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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Blackstock, R. v [2007] EWCA Crim 3100 (22 November 2007) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2007/3100.html Cite as: [2007] EWCA Crim 3100

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London, WC2A 2LL
		22 November 2007

1. MR JUSTICE WYN WILLIAMS: On 15th June 2007 at a pretrial review at the Coventry Crown Court, the appellant pleaded guilty to two offences of robbery. On 17th August 2007 he was sentenced to two terms of imprisonment for public protection in respect of those offences. The sentences should have been detention for public protection but nothing turns on that and we will correct the form of sentence in due course.
2. As he was bound to do, the sentencing judge, Mr Recorder Sanghera, considered the minimum term which the appellant should serve before he could be considered for release by the Parole Board and he reached the conclusion that it should be a period of three years nine months. In reaching that minimum term the learned Recorder took into account the fact that the appellant had spent 78 days in custody.
3. The appellant fell to be sentenced with another man who was jointly charged with the two offences of robbery. This man, Jamie Prentice, was also to be sentenced for a third offence of robbery. In his case the Recorder also imposed a sentence of imprisonment for public protection and fixed the minimum term at four years.
4. With the leave of the single judge the appellant appeals to this court upon one aspect of his sentence. He does not complain about the imposition of an indeterminate sentence, but he does submit that the minimum term fixed in his case, namely three years and nine months, is manifestly excessive.
5. We deal first with the relevant facts of the two offences of robbery. At about 8.00 pm on 18th January 2007, the appellant and Prentice ran into a convenience store, known as One-Stop, and shouted "Don't move" to a security guard employed there. They were both wearing balaclavas and together were armed with an axe and a crowbar that had been purchased earlier that same day. One of the two of them positioned himself by the entrance door, whilst the other walked behind the tills having pulled his way through a security door. That person took hold of one of the two female cashiers by the arm and told her to open second till. She complied and he emptied the till before ordering the other cashier to open her till. Not surprisingly she also complied and money was taken from that till as well. The two men then made their escape, instructing the staff not to call the police. The amount stolen was £617.
6. Six days later, again in the evening at about 9.30 pm, the two men entered another One-Stop store. Again they were wearing balaclavas and one of them was armed with a small axe and a crowbar and the other with a crowbar. They shouted to the female cashier who was present that they wanted money and told her to open the till. The cashier was followed to the till by one of them who was acting in a very intimidating and frightening manner, and after she opened the till that person grabbed very nearly £400, as well as some electricity cards and stamps. Both men then made off.
7. The following day the appellant was arrested. Clothing recognisable as having been worn by one of the two men was recovered from his home address. However, when he was interviewed under caution his response was either to deny involvement or to decline to comment.
8. At the time of these two robberies the appellant was two months short of his 18th birthday. At the date of sentence he was aged nearly eighteen-and-a-half. He has an unenviable criminal record. He has been convicted of 85 offences. His offending began at the age of 10 and continued throughout his juvenile years. Virtually every type of sentence has been tried and regrettably all have failed to kerb this appellant's offending. In the main the appellant's offending has consisted of offences of dishonesty and offences relating to motor vehicles. However, he has on occasion been convicted of violent offences also, most notably an offence of causing grievous bodily harm. That conviction was recorded on 9th January 2006 at the Stafford Crown Court. On that occasion an order for 12 months' detention and training was made.
9. On any view the two offences of robbery for which the appellant fell to be sentenced were by some measure more serious than any offence committed in the past. We note, however, that there appears to have been a consistently ascending scale of seriousness in the pattern of the appellant's offending.
10. Submissions were made to the Recorder about the Sentencing Council Guidelines for offences of robbery. As we understand it, they were made specifically in the case of the appellant's co-accused Prentice but of course the Recorder was bound to have regard to them when sentencing both men. We accept, as did the Recorder, that the offences fell within the Guidelines and would be categorised as Level 2 offences. Further, we accept that at the material time the appellant was just a young offender. However, the Guidelines by no means provide a complete answer in this case. We say that since they are predicated upon the basis of a first time offender who has committed one offence. In this case we have to consider an offender with multiple previous convictions and two offences of robbery committed within six days of each other. Each of the offences were carried out in circumstances in which many of the aggravating features specified by the Guidelines were present.
11. In his sentencing remarks, the Recorder appeared to conclude that the appropriate determinate sentence for these two offences was a total of eight years. He reached the minimum term of three years nine months by recognising that he should half the notional determinate sentence and he also took into account the time spent in custody which, as we have said, was 78 days.
12. As we have said earlier in this judgment, the appellant pleaded guilty to the two offences for which he was sentenced. It was not at the first opportunity but significantly before the trial was due to begin. On any view he was entitled to substantial credit for his pleas.
13. In this court, counsel for the appellant submits that the appropriate reduction in sentence, given the time at which the plea was entered, was 25 per cent. For our part we accept that submission.
14. In passing sentence, however, the Recorder appears to have given no credit for the guilty pleas. It is true that at a point in his sentencing remarks he appears to reduce the overall determinate sentence from ten to eight years, but we do not understand him to be doing so on a basis of guilty pleas, rather it was on the basis of the principle of totality.
15. We ask ourselves what was the appropriate determinate sentence for these two serious offences, given the appellant's age and previous offending? We are satisfied that a notional determinate sentence of 10 years was significantly too high and we have reached the conclusion that a notional determinate sentence of eight years was also too high. In our judgment, after a trial the appropriate notional determinate sentence would have been six years' detention at a young offender institution. Whether that would have been made up by consecutive sentences of three years for each offence or whether the judge would have passed two concurrent sentences of six years matters not. To repeat, we are satisfied that the appropriate starting point for a determinate sentence therefore would have been one of six years' detention.
16. When credit is given for the pleas, that reduces the six years to four-and-a-half years. That being so, in our judgment, the appropriate minimum term is one-half of that notional determinate term, namely two years and three months. Accordingly, we substitute a minimum term of two years and three months in this case and we make an order that the 78 days which was spent in custody should count towards the computation of that two years and three months. To that extent this appeal is allowed.