent him continuing his relationship with his family; nor was there any evidence to suggest that the deprivation of citizenship would have any significant effect on the interests of his children. The FTT said that it had "no hesitation in finding that given the grave nature of the offending and the fact that it was an organised crime perpetrated with others over a sustained period, the consequences of the appellant no longer being a British citizen on either himself or his family members is not such as to outweigh the public interest in the deprivation."
16. By reason of the guidance in Delialissi the FTT then went on in each case to consider whether there would be a breach of the appellant's or his family's rights under Article 8 or of the duty under section 55 if the appellant were deported, and concluded that there would not be.
17. The appellants appealed against these decisions to the Upper Tribunal. Each of the appellants was represented at the hearing in the Upper Tribunal. The Upper Tribunal dismissed their appeals. As regards ground (i), the Upper Tribunal held that the FTT had been correct to direct itself by reference to Delialissi and that it had lawfully and sufficiently considered the interests of the appellants and their children in relation to the deportation of the appellants. As regards ground (iii), the Upper Tribunal held that it was rationally open to the Secretary of State and the FTT to conclude that the appellants' offending was embraced by the words "unacceptable behaviours" in para. 55.4.4 of the Nationality Instructions ([62]); that the ultimate question was whether the Secretary of State's conclusion that deprivation of British nationality is conducive to the public good was one reasonably open to her, which it was ([67]); but that in any event, as counsel for the appellants accepted, criminality of the kind of which the appellants had been found guilty could in principle be characterised as "serious organised crime" within the meaning of para. 55.4.4 and whether or not it should be so characterised was an evaluative judgment involving a wide margin of appreciation on the part of the relevant decision-maker (be it the Secretary of State or the FTT), and the evaluative assessments by the Secretary of State and the FTT that the offending in each case did constitute "serious organised crime" within the meaning of para. 55.4.4 were lawful ([64] and [68]).
18. The appellants now appeal to this court on the two limited grounds of appeal in respect of which the Upper Tribunal granted them permission to appeal. Those grounds are: (1) the FTT's decision in each case is not "entirely consistent" with the decision of the Upper Tribunal in Delialissi; and (2) the decision to deprive the appellant of British citizenship is not compatible with the Secretary of State's policy in para. 55.4.4 of the Nationality Instructions, set out above.
19. The appellants have not secured public funding for this appeal and their judicial review claim against the legal aid authority was dismissed. They represented themselves at the hearing before us. This court took steps to ensure that we had before us their skeleton argument prepared by counsel for the hearing in the Upper Tribunal. The court also ensured that the hearing before us was conducted at a pace which ensured that the appellants could follow the arguments being presented and that they had a fair opportunity to advance their case.
20. Mr Khan made a submission that he was not guilty of the offences of which he was convicted. However, we consider that it is right that we should approach the appeal on the footing that each of the appellants was indeed guilty of the offences of which he had been convicted and that the judge's sentencing remarks were accurate. That is the approach correctly adopted by the FTT and the Upper Tribunal below, and there is no ground of appeal in the appeal to this court which puts that in issue.

Discussion

Ground (1): the guidance in Delialissi

21. In Delialissi the Upper Tribunal (Judge Peter Lane and Judge Kebede) gave guidance regarding the approach to be followed on an appeal under section 40A of the 1981 Act against a decision to deprive an individual of British citizenship. Amongst other things, the Upper Tribunal held that consideration on such an appeal should include Article 8 issues. It observed that, unlike section 84(1)(g) of the Nationality, Immigration and Asylum Act 2002, section 40A does not involve any statutory hypothesis that the appellant will be removed from the UK in consequence of the deprivation decision. However, it said that a FTT is required to determine the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation which may, depending on the facts, include removal. The Upper Tribunal said this at [55]-[56]:

"55. The absence of a statutory requirement to hypothesise removal, does not, however mean that removal as a consequence of deprivation is automatically excluded from the factors to be considered by the Tribunal hearing a section 40A appeal. Removal will be relevant if, and insofar as the Tribunal finds, as a matter of fact, that in the circumstances of the particular case, it is a reasonably foreseeable consequence of depriving the person of British citizenship.

56. Indeed, the whole focus of a section 40A appeal is to ascertain the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation, whether or not involving removal. Thus, even if removal is too uncertain to feature directly as a consequence, the possibility of removal and any period of uncertainty following deprivation may require to be taken into account in assessing the effect that deprivation would have, not only on the appellant but also on members of his family."

