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You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Civil Division) Decisions >> Al-Najar & Ors v The Cumberland Hotel (London) Ltd [2020] EWCA Civ 1716 (18 December 2020) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Civ/2020/1716.html Cite as: [2020] WLR(D) 693, [2020] EWCA Civ 1716, [2021] 1 WLR 3415 |
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ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF JUSTICE
(QUEEN'S BENCH DIVISION
Mr Justice Dingemans
HQ17P00870
Strand, London, WC2A 2LL |
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B e f o r e :
LORD JUSTICE FLAUX
and
LORD JUSTICE NEWEY
____________________
OHOUD AL-NAJAR (by her litigation friend, KHADIA AL-MULLA) and others |
Appellants |
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- and - |
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THE CUMBERLAND HOTEL (LONDON) LIMITED |
Respondent |
____________________
Neil Block QC and Camilla Church (instructed by DWF Law LLP) for the Respondent
Hearing date: 5 November 2020
____________________
Crown Copyright ©
Lord Justice McCombe:
Introduction
Background Facts
The Judge's Decision
"The Defendant admits that it owed the duty to its guests but contends that the duty did not include a liability to protect guests from the criminal acts of a third party such as Mr Spence, denies that the attack by Mr Spence was reasonably foreseeable, denies that it has acted in breach of any duty, and denies that any breach of duty caused the injuries suffered by Ohoud, Khaloud or Fatima."
"(1) whether the duty owed by the Cumberland hotel extended to a duty to take reasonable steps to prevent the attack by Mr Spence; and if there was any such duty: (2) whether the attack by Mr Spence was a new intervening act which broke any chain of causation; (3) whether the attack by Mr Spence was reasonably foreseeable; (4) whether the hotel acted in breach of any duty owed to Ohoud, Khaloud and Fatima by failing to act as a reasonable, prudent and competent operator of a London hotel of this standard; (5) whether any breach of duty on the part of the Cumberland hotel caused the injuries suffered by Ohoud, Khaloud and Fatima; (6) whether there was any contributory negligence on the part of Ohoud."
His conclusions on those issues were as follows:
"187. In the light of all these authorities in my judgment, among other duties which are not material, the Cumberland Hotel owed the claimants, as guests of the hotel, a duty of care "to take reasonable care to protect guests at the hotel against injury caused by the criminal acts of third parties". In my judgment the duty of care arises in respect of the omission to take steps to prevent the attack (or the duty to make things better by preventing the attack) as a "responsibility" type case as identified in paragraph 35 of Robinson[1]. This is because the hotel invited guests to. come and stay at the hotel and thereby assumed a duty to take reasonable care to protect guests. There is a loose analogy with the· situation in Stansbie v Troman[2] and the imposition of the duty is consistent with the result of the decisions in Chordas[3] and Everett v Komo Jo[4] the latter of which is binding on me. As is apparent I have found the duty to exist by reason of the assumption of responsibility test set out in Robinson rather than by the use of the Caparo test, although I should record that in my judgment the imposition of such a duty of care accords with the reasonable expectations of both hotel proprietors and guests, as well as the subjective expectations of both the Claimants and the Defendant's witnesses such as Mr Stanbridge as given in evidence. It is clear that the common law relating to hotel proprietors has developed since 1604."
"195. In my judgment it was reasonably foreseeable to the Cumberland hotel that a third party might gain entry to the hotel and might injure the guests by a criminal assault, whether as part of an armed robbery, sexual assault or physical assault, with consequences which might be very serious. This was specifically identified in the DSO[5] training programme referred to above. However, it is also right to record that the evidence showed that the likelihood of such an attack occurring was extremely low, which is relevant to what steps ought reasonably to be taken by the hotel to prevent such an attack."
