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	England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions
You are here: BAILII >> Databases >> England and Wales Court of Appeal (Criminal Division) Decisions >> Rycroft, R. v [2025] EWCA Crim 231 (19 February 2025) URL: http://www.bailii.org/ew/cases/EWCA/Crim/2025/231.html Cite as: [2025] EWCA Crim 231

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IN THE COURT OF APPEAL
CRIMINAL DIVISION
ON APPEAL FROM THE CROWN COURT AT LEEDS
HHJ KHOKHAR 13KD0019623 & 13KD0293823

		Royal Courts of Justice Strand London WC2A 2LL
		19 February 2025

MR JUSTICE DOVE:

1. The provisions of the Sexual Offences (Amendment) Act 1992 apply to this offence. Under those provisions, where a sexual offence has been committed against a person, no matter relating to that person shall, during that person's lifetime, be included in any publication if it is likely to lead members of the public to identify that person as the victim of that offence. This prohibition applies unless waived or lifted in accordance with section 3 of the 1992 Act.
2. On 25 January 2024, the applicant was convicted of ten counts of sexual offences which we have detailed so far as necessary below. On 27 September 2024, the applicant was sentenced to a special custodial sentence of 23 years, for an offender of particular concern, pursuant to section 278 of the Sentencing Act 2020, comprised of a custodial term of 22 years and a further 1-year licence period. He was sentenced to a restraining order until further order and a sexual harm prevention order also until further order. The applicant renews his application for permission to appeal following the refusal of this application by the single judge on the papers.
3. The facts of the offences were as follows. The offending occurred against two young girls. The first of these girls (who we shall refer as "C1") was aged between 6 and 9 when the offending occurred. The second of these girls (who we shall refer to as "C2") was aged between 9 and 10 at the time of the offending. The mother of C1 was in a relationship with the applicant from around 2017. They had two children together, who were very young at the time of these offences. C1 would stay over with the applicant and her mother on one evening during the week and over the course of alternative weekends.
4. The sexual abuse of C1 began at the end of July 2019, at around the time that the applicant's son broke his collarbone. On the first occasion the applicant touched C1's vagina over her clothing, which was charged as count 1, and digitally penetrated her vagina, charged as count 2. The abuse continued regularly until 1 October 2022. During this period the applicant was aged 38-41 years old.
5. Counts 3 and 7 charged the applicant with oral rape - count 7 being a multiple-incident count of not less than three further occasions beyond count 3. Counts 4 and 5 were related to allegations of the applicant kissing C1. Count 6 was a further multiple-incident count of penetration of C1's vagina by the applicant with his fingers. Counts 8 and 9 charged the applicant with penetrating C1's vagina with a vibrating object. Count 9, being a multiple-incident count representing not less than three further occasions when this occurred. The applicant threatened to hurt C1 if she made any disclosure to anyone. The abuse only came to an end when the relationship between the applicant and C1's mother finished. Thereafter, in early November 2022, C1 disclosed the abuse to a schoolteacher and the police became involved.
6. In May 2022, the applicant met the mother of C2 in a public house and they commenced a sexual relationship. C2 and her mother would stay over at the applicant's caravan. On an occasion between January 2022 and March 2023, the applicant penetrated C2's vagina with his fingers. This was charged as count 10. On 16 February 2023, C2 disclosed to her social worker that the applicant had touched the very top of her leg. Thereafter, on 26 June 2023, C2 disclosed the incident of penetration to a schoolteacher. The police then became involved.
7. In support of their case, the prosecution relied upon the evidence of C1 together with her parents and the evidence of her deputy headteacher. They also relied upon the evidence of C2 along with the evidence of C2's mother, a social worker and her schoolteacher. Other documentary material was adduced to illustrate the case.
8. The applicant's defence was one of complete denial of all the offending. He gave evidence and maintained that the allegations had been fabricated by the complainants either alone or with the assistance of their mothers. He contended that he was never alone in the house with C1 and that his employment meant that he was out working at all times. On one occasion, C1 had walked in on him in the bathroom when he was naked and this might explain why she was able to accurately describe his penis. C1's mother had threatened to destroy his life when their relationship ended, including stopping him seeing his children and destroying his business. The applicant contended that C2 had only stayed at his caravan possibly twice and that he had had little, if any, interaction with C2. He had never been alone with her. Her mother threatened to report him to the police and demanded money from him. The applicant's father gave evidence in support of his defence, saying that when the applicant's son had broken his collarbone, he had taken the applicant's son and C1's mother to hospital but had not seen the applicant's daughter or C1 at the property, this being relevant to the time when it was the prosecution's case that the sexual abuse of C1 had commenced. He had seen C2's mother on a few occasions but did not believe she was in a sexual relationship with the applicant.
9. The applicant's application for leave to appeal is presented on a number of grounds. The first ground is that the judge erred in permitting a jury member to continue to serve in circumstances where he had said that he could not do the case as a result of having been the subject of sexual abuse himself. In the light of this revelation, it is submitted that the juror should not have been allowed to continue to serve and that he would have had an influence on other members of the jury and he should have been discharged. The second ground is that evidence was available from the applicant's mother to prove that the complainant's mothers knew one another despite the court being under the impression that they did not. The applicant's mother was not called and she could have assisted with this point. The third ground relates to criticisms of the applicant's legal representatives who he contends did not properly take instructions from him or challenge witnesses when they were inconsistent or embellished their accounts. The fourth ground is the applicant contends that during the prosecution closing speech, it was said that the prosecution had no evidence against him and that some of the pictures relied upon had no relevance to him. The fifth ground is that the jury were misled that screenshots of travel from the applicant's address were taken from his phone when in fact they were taken from the phone of C2's mother. The sixth ground is that the applicant's solicitors failed to request text messages and phone contacts from the relevant witnesses.

Finally, in ground 7, the applicant submits that during the course of the prosecution closing, they indicated that they had no evidence in relation to some of the charges of which he was convicted.

10. The applicant has also submitted a witness statement from his mother as fresh evidence to be considered in the case on appeal, in which the applicant's mother states that in a conversation around Christmas time in 2022, the mother of C1 stated that the applicant was innocent and that C1's evidence arose as she had overheard another child talking about sexual abuse. The applicant's mother also states that in May 2023, the mother of C2 visited her home and stated that police had told her the applicant had put his hand on C2's leg but this was not classed as sexual abuse. At the time of her visit the mother of C2 was drunk and indicated that she was in contact with the mother of C1.
11. As a consequence of the applicant's criticisms of his representatives, their views have been sought in respect of these allegations. His former solicitors reject the suggestion that they were inattentive to his instructions or inquiries after he had been convicted. This however is not central to the grounds of appeal that are advanced by the applicant. The response of counsel instructed at trial is directed to the grounds of appeal. Having noted the numerous occasions when counsel had conferences with the applicant prior to and during the trial, counsel observes that the applicant had no criticism or complaint of the way in which he was represented during the course of the trial. Counsel records the incidents in relation to the juror but takes the view that the judge's decision in relation to this issue could not be faulted. So far as text messages between the mothers of the two complainants are concerned, counsel notes that she was not made aware of the existence of any such messages and indeed her instructing solicitor had informed her that, having made inquiries of the applicant's mother and father, they had nothing to add of any use in relation to these issues. This position was reinforced by the contact which counsel had with the applicant's parents at trial and the scope of the evidence of the applicant's father when he gave evidence, which was limited to the time when the youngest child of the family was taken to hospital. Counsel notes the suggestion there is evidence that the mother of C2 visited the applicant's home in May 2023 to admit she was in contact with the mother of C1 but this did not accord with the contents of the applicant father's evidence to the jury and was unsupported by any material in counsel's instructions. Counsel had put to the mother of C2 that she had communicated with the mother of C1 and that was denied and thereafter there was no material to pursue the point available.
12. The grounds of appeal upon which this application is based were comprehensively addressed by the single judge in refusing leave to appeal. We endorse his reasons and are unable to identify any arguable basis upon which leave to appeal could be granted. Whilst much of the correspondence from the applicant during the course of the appeal relates to his complaints about his former solicitors, as noted above, they are of little relevance to the grounds which are advanced. They take the applicant's case no further forward.
13. We turn to the grounds in detail. We have considered the circumstances relating to the juror indicating to the judge that he was not able to do the case. Quite correctly the judge did not take that simply at face value but made the perfectly proper inquiry as to whether or not the juror considered that he would be able to remain loyal to his oath and try the case on the basis of the evidence presented to the trial. The juror confirmed that he would be able to remain loyal to his oath and was in fact concerned as to whether or not, in the light of the fact that he was a survivor of sexual abuse, he might be affected by hearing the evidence in the trial. The judge's approach indicating that he should continue to serve as a juror was one which was clearly reasonable and proportionate in the circumstances. We can see no arguable error in the approach which the judge took.
14. Turning to the ground 2, we have no reason to question the information provided by trial counsel that there was no material capable of being deployed in the course of testing the evidence, to suggest that the mothers of the complainants were in contact with one another. In so far as this issue is addressed in the witness statement provided by the applicant's mother, it is clear that such evidence could have been available but was not given at the trial. In the course of her observations, trial counsel has advised that the applicant's mother was unwilling, in any event, to give evidence in the applicant's defence at his trial. We note, as the single judge observed, that the evidence contained in the applicant's mother's witness statement has little bearing in relation to the merits of the charges which he faced. There is therefore no proper basis for that material to be adduced in the context of this appeal. This ground is therefore without merit and unarguable.
15. The suggestion in ground 3 that the applicant's legal representatives failed to properly take his instructions in conducting the trial and failed to challenge the prosecution evidence appropriately, is one which we are entirely unwilling to accept. Firstly, the account provided by trial counsel clearly articulates the care and attention which she devoted to taking the applicant's instructions and presenting his case to the jury to the best advantage. Secondly, we have reviewed the judge's summing-up and it is clear that in his account of the evidence the judge reflects the conflicts in the evidence which were addressed by counsel in the course of cross-examination. This ground is therefore unarguable. Equally unarguable is the suggestion that during the prosecution's closing speech, it was conceded that there was no evidence against the applicant. Having reviewed the transcript of the closing speech to the jury by the prosecution, it is clear that no such concession was made and in fact a robust case was advanced in support of the applicant's conviction on all counts.
16. Our review of the transcript of the prosecution's closing also demonstrates that there is no substance whatsoever in ground 7. Apart from offering no evidence in relation to some charges, the prosecution presented a compelling case that the evidence of both of the complainants should be accepted by the jury and the applicant convicted on all counts.
17. Turning to ground 5 and the suggestion that the jury were misled in relation to screenshots which were from C2's mother's phone but which the jury were led to believe were from the applicant's phone, in common with the single judge, we are unable to identify how, if it all, they featured in the judge's careful and thorough summing-up of the relevant evidence in the applicant's case. This point is not capable therefore of making any material difference to the merits of the applicant's case and adds nothing to his application for leave to appeal. Ground 5 is therefore unarguable.
18. Ground 6, the complaint that further text messages and contact ought to have been obtained is unsupported by any evidence to suggest that disclosure by the prosecution in this case was incomplete or that trial counsel had any basis to submit that further disclosure was required in the interests of justice.
19. Having reviewed all of the grounds of appeal advanced by the applicant in renewing his application for leave to appeal, as set out above, we are entirely satisfied that the conclusions reached by the single judge were entirely apt. In reality, the prosecution presented a strong case, supported by a significant volume of evidence. Notwithstanding the endeavour of the applicant's representatives and in particular the work of trial counsel, the applicant was convicted by the jury in circumstances which do not give rise to any proper suggestion that there was any error of law in the trial process. This application must therefore be refused.