22. On the particular facts in Delialissi, the Upper Tribunal found that "the likelihood of the [Secretary of State] deciding to remove the appellant, upon his ceasing to be a British citizen is so remote as to be disregarded in the context of [the] proceedings" ([59]). However, in the present cases, the FTT thought that the guidance by the Upper Tribunal meant that in each case it had to make an assessment whether it was likely the appellant would in fact be deported eventually and to consider his Article 8 rights and those of his family and the impact of section 55 in relation to such hypothetical future deportation, when assessing the lawfulness of the prior step of deprivation of British citizenship.
23. That approach is in line with that of the Upper Tribunal (Judge Peter Lane) in another case in which the Delialissi guidance was followed and applied: AB (British citizenship: deprivation Delialissi considered) Nigeria [2016] UKUT 451 (IAC), at [58]-[59] and [95]-[102]. In that case, after consideration on a proleptic basis of whether AB would be likely to be removed to Nigeria, Judge Lane concluded that she had such a strong human rights claim not to be removed that it was not reasonably foreseeable that she would be. By contrast, in the present cases the FTT found, after carrying out a similar proleptic analysis, that it was likely that the appellants would be deported and that in view of the gravity of their offending such deportation would not violate anyone's Article 8 rights, nor the duty under section 55. What is common to AB and the present cases is that the tribunal undertook such a proleptic analysis regarding what might ultimately happen in relation to removal or deportation before reaching its conclusion regarding the lawfulness of the deprivation of citizenship. In AB, Judge Lane said this at [99]:

"I agree with [counsel for AB and counsel for the Secretary of State] that it is not for the Tribunal, in the present proceedings, to pre-judge the outcome of any appeal that the appellant may bring against a decision to deport her. It would, nevertheless, be wrong to make a finding regarding the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation that ignores this aspect. The Tribunal must take a view as to whether, from its present vantage point, there is likely to be force in any challenge to deportation that the appellant can be expected to bring. The stronger the case, the less likely it will be that the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation will include removal from the United Kingdom …"

24. Conversely, by this reasoning, the weaker the case for the individual, the more likely it will be that the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation will include removal from the UK, which presumably should then be brought into account when considering whether deprivation of citizenship is lawful. The effect is to draw the tribunal into considering on a proleptic basis the legal merits in relation to deportation or removal of an individual, as the FTT did in the present cases under appeal.
25. In my opinion, the passage quoted above from Judge Lane's decision in AB (British citizenship: deprivation Delialissi considered) Nigeria demonstrates the uncomfortable tension which arises from the correct recognition that, on the one hand, there may be a removal decision in the future which, if it occurs, will be subject to its own separate appeal based on Article 8 and other legal duties in light of evidence about the circumstances which then obtain (which will or may be different from the evidence available at the earlier time when a decision on deprivation of citizenship is made) - which the tribunal ought not to pre-judge; while on the other hand the formula set out in the guidance in Delialissi seems to suggest that there should be an attempt to pre-judge (in the sense of making a predictive assessment) what would happen in those future proceedings, by reference to such evidence as is available at the time of the earlier deprivation decision.
26. In my view, the guidance in Delialissi and in AB (British citizenship: deprivation Delialissi considered) Nigeria on this point is liable to mislead tribunals in relation to how they should approach consideration of Article 8 and other Convention rights and section 55 in appeals concerned with deprivation of citizenship. Although in a sense it is of course difficult to quibble with the formula in Delialissi that regard should be had to the reasonably foreseeable consequences of deprivation of citizenship, an examination of such consequences is only required insofar as it is necessary to make an assessment in relation to them in order to rule upon whether the making of the deprivation order itself will be lawful and compatible with Convention rights, in particular Article 8, and section 55. That will depend in turn upon the reasons put forward by the Secretary of State to justify the making of the deprivation order (as distinct from any deportation or removal order which might be made at a later time).
27. The usual position is likely to be that the Secretary of State contends that deprivation of citizenship is conducive to the public good because, by reason of the individual's harmful conduct, he ought not to be allowed to enjoy the benefits of British citizenship generally, quite aside from the possibility of his removal from the UK. That was the position of the Secretary of State in relation to these three appellants; and the FTT in each case found that by reason of the serious offending of each appellant the Secretary of State was entitled to take that position. That was particularly so because deprivation itself would be likely to have minimal impact upon each appellant's family life and the interests of their children. The making of the deprivation orders would not violate anyone's rights under Article 8, nor would there be any breach of the duty under section 55.
28. In my judgment, the Secretary of State and, in turn, the FTT were entitled to make these assessments. It was unnecessary for the FTT to go further, as it did in each case, and conduct a proleptic analysis of whether each appellant would be likely to be deported or removed at a later stage. The Secretary of State had already been successful in showing that the making of a deprivation order in each case would be lawful and compatible with Convention rights, without needing to go on to establish whether the appellant would or could lawfully be deported later on. It was known that if a deportation order was sought to be made after deprivation of citizenship had occurred, the relevant appellant would have the opportunity of making representations and presenting full up-to-date evidence at that stage to contest the making of such an order; and that he would have a full right of appeal to present his arguments and relevant up-to-date evidence to the FTT. Since the rights of the appellants and their children as regards deportation (as distinct from deprivation of citizenship) would be fully protected by the procedures to be followed at that later stage, there was in these cases no possibility that the making of an order of deprivation of citizenship at the earlier stage could itself be assessed to be incompatible with their Article 8 rights or with the duty under section 55 by reason that there might ultimately be a deportation later on.
29. In other cases, it may be that part of the Secretary of State's reasons why the making of an order to deprive an individual of British citizenship is conducive to the public interest is that this step is necessary to afford the Secretary of State an opportunity to make a deportation or removal order at a later stage. In such a case, again it seems to me that it is likely to be unnecessary and inappropriate for the FTT on an appeal against deprivation of citizenship to conduct a full proleptic assessment of whether a deportation order will or will not ultimately be made at some time in the future (and after a separate appeal to the FTT in relation to the decision to make such an order). The evidence available and circumstances obtaining at the time of the making of the deprivation order (and the appeal in relation to that) are very likely to be different from that which will be available and those which will obtain when the decision regarding the making of a deportation order is actually taken (and when there is an appeal in relation to that). It will usually be sufficient to support this part of the reasoning of the Secretary of State in relation to making a deprivation order that it can be seen that by making such an order he will have a real prospect of making a deportation order at the later stage. The FTT should resist having tribunal time taken up with unnecessary and inevitably speculative evidence and argument about whether a deportation order will in fact be made at the end of the day, if all that needs to be shown is that there is a real prospect that a deportation order may eventually be made.
30. In relation to such a case, it would in principle be open to the individual concerned to try to show that there was no real prospect of him being deported at the end of the day, as part of his case to challenge the making of the deprivation order (this would be especially important if the Secretary of State does not seek to or cannot justify the making of a deprivation order on the simple basis referred to in para. [27] above). If the individual could show that, then the Secretary of State's justification for making the deprivation order might fall away. I can see that if the individual does seek to make out such a case, this could give rise to case management issues for the FTT. Again, where possible, the FTT should resist being drawn at the deprivation of citizenship stage into a full proleptic assessment of whether a deportation order will be made at the end of the day, where that is unnecessary and would involve an inappropriate waste of time and effort for the tribunal and the parties. It may be that if an individual maintains that there will be no real prospect of his being deported at the end of the day, the FTT would in anything other than a very clear case be able to dismiss that contention at an early stage in the proceedings without needing to proceed to a full, elaborate proleptic assessment of whether a deportation order will be made or not. Much will depend upon the way in which the issues are framed on the appeal and whether the FTT is in a position sensibly to make an early assessment of the position and to avoid a full proleptic hearing on the issue of whether a deportation will in fact occur at the end of the day.
31. Against the backdrop of this discussion, I turn to consider Ground (1) in the appeal. In my view, this ground of appeal must be dismissed. It is clear from the FTT's reasoning in each of the three cases under appeal that it did follow the guidance in Delialissi and that it made a proper and lawful assessment regarding the likelihood that the appellants would eventually lawfully be deported without any breach of Article 8 rights or the section 55 duty. Given the extremely serious nature of the offending by each appellant, there is no good ground for calling that conclusion into question. There was no error of law by the FTT.
32. I would observe, however, in line with my comments above about the guidance in Delialissi, that in carrying out the proleptic assessment it did regarding the likelihood of a lawful deportation taking place in each case, the FTT went further than it needed to when assessing the lawfulness of the Secretary of State's decision in each case to make an order to deprive the relevant appellant of his British citizenship. The fact that it did so is a testament to the care with which the FTT considered each case. It does not indicate that it committed any error of law.

