Neutral Citation Number: [2011] EWCA Crim 767
Case No: 201003617 B1 
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION 
Royal Courts of Justice
Strand
London, WC2A 2LL 

Date: Tuesday, 15th March 2011

B e f o r e:

LORD JUSTICE AIKENS 

MR JUSTICE KEITH 
 
MRS JUSTICE THIRLWALL DBE 
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R E G I N A 

v 

CHRISTOPHER PAUL LONG
 
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Mr M Turner appeared on behalf of the Appellant

Mr S Brady appeared on behalf of the Crown 
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J U D G M E N T 

1.	LORD JUSTICE AIKENS:  This is an appeal against conviction by Christopher Long.  It is made with the leave of the single judge.  On 9th July 2010, before His Honour Judge Greenwood and a jury in the Crown Court at Harrow, the appellant was convicted of entering into or being concerned with a money laundering arrangement contrary to section 328(1) of the Proceeds of Crime Act 2002.  He was sentenced to 18 months' imprisonment.  The appellant was also sentenced for a Bail Act offence to which he had pleaded guilty.  His total term of imprisonment was 20 months less 111 days spent on remand which the judge ordered to count towards sentence.  The appeal relates only to the conviction on the money laundering offence.
2.	The facts giving rise to the charge are as follows: in January 2009 an 82‑year old man, Mr White, arranged for Mr Phillip Carey, of Town and Country Tree Care, to do work in Mr White's garden at a price of £500.  The work was done by Mr Carey's men on 28th and 29th January 2009.  Then a man arrived at Mr White's house asking for payment.  Mr White gave the man a signed and dated cheque which left blank the amount to be paid and the name of the payee, although it must have been obvious that Mr White was expecting it to be filled in for payment of £500 in favour of Mr Carey's firm.  Then, on 30th January 2009, Mr Carey himself arrived at Mr White's house seeking payment.  Mr White said that he had already given a cheque to someone from Mr Carey's firm called "Tony", but Mr Carey said that he had not sent anyone around to get payment and did not employ anyone called Tony.  Mr Carey doubled checked with his staff.  Mr Carey then notified the police of what had occurred.
3.	Subsequently the cheque was paid into a branch of Lloyds TSB.  It had been completed in the name of "C.Long".  In late January 2009 the appellant's account with Lloyds TSB was credited with the sum of £12,000, which sum was at the same time debited from Mr White's account.  That sum was then withdrawn from Mr Long's account in nine amounts of £1,200, that being the maximum amount that the appellant was permitted to withdraw from his account in one day.  Then smaller amounts were withdrawn until there was only £8.88 remaining in the appellant's account by 17th February 2009.  
4.	The appellant was arrested and interviewed.  In the interview the appellant gave an account that he had in the past allowed people from Ireland who lived in his road to cash cheques using his bank account because, he said, being from Ireland they had no UK bank accounts to use.  He said he had thought nothing of this.  He agreed that he had previously paid into his account cheques for £10,000, £19,500 and £7,000 in similar circumstances.  He said that he had repaid the money to those who had asked him to pay any cheques into his account and he had made no financial gain from the arrangements, although he had hoped, as an unemployed person, to get some work in return.
5.	The appellant accepted in interview that he had paid the cheque which was made out to C.Long for £12,000 into his bank account.  He described how and where he had paid the cheque and described the van used by the man who had requested that he do it, who was called John Reggie.  The appellant said that the bank clerk had asked for proof of where the money had come from and he had given the bank clerk an invoice which had been given to him by the person who had asked him to bank the cheque.  The invoice was made out by "T&M Contractors", which was not the name of Mr Carey's firm.
6.	At the trial the prosecution case was that the appellant had allowed his bank account to be used to bank the cheque and then he had given the proceeds to others, all knowing or suspecting that this facilitated the acquisition of criminal property, viz the proceeds of a fraud on Mr White by other persons.  The prosecution accepted that the appellant was not a party to the original fraud on Mr White.
7.	The defence case was that the appellant had cashed the cheque on behalf of acquaintances from Ireland that he knew did not have bank accounts in the UK.  The appellant's case was that he had assumed that this had been obtained through a legitimate business as gardeners or roofers.  The appellant had cashed cheques for these people on numerous occasions and would not have done this if the money had been obtained through fraud.  The appellant's case was that he had not benefited financially from the arrangement but, as in previous instances, had hoped to receive work in return.
8.	On the second day of the trial, after the transcripts of the interview of the appellant, including all the questions and answers about other amounts paid into his bank account, had been put before the jury as part of the prosecution case, the judge heard submissions on whether or not further evidence concerning those previous banking transactions should go before the jury.  As we understand it, the defence wanted this material to go before the jury, but wished to know the basis upon which that would be done.  
9.	In his ruling on the issue, the judge noted that the Crown were not alleging that there had been any misconduct by the appellant in respect of those previous transactions.  The judge also noted that counsel for the appellant had said that if that was the Crown's stance, he would say nothing more.  The judge then said at page 4E‑G of his ruling:
"In my judgment, this evidence is relevant and admissible to go to knowledge and suspicion at the relevant time.  In other words, the fact that he had earlier cashed cheques in large amounts is a matter the jury are entitled to know about and consider when dealing with the question of whether, or that the Crown has proved that in relation to this payment in, he knew or suspected that it was criminal property."
