Neutral Citation Number: [2009] EWCA Crim 1910
Case No. 2009/02541/A7

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL  DIVISION
Royal Courts of Justice
The Strand
London
WC2A 2LL

Date: Tuesday  1  September  2009

B e f o r e:

LORD  JUSTICE  RIX

MR  JUSTICE  COLLINS

and

HIS  HONOUR  JUDGE  PERT  QC
(Sitting as a Judge of the Court of Appeal Criminal Division)

__________________

R E G I N A

- v -

DAN  THIEU  TRUONG
__________________

Computer Aided Transcription by
Wordwave International Ltd (a Merrill Communications Company)
165 Fleet Street, London EC4
Telephone 020 7404 1400; Fax No: 020 7404 1424
(Official Shorthand Writers to the Court)
__________________

Mr A Butler appeared on behalf of the Appellant

____________________

J U D G M E N T

LORD JUSTICE RIX:  I shall ask Mr Justice Collins to give the judgment of the court.

MR JUSTICE COLLINS:
1.  On 16 April 2009, in the Crown Court at Blackfriars, before His Honour Judge Karsten QC, the appellant pleaded guilty to possessing a prohibited weapon (a Taser gun) and was sentenced to two years' imprisonment.  That sentence was ordered to run consecutively to a sentence of two years' imprisonment which had been imposed on 31 October 2008 for an offence of burglary.

2.  The recovery of the Taser gun resulted from the execution by police officers of a search warrant at the appellant's home address on 25 April 2008.  When the weapon was found, it was noted that the batteries were fully charged so that it would have been a simple matter to have put it into working order.  When asked what it was, the appellant said "Taser -- I got that in France".  That was later modified when he said that it had been obtained for him by his brother.  It was legal in France.  He asserted that he did not appreciate that it was not legal in this country.  

3.  The effect of a taser can be serious.  It can produce a loss of muscle control, incapacitation, intense pain and mental confusion.  Indeed, it is designed to overcome an individual for a period of time so that the person in possession of the Taser can do what he will to its target.  Its lawful use is for law and order and to deal with those who are misbehaving in a serious way.

4.  It is significant to note that the burglary offence was committed on 30 June 2008 whilst the appellant was on bail for the offence before us.  He committed that burglary with an accomplice.  The accomplice had with him an imitation firearm.  Thus the charge was one of aggravated burglary.  The appellant pleaded guilty to simple burglary on the basis that he was not aware that his accomplice had the imitation firearm.  The judge who dealt with that indicated that it would make no difference to his sentence whether or not the appellant was aware of the possession by his accomplice, and so the case was dealt with on the basis of that plea.  Although that plea may have been accepted, the court never assumed that the appellant was guilty on that limited basis but was prepared to treat him as if he were.

5.  For reasons which are far from clear, the instant offence was not dealt with at the same time as the burglary offence.  It clearly should have been.  The totality of the appellant's offending ought to have been before the same judge, particularly as the appellant committed the burglary while on bail.  It can be assumed that the judge took that into account in imposing the sentence that he did impose because the fact that the appellant was on bail made it more serious. 

6.  The appellant has previous convictions largely for possession of drugs.  This is the first time that he has been sentenced to a term of imprisonment.  As his counsel recognises in his advice, a Taser gun is something which can be used for criminal purposes and frequently is by those who indulge in the drug trade one way or another and by those who commit offences such as burglary.  However, it is fair to say that there is no evidence that the appellant had the weapon for any nefarious purpose.  Although he never explained why he kept it, it would be wrong to assume against him that he intended to use it for a criminal purpose.

7.  We have been referred to a number of cases which deal with possession of stun guns such as this.  The point is made that Parliament has not provided a minimum sentence for these as opposed to firearms for which minimum sentences have been set out.  There are a number of authorities to which our attention has been drawn which indicate that for an offence of possession of a stun gun simpliciter, without any aggravating features (and this case was treated in that way), a sentence of less than twelve months on a contested case would be, generally speaking, appropriate.  We put it that way because it is far from clear precisely where the limit is, but certainly it is not more than twelve months.

8.  In all the circumstances of this case we take the view, and counsel does not disagree, that a consecutive sentence was appropriate but that two years' imprisonment was excessive.  Having regard to the plea of guilty we consider that the appropriate sentence should have been one of six months' imprisonment, to be served consecutively to the sentence of two years' imprisonment which he was already serving.  
9.  Accordingly, we quash the sentence of two years' imprisonment and substitute for it a sentence of six months' imprisonment which will run consecutively to the sentence of two years' imprisonment which he was already serving.  To that extent this appeal is allowed.

	_____________________________