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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Lawson & Anor, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 198 (23 January 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/198.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 198

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		23 January 2025

MR JUSTICE LAVENDER:

1. Fortune Lawson renews his applications for an extension of the time for appealing and, if the extension of time is granted, for leave to appeal against his conviction on 27 April 2023 in the Crown Court at Cardiff on two counts of kidnapping, three counts of false imprisonment and one count of blackmail. Gideon Lawson renews his applications for an extension of the time for appealing and, if the extension of time is granted, for leave to appeal against the total sentence of an extended determinate sentence of 15 years, with a custodial term of 12 years' imprisonment and an extended licence period of 3 years, imposed on him in the same court on 27 October 2023 for the same six offences of which he had been convicted on 26 June 2023.
2. On 15 November 2018 Fortune Lawson, and others who have not been identified, kidnapped Mohammed Saroya in London ("the London incident"). Fortune Lawson was arrested on 27 March 2019 and answered "no comment" to all of the questions put to him in his police interview. He did not admit his guilt until 16 October 2023, when he pleaded guilty in the Crown Court at Cardiff to one count of kidnapping and one count of false imprisonment arising out of the London incident.
3. On 11 December 2020 Ledio Ibrahimi was kidnapped in Cardiff and falsely imprisoned in a property there. Halim Vladi was also falsely imprisoned in the same property in Cardiff. Mr Ibrahimi was subsequently taken to an address in Hemel Hempstead and held there until the police arrived. Including Fortune and Gideon Lawson, nine defendants have been convicted of offences arising out of this incident ("the Cardiff incident") on some or all of the six counts on which Fortune and Gideon Lawson have been convicted. Fortune Lawson is alleged to have been the ringleader. He is the only defendant who seeks to appeal his conviction.
4. Both incidents were instances of kidnapping for the purposes of extorting money. The counts arising out of the two incidents were originally the subject of two separate indictments. The Crown applied for the indictments to be joined and Fortune Lawson, who was the only defendant named in both indictments, applied for the counts relating to the London incident ("the London counts") to be severed. On 13 August 2021 the Recorder of Cardiff, Her Honour Judge Lloyd-Clarke, refused the severance application.
5. A trial began in March 2022, but the jury were discharged, largely as a result of issues relating to the pandemic. The Crown applied for the indictment to be severed so that there would be two trials, with those defendants who included Gideon Lawson, who did not dispute that Mr Ibrahimi had been kidnapped, being tried after the other defendants, who included Fortune Lawson. He renewed his application for the severance of the London counts. On 8 September 2022 His Honour Judge Williams dismissed the renewed application for severance.
6. The retrial of Fortune Lawson and others, before His Honour Judge Williams, began in January 2023, and so far as he was concerned, resulted in his conviction by the jury on 27 April 2023 on six counts relating to the Cardiff incident, but the jury were unable to agree on verdicts on the London counts.
7. The second retrial of Gideon Lawson and others began in May 2023 and resulted, so far as Gideon Lawson was concerned, in his conviction by the jury on 26 June 2023 on the same six counts as Fortune Lawson.
8. The retrial of Fortune Lawson on the London counts was due to start on 16 October 2023, but, as we have said, he pleaded guilty on that day to kidnapping and falsely imprisoning Mr Saroya.
9. On 27 October 2023 His Honour Judge Williams sentenced Fortune and Gideon Lawson and seven others. The documents before the court included a letter from Fortune Lawson in which he said, amongst other things:

"Upon having time out from the vacuum of life, I am now man enough to acknowledge my wrongdoings and unimaginable discomfort my complainants may have experienced. Nobody deserved that, and I only ask that I can be granted an opportunity to personally give each of them my sincere apology."

10. There was no evidence before this court from Fortune Lawson in relation to this letter and Mr Bertham, who represents him today, had no instructions from his client in relation to it. The most that he could submit to us was that we could infer that his client was not telling the truth to the sentencing judge when he admitted his guilt. In our judgment, there is no basis on which we could draw that inference.
11. The extensions of time sought by Fortune and Gideon Lawson are short (12 days and 3 days, respectively) and explanations have been provided for the delay. We have considered it appropriate to focus on the merits of the proposed appeals.
12. We start with Fortune Lawson's proposed appeal against conviction. Two proposed grounds of appeal are advanced on this renewed application. The first concerns the decisions not to sever the London counts. The second concerns certain of the judge's directions to the jury. We observe at the outset, however, that the proposed appeal faces a considerable hurdle by reason of Fortune Lawson's admission of his guilt in his letter to the judge. Having admitted his guilt, it is difficult for him to say that this conviction was unsafe.
13. In relation to severance, rule 3.29(4) of the Criminal Procedure Rules provides as follows:

"Where the same indictment charges more than one offence, the court may exercise its power to order separate trials of those offences if of the opinion that—

(a) the defendant otherwise may be prejudiced or embarrassed in his or her defence (for example, where the offences to be tried together are neither founded on the same facts nor form or are part of a series of offences of the same or a similar character); or

(b) for any other reason it is desirable that the defendant should be tried separately for any one or more of those offences."