10.	The judge also ruled that neither party had contended that those other payments in amounted to "bad character" evidence.  That is obviously so as it was not suggested, let alone proved, that they had involved any kind of misconduct on the part of the appellant.  However, the judge said that even if the evidence did amount to evidence of bad character, he would have admitted it, although his reason for saying that he would have been so is obscure.  
11.	The material therefore went before the jury.  As we understand it, it went before the jury as part of the prosecution case.  
12.	The appellant did not give evidence.  
13.	In his summing‑up the judge went through the interview evidence, including the questions and answers on the other transactions, in some considerable detail.  The judge also went through in detail the bank statements that were before the jury concerning the payment in and payments out concerning the sums of £10,000, £19,500 and £7,000.  
14.	The judge told the jury, at page 27C of the transcript of his summing‑up, that it was a matter for them to consider the evidence in relation to the other transactions and "to consider the pattern, the differing pattern of where the monies go in relation to these differing transactions".  Thereafter the judge carried on reciting in detail from the transcript of the interview of the appellant.  The judge's recital of the interview evidence continues until page 44E of the transcript of the summing‑up.  He then dealt with the cross‑examination of the officer in the case who had conducted the interviews.
15.	When the single judge granted leave, he said at paragraph 4 of his reasons:
"The reasonably arguable ground of appeal is that the judge did not anywhere in the summing‑up clearly spell out what the defence really was, namely that you did not know or suspect any illegality.  The fact that the case against you was strong, and probably even stronger because you did not give evidence, arguably made it even more important that the judge did, at least once in his summing‑up, summarise the defence and in doing so at least mention that there was no evidence before the jury that the earlier transactions were criminal."
16.	It seems to us that there are in fact two connected limbs to this ground of appeal.  The first is that the judge did not either in his ruling or at any stage properly identify why the evidence relating to the previous transactions involving £10,000, £19,500 and £7,000 was before the jury at all.  The Crown did not assert that those were money laundering exercises in which the appellant had facilitated the acquisition of criminal property by others by banking cheques and then giving others cash from his account.  So the transactions had no relevance at all to the prosecution's case.  The defence was content to let the material go before the jury as evidence that the appellant had performed this kind of service for others before, and, as the prosecution was obliged to accept, those transactions had not been tainted in any way.  Therefore, the argument must have run, there was no reason for the appellant to think that the position was any different when he was asked to bank and repay in cash the cheque for £12,000.  
17.	That leads on to the second limb of the ground of appeal.  The judge does not, at any point in his summing‑up, tell the jury why they are being invited to consider these transactions at all.  Nor was the process of it being introduced to the jury explained to them.  As we have said, this material was introduced apparently as part of the prosecution case.  The judge does not say that the Crown accepted that these previous transactions were not money laundering transactions.  Nor did he say that the Crown accepted that in relation to them there was no question that the appellant was guilty of being a party to a money laundering offence.  Nor does the judge explain to the jury that the only reason that those transactions were before them was because it was the appellant's case that he had often banked cheques for others and then repaid them in cash and that here were three examples which the Crown accepted did not involve any criminal activity on the part of the appellant.  Nor did the judge say that the jury might regard that as relevant to the appellant's case that, as with the earlier transactions, he had no reason to know or suspect that the request was to facilitate money laundering.  
18.	In our view, if this evidence of the previous transactions was to be before the jury at all, then they had to be told in clear terms why they were being asked to consider it.  Without clear directions upon the lines we have set out above, the jury might simply have thought that they were all evidence that the appellant had engaged in facilitating money laundering before and that the previous transactions was therefore evidence against him, which helped them to decide that the appellant must have known or suspected that the banking of the cheque for £12,000 was facilitating money laundering.  
19.	As the single judge pointed out, the fact that the appellant did not give evidence made it all the more important that the judge should explain the relevance of the previous transactions.  Furthermore, we note that the judge did not either give a good or a bad character direction.  That, in our view, made it all the more important to explain to the jury precisely why they were looking at those previous transactions.
20.	For these reasons, we think that this conviction was unsafe and that the appeal must be allowed.
21.	MR BRADY:  My Lord, I wonder if I may have seven days to consider the question of applying for a re‑trial.  I have not been able to confirm ‑‑ I am told that Mr Long has in fact served his sentence. 
22.	LORD JUSTICE AIKENS:  So we understand. 
23.	MR BRADY:  My Lords, I had not been able to confirm that officially, but if that is the position then of course the question does not arise. 
24.	LORD JUSTICE AIKENS:  I do not think there is any question of a re‑trial in this case, Mr Brady.  Thank you.