"229. I have considered carefully all of the lay and expert evidence about the breaches of duty. In my judgment the evidence as a whole showed a hotel in which security was taken seriously by Mr Loughrey and the security officers and the hotel did take reasonable care to protect the Claimants against the injuries caused by Mr Spence. The hotel did not need to monitor continuously CCTV cameras. This is because there is nothing to suggest that this is an activity carried out by any other hotel proprietor given the low likelihood of any attack occurring. For similar reasons in my judgment to act reasonably the hotel did not need to install CCTV cameras in the lift or on the fire escape staircases. The hotel did not need to have an alarm system to alert security staff to open guest doors. Any such system would generate alarms when there was cleaning of the rooms, or guests were taking too long leaving the room. There was nothing to suggest that this should be used by any reasonable hotel proprietor. The duty was to take reasonable care to prevent the attacks, it was not an absolute duty to prevent an attack.
…
232 In my judgment the duty on the hotel did not require the hotel to provide another lobby officer or to require the lobby officer to host and greet every guest entering the hotel after 11 pm. This is because there was sufficient security provided by the lobby officer walking around the lobby and looking at guests, even though this activity was not apparent on all occasions as appears from Ms Coleman's evidence. In my judgment to act reasonably the hotel was not required to insist that the lobby officer greet every single guest after 11 pm. This was because the lobby officer was looking after the whole of the lobby and looking at some, but not all guests when they entered. For similar reasons there was no duty to put a key card reader and insist that every guest show their key card, even though this occurred later at a time of heightened terrorist alert.
233. In my judgment to act reasonably the hotel did not have to provide key card access to the lifts, even though it had been proposed by Mr Loughrey in 2012 and the system was adopted after the attack. The evidence showed that such systems were liable to being overridden by tailgating and other guests pressing buttons allowing access to others. Even after its installation it was noted that the lobby security officer was the primary means of providing security. My conclusion on these matters is part supported by the approach taken to security by other 4 star London hotels where all but one did not have key card lift access readers."
The Appeal and My Conclusions
"2. The appellants submit that the learned judge erred in respect of his assessment that there was no breach of duty in relation to the failure by Mr Zafar, the lobby security officer ('lobby officer') to greet Mr Spence in the lobby; if that assessment is reversed, the appellants rely on the judge's finding on causation that the assaults would have been avoided.
3. The learned judge should have found that:
(a) the requisite standard of care in respect of controlling access to the guest lifts by the lobby officer involved the lobby officer at the least meeting and greeting every guest after 11 pm where possible, alternatively where reasonably practicable;
(b) it was (eminently) possible/reasonably practicable for Mr Zafar to have greeted Mr Spence, given the court's findings at [227] – [228] (and those he should have made viz how quiet the lobby was at the relevant time);
(c) Mr Zafar's failure to greet Mr Spence involved a breach of duty, whether operational negligence by Mr Zafar or systemic negligence by the defendant for failing properly to train, supervise and/or monitor Mr Zafar;
(d) had the defendant not so acted in breach of duty to the claimants, Mr Zafar would have greeted Mr Spence;
(e) as found by the learned judge, in such a situation Mr Spence would have then left the hotel [236] i.e. the assaults would have been avoided."
There follows, in paragraph 4 of the grounds a list of features of the judgment, in which it is said that the judge erred in reaching his conclusion on the breach of duty point. The first two of these are:
"4. Instead, and wrongly, the learned judge:
(a) erred in law in setting the standard as requiring only that the lobby officer walk around the lobby and look at guests [232];
(b) erred in law by asking only whether the duty on the defendant was to provide another lobby officer or to require the lobby officer to host and greet every guest entering the hotel after 11 pm [232] and not also whether the duty on the defendant required that the lobby officer host and greet every guest where possible, alternatively where reasonably practicable; …"
In my judgment, those two points cannot properly be classed as errors of law at all, the findings criticised were merely assessments, on the facts of the case, of whether the admitted legal duty had been broken, which is a different thing: see the reference to Biogen Inc v Medeva plc [1997] RPC 1 at 45 below.
"(i) 'Lobby must be covered 24 hours'; and
(ii) 'Must patrol Momentus, Brasserie and outside main entrance'; and
(iii) 'Assist with other departments if Lobby is quite [sic]'."
