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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Copeland, R. v [2011] EWCA Crim 1711 (28 June 2011) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2011/1711.html Cite as: [2011] EWCA Crim 1711

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice The Strand London WC2A 2LL
		28 June 2011

THE LORD CHIEF JUSTICE:

1. This is an appeal by David Copeland against the order by Burton J in accordance with paragraph 3 of Schedule 22 to the Criminal Justice Act 2003 that the minimum term to be served following his convictions for three offences of murder and three further distinct offences of causing explosions likely to endanger life should be fixed at 50 years. Credit was given for the period served on remand.
2. It is difficult to exaggerate the horror of these appalling crimes which stemmed from the appellant's abhorrent beliefs. They led him carefully to plan on three separate occasions to cause dreadful injury and death.
3. On 17 April 1999 the appellant left a holdall containing an improvised time bomb packed with a large quantity of nails outside a supermarket in Brixton next to a crowded bus stop. Two men carried the bag around the corner and examined its contents. Others became involved. Inside they found a plastic box containing two square batteries and a round, old-fashioned alarm clock type object, which was on top of, and sellotaped to, a large cardboard box. Two wires went from the plastic box to the cardboard box, which was packed full of nails. On examination it immediately became apparent that it might be a bomb. Two men moved it away from the stalls. Another man took the boxes out of the holdall and walked off with it. A police car was flagged down. As the men reported to the officers what they had found, the bomb exploded.
4. Many people were injured. A number of casualties suffered multiple lacerations caused by the flying debris, including nails. Some of the nails became embedded in the bodies of those who were injured. There were fractures to legs and feet and temporary hearing loss. Three people suffered perforated eardrums. A 23 month old child had to have a nail removed from his skull. Two people lost an eye. One suffered a fractured ankle and elbow, and severe damage to a facial nerve.
5. That horrific event was but first in a sequence of three. A week later, on 24 April 1999, the appellant left a sports bag on the pavement in front of a parked van in East London. A passer-by, thinking it was lost property, carried it to the police station at Brick Lane. The station was closed and so, public spiritedly, he put the bag, which was very heavy, into the boot of his car. When he looked inside it he found that the bag contained a cardboard box full of what he thought were screws with a plastic box on top. At first he thought that the box belonged to a workman, so he closed the boot and walked to Leman Street Police Station to report it. That station was also closed. He then remembered the Brixton bomb which had exploded a week earlier, and so he dialled 999 on his mobile phone. The bomb exploded in the boot of his car in Brick Lane. Some people were injured. They received cuts, abrasions and hearing damage, including perforated eardrums. In comparison with the Brixton explosion, on the whole the injuries were less serious.
6. The date of the third offence, to which we shall now come, was brought forward because the appellant feared that his arrest and detention may be imminent and that the third bomb therefore should be exploded earlier than was otherwise intended. That was a deliberate decision.
7. In the early evening of 30 April 1999 customers arrived at a public house in Old Compton Street, Soho. The appellant placed a large sports bag at the foot of the counter and moved away. Other customers noticed the bag. The assistant manager asked a number of customers if the bag belonged to them. His concerns increased when each in turn said that it did not. He moved people away and returned to the bag. As he stood over it, it exploded.
8. The explosion had devastating consequences. It killed Nicholas Moore, Andrea Dykes (a young woman who was pregnant) and John Light. It nearly killed Mark Kleiss, who suffered extensive burns and serious wounds. A leg had to be amputated. He developed sepsis and kidney failure; his survival was described as quite remarkable. Tommy Douglas sustained injuries which necessitated the amputation of both legs. Mauro Mazzon had to have a leg amputated. Julian Dykes was seriously injured. He was unconscious for three weeks before he learned of the deaths of his wife and his friend John Light. Gary Reid suffered serious burns and fractures and required a leg amputation. Nails were recovered from the victims' bodies.
9. In due course a man who saw CCTV footage of the person suspected of being the Brixton bomber became convinced that the appellant was involved. He informed the police of his suspicions. As a result the Flying Squad went to the appellant's home in Farnborough in Hampshire where he had rented a rear bedroom for about three months. The officers were let into the premises and they went to the appellant's room. There were Nazi flags on the walls. The appellant resembled the published images of the suspect for the Brixton bomb. He was arrested on suspicion of causing the Brixton, Brick Lane and Soho explosions. He said, "Yeah, they're all down to me. I did them on my own". He said that there were two kilos of ammonium nitrate in the room but that it was safe; that he had no explosives elsewhere; that he had made the last bomb at a B&B in Victoria; and that he had used fireworks as explosives.
10. The appellant's room was searched. The result of the search produced internet printouts of "The Terrorist's Handbook" which contained detailed instructions for the manufacture of bombs and clockwork timer devices, together with guidance on the use of nails and flash powder-based explosive, which was obtainable from fireworks. Press coverage was also found of the Brixton and Brick Lane explosions.
11. During a series of interviews, in the presence of his solicitor and an appropriate adult, the appellant said that he was a Nazi. He believed in the National Socialist State; that was his ambition for this country. He had planned the explosions for three years. He wanted to start a race war. Brixton and Brick Lane were the focal point of the black and Indian communities respectively. He wanted to attack gays for personal reasons and so chose the public house in Soho. He intended that white people would vote BNP. He had no association with militant right-wing groups and had acted entirely on his own. He gave a detailed description of how he had acquired the materials and made all three bombs. He caused these explosions because he wanted to be famous; it was his destiny. As a Nazi he believed in the Aryan domination of the world. He had calculated that there would be casualties and fatalities. As to those who had been killed, he felt nothing, neither sadness nor joy. Although he expressed sorrow for the woman and her unborn child, he felt no guilt for the others.
12. On 24 February 2000, at the Central Criminal Court, before His Honour Judge Hyam (the Recorder of London), the appellant pleaded guilty to three offences of causing an explosion likely to endanger life. He pleaded not guilty to the three offences of murder, but admitted manslaughter on the grounds of diminished responsibility. Following a trial, on 3 June 2000 the appellant was convicted of the three offences of murder. He was sentenced to mandatory life imprisonment for the counts of murder and discretionary life imprisonment for the offences of causing explosions likely to endanger life. The specified period in relation to the discretionary life imprisonment was assessed at fifteen years (less the period spent in custody). In relation to the mandatory life imprisonment sentences, the judge did not at that stage indicate the appropriate tariff; but on 11 July, in his report to the Home Secretary, he indicated that the minimum term to be served before the appellant could be eligible to apply for release should be set at thirty years.
13. The judge identified as aggravating factors the appellant's