Ground (2)

33. This ground can be dealt with more shortly. I would dismiss the appeal on this ground as well.
34. I do not consider that the first two reasons given by the Upper Tribunal for dismissing the appeal based upon para. 55.4.4 of the Nationality Instructions can be supported. As to the Upper Tribunal's reliance at [62] on the words "unacceptable behaviours" in that paragraph, the difficulty is that an evaluative judgment would be required in relation to whether the conduct of the appellants fell within those words, but neither the Secretary of State nor the FTT in fact made any such assessment. The Upper Tribunal only said that it was rationally open to them to do so. If the outcome of the appeal had depended on this point, either the Upper Tribunal should have remitted the case to the FTT for further consideration or it should have re-made the decision on the appeal itself, with far fuller reasoning on this topic.
35. As regards the Upper Tribunal's point at [67] that it was entitled to dismiss this ground of appeal just by saying that it was reasonably open to the decision-makers to consider that the deprivation of citizenship was conducive to the public good, this ignores the significance for legal analysis of the issuing by the Secretary of State of policy guidance in respect of how his discretion under section 40(2) of the 1981 Act would be exercised. The Secretary of State and the FTT were bound in law to apply the policy guidance in the Nationality Instructions, or to say that they were departing from it and then give rational and defensible reasons for doing so. They did not purport to do that.
36. However, the reason this ground of appeal should be dismissed is that given by the Upper Tribunal at [64] and [68]. The Secretary of State and the FTT both considered that the offending by the appellants amounted to participation in serious organised crime. They were lawfully entitled to make that evaluative assessment in the circumstances of these cases. The crimes were plainly very serious and there was a sufficient element of organisation in the way they were committed to justify characterising the offending as participation in serious organised crime within the meaning of that expression in para. 55.4.4 of the Nationality Instructions. Accordingly, the Secretary of State and the FTT were entitled to find that the deprivation of citizenship in the case of each appellant would be compliant with the policy set out in that paragraph.

Conclusion

37. For the reasons given above, I would dismiss these appeals.

Sir Stephen Richards:

38. I agree.

Sir Terence Etherton MR:

39. I also agree.