14. The Crown submitted that the London incident and the Cardiff incident formed a series of offences of the same or similar character, that the evidence of the London incident would be admissible as bad character evidence at the trial of Fortune Lawson on the counts relating to the Cardiff incident ("the Cardiff counts") and that there was no reason why he should be tried separately on the two sets of counts. The Crown listed the following similarities between the two incidents. The Crown's case was that in both cases Fortune Lawson used his previous contact with the victim to execute the kidnap through fraud. Fortune Lawson was known by the victim as "Millz". It was a gang offence, with Fortune Lawson orchestrating the roles of a number of participants. The victim was taken to another location and was subjected to violence, threats of violence and torture. There was the threat or use of dogs to intimidate the victim into submission. The victim was threatened with lethal weapons. Associates of the victim were contacted by the victim to make arrangements for the collection of the ransom by the gang.
15. Against that, it was submitted on behalf of Fortune Lawson that the two incidents were separated by two years, they took place in very different locations, the victims were different and Fortune Lawson's defences in each case were different. He denied participation in the London incident and the issue was therefore one of identification in relation to the London counts, whereas he admitted participation in the Cardiff incident, but asserted that it had not been a kidnapping at all, but an event staged with the co-operation of Mr Ibrahimi to give the impression of a kidnapping to assist Mr Ibrahimi in his dealings with a drugs associate to whom he owed money.
16. Accordingly, it was submitted that there was an insufficient nexus between the two incidents and that Fortune Lawson would be prejudiced in his defence to each set of counts. It was also submitted that the trial of the London counts would add unjustifiably to the length and complexity of the trial of the Cardiff counts. Neither Her Honour Judge Lloyd-Clarke nor His Honour Judge Williams accepted those submissions. It is submitted before us that no reasonable judge could have refused the severance application. In our judgment that submission is unarguable. It is clear that there was a sufficient nexus between the two incidents to justify trying the two sets of counts together. This is plainly demonstrated by the fact that the judge gave a cross-admissibility direction to the jury, to which no objection is made. Reliance is placed on the fact that that direction was given on the basis of rebuttal of coincidence and not also on the basis of propensity, but that is of no consequence. The cross-admissibility direction demonstrates that evidence relating to the London incident was admissible at the trial of the Cardiff counts.
17. Insofar as it was contended that without severance the trial would be unwieldy, the decision by both judges to reject that contention was a case management decision, with which this court will be reluctant to interfere. There is no good reason for doing so in the present case.
18. Reliance is also placed on the fact that the jury were unable to return verdicts on the London counts, but that merely demonstrates that the jury were able to follow the directions which they were given and to consider each count separately.
19. We turn now to the proposed challenges to His Honour Judge Williams's legal directions, of which there are three. The first is that the judge did not direct the jury that they must not convict Fortune Lawson wholly or mainly on the strength of any similarity between the London and Cardiff cases. That is not a direction which the judge was obliged to give in the context of a cross-admissibility direction based on coincidence, but not on propensity.
20. The second aspect of the legal directions which is complained of is that the judge did not remind the jury of some of the reasons given by Fortune Lawson in evidence for his failure to mention in his defence statements matters which he relied on at trial and that the judge did not direct the jury that they should not convict him wholly or mainly on the basis of his failure to mention those matters in his defence statements. The judge said that he would deal in his summing-up with the reasons given by Fortune Lawson for failing to mention matters in his defence statements and that is what the judge did. The judge ought to have directed the jury, but did not direct the jury, presumably as a result of an oversight, that they should not convict Fortune Lawson wholly or mainly on the basis of his failure to mention in his defence statements matters which he relied on at trial. However, it is not arguable that that omission rendered Fortune Lawson's conviction unsafe, given both the large amount of evidence against him and his own admission of guilt in his letter to the judge.
21. Thirdly, it is submitted that the judge was wrong not to direct the jury not to allow emotion to influence their verdicts, especially having regard to the nature of the evidence as summarised by the judge as to the nature of the injuries inflicted on the victims and the victims' fear and other emotions during their experiences. The Crown Court Compendium states in paragraph 5(9) of chapter 4 that such a direction should be given if appropriate and that it may be particularly appropriate in sexual cases. Many judges would have given such a direction in the present case, but we do not consider that the fact that such a direction was not given rendered Fortune Lawson's conviction unsafe. In reaching this conclusion, we have had regard not merely to the body of evidence against him and his admission of guilt in his letter to the judge, but also to the fact that the injuries inflicted in the London incident, which included pouring boiling water on Mr Saroya's lap, were much more serious and distressing than those inflicted in the Cardiff incident, yet the jury did not convict Fortune Lawson on the London counts.
22. We turn now to Gideon Lawson's application for leave to appeal against sentence. He was convicted of: two counts of kidnapping Mr Ibrahimi, reflecting Mr Ibrahimi's initial abduction in Cardiff and his subsequent removal to Hemel Hempstead; two corresponding counts of falsely imprisoning Mr Ibrahimi; one count of falsely imprisoning Mr Vladi; and one count of blackmail for the purpose of obtaining money from Mr Ibrahimi. For each of the counts of kidnapping and falsely imprisoning Mr Ibrahimi, the judge imposed on Gideon Lawson a concurrent, extended sentence of 15 years, consisting of a custodial term of 12 years and extended licence period of 3 years. Concurrent sentences of 7 years' and 9 years' imprisonment were imposed for the counts of falsely imprisoning Mr Vladi and blackmail. The sentences imposed on the other defendants were similar in structure. Fortune Lawson and two others, David Assadpour and Micaiah Marley, were described by the Crown as level 1 offenders. Fortune Lawson received the longest sentence because his offending included the London counts. The judge said that the custodial term of his sentence for the Cardiff counts alone would have been 16 years. The custodial term of the sentences imposed on each of Mr Assadpour and Mr Marley was 15 years.
23. Gideon Lawson was one of three defendants who were described as level 2 offenders. The other two were Arnold Fumumeya and Alexis Mutesa, who each received an extended determinate sentence with a custodial term of 13 years and an extended licence period of 3 years.
24. Gideon Lawson was the youngest of the defendants. He was 21 at the time of the Cardiff incident. He had been convicted of seven offences, the last of which was committed in 2017, but he had never before received a custodial sentence. When interviewed for the purposes of the pre-sentence report, Gideon Lawson denied his guilt of any of the offences of which he had been convicted. The author of the pre-sentence report expressed the opinion that, due to the nature of this conviction, Gideon Lawson was assessed as posing a high risk of causing serious harm to unknown members of the public in the future.
25. There are two proposed grounds of appeal. The first is that there was disparity in the sentence which Gideon Lawson received. It is submitted that a greater distinction should have been made between the level 1 and level 2 offenders and between Gideon Lawson and the other level 2 offenders, Mr Fumumeya and Mr Mutesa. Particular reliance is placed on the fact that there was no evidence that Gideon Lawson was personally involved in transporting Mr Ibrahimi to Hemel Hempstead or attended the property in Hemel Hempstead where Mr Ibrahimi was imprisoned.
26. The second proposed ground of appeal is that the judge erred in concluding that Gideon Lawson was a dangerous offender. It is submitted that too much weight was placed on the pre-sentence report, which itself contained two material factual inaccuracies, namely, one, that he had driven to Bristol during the kidnap offences, when in fact, once he returned to London, that was where he remained, and two, that he had been placed into care at the age of nine because he had harmed his younger brother, when in fact he was the youngest sibling and the one who had been harmed on that occasion. In addition, it is submitted that insufficient weight was given to the factors which indicated that he was not a dangerous offender, namely the probation risk assessments in relation to future offending, his lack of previous convictions, his young age, his compliance with bail conditions and his settled family life.
27. In refusing permission to appeal, the single judge said as follows:

"You were a member of the team providing what the prosecution described as 'the muscle' in the carrying out of serious crimes of gang violence. At one stage, you were part of a group of men armed with a gun and a knife lying in wait for your victims.

The judge, having sat on the lengthy trial, was in by far the best position to judge the level of your culpability and the harm caused. No complaint is made of the fact that you were placed in level 2, and it was a matter of evaluative judgment as to where within that level your offending should fall. Taken in isolation your sentence was not manifestly excessive.

The next matter to consider is whether right-thinking members of the public would think that you would have a legitimate sense of grievance arising from the sentences of your co-defendants. In giving consideration to that principle, it must be balanced against the proposition that an appellant cannot justifiably complain if a co-offender fortuitously receives a more lenient sentence.

Sentencing in a case such as this is not an exercise in accountancy. The factors in your favour were reflected in the one-year deduction made by the judge. No right-thinking member of the public would consider that this was inadequate to the extent of engendering a legitimate sense of grievance on your part.

The inaccuracies relied upon in the pre-sentence report relied upon are not of sufficient significance as to detract from the author's conclusion on the issue of dangerousness. The nature of your offending in the context of sophisticated gang violence was quite sufficient to enable the judge to conclude that dangerousness was made out. The 'weight' to be given to the other factors relied upon is very much a matter for the assessment of the judge and will not be lightly interfered with on appeal.

Whether taken singly or together, the grounds do not make out a case for suggesting that the sentence was manifestly excessive."

28. We have carefully considered the proposed grounds of appeal for ourselves and we have done so in the light of the attractive submissions made today by Miss Williams on behalf of Gideon Lawson, but we have come firmly to the conclusion that we agree with the single judge that, for the reasons which he gave, it is not arguable that Gideon Lawson's sentence was either manifestly excessive or wrong in principle.
29. For the reasons which we have given, we dismiss the applications made by both applicants.