"avowed aim to kill, maim and terrorise. His motivation was hatred of the communities he attacked. The making and laying of the explosive devices was long-planned and carried out without compunction".

The judge concluded that there were no mitigating factors.

14. The Lord Chief Justice considered the papers and the recommendation of the Recorder of London. He observed that these crimes were "almost as serious as they could be. Three people were killed, but more could have been". He agreed that the tariff should be set at thirty years.
15. In accordance with the practice which prevailed at the time, in the light of developing jurisprudence on the issue of the fixing of the minimum term in cases where the defendant was convicted of murder, the Home Secretary of the day did not specify the minimum term. In due course, in March 2007, the case came before Burton J who, after considering the arguments and reflecting on the statutory provisions, concluded that the minimum term should be one of fifty years, so that the total sentence in relation to the counts of murder was life imprisonment with a minimum term of fifty years.
16. In a careful judgment, Burton J set out the facts. He noted the horrific nature of the offences. He referred to the impact statement he had received from the parents of one of the victims -- a document which we, too, have considered. The families of each of the victims will carry the pain of these events for the rest of their lives. In addition, there were a number of victims who were not killed but who will continue to suffer significant disadvantages as a result of what happened to them. Burton J examined the information that was placed before the Home Secretary. He took account of the general principles set out in Schedule 21 to the 2003 Act and the guidance in the Lord Chief Justice's letters of July 2004, and he concluded that this was an exceptionally grave case which fell within the provisions of paragraph 4(1)(a) of Schedule 21 to the 2003 Act. He was plainly right. Three people were murdered. Many were very seriously injured indeed. There will be very many victims who will suffer life-long grief and difficulty.
17. The second offence followed the horror of the first offence; and the third offence followed the horror of the second as well as the first. Each of the three offences was carefully premeditated; each of them was associated with the other for the purposes of Schedule 21; all were aggravated by each of the other two. The offences were not only premeditated, they required careful planning. The motivation was racial and sexual prejudice. The judge found that there was an additional sadistic motive.
18. In the light of Schedule 21, on any view, this case amply justified the imposition of a whole life order. We note, as did Burton J, and give full weight to the views expressed by the Recorder of London and the Lord Chief Justice in relation to the tariff when they made their recommendations to the Home Secretary. However, they did not fix the minimum term to be served, and the appellant knew perfectly well that the minimum term was yet to be fixed.
19. We have examined the provisions of paragraph 4 of Schedule 22, which deals with the way in which the court should approach mandatory life sentences and the assessment of the minimum term in transitional cases, of which this is one; and we have also reflected on paragraph 10 of Schedule 22, which requires the court not to make an order which would exceed the order that the Secretary of State would have been likely to notify as the appropriate fixed period. We have examined the decision of this court in Sullivan [2005] 1 Cr App R(S) 67, and in particular the entries at pages 325 and 329, reinforced by the schedule which has been prepared for the purposes of this case, from which it is plain that at the time with which we are concerned the Home Secretary was likely to fix minimum terms at significantly longer periods than the judicial recommendations in the most serious cases, of which this is undoubtedly one.
20. It is accepted by Mr George QC, in a careful submission on behalf of the appellant, that a whole life tariff as the starting point in the assessment of the sentence was appropriate. That was a realistic concession. However, he has drawn our attention to two features of the case for which, he suggests, no sufficient allowance was made by Burton J in reaching his conclusion. They are the appellant's mental disorder, his comparative youth (22 at the time when these offences were committed), and his lack of convictions for violence.
21. We have studied the medical evidence with which we have been provided. We have noted that the jury was not satisfied that the appellant's mental responsibility for his actions was sufficiently diminished for the purposes of the defence of diminished responsibility. We have reminded ourselves that there will be occasions when it will be a mitigating feature of the case that an offender suffered from mental disorder or mental disability which did not fall within the defence of diminished responsibility, provided that that mental disorder lowered his degree of culpability. We have examined the papers in the light of that consideration. We cannot find that the appellant's culpability was in any way reduced by the schizophrenia from which he suffered. He was a highly dangerous man who knew exactly what he intended to do and he carried it through to its horrific conclusions. As we have noted in narrating the facts, the third attack was deliberately brought forward to avoid capture before the objective was finally achieved.
22. As to Mr George's second submission, it is clear that Burton J addressed the appellant's youth at the date of the offence. He expressly came to the conclusion that he should reduce the sentence from the whole life term, which would otherwise be appropriate, to allow for this feature of the case. The allowance that he made in our judgment was sufficient.
23. In these circumstances we have come to the conclusion that the appeal must be dismissed.

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