(j) (i) be fully aware of all criminal trends and ensure effective measures were in place to combat criminal activity; (ii) ensure effective procedures for protection against theft etc.; (iii) produce and maintain policies and procedures on security; (k) review systems in the light of incidents demonstrating access by thieves [details given]; (l) in its security department hold regular meetings; (m) ensure at two meetings in 2013 and 2014 that there was an assessment of risks from thefts; (n) institute a programme of training and continuing development for security personnel; (o) monitor performance of such personnel; (p) ensure those training security staff were properly qualified; (q) provide Security manager/Supervisor with training and professional education etc.; (r) prior to 5 April 2014 to provide Mr Zafar with " (i) SOP Security Training, (ii) Security Policies Training, (iii) Security Awareness Training; (s) to take account of advice offered to hotels by the National Counter Terrorism Security Office [details given]; (t) install sufficient CCTV cameras and to check their operation; (u) monitor CCTV; (v) take adequate steps to address risk of Middle Eastern guests in particular leaving room doors "on the latch"; (w) carry out regular and sufficient patrols of guest corridors; (x) to use its "Morse Watchman" system properly; (y) carry out sufficient patrols in the night of 5/6 April 2014; (z) review and address shortcomings in patrol performance; (aa) have sufficient staff on duty over evening and night shift, including …(ii) one patrolling officer; …and (iv) one lobby officer; (bb) to ensure that from 2300 hours the lobby officer adopted a fixed and visible position; (cc) monitor the performance of the lobby officer and to secure compliance with instructions.
"(dd) By its lobby officer Wasif Zafar, who was on duty between 23.15 on 5 April and 01.37 on 6 April 2014, it failed to provide an adequate level of security in that:
(i) He failed to position himself so that he was able to host and greet persons entering the hotel for more than 46 minutes (38%) of the period between 23.15 and 01.15 and left the lobby completely unattended for 3 minutes and 13 seconds;
(ii) Despite the written procedures and training requiring him to host, smile and greet all persons entering the hotel, to verify guests and to carry out security checks on persons entering the lifts via the main entrance:
(1) over the period between 23.15 and 23.45 he carried out no security checks and spoke to just one of the 175 people who entered the hotel;
(2) over the period between 23.45 and 00.15 he carried out no security checks and spoke to none of the 153 people who entered the hotel;
(3) over the period between 00.15 and 00.45 he carried out no security checks and spoke to none of the 133 people who entered the hotel;
(4) over the period between 00.45 and 01.15 he carried out no security checks and spoke to none of the 105 people who entered the hotel;
(iii) When Spence entered the hotel at 01.13 and walked directly to the lifts, Wasif was not positioned between the main entrance and the lifts, was paying no attention to persons entering the hotel and made no attempt to host, greet, verify or security check Spence."
"57. The specific duties of the lobby security officer were set out in writing as part of the "lobby duties training record" which was signed by a person after training and re-training on their duties: - For example Mr Zafar had signed on 3 August 2013 and then again on 10 August 2014. The listed duties included "Lobby must be covered 24 hours; Never leave your shift before on coming officer relieves you; ... Must patrol Momentus, Brasserie and outside main entrance (smoking area); … Assist with other departments if lobby is quiet; Host, greet, smile and introduce to all persons entering hotel; security check of persons entering lifts via main entrance max 20 per hour; ... lobby officer is fully responsible for the protection of staff, customers & property; ... Be vigilant for undesirables: thieves, prostitutes, homeless; ...."."
It can be seen, however, that the duties so listed could not keep a single security officer in a fixed place in the lobby for the particular purpose of greeting or challenging those entering the hotel at all times. He had to attend other areas, including the bar, brasserie and outside smoking area. At the material time, the Respondent only engaged one lobby officer at any one time. The judge rejected criticism of the failure to engage more than one such officer at any one time (paras. 224 and 232) and the Appellants do not appeal against that finding.
"59. There was some discussion about the lobby security officer duties at the trial. It was apparent that the Claimants contended that the lobby security officer must greet and introduce himself to every person ·entering the hotel pursuant to the direction to "Host, greet, smile and introduce to all persons entering hotel". Schedules were produced to show that Mr Zafar, in the early hours of the morning of 6 April 2014, was not positioned to intercept every person coming into the lobby through · the front entrance left. Mr Loughrey contended that the duties were not intended to mean that every single guest had to be greeted, and that duties included patrolling the bar and restaurant area, meaning that not every guest could be hosted and greeted. Mr Loughrey said that by moving around the lobby security officer acted as a deterrent. Although a possible reading of the duties of the lobby security officer was to greet and introduce himself to every person entering the hotel (because of the words " ... introduce to all persons entering hotel") Mr Loughrey said that was not the proper interpretation of the duties of the lobby officer. This is because it would have been impossible to patrol the bar and restaurant areas, and to introduce himself to every guest, which were also part of the duties. I accept that the evidence showed that the lobby officers and the hotel understood that there was no requirement to greet every single guest. This does not answer the point about whether the hotel, in order to discharge its duty of care, should have ensured that every guest was met by the lobby security officer."
(In the end, in para. 232 of the judgment, the judge answered the question in the last sentence of para. 59 in the negative.)
"12 Q. And we can see that for periods of time,
13 in fact throughout most of the period of that
14 time, you are a long way away from the lift
15 lobby, aren't you?
16 A. Yes. I was walking around in the hall
17 lobby, the Brasserie and all --
18 Q. Yes, and you stand, sorry --
19 MR JUSTICE DINGEMANS: Mr Zafar,
20 you need to speak up a bit more?
21 A. Okay.
22 MS RODWAY: So, let us go back so you
23 can give that answer again. I am asking you
24 what you were doing when you were away
25 from the lift lobby?
page 79
1 A. I was just walking around. I need to keep
2 an eye on the Brasserie. There was some
3 others sitting on that- with their pink lights,
4 there, and yeah there was no specific place
5 that I need to stand on the end of this - this
6 place. I was just moving around everywhere
7 and just keeping an eye, and sometime I need
8 to go outside as well, just to have a look
9 Q. So, it was your understanding that you
10 were not required to stay in a specific place
11 at night-time?
12 A. Yes.
13 Q. That is correct, is it?
14 A. Yes.
15 Q. And we also see that you do not interact
16 with any of the guests who are coming into
17 the hotel. Why was that?
18 A. I do interact sometime and if I found
19 someone suspicious, I do approach him,
20 challenge him or ask him something. Key
21 card or where is he going, but if he looks
22 suspicious or if he looks like he's avoiding
23 eye contact or looking around or something,
24 like he don't know where is he going--
25 Q. Right?
Page 80
1 A. -- Mr Spence, as you can see on the
2 picture, is - just focused, going straight to the
3 lift like he knows where's he going. …
Page 81."
"The need for appellate caution in reversing the judge's evaluation of the facts is based upon much more solid grounds than professional courtesy. It is because specific findings of fact, even by the most meticulous judge, are inherently an incomplete statement of the impression which was made upon him by the primary evidence. His expressed findings are always surrounded by a penumbra of imprecision as to emphasis, relative weight, minor qualification and nuance … of which time and language do not permit exact expression, but which may play an important part in the judge's overall evaluation. … Where the application of a legal standard such as negligence or obviousness involves no question of principle but is simply a matter of degree, an appellate court should be very cautious in differing from the judge's evaluation." (Italics added)
"Appellate courts have been repeatedly warned, by recent cases at the highest level, not to interfere with findings of fact by trial judges, unless compelled to do so. This applies not only to findings of primary fact, but also to the evaluation of those facts and to the inferences to be drawn from them … The reasons for this approach are many. They include: …" (Italics again added)
Of those reasons (i) and (iv) expressed by Lewison LJ have particular relevance here, in view of the shift of emphasis in the Appellants' case on this appeal, but, while the principles expressed still apply, it might be thought indelicate to quote them precisely in the context of this tragedy.
Conclusion
Lord Justice Flaux:
Lord Justice Newey:
Note 1 Robinson v Chief Constable of W. Yorkshire [2018] UKSC 4 [Back] Note 3 Chordas v Bryant (Wellington) Pty Ltd. (1988) 91 ALR 19